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PART XIII.

CATHOLIC POLICY.

IN a former Number we laid before our readers some general views on the Theory of Party. We pointed out the dangers and evils which must always follow the attempt to construct a separate Catholic party without any connection with either of the great political parties which alternately govern the country.

Nothing, however, was further from our intention than to deny that Catholics had peculiar interests which they were bound to defend, and that the only condition on which sincere Catholics could act with any party was, that a fair consideration should be given to those interests. If a party is composed of several of those subdivisions to which we referred, a systematic neglect of any one of those subdivisions imposes upon it the duty of vindicating its rights; and it may be forced into a course of conduct calculated for the moment to weaken, or even to overthrow, the party with which it generally acts.

It would be manifestly absurd for the representatives of any large section of electors to enter into combinations from which the views of those electors were excluded; and, as generosity is not the distinguishing characteristic of political parties, such weak and tame submission would be infallibly followed by permanent ostracism.

A leader of a party has difficulties enough to contend with. He has a number of earnest yet sometimes diverging convictions to fuse together into one whole by compromise; and if he found any considerable section ready to follow him

at any price,—docile when disregarded, and, like the ancient cavaliers,

“True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shined upon,”—

he would rejoice at having one difficulty the less in his course, and would continue to disregard those whose *souple* submission had shown him that he might disregard them with impunity. We need not say, therefore, that we have seen without pain the demonstrations hostile to the present government made on a remarkable and critical occasion last year, and continued during the present session, by many of the most influential and most sincerely liberal Catholics in the House of Commons; and, much as we should regret to see the Tory party restored to power, we consider, upon the whole, that their temporary occupancy of the Treasury benches would be a lesser evil than the tame submission of an influential portion of the liberal party to insult and to ostracism. Thus much, to prevent any misconception of our views, we have thought it necessary to say, by way of preface to the question which we now propose to discuss.

We should rejoice to see the Catholics of these kingdoms acting, as they used to act, in combination with that party which upon the whole is most prepared to give effect to the principles involved in the passing of the Emancipation Act; and just in proportion as we should object to their being leagued together in a separate faction, is our desire that, in the difficult times on which we are now entering, their influence should not be frittered away by any difference of opinion as to which party most demands their independent allegiance. In times such as these united and energetic action is necessary. In the face of the events which in rapid succession are subverting the ancient European system, those miserable quarrels and petty piques which have divided us ought to be forgotten.

At best we are a minority, weak in numbers, weaker in influence; a minority that was called into political existence only thirty years ago. We are always in the face of active and unsleeping as well as unscrupulous foes. Forgetful of the lessons which the history of 1800 years teaches, for the hundredth time the song of triumph is raised, and they begin to ring again the knell of the old faith. We know that the passion will once again, as it has been a hundred times before, be followed by a glorious resurrection; but faith is not fatalism, and we must rely on our own energies, and use the means which Providence provides for us, just as if

there were no promise of invincibility to the see and to the faith of Peter. We doubt not that the Catholics of these kingdoms will thus act, and our object now is, by a careful investigation of the causes which have produced our present divisions, to facilitate their removal. If the truth must be told, the main cause of the secession that has lately taken place from those serried ranks which won, under a great leader, the battle of Emancipation, is to be found in the anti-Irish spirit which pervades a portion, small but influential, of the English Catholics. We do not speak of fine ladies or fine gentlemen who lisp their contempt of every thing Irish, still less do we care to mention those humbler votaries of fashion who vindicate their gentility by denying their country; they are a great deal more contemptible themselves, and infinitely more culpable, than the poor Pats and Mikes who, on their arrival in England, attempt to disguise a nationality which their speech betrays, by assuming Saxon Christian names. But putting aside these not very numerous, and certainly not very influential, classes, we admit with pain that among the best and most earnest Catholics on this side of the water are to be found some who have their eyes so exclusively occupied by the scene before them, that they forget their Irish brethren, and act and feel as if no part of the United Kingdom but their own had any claim on their regard; but they are few. It was, we believe, Mr. O'Connell who said that the English Catholics have in their days of power been as oppressive and as contemptuous of the Irish as the English Protestants have since been, and that there still remains in the minds of some of the former as bitter a hostility as ever to the Irish. These expressions are too strong; but we put it to our readers whether they have not at least some foundation in fact; and the natural result of such feelings is to look upon the Irish as a race so difficult to understand,—so little governed by English common sense,—that it is useless to try to comprehend their grievances, and hopeless to attempt to redress them. Admit these premises, and the conclusion is not illogical. Isolate England from Ireland, admit that English Catholic interests are alone to be considered, and we freely grant that the importance of party questions is much diminished. Looking from an exclusively English point of view at the parties which contend for power, we can understand a preference for Lord Derby to any liberal leader. The Tories are weak and therefore civil; they have to make their characters with Catholics; the liberal party is too apt to live on the memory of former services. At this moment its chief, like an attorney-general

who anticipates a speedy and secure refuge on the bench, evidently considers that his government can be made to last for his time without Catholic support, and with unbridled tongue exults in a foreign policy which his opponents silently approve. His warmest English supporters are to be found among the ranks of those Dissenters whose bigoted hatred of Catholicism takes the most offensive shape. Lord Shaftesbury and the Protestant Alliance forgive his heresies on the subject of original sin, in consideration for the mitres distributed among their followers; and the gloomy constellation of North Warwickshire shines approbation on the liberal statesman who has handed over Mr. Turnbull to the Protestant lions. Such shameless abnegation of former principles naturally and properly excites our indignation. We are a small minority in England; the dominance of the Established Church does not wound our pride. Protestant officials of all descriptions administer the affairs of the country, because the vast majority of the country is Protestant. We may sigh after the times when these things were otherwise; but in a Protestant country we cannot repine at Protestant ascendancy.

Such is the position of English Catholics—citizens of a Protestant state—not, indeed, what they were when Edmund Burke said of them, that they were enough to torment, but not enough to fear—rescued from that position mainly by Irish influence. We have no political position; our social grievances are great. Those who ran wild about the young Mortara, have no mercy on our children, and rear them up as Protestants in their workhouses. Every obstacle is put in the way of the priest who desires to move our Catholic prisoners to repentance; but the Tory party is at least as willing to remedy these grievances as the Liberals are. In Ireland the Catholics are the nation. To every privilege which rightly belongs to the members of the Established Church in England they are by the strictest rules of justice entitled. Until a time within the memory of young men—until Lord Normanby's vice-royalty—they were dominated over by a small and foreign sect, and excluded from almost every privilege and every influence in the land of their birth.

“In that country,” to use the words of Sir Robert Peel, “there exist two religious establishments—two coextensive hierarchies; the one sedulously affecting, the other legally possessing, the same dignities, titles, and spiritual authorities: the former superintending the religious concerns of the great majority of the people, not endowed, indeed, not encouraged, by the State, but exercising over the minds of its

adherents, from the very nature of its doctrines and the solemnity of its ceremonies, an almost unbounded influence; the other, the Church of the minority, splendidly endowed, no doubt, but endowed with the temporalities which once belonged to its excluded but aspiring rival."

This Church is the symbol and the effect of an odious ascendancy. In Irish parishes the Protestant minister has glebe and church provided for him. He has large revenues. The pastor of the Catholic majority has no revenue except what he derives from the voluntary alms of the people. When he is appointed to a parish, he has, as best he may, to hire a residence, to build and repair his church, without the assistance of one shilling from any public fund. Well might Lord Macaulay say that England and Scotland are one because their churches are two, and England and Ireland are two because their churches are one. But the Protestants of Ireland are not contented with ecclesiastical, they insist also on civil ascendancy. They insist on the right which a prescription of two centuries has given them to administer the whole of the affairs of the country, political as well as social. Alien in feeling no less than in creed from the majority among whom they live, they consider every Catholic appointment to every office an encroachment on their rights. Italians had a far larger share in the government of their own country by Austria, Poles have infinitely more political power in Poland, than Irish Catholics in Ireland under a Tory government. Not one single Catholic during the last two periods when they held office received any part in the administration of the country. To the question proposed by Sir Robert Peel they have a ready answer. He said: "Do you mean *bonâ fide* to give the Catholics the practical advantages of the eligibility you propose to confer upon them? Do you mean to give them that fair proportion of political power to which their numbers, wealth, talents, and education, will entitle them?" By the mouth of their Irish supporters, by their own conduct, by the rigid rule of exclusion from which they have never even for an instant varied, every successive Tory government have answered, 'No.' Wiser than their forefathers, they have offered some tempting material baits: they have dangled packet-stations and railroads before the eyes of Ireland.

They have said, 'All these things will we give thee,' but they have sternly and unwaveringly attached the condition, that from every sort of political weight, influence, and

authority, the Catholic majority must consent to be excluded in the land of their birth. An Irish Tory Catholic—if, with the exception of Mr. Hennessy, such an extraordinary phenomenon exists—deliberately by his acts adopts the whole system. He may bring forward measures inconsistent with these views as a private member of Parliament. The Tory party allow him to do so, because they know he cannot pass them. He may skirmish as a free lance on behalf of Catholic interests; but when the pitched battle comes,—when the question arises, who is to govern the country, who is to make and administer the laws,—he must fight under the banner of Protestant ascendancy; and his only fruitful acts are those by which he excludes every one of his coreligionists from having any share of political power. The effect of his act is felt through every fibre of the political frame—the Orange squireen, the docile policeman aspiring to promotion, the freeman of Dublin. Look at them when the news comes that a Tory majority has placed a Tory government in office; see their dilated eyes, their greetings in the streets, their exultation; they feel that they are now the government of Ireland—that the whole force of the executive is behind them to back them. They unlearn those lessons of liberality which they had awkwardly endeavoured to recite, and that which Elie de Beaumont describes as the worst curse of Ireland, the *mauvaise aristocratie*, reigns supreme. Would any English Protestant, we don't say promote, but even submit to such a system for himself? Would he support, if by his support he were to gain any amount of material prosperity, a government which treated him as the Tory party treat the Irish Catholics? And can English Catholics be justified, for the sake of any advantages—admitting, for the sake of argument, that there are advantages—which a Tory government may offer them, to subject the people who won Emancipation for them to such degrading and odious helotism? At all events, any one who thinks otherwise must abandon all hopes of Catholic union. He cannot expect the Irish nation to sign the decree for its own political annihilation.

With them politics are no question of abstract speculation. They care perhaps too little for the doctrines of the Whigs or the doctrines of the Tories. Reform, or free-trade, or even, in ordinary times, foreign policy, are overshadowed in their minds by the—to them—vital question whether Ireland is to be governed by the representatives of the Irish nation, or by the representatives of the Protestant squire-

archy; and any lukewarmness on their parts in late party struggles has been caused, not by any vacillation in their convictions, but by the degree in which the present prime minister has himself vacillated in carrying out the tradition of his present party at home, and by his utter abnegation, in his foreign policy, of every one of those principles which all parties in this country have hitherto considered sacred, and which, so long as the English people retain the love of justice, the manly instincts, and the generosity which have hitherto distinguished them, will, except when religious prejudice blinds them, be the distinguishing characteristics of their policy abroad.

Look at what has just happened in the House of Commons. Our readers no doubt remember the Orange demonstrations which took place in the north of Ireland last July: Orange flags were hoisted on the Protestant churches; one of her Majesty's judges, who is a Catholic, was insulted by the Orange grand jury of the county of Fermanagh; some Orangemen marching in illegal procession in the neighbourhood of Lurgan fired upon an unarmed body of Catholics, one of whom was killed, and several others were grievously wounded. The effect produced on the public mind was such, that a new law as to party demonstrations, opposed by a considerable section of the Tory party, was passed through Parliament. On the spot vigorous measures to discover the murderers were adopted; informations were sworn against several of the Orangemen; they were committed for trial, and at the spring assizes Mr. O'Hagan, the Irish Attorney-General proceeded to Armagh to conduct the prosecution. Three cases were tried, with extreme moderation and exemplary fairness on the part of the crown; and the Attorney-General gave a precedent of vast importance to all who may succeed him in the conduct of political trials in Ireland, for he directed that partisanship and prejudice only, and not religious opinion, should exclude men from the jury. In the two first cases, the prisoners having challenged every Catholic, Protestants exclusively were impaneled; and on the third, a misdemeanour case, there was a mixed jury—eight Catholics and four Protestants. The first and the third juries convicted; the second gave a verdict of acquittal. The Orangemen were in consternation. Forthwith they assailed the prosecution and the Attorney-General with an outrageous malignity and audacity of falsehood which have had no parallel in our time. They howled like baffled fiends about the packing of the jury! *They*, whose settled practice it had been never to

permit one Catholic to sit upon a jury for the trial of a Catholic when it could possibly be prevented ;—*they*, who tried Daniel O'Connell by twelve Protestants seventeen years ago, and with a desperate consistency of action, on their last advent to power, tried Daniel Sullivan, the young "Phoenix" prisoner of Kerry, also a Catholic, by twelve Protestants, every Catholic, however high his station or pure his character, being deliberately driven from the box ;—*they*, who have repeated this operation of wrong and insult until it has become too familiar to Irishmen to stir their wonder, though it has not ceased to move them to indignation ;—*they* dared to assail a Catholic attorney-general because he would not permit Orange partisans to try an Orangeman charged with an Orange murder. They got two exclusively Protestant juries and a mixed jury ; they *never* have given a Catholic jury, and rarely a mixed jury, to a Catholic in any political case. Yet they had the impudence to rave and roar as if they had suffered injury. To them mere justice, simple fair play, wears the show of oppression, because for generations they have had license to tyrannise and trample down their fellow-beings, and interference with the precious privilege is utterly intolerable to them. So they attacked the Catholic Attorney-General as not even Plunkett was attacked, when he ventured to do his duty and encounter them forty years ago in Dublin. They manufactured lies ; they charged the suppression of proof, and the withholding of witnesses, and official partiality, without the shadow of evidence ; and they went on, day after day and week after week, scattering the "poison-spume" of their rancour through all their organs, with an unconquerable malice which made them wholly reckless of exposure and refutation.

We venture to say that there is no one whose character stands higher with all classes and creeds than Mr. O'Hagan. He is not only a great orator and an accomplished scholar, but his scrupulous justice and his tolerant spirit have won for him the love and the approbation, often recorded in public documents, of those who most widely differ from him in religion and in politics ; but he is a Catholic,—the culprit was an Orangeman. The Orange feeling of Ireland was roused just as in the southern states of America the indignation of the slave-owners will be roused if—the blacks having been placed by the law on an equality with the whites—a black attorney-general ever prosecutes to conviction a white criminal.

How did this indignation find a voice in the House of

Commons? Where did outraged Protestant ascendancy find advocates there? Was it Mr. Spooner, or Mr. Newdegate, or that new and fitting antagonist of Maynooth, Mr. Whalley, who was chosen for the purpose? No; Sir Hugh Cairns, the late English Solicitor-General, and Mr. Whiteside, late Irish Attorney-General, were the two men to whom was intrusted the task of impugning the conduct of the Queen's law-officer, and of vindicating for Orange delinquents a virtual impunity from the terrors of the law.

Some fourteen Orangemen were found guilty at Armagh. One of them, convicted of manslaughter by an exclusively Protestant jury, escaped, we believe, from some doubt expressed by the judge who tried him as to the effect of evidence which happened to be given on a subsequent trial. The executive acted according to usage on the suggestion of the judge. And there was great jubilation amongst the Orangemen; their rancour was intensified instead of being subdued, and they raved for the destruction of the Attorney-General. The whole of the incidents of this transaction, to which we cannot more fully advert, are frightfully illustrative of the unchanged ferocity of this terrible faction, and of their resolution, so far as they have power, to deal with the Catholic people as insolently and as barbarously as in the darkest period of the penal times.

We have dwelt on this matter at so much length because we think that it brings out in the clearest light the point we are insisting on,—the ingrained, ineradicable conviction of the Tory leaders, that whatever the Act of Emancipation may have done as to the law in fact, Protestants and Catholics are not, and ought not to be, treated as equals. They are ready to rule us as kind masters, but masters they are determined to be.

Mr. Whiteside has often said in the House of Commons, "I don't know how things are looked upon in the rest of Ireland; I know the opinion of Ulster." Ulster is his Ireland and that of his party; the rest of Ireland is a conquered province, to be treated generously, kindly, even liberally, but to be kept in subjection. This is well understood in Ireland. Hence her influence has maintained the liberal party in power perhaps for the greater part of the last thirty years. But if the Irish Catholics never can be supporters of Tory rule, are they bound to support Lord Palmerston's government? must they be either Derbyites or Palmerstonians? Nothing can be more absurd, more contrary to reason, more unsustained by parliamentary precedent, than such a view. When

Lord John Russell turned out Lord Palmerston from his government, did Lord Palmerston join the Tories? Far from it. He took a line of his own, and, with the assistance of Tory votes, he overthrew Lord John's government. When the Manchester party were disgusted by the exclusiveness and nepotism of Lord Palmerston's administration, did they inscribe Church and Queen upon their banners, and join that Tory party whose principles were far more opposed to theirs than the principles of the existing government were? Nothing of the sort. They took an independent line, watched their opportunity, and drove Lord Palmerston from office. We could multiply instances of a similar line of conduct. The two we have mentioned are, however, sufficient for our present purpose; and be it observed, that in both these instances the result aimed at by the actors was obtained. Lord Palmerston wished for revenge; he certainly had no intention of joining the Tories, or of spending the rest of his life in opposition. After a short Tory administration he came into power himself as prime minister, and he humiliated his rival. In the case of the Manchester party, within a few months a new liberal government was formed, in the constitution and direction of which they had their fair share of influence.

It is true that in each of these cases Lord Derby was given a short possession of power; but after all, in this country, no government can long remain in office that does not represent popular opinion. If the popular opinion had been with the Tories, they would have gained and kept power without the intervention of Lord Palmerston at the one period, or of the Manchester party at the other. As the popular opinion was liberal, the Tories were not able to maintain the position they had accidentally gained.

That policy, therefore, which recommends itself not only to the instinct of the great mass of the Catholics of the United Kingdom, but also to the deliberate convictions of the deepest thinkers among them, involves no abandonment of liberal principles, and no defection from the liberal party. They may turn out the government over which Lord Palmerston and Lord John preside, but they will not become Tories. It would be madness on our parts to establish Orange ascendancy because for a moment, under the influence of politico-religious excitement, the party with which we have been identified has been untrue to its principles. Let us not undo the work of O'Connell, and bind round our neck and kiss those chains which he struck off from the necks of

our forefathers, because a statesman who never sacrificed once in the course of his long life his own interest to any principle, sees us weak from division, and, thinking that he can do without us, insults us in order to conciliate our enemies; but, on the other hand, let us not submit to outrage or to insult from those whose battles we have fought, and whose victories without our sacrifices could never have been achieved.

The leaders of Catholic opinion in the county of Cork have recently set us a good example. Mr. Baron Deasy, after having through their influence represented the county for a long time, thought fit to insult them, and to proclaim that his party could do without them. An election came on; they stood aloof, and the liberal party was ignominiously defeated. We doubt not that this salutary lesson has already purged the mental error of Mr. Deasy's friends, and made them forget those vows made at ease, as violent as void.—A similar process on a wider amphitheatre will produce a similar effect on the leaders of the liberal party. We regret, as much as any one can do, the necessity of giving them such a lesson, but that necessity under existing circumstances is imperative. Nothing, however, can be further from our intention than to maintain that we ourselves are not in a large degree responsible for the unfortunate position in which we are now placed; on the contrary, we believe that the insolence of those few among us who are *Veneziani e poi Cattolici*—first Whigs and then Catholics, the absolute ignoring of the convictions of one-fourth of her Majesty's subjects by Lord John's foreign policy, the exclusion of Catholics from every position of influence or authority,—all these injuries and all these insults would never have been possible if it had not been for our own disunion. No party, we may be quite sure, will deal justly by us from any exuberance of affection for us. It is quite true that the Tories are faithful, and the Liberals unfaithful to their principles when they wrong us. Carry out the principles of the one party to their logical results, and we have all we ask for or desire—liberty; a clear stage, and no favour; absolute and entire equality, civil and religious; in foreign affairs *bonâ-fide* non-intervention. Tory principles, on the other hand, involve privilege—exceptional favour towards the Established Church. Church and king is the idea on which the one party subsists, civil and religious liberty, the very life-blood of the other; the reason for which it exists, and the negation of which would make it cease to exist. A very slight consideration of these simple truths will show how utterly absurd is the view of those who say, How can Catholics

support the party which represents the Dissenters, and oppose that which represents the Established Church, when the former sect is much more anti-Catholic than the latter? As politicians we have nothing to say to the theological opinions of either. The interests of the Established Church are bound up with privilege, therefore they refuse to treat us as their equals. The interests of the Dissenters are against privilege, and therefore in favour of the entire equality of all. The one invoke the assistance of the State to maintain their preëminence, the other deprecate all State interference in religious matters, because, where the State does interfere, it necessarily interferes against them. This is obviously true, but parties are not governed by logic, but by interest, and often by prejudice. Politicians instinctively dislike any real spiritual power, and therefore they dislike us. They find us an obstacle in their way. Mr. Fox's dictum, that "power is the only security for political liberty," is therefore especially applicable to us. We have influence when we have power. Every government will neglect and ill-treat us if it dare. Individuals there are—we rejoice to believe that there are many such—who wish to treat us fairly simply from a love of justice. We could mention not a few names of strong Protestants who have sacrificed every thing they most prized rather than consent to violate in our regard the principles of civil and religious liberty. But certainly the age of party chivalry is gone. We see before our eyes the Conservative party afraid to protest against a revolutionary foreign policy, because they believe it to be popular; among them, at the present crisis, the principles of Edmund Burke have not found a single exponent, and those who call themselves the disciples of Mr. Pitt have looked on in ignominious silence while the Government has stamped with its approbation acts from which the truthful English spirit of Mr. Fox, even in the excitement of the first French revolution, would have revolted from as base and would have condemned as anarchical. As to the Government, *il n'y a personne qui change si souvent d'idées fixes*—in other words, they have no *idées fixes* at all. Talk of Abbé Sièyes constitutions, all ticketed and all ready for every emergency, why in the Foreign Office there is a whole repository of contradictory principles,—some for the Ionian Islands, some for Turkey, some for Rome,—ready to be applied, as the occasion may demand, to every possible combination of circumstances.

In the East the remnant of those Christian races which have not yet been massacred by the Sultan's troops, cry out for emancipation from the Turkish yoke. Lord John

Russell and Lord Palmerston declare that the integrity of the Turkish empire must be maintained at any price. In Italy, according to them, the popular will is to override every law. Within the last few weeks Mr. Gladstone expressed his astonishment at any one daring to invoke the principles of international law in behalf of King Francis II., the son of that sovereign who had broken the solemn oath by which he had engaged to give a constitution to his subjects.

That same Mr. Gladstone had, in 1850 (the sovereign who, as he alleges—into the truth of the assertion we don't enter—had thus absolved his subjects from their allegiance by his perjury then reigning), declared that “the more we may be tempted to sympathise with Sicily, the less we admire Neapolitan institutions and usages of government, the more tenacious, as he contended, we should be of our duty to do them full justice, the more careful that we do not, because we differ from them, impair, in their case, the application of those great and sacred principles that govern and harmonise the intercourse between states, and from which you can never depart without producing mischiefs by the violation of the rule a thousandfold greater than any benefit you may promise yourself to achieve in the special instance.”

About the same time Lords Palmerston and John Russell were emphatic in their declarations that the temporal power of the Pope—which they now proclaim to be a nuisance which must be abated—ought to be maintained. Are we wrong in believing that men who enunciate such opposite principles have no principles at all? God help us if we have nothing more firm or stable to rest upon than their moral convictions! We console ourselves by meditating on the elasticity of their consciences. They profess to look upon the Pope's weakness as a proof that it is God's will that His temporal power should be abolished, and that the oldest throne in Europe should be overthrown. Depend upon it, if we regain our natural strength and power, they will perceive in that fact a providential intimation that our feelings ought no longer to be wounded, and that a just weight should be given to us in the councils of the empire. They will reverently bow their heads and carry out the divine decree, if the doing so appears to be the only means of preventing the faithful from languishing in opposition while the impious Tory crew possess the earth. As to that question which most occupies now the thoughts and wounds the hearts of

Catholics, as to the insults and injuries which our Holy Father so meekly endures, it was Lord Derby's government that first proposed to despoil him of a portion of his states, and the present government has bettered their example; but neither the one nor the other cabinet would have dared thus to act if there had been sixty or seventy Catholic representatives, party men, as others are in ordinary times, bound together in a vigorous union in sight of a great emergency, ready to avenge any insult offered to their religion or its earthly chief. Such a body would have been able to insist on the only thing that they could reasonably ask for in a country where they are a minority, real non-intervention, perfect and scrupulous neutrality.

There are some among the Catholics of these kingdoms who turn, through indolence or through disdain, from political strife, and inquire what advantages the great mass of Catholics have gained from their admission to political power, and from the sacrifices they have made in electoral strifes.

No doubt they have often been deceived by those who sought their suffrages. Personal ambition has put on the mask of patriotism, and vows to defend religion or to promote social improvement have resulted in the selfish abandonment of both.

Such deception and such perjury there will always be. The histories of all parties and of all countries are full of them. But who ever thinks of renouncing marriage because some wives have been unfaithful, or of not settling his property because some trustees have been robbers? It is sometimes asked, by those who point to the miseries and religious persecutions to which the Catholic poor are subjected, what has been gained by Emancipation for any except the few who have seats in either house of Parliament, and those friends or followers for whom they have procured places? Such an objection goes very deep. It strikes at the very root of political liberty, and resolves the question of constitutions and forms of government into the consideration of material well-being. Food and lodging satisfy brutes. It makes no difference to the animal creation of Warsaw or of Bulgaria what flag floats over the habitations of their masters; but those masters consider that man does not live by bread alone, and the poorest peasant among them is ready to risk his little all for his religion and his country.

But is it true that, judging even by this low material standard, the few only among the Catholics have been benefited by a participation in political power? Has the magic

touch of liberty had no effect in elevating, not only our moral, but also our social position? Is ours the only country in which the struggle of life is not carried on more successfully by freemen than by serfs? There is not one town in England with a large Catholic population, there is not one county or town in Ireland, in which not only churches, and convents, and schools have not sprung up since 1829, but also Catholics have not risen in the social scale,—emerging from that dead level of degradation and of inferiority in which a long night of slavery had enveloped them, acquiring property and habits of self-respect and self-reliance, and successfully asserting their equality with the Protestants around them. Such transformations are not accomplished in a moment. The habits and demeanour burnt in by long ages of ill-treatment, require more than one generation to be eradicated. All we ask is, that any one through whose mind have passed timid and desponding thoughts should open his eyes. Let him look upon the position of Catholics now, and let him compare it with their position when O'Connell won the battle of Emancipation. Any one who, in 1829, had drawn a picture of us as we now are, and had said, 'Such will be Catholic power and Catholic social influence thirty years hence,' would have been looked upon as a vain dreamer. No faith in the vivifying power of liberty could have anticipated for us any approximation to the reality. We have the power in our own hands. We may continue to increase in strength, and we may win back much of which our ancestors were violently deprived. Upon the other hand, we may abandon the struggle like spoiled children, because we do not obtain all we want, or consider ourselves entitled to, at once, and we may relapse into obscurity and impotence. In our hands the future position of the Catholic Church in these countries, under God, is placed. Every one on whom the franchise has been conferred has had a duty imposed on him for the exercise of which he is responsible. We may, if we please, sacrifice our rights. No man, without sin, can decline to perform a duty: God has placed in the hands of almost every one of our readers a portion of the power which rules this mighty realm. We cannot consent to be as foreigners, enjoying the material advantages, but not controlling the destinies of our native land; nor are our duties and our responsibilities confined even within its limits. The whole civilised world is now as it were one vast assembly,—“the parliament of men, the federation of the world,”—in which the voice and the influence of the statesman affects not his own country only, but the welfare of the whole. Lord Palmerston the other

day, at Tiverton, said that England had changed the fate of Italy, although not a single English soldier had taken part in the Italian struggle, and he and Cavour and Mazzini understand this well. If the confederation of revolution and impiety is widely spread, and acts together as if moved by one soul, and by its baneful influence perplexes nations; if

“the ark of God is in the field,
And all around the alien armies sweep,”

are not those who are the enemies of anarchy, and the friends of social order and of true liberty, to band themselves together also, to be as active and as energetic for good as their adversaries are for evil? In every age there is a tendency to exaggerate the relative importance of its own trials and difficulties. We cannot, however, believe that we exaggerate when we say, that not for centuries has there been a crisis so pregnant with good or with evil, with blessing or with cursing, as the present. Never were the confines of good and of evil more clearly defined. Never were there such world-wide combinations. The conflict is not confined to any one country. It is no mere skirmish; the battle-field is the whole world, and the engagement reaches along the whole line. The importance of the issue to be decided it is impossible to exaggerate, or even completely to realise. Is the Church to be free, or is the State to be absolute? Is the law of God to be trammelled, modified, adapted to the will or the caprice of man, or is it to have free course? Is right or is might to be the arbiter of nations? In one word, is the world to progress and to develop according to the Christian idea, or is it to relapse into pagan habits of thought? In the presence of such momentous issues, can we refuse to make great sacrifices,—sacrifices of ease, of quiet, of peculiar views, of resentments, of party interests? If such sacrifices were never more required, never, we rejoice to believe, were they, if generously made, more certain to be rewarded with victory, because, never since the day of Pentecost, were the children of the Church more entirely of one mind. We have no secret enemies in our own bosoms; the enemy is before us.

We have no right to dictate to any one. We have no jurisdiction even over those who do us the favour to peruse our pages. We can appeal only to their reason and their consciences. To reason and to conscience we do appeal. We appeal through them to the Catholics of these kingdoms not to neutralise one another's efforts by intestine division; to forget past differences, and injuries, and disappointments; above all, to banish national prejudices, and to resolve, in

their own stations, at any cost to play their part worthily in a united effort to vindicate for themselves that amount of influence in the direction of public affairs to which, by their intelligence and their numbers, they are justly entitled.

By so acting in their own parishes, or towns, or counties, or in the larger sphere of public life, they will contribute in the most effectual manner their aid throughout the world to that sacred cause which, under circumstances far more difficult than ours, has rallied round it the best men in all nations, and upon which the benediction rests of our Sovereign Pontiff, the representative of that law whose seat is the bosom of God, and whose voice is the harmony of the world.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

AT the time of the utmost degradation of the Athenian democracy, when the commanders at Arginusæ were condemned by an unconstitutional decree, and Socrates alone upheld the sanctity of the law, the people, says Xenophon, cried out that it was monstrous to prevent them from doing whatever they pleased.* A few years later the archonship of Euclides witnessed the restoration of the old constitution, by which the liberty, though not the power, of Athens was revived and prolonged for ages; and the palladium of the new settlement was the provision that no decree of the council or of the people should be permitted to overrule any existing law.†

The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the sovereignty of the people, depends on the choice it makes between these opposite principles, absolute power on the one hand, and on the other, the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition. It must stand or fall according to its choice, whether to give the supremacy to the law or to the will of the people; whether to constitute a moral association maintained by duty, or a physical one kept together by force. Republics offer, in this respect, a strict analogy with monarchies, which are also either absolute or organic, either governed by law, and therefore constitutional, or by a will which, being the source, cannot be the object of laws,

* Τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεῦνδν εἶναι εἰ μὴ τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται. Hellen. i. 7, 12.

† Ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μῆτε βουλῆς μῆτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. Andocides de Myst. Or. Att., ed. Dobson i. 259.

and is therefore despotic. But in their mode of growth, in the direction in which they gravitate, they are directly contrary to each other. Democracy tends naturally to realise its principle, the sovereignty of the people, and to remove all limits and conditions of its exercise; whilst monarchy tends to surround itself with such conditions. In one instance force yields to right; in the other might prevails over law. The resistance of the king is gradually overcome by those who resist and seek to share his power; in a democracy the power is already in the hands of those who seek to subvert and to abolish the law. The process of subversion is consequently irresistible, and far more rapid.

They differ, therefore, not only in the direction, but in the principle of their development. The organisation of a constitutional monarchy is the work of opposing powers, interests, and opinions, by which the monarch is deprived of his exclusive authority, and the throne is surrounded with and guarded by political institutions. In a purely popular government this antagonism of forces does not exist, for all power is united in the same sovereign; subject and citizen are one, and there is no external power that can enforce the surrender of a part of the supreme authority, or establish a security against its abuse. The elements of organisation are wanting. If not obtained at starting, they will not naturally spring up. They have no germs in the system. Hence monarchy grows more free, in obedience to the laws of its existence, whilst democracy becomes more arbitrary. The people is induced less easily than the king to abdicate the plenitude of its power, because it has not only the right of might on its side, but that which comes from possession, and the absence of a prior claimant. The only antagonism that can arise is that of contending parties and interests in the sovereign community, the condition of whose existence is that it should be homogeneous. These separate interests can protect themselves only by setting bounds to the power of the majority; and to this the majority cannot be compelled, or consistently persuaded, to consent. It would be a surrender of the direct authority of the people, and of the principle that in every political community authority must be commensurate with power.

“*Infirma minoris*

Vox cedat numeri, parvaque in parte quiescat.”

“*La pluralité,*” says Pascal, “*est la meilleure voie, parce qu’elle est visible, et qu’elle a la force pour se faire obéir; cependant c’est l’avis des moins habiles.*” The minority can

have no permanent security against the oppression of preponderating numbers, or against the government which these numbers control, and the moment will inevitably come when separation will be preferred to submission. When the classes which compose the majority and the minority are not defined with local distinctness, but are mingled together throughout the country, the remedy is found in emigration ; and it was thus that many of the ancient Mediterranean states, and some of the chief American colonies, took their rise. But when the opposite interests are grouped together, so as to be separated not only politically but geographically, there will ensue a territorial disruption of the state, developed with a rapidity and certainty proportioned to the degree of local corporate organisation that exists in the community. It cannot, in the long-run, be prevented by the majority, which is made up of many future, contingent minorities, all secretly sympathising with the seceders because they foresee a similar danger for themselves, and unwilling to compel them to remain, because they dread to perpetuate the tyranny of majorities. The strict principle of popular sovereignty must therefore lead to the destruction of the state that adopts it, unless it sacrifices itself by concession.

The greatest of all modern republics has given the most complete example of the truth of this law. The dispute between absolute and limited power, between centralisation and self-government, has been, like that between privilege and prerogative in England, the substance of the constitutional history of the United States. This is the argument which confers on the whole period that intervenes between the convention of 1787 and the election of Mr. Davis in 1861 an almost epic unity. It is this problem that has supplied the impulse to the political progress of the United States, that underlies all the great questions that have agitated the Union, and bestows on them all their constitutional importance. It has recurred in many forms, but on each occasion the solution has failed, and the decision has been avoided. Hence the American government is justly termed a system of compromises, that is to say, an inconsistent system. It is not founded, like the old governments of Europe, on tradition, nor on principles, like those which have followed the French Revolution ; but on a series of mutual concessions, and momentary suspensions of war between opposite principles, neither of which could prevail. Necessarily, as the country grew more populous, and the population more extended, as the various interests grew in

importance, and the various parties in internal strength, as new regions, contrasting with each other in all things in which the influence of nature and the condition of society bear upon political life, were formed into states, the conflict grew into vaster proportions and greater intensity, each opinion became more stubborn and unyielding, compromise was more difficult, and the peril to the Union increased.

Viewed in the light of recent events, the history of the American Republic is intelligible and singularly instructive. For the dissolution of the Union is no accidental or hasty or violent proceeding, but the normal and inevitable result of a long course of events, which trace their origin to the rise of the constitution itself. There we find the germs of the disunion that have taken seventy years to ripen, the beginning of an antagonism which constantly asserted itself and could never be reconciled, until the differences widened into a breach.

The convention which sat at Philadelphia in 1787, for the purpose of substituting a permanent constitution in the place of the confederacy, which had been formed to resist the arms of England, but which had broken down in the first years of peace, was not a very numerous body, but it included the most eminent men of America. It is astounding to observe the political wisdom, and still more the political foresight, which their deliberations exhibit. Franklin, indeed, appears to have been the only very foolish man among them, and his colleagues seem to have been aware of it. Washington presided, but he exercised very little influence upon the assembly, in which there were men who far exceeded him in intellectual power. Adams and Jefferson were in Europe, and the absence of the latter is conspicuous in the debates and in the remarkable work which issued from them. For it is a most striking thing that the views of pure democracy, which we are accustomed to associate with American politics, were almost entirely unrepresented in that convention. Far from being the product of a democratic revolution, and of an opposition to English institutions, the constitution of the United States was the result of a powerful reaction against democracy, and in favour of the traditions of the mother country. On this point nearly all the leading statesmen were agreed, and no contradiction was given to such speeches as the following. Madison said: "In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A prudent regard to the maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by experience to be as little re-

garded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals; in large numbers little is to be expected from it.”*

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, “insisting that it ought to be by the State legislatures. The people immediately should have as little to do as may be about the government.”

Mr. Gerry said: “The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. . . . He had been too republican heretofore: he was still, however, republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.” Mr. Mason “admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme.” Mr. Randolph observed “that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States laboured; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy: that some check, therefore, was to be sought for against this tendency of our governments.”†

Mr. Wilson, speaking in 1787, as if with the experience of the seventy years that followed, said, “Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes; sometimes in an executive, sometimes in a military one. Is there no danger of a legislative despotism? Theory and practice both proclaim it. If the legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability.”‡ “However the legislative power may be formed,” said Gouverneur Morris, the most conservative man in the convention, “it will, if disposed, be able to ruin the country.”§

Still stronger was the language of Alexander Hamilton: “If government is in the hands of the few, they will tyrannise over the many; if in the hands of the many, they will tyrannise over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both, and they should be separated. This separation must be permanent. Representation alone will not do; demagogues will generally prevail; and, if separated, they will need a mutual check. This check is a monarch. . . . The monarch must have proportional strength. He ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more. . . . Those who mean to form a

* Madison's Reports, 162.

† Ibid. 196.

‡ Ibid. 135, 138.

§ Ibid. 433.

solid republican government ought to proceed to the confines of another government. . . . But if we incline too much to democracy, we shall soon shoot into a monarchy.”* “He acknowledged himself not to think favourably of republican government, but addressed his remarks to those who did think favourably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their government as high as possible.”† Soon after, in the New York convention, for the adoption of the constitution, he said, “It has been observed that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny.”‡

Hamilton’s opinions were in favour of monarchy, though he despaired of introducing it into America. He constantly held up the British constitution as the only guide and model ; and Jefferson has recorded his conversations, which show how strong his convictions were. Adams had said that the English government might, if reformed, be made excellent ; Hamilton paused and said : “Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable government ; as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which ever existed.” And on another occasion he declared to Jefferson, “I own it is my own opinion that the present government is not that which will answer the ends of society, by giving stability and protection to its rights ; and that it will probably be found expedient to go into the British form.”§

In his great speech on the constitution, he spoke with equal decision : “He had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. . . . As to the executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question ? for can there be a good government without a good executive ? The English model was the only good one on this subject. . . . We ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit.”||

* Hamilton’s Works, ii. 413-417.

† Madison’s Reports, 244.

‡ Hamilton’s Works, ii. 440.

§ Rayner’s Life of Jefferson, 268, 269.

|| Madison’s Reports, 202.

Mr. Dickinson "wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,—distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible."*

Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, said, "Much has been said of the constitution of Great Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the best constitution in existence; but, at the same time, I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced into this country for many centuries."†

The question on which the founders of the constitution really differed, and which has ever since divided, and at last dissolved the Union, was to determine how far the rights of the States were merged in the federal power, and how far they retained their independence. The problem arose chiefly upon the mode in which the central Congress was to be elected. If the people voted by numbers or by electoral districts, the less populous States must entirely disappear. If the States, and not the population, were represented, the necessary unity could never be obtained, and all the evils of the old confederation would be perpetuated. "The knot," wrote Madison in 1831, "felt as the Gordian one, was the question between the larger and the smaller States, on the rule of voting."

There was a general apprehension on the part of the smaller States that they would be reduced to subjection by the rest. Not that any great specific differences separated the different States; for though the questions of the regulation of commerce and of slavery afterwards renewed the dispute, yet interests were so different from what they have since become, and so differently distributed, that there is little analogy, excepting in principle, with later contests; what was then a dispute on a general principle, has since been envenomed by the great interests and great passions which have become involved in it. South Carolina, which at that time looked forward to a rapid increase by immigration, took part with the large States on behalf of the central power; and Charles Pinckney presented a plan of a constitution which nearly resembled that which was ultimately adopted. The chief subject of discussion was the Virginia plan, presented by Edmund Randolph, in opposition to which the small State of New Jersey introduced another plan founded on the centrifugal or State-rights principle. The object of this party was to confirm the sovereignty of the several States, and to surrender as little as possible to the federal government. This feeling was expressed by Mr.

* Madison's Reports, 166.

† Ibid. 234.

Bedford : "Is there no difference of interests, no rivalry of commerce, of manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones, whenever they stand in the way of their ambitions or interested views?"*

"The State legislatures," said Colonel Mason, "ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the national government. In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with means for this purpose?"†

These speakers may have been good or bad politicians, they were certainly good prophets. They were nearly balanced in numbers, and surpassed in ability, by the centralising party. Madison, at that time under the powerful influence of Hamilton, and a federalist, but who afterwards was carried by Jefferson into the democratic camp, occupied an uncertain intermediate position. A note preserved in Washington's handwriting records : "Mr. Madison thinks an individual independence of the States utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable."‡

In convention he said : "Any government for the United States formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress."§

The consistent Federalists went farther : "Too much attachment," said Mr. Read, "is betrayed to the State governments. We must look beyond their continuance ; a national government must soon, of necessity, swallow them all up."||

Two years before the meeting of the convention, in 1785, Jay, the very type of a federalist, wrote : "It is my first wish to see the United States assume and merit the character of one great nation, whose territory is divided into different States merely for more convenient government."

Alexander Hamilton went further than all his colleagues. He had taken no part in the early debates, when he brought forward an elaborate plan of his own ; the most characteristic features of which are, that the State governments are to be altogether superseded ; their governors to be appointed by the general government, with a veto on all State laws, and the president is to hold office on good behaviour. An executive, elected for life, but personally responsible, made the

* Madison's Reports, 173.

† Ib. 170.

‡ Williams's Statesman's Manual, 268.

§ Reports, 171.

|| Ibid. 163.

nearest possible approach to an elective monarchy; and it was with a view to this all but monarchical constitution that he designed to destroy the independence of the States. This scheme was not adopted as the basis of discussion. "He has been praised," said Mr. Johnson, "by all, but supported by none." Hamilton's speech is very imperfectly reported, but his own sketch, the notes from which he spoke, are preserved, and outweigh, in depth and in originality of thought, all that we have ever heard or read of American oratory. He left Philadelphia shortly after, and continued absent many weeks; but there can be no doubt that the spirit of his speech greatly influenced the subsequent deliberations. "He was convinced," he said, "that no amendment of the confederation, leaving the States in possession of their sovereignty, could answer the purpose. . . . The general power, whatever be its form, if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. . . . They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities, he was aware, would be necessary. There must be distinct tribunals; corporations for local purposes. . . . By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the national and State legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalry of the States would gradually subvert it. . . . As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them subordinate jurisdictions."*

This policy could be justified only on the presumption that when all State authorities should disappear before a great central power, the democratic principles, against which the founders of the constitution were contending, would be entirely overcome. But in this Hamilton's hopes were not fulfilled. The democratic principles acquired new force, the spirit of the convention did not long survive, and then a strong federal authority became the greatest of all dangers to the opinions and institutions which he advocated. It became the instrument of the popular will instead of its barrier; the organ of arbitrary power instead of a security against it. There was a fundamental error and contradiction in Hamilton's system. The end at which he aimed was the best, but he sought it by means radically wrong, and necessarily ruinous to the cause they were meant to serve. In order to give to the Union the best government it could enjoy, it was necessary to destroy, or rather to ignore, the existing authorities. The people was compelled to return to

* Madison's Reports, 201, 212.

a political state of nature, irrespective of the governments it already possessed, and to assume to itself powers of which there were constituted administrators. No adaptation of existing facts to the ideal was possible. They required to be entirely sacrificed to the new design. All political rights, authorities, and powers must be restored to the masses, before such a scheme could be carried into effect. For the most conservative and anti-democratic government the most revolutionary basis was sought. These objections were urged against all plans inconsistent with the independence of the several States by Luther Martin, Attorney General for Maryland.

"He conceived," he said, "that the people of the States, having already vested their powers in their respective legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their governments. . . . To resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature; the dissolution of the State governments is involved in the nature of the process;—the people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes."* And in his report to the convention of Maryland of the proceedings out of which the constitution arose, he said: "If we, contrary to the purpose for which we were intrusted, considering ourselves as master-builders, too proud to amend our original government, should demolish it entirely, and erect a new system of our own, a short time might show the new system as defective as the old, perhaps more so. Should a convention be found necessary again, if the members thereof, acting upon the same principles, instead of amending and correcting its defects, should demolish that entirely, and bring forward a third system, that also might soon be found no better than either of the former; and thus we might always remain young in government, and always suffering the inconveniences of an incorrect imperfect system."†

It is very remarkable that, while the Federalists, headed by Hamilton and Madison, advocated, for the soundest and wisest object, opinions which have since been fatal to the Union, by furnishing the democratic party with an irresistible instrument, and consequently an irresistible temptation, Martin supported a policy in reality far more conservative, although his opinions were more revolutionary, and although he quoted as political authorities writers such as Price and Priestley. The controversy, although identical in substance

* Madison's Reports, 218, 248.

† Elliot's Debates, i. 350.

with that which has at last destroyed the Union, was so different in form, and consequently in its bearings, that the position of the contending parties became inverted as their interests or their principles predominated. The result of this great constitutional debate was, that the States were represented as units in the Senate, and the people according to numbers in the House. This was the first of the three great compromises. The others were the laws by which the regulation of commerce was made over to the central power, and the slave-trade was tolerated for only twenty years. On these two questions, the regulation of commerce and the extension of slavery, the interests afterwards grew more divided, and it is by them that the preservation of the Union has been constantly called in question. This was not felt at first, when Jay wrote "that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people ; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs."* The weakening of all these bonds of union gradually brought on the calamities which are described by Madison in another number of the same publication : " A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilised nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by common interests, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil : the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself ; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render one unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if

* *Federalist*, 2.

not impracticable. . . . In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists, in the one case, in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."* That Madison should have given so absurd a reason for security in the new constitution, can be explained only by the fact that he was writing to recommend it as it was, and had to make the best of his case. It had been Hamilton's earnest endeavour to establish that security for right which Madison considers peculiar to monarchy, an authority which should not be the organ of the majority. "'Tis essential there should be a permanent will in a community. . . . The principle chiefly intended to be established is this, that there must be a permanent will. . . . There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current."†

This is precisely what Judge Story means when he says: "I would say in a republican government the fundamental truth, that the minority have indisputable and inalienable rights; that the majority are not every thing, and the minority nothing; that the people may not do what they please."

Webster thought the same, but he took a sanguine view of actual facts when he said: "It is another principle, equally true and certain, and, according to my judgment of things, equally important, that the people often limit themselves. They set bounds to their own power. They have chosen to secure the institutions which they establish against the sudden impulses of mere majorities."‡

Channing was nearer the truth when he wrote: "The doctrine that the majority ought to govern passes with the multitude as an intuition, and they have never thought how far it is to be modified in practice, and how far the application of it ought to be controlled by other principles."§

In reality, the total absence of a provision of this kind, which should raise up a law above the arbitrary will of the people, and prevent it from being sovereign, led the greatest of the statesmen who sat in the convention to despair of the success and permanence of their work. Jefferson informs us that it was so with Washington: "Washington had not a firm confidence in the durability of our government. Washington was influenced by the belief that we must at length end in something like a British constitution."

Hamilton, who by his writings contributed more than any other man to the adoption of the constitution, declared

* *Federalist*, 10, 51. † *Works*, ii. 414, 415. ‡ *Works*, vi. 225. § *Memoir*, 417.

in the convention that "no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own," and he explained what he thought of the kind of security that had been obtained: "Gentlemen say that we need to be rescued from the democracy. But what the means proposed? A democratic Assembly is to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate."*

"A large and well-organised republic," he said, "can scarcely lose its liberty from any other cause than that of anarchy, to which a contempt of the laws is the high-road. A sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital principle, the sustaining energy of a free government. The instruments by which it must act are either the authority of the laws, or force. If the first be destroyed, the last must be substituted; and where this becomes the ordinary instrument of government, there is an end to liberty."†

His anticipations may be gathered from the following passages: "A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people, and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed constitution seems to promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether over the State governments, and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the larger States into smaller districts. If this should not be the case, in the course of a few years it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government, and the momentum of the larger States in such contests, will produce a dissolution of the Union. This, after all, seems to be the most likely result. The probable evil is, that the general government will be too dependent on the State legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious to their humours; that the States, with every power in their hands, will make encroachments on the national authority, till the Union is weakened and dissolved."‡

The result has justified the fears of Hamilton, and the course of events has been that which he predicted. Democratic opinions, which he had so earnestly combated, gained ground rapidly during the French revolutionary period. Jefferson, who, even at the time of the declaration of independence, which was his work, entertained views resembling those of Rousseau and Paine, and sought the source of freedom in the abstract rights of man, returned

* Works, ii. 415.

† Ibid. vii. 164.

‡ Ibid. ii. 421, 450.

from France with his mind full of the doctrines of equality and popular sovereignty. By the defeat of Adams in the contest for the presidency, he carried these principles to power, and altered the nature of the American government. As the Federalists interpreted and administered the constitution, under Washington and Adams, the executive was, what Hamilton intended it to be, supreme in great measure over the popular will. Against this predominance the State legislatures were the only counterpoise, and accordingly the democratic party, which was the creature of Jefferson, vehemently defended their rights as a means of giving power to the people. In apparent contradiction, but in real accordance with this, and upon the same theory of the direct sovereignty of the people, Jefferson, when he was elected president, denied the right of the States to control the action of the executive. Regarding the President as the representative and agent of a power wholly arbitrary, he admitted no limits to its exercise. He held himself bound to obey the popular will even against his own opinions, and to allow of no resistance to it. He acted as the helpless tool of the majority, and the absolute ruler of the minority, as endowed with despotic power, but without free-will.

It is of this principle of the revolution that Tocqueville says: "*Les gouvernements qu'elle a fondés sont plus fragiles, il est vrai, mais cent fois plus puissants qu'aucun de ceux qu'elle a renversés; fragiles et puissants par les mêmes causes.*"*

Hence Jefferson's determined aversion to every authority which could oppose or restrain the will of the sovereign people, especially to the State legislatures and to the judiciary. Speaking of an occasion in which the judges had acted with independence, Hildreth says: "Jefferson was not a little vexed at this proceeding, which served, indeed, to confirm his strong prejudices against judges and courts. To him, indeed, they were doubly objects of hatred, as instruments of tyranny in the hands of the Federalists, and as obstacles to himself in exercises of power."†

His views of government are contained in a paper which is printed in Rayner's life of him, p. 378: "Governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it. . . . Each generation is as independent of the one preceding as that was of all which had gone before. It has, then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive

* *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, p. 13.

† *History of the United States*, vi. 70.

of its own happiness it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this, every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the constitution. . . . The dead have no rights. . . . This corporeal globe and every thing upon it belong to its present corporeal inhabitants during their generation. . . . That majority, then, has a right to depute representatives to a convention, and to make the constitution which they think will be best for themselves. . . . Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass." With these doctrines Jefferson subverted the republicanism of America, and consequently the Republic itself.

Hildreth describes as follows the contest between the two systems, at the time of the accession of Jefferson to power, in 1801: "From the first moment that party lines had been distinctly drawn, the opposition had possessed a numerical majority, against which nothing but the superior energy, intelligence, and practical skill of the Federalists, backed by the great and venerable name and towering influence of Washington, had enabled them to maintain for eight years past an arduous and doubtful struggle. The Federal party, with Washington and Hamilton at its head, represented the experience, the prudence, the practical wisdom, the discipline, the conservative reason and instincts of the country. The opposition, headed by Jefferson, expressed its hopes, wishes, theories, many of them enthusiastic and impracticable, more especially its passions, its sympathies and antipathies, its impatience of restraint. The Federalists had their strength in those narrow districts where a concentrated population had produced and contributed to maintain that complexity of institutions, and that reverence for social order, which, in proportion as men are brought into contiguity, become more absolutely necessities of existence. The ultra-democratical ideas of the opposition prevailed in all that more extensive region in which the dispersion of population, and the despotic authority vested in individuals over families of slaves, kept society in a state of immaturity."*

Upon the principle that the majority have no duties, and the minority no rights, that it is lawful to do whatever it is possible to do, measures were to be expected which would oppress most tyrannically the rights and interests of portions of the Union, for whom there was no security and no redress. The apprehension was so great among the Federalists, that Hamilton wrote in 1804: "The ill opinion

* History of the United States, v. 414.

of Jefferson, and jealousy of the ambition of Virginia, is no inconsiderable prop of good principles in that country (New England). But these causes are leading to an opinion, that a dismemberment of the Union is expedient.”*

Jefferson had given the example of such threats, and owed his election to them during his contest for the presidency with Colonel Burr. He wrote to Monroe, 15 February 1801: “If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government into the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed the middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”

Shortly afterwards a conjuncture arose in which Jefferson put his principles into practice in such a way as greatly to increase the alarm of the North-Eastern States. In consequence of Napoleon’s Berlin decree and of the British orders in council, he determined to lay an embargo on all American vessels. He sent a pressing message to Congress, and the Senate passed the measure after a four hours’ debate with closed doors. In the House the debate was also secret, but it lasted several days, and was often prolonged far into the night, in the hope of obtaining a division. The Bill was passed December 22, 1807. The public had no voice in the matter; those whom the measure touched most nearly were taken by surprise, and a conspicuous example was given of secrecy and promptitude in a species of government which is not commonly remarkable for these qualities.

The embargo was a heavy blow to the ship-owning states of New England. The others were less affected by it. “The natural situation of this country,” says Hamilton, “seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-navigating States. The Northern are properly the navigating states; the Southern appear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. This difference in situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting foreign commerce.”†

Accordingly the law was received in those States with a storm of indignation. Quincy, of Massachusetts, declared in the House: “It would be as unreasonable to undertake to stop the rivers from running into the sea, as to keep the people of New England from the ocean. They did not believe in the constitutionality of any such law. He might be told that the courts had already settled that question.

* Works, vii. 852.

† Ibid. ii. 433.

But it was one thing to decide a question before a court of law, and another to decide it before the people.”*

Even in a juridical point of view the right to make such a law was very doubtful. Story, who first took part in public affairs on this occasion, says: “I have ever considered the embargo a measure which went to the extreme limit of constructive power under the constitution. It stands upon the extreme verge of the constitution.”†

The doctrine of State-rights, or nullification, which afterwards became so prominent in the hands of the Southern party, was distinctly enunciated on behalf of the North on this occasion. Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, summoned the legislature to meet, and in his opening address to them he took the ground that, on great emergencies, when the national legislature had been led to overstep its constitutional power, it became the right and duty of the State legislatures “to interpose their protecting shield between the rights and liberties of the people, and the assumed power of the general government.”‡

They went further, and prepared to secede from the Union, and thus gave the example which has been followed, on exactly analogous grounds, by the opposite party. Randolph warned the administration that they were treading fast in the fatal footsteps of Lord North.§

John Quincy Adams declared in Congress that there was a determination to secede. “He urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the legislature, and probably by the judiciary of the State. . . . Their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation.” Twenty years later, when Adams was President, the truth of this statement was impugned. At that time the tables had been turned, and the South was denying the right of Congress to legislate for the exclusive benefit of the North-Eastern States, whilst these were vigorously and profitably supporting the federal authorities. It was important that they should not be convicted out of their own mouths, and that the doctrine they were opposing should not be shown to have been inaugurated by themselves. Adams therefore published a statement, October 21, 1828, reiterating his original declaration. “The people were constantly instigated to forcible resistance against it, and juries after juries acquitted the violators of it, upon the ground that it was

* Hildreth, vi. 100.

† Life, i. 185.

‡ Hildreth, vi. 120.

§ Ibid. vi. 117.

unconstitutional, assumed in the face of a solemn decision of the district court of the United States. A separation of the Union was openly stimulated in the public prints, and a convention of delegates of the New-England States, to meet at New Haven, was intended and proposed." That this was true is proved by the letters of Story, written at the time. "I was well satisfied," he says, "that such a course would not and could not be borne by New England, and would bring on a direct rebellion. . . . The stories here of rebellion in Massachusetts are continually circulating. My own impressions are, that the Junto would awaken it, if they dared; but it will not do. . . . A division of the States has been meditated, but I suspect that the public pulse was not sufficiently inflamed. . . . I am sorry to perceive the spirit of disaffection in Massachusetts increasing to so high a degree; and I fear that it is stimulated by a desire, in a very few ambitious men, to dissolve the Union. . . . I have my fears when I perceive that the public prints openly advocate a resort to arms to sweep away the present embarrassments of commerce."*

It was chiefly due to the influence of Story that the embargo was at length removed, with great reluctance and disgust on the part of the President. "I ascribe all this," he says, "to one pseudo-republican, Story."† On which Story, who was justly proud of his achievement, remarks, "Pseudo-republican of course I must be, as every one was, in Mr. Jefferson's opinion, who dared to venture upon a doubt of his infallibility."‡ In reality Jefferson meant that a man was not a republican who made the interests of the minority prevail against the wish of the majority. His enthusiastic admirer, Professor Tucker, describes very justly and openly his policy in this affair. "If his perseverance in the embargo policy so long, against the wishes and interests of New England, and the mercantile community generally, may seem to afford some contradiction to the self-denying merit here claimed, the answer is, that he therein fulfilled the wishes of a large majority of the people. . . . A portion of the community here suffered an evil necessarily incident to the great merit of a republican government, that the will of the majority must prevail."§

We have seen that in the case of the embargo, as soon as this democratic theory was acted upon, it called up a corresponding claim of the right of the minority to secede, and that the democratic principle was forced to yield. But

* Life, i. 187, 191, 243, 182.

† Life, i. 185.

‡ Correspondence, iv. 148.

§ Life of Jefferson, ii. 322.

secession was not a theory of the constitution, but a remedy against a vicious theory of the constitution. A sounder theory would have avoided the absolutism of the democrats and the necessity for secession. The next great controversy was fought upon this ground. It exhibits an attempt to set up a law against the arbitrary will of the government, and to escape the tyranny of the majority, and the remedy, which was worse than the disease. An ideal of this kind had already been sketched by Hamilton. "This balance between the national and state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional limits, by a certain rivalry which will ever subsist between them."* This was also what Mr. Dickinson looked forward to when he said in the Convention of 1787: "One source of stability is the double branch of the legislature. The division of the country into distinct States forms the other principal source of stability."†

The war with England, and the long suspension of commerce which preceded it, laid the foundations of a manufacturing interest in the United States. Manufactories began to spring up in Pennsylvania, and more slowly in New England. In 1816 a tariff was introduced, bearing a slightly protective character, as it was necessary to accommodate the war prohibitions to peaceful times. It was rather intended to facilitate the period of transition than to protect the new industry; and that interest was still so feeble, and so little affected by the tariff, that Webster, who was already a representative of Massachusetts in Congress, voted against it. It was carried by the coalition of Clay with the South-Carolina statesmen, Lowndes and Calhoun, against whom this vote was afterwards a favourite weapon of attack. In the following years the increasing importance of the cultivation of cotton, and the growth of manufactures, placed the Northern and Southern interests in a new position of great divergency. Hamilton had said long before: "The difference of property is already great amongst us. Commerce and industry will still increase the disparity. Your government must meet this state of things, or combinations will, in process of time, undermine your system."‡

The New-England manufacturers were awakened to the advantage of protection for their wares. In a memorial of

* Works, ii. 444.

† Madison's Debates, 148.

‡ Elliot's Debates, i. 450.

the merchants of Salem, written by Story in 1820, he says : "Nothing can be more obvious than that many of the manufacturers and their friends are attempting, by fallacious statements, founded on an interested policy, or a misguided zeal, or very short-sighted views, to uproot some of the fundamental principles of our revenue policy. . . . If we are unwilling to receive foreign manufactures, we cannot reasonably suppose that foreign nations will receive our raw materials. . . . We cannot force them to become buyers when they are not sellers, or to consume our cotton when they cannot pay the price in their own fabrics. We may compel them to use the cotton of the West Indies, or of the Brazils, or of the East Indies." About the same time, May 20, 1820, he writes to Lord Stowell on the same subject : "We are beginning also to become a manufacturing nation ; but I am not much pleased, I am free to confess, with the efforts made to give an artificial stimulus to these establishments in our country. . . . The example of your great manufacturing cities, apparently the seats of great vices, and great political fermentations, affords no very agreeable contemplation to the statesman or the patriot, or the friend of liberty."* The manufacturers obtained a new tariff in 1824, another was carried by great majorities in 1828, and another in 1832 by a majority of two to one. It is the measure of 1828, which raised the duties on an average to nearly fifty per cent on the value of the imports, that possesses the greatest importance in a constitutional point of view. "To it," says the biographer of Mr. Calhoun, "may be traced almost every important incident in our political history since that time, as far as our internal affairs are concerned."† At this time the interests of North and South were perfectly distinct. The South was teeming with agricultural produce, for which there was a great European demand ; whilst the industry of the North, unable to compete with European manufactures, tried to secure the monopoly of the home market. Unlike the course of the same controversy in England, the agriculturists (at least the cotton-growers) desired free trade, because they were exporters ; the manufacturers protection, because they could not meet competition. "The question," said Calhoun, "is in reality one between the exporting and non-exporting interests of the country." The exporting interest required the utmost freedom of imports, in order not to barter at a disadvantage. "He must be ignorant of the first principles of commerce, and the policy of Europe, particularly England, who does

* Life, i. 385.

† Life of Calhoun, p. 34.

not see that it is impossible to carry on a trade of such vast extent on any other basis than barter; and that if it were not so carried on, it would not long be tolerated. . . . The last remains of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in the conflict. In the first place, we will be thrown on the home market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and instead of supplying the world, as we would with a free trade, we would be compelled to abandon the cultivation of three-fourths of what we now raise, and receive for the residue whatever the manufacturers—who would then have their policy consummated by the entire possession of our market—might choose to give.”* It seemed a fulfilment of the prophecy of Mr. Lowndes, who, in resisting the adoption of the constitution in South Carolina forty years before, declared, that “when this new constitution should be adopted, the sun of the Southern States would set, never to rise again. . . . The interest of the Northern States would so predominate as to divest us of any pretensions to the title of a republic.”† Cobbett, who knew America better than any Englishman of that day, described, in his *Political Register* for 1833, the position of these hostile interests in a way which is very much to the point. “All these Southern and Western States are, commercially speaking, closely connected with Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, and Leeds; . . . they have no such connection with the Northern States, and there is no tie whatsoever to bind them together, except that which is of a mere political nature. . . . Here is a natural division of interests, and of interests so powerful, too, as not to be counteracted by any thing that man can do. The heavy duties imposed by the Congress upon British manufactured goods is neither more nor less than so many millions a year taken from the Southern and Western States, and given to the Northern States.”‡

Whilst in England protection benefited one class of the population at the expense of another, in America it was for the advantage of one part of the country at the expense of another. “Government,” said Calhoun, “is to descend from its high appointed duty, and become the agent of a portion of the community to extort, under the guise of protection, tribute from the rest of the community.”§

Where such a controversy is carried on between opposite

* Exposition of South-Carolina Committee on the Tariff, 1828, in Calhoun's Works, vi. 12.

† Elliot's Debates, iv. 272.

‡ Political Works, vi. 662.

§ Works, iv. 181.

classes in the same State, the violence of factions may endanger the government, but they cannot divide the State. But the violence is much greater, the wrong is more keenly felt, the means of resistance are more legitimate and constitutional, where the oppressed party is a sovereign State.

The South had every reason to resist to the utmost a measure which would be so injurious to them. It was opposed to their political as well as to their financial interests. For the tariff, while it impoverished them, enriched the government, and filled the treasury with superfluous gold. Now the Southern statesmen were always opposed to the predominance of the central authority, especially since it lent itself to a policy by which they suffered. They had practical and theoretical objections to it. The increase of the revenue beyond the ordinary wants of the government placed in its hands a tempting and dangerous instrument of influence. Means must be devised for the disposal of these sums, and the means adopted by the advocates of restriction was the execution of public works, by which the people of the different States were bribed to favour the central power. A protective tariff therefore, and internal improvement, were the chief points in the policy of the party which, headed by Henry Clay, sought to strengthen the Union at the expense of the States, and which the South opposed, as both hostile to their interests and as unconstitutional. "It would be in vain to attempt to conceal," wrote Calhoun of the tariff in 1831, "that it has divided the country into two great geographical divisions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at least, if not interests also, on some of the most vital of political subjects—on its finance, its commerce, and its industry. . . . Nor has the effect of this dangerous conflict ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on the important point already stated, but on the deeper and more dangerous questions, the constitutionality of a protective tariff, and the general principles and theory of the constitution itself: the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority, giving a construction to the instrument which the other believes would convert the general government into a consolidated irresponsible government, with the total destruction of liberty."* "On the great and vital point—the industry of the country, which comprehends almost every interest—the interest of the two great sections is opposed. We want free trade, they restrictions; we want moderate taxes, frugality in the government, economy, accountability, and a rigid application of the public money to the payment of the debt, and to the objects authorised by the

* Works, vi. 77, 78.

constitution. In all these particulars, if we may judge by experience, their views of their interest are precisely the opposite.”* In 1828 he said of the protective system: “No system can be more efficient to rear up a moneyed aristocracy;” wherein he is again supported by Cobbett, in the well-known saying, uttered five years later, concerning the United States: “It is there the aristocracy of money, the most damned of all aristocracies.” South Carolina took the lead in resisting the introduction of the protective system, and being defeated by many votes on the question itself, took its stand on the constitutional right of each sovereign State to arrest by its veto any general legislation of a kind which would be injurious to its particular interests. “The country,” said Calhoun, “is now more divided than in 1824, and then more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but the opposite sides are, beyond dispute, more determined and excited than at any preceding period. Formerly the system was resisted mainly as inexpedient, but now as unconstitutional, unequal, unjust, and oppressive. Then relief was sought exclusively from the general government; but now many, driven to despair, are raising their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the States as the only refuge.”† Calhoun was at that time Vice-President of the United States, and without a seat in Congress. The defence of his theory of the constitution devolved therefore upon the senator from South Carolina, General Hayne; and a debate ensued between Hayne and Webster, in January 1830, which is reckoned by Americans the most memorable in the parliamentary history of their country. Hayne declared that he did not contend for the mere right of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance; and in reply to Webster’s defence of the supreme power, he said: “This I know is a popular notion, and it is founded on the idea that as all the States are represented here, nothing can prevail which is not in conformity with the will of the majority; and it is supposed to be a republican maxim, ‘that the majority must govern.’ . . . If the will of a majority of Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the constitution is a dead letter, and has utterly failed of the very object for which it was designed—the protection of the rights of the minority. . . . The whole difference between us consists in this—the gentleman would make force the only arbiter in all cases of collision between the States and the federal government; I would resort to a peaceful remedy.”‡

Two years later Mr. Calhoun succeeded Hayne as senator

* Works, vi. 31.

† Ibid. vi. 80.

‡ Elliot’s Debates, iv. 498.

for South Carolina, and the contest was renewed. After the tariff of 1828 Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, joined in the recognition of the principle of nullification. When the tariff of 1832 was carried, South Carolina announced that the levying of dues would be resisted in the State. Calhoun defended the nullifying ordinance in the Senate, and in speeches and writings, with arguments which are the very perfection of political truth, and which combine with the realities of modern democracy the theory and the securities of mediæval freedom. "The essence of liberty," he said, "comprehends the idea of responsible power,—that those who make and execute the laws should be controlled by those on whom they operate,—that the governed should govern. No government based on the naked principle that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense, and under proper restrictions, can preserve its liberty even for a single generation. The history of all has been the same,—violence, injustice, and anarchy, succeeded by the government of one, or a few, under which the people seek refuge from the more oppressive despotism of the many. Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence and force must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that, where the majority rules without restriction, the minority is the subject. Nor is the right of suffrage more indispensable to enforce the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, than a federal organisation to compel the parts to respect the rights of each other. It requires the united action of both to prevent the abuse of power and oppression, and to constitute really and truly a constitutional government. To supersede either is to convert it in fact, whatever may be its theory, into an absolute government."*

In his disquisition on government Calhoun has expounded his theory of a constitution in a manner so profound, and so extremely applicable to the politics of the present day, that we regret that we can only give a very feeble notion of the argument by the few extracts for which we can make room.

"The powers which it is necessary for government to possess, in order to repress violence and preserve order, cannot execute themselves. They must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social

* Works, vi. 32, 33, 75.

feelings. And hence the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to government. Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands to government as government stands to society; and, as the end for which society is ordained would be defeated without government, so that for which government is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution. . . . Constitution is the contrivance of man, while government is of divine ordination. . . . Power can only be resisted by power, and tendency by tendency. . . . I call the right of suffrage the indispensable and primary principle; for it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to form constitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may be traced one of the causes why so few attempts to form constitutional governments have succeeded; and why, of the few which have, so small a number have had durable existence. . . . So far from being of itself sufficient,—however well-guarded it might be, and however enlightened the people,—it would, unaided by other provisions, leave the government as absolute as it would be in the hands of irresponsible rulers, and with a tendency at least as strong towards oppression and abuse of its powers. . . . The process may be slow, and much time may be required before a compact, organised majority can be formed; but formed it will be in time, even without preconcert or design, by the sure workings of that principle or constitution of our nature in which government itself originates. . . . The dominant majority, for the time, would have the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power which, without the right of suffrage, irresponsible rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned why the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply with equal force to the former. . . . The minority, for the time, will be as much the governed or subject portion as are the people in an aristocracy, or the subject in a monarchy. . . . The duration or uncertainty of the tenure by which power is held cannot of itself counteract the tendency inherent in government to oppression and abuse of power. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of the tenure, combined with the violent party warfare which must ever precede a change of parties under such governments, would rather tend to increase than diminish the tendency to oppression. . . . It is manifest that this provision must be of a character calculated to prevent any

one interest, or combination of interests, from using the powers of government to aggrandise itself at the expense of the others. . . . This too can be accomplished only in one way, and that is, by such an organism of the government—and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also—as will, by dividing and distributing the powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution. . . . Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, constitutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional government. The one, by rendering those who make and execute the laws responsible to those on whom they operate, prevents the rulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by making it impossible for any one interest or combination of interests, or class, or order, or portion of the community, to obtain exclusive control, prevents any one of them from oppressing the other. . . . It is this negative power,—the power of preventing or arresting the action of the government,—be it called by what term it may, veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance of power,—which in fact forms the constitution. . . . It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and the positive which makes the government. . . . It follows necessarily that where the numerical majority has the sole control of the government, there can be no constitution; as constitution implies limitation or restriction; . . . and hence, the numerical, unmixed with the concurrent majority, necessarily forms in all cases absolute government. . . . Constitutional governments, of whatever form, are, indeed, much more similar to each other in their structure and character than they are, respectively, to the absolute governments even of their own class; . . . and hence the great and broad distinction between governments is,—not that of the one, the few, or the many,—but of the constitutional and the absolute. . . . Among the other advantages which governments of the concurrent have over those of the numerical majority,—and which strongly illustrates their more popular character,—is, that they admit, with safety, a much greater extension of the right of suffrage. It may be safely extended in such governments to universal suffrage, that is, to every male citizen of mature age, with few ordinary exceptions; but it cannot be so far extended in those of the numerical majority, without placing them ultimately under the control of the more ignorant and dependent portions of the community. For, as the community becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly civilised, the difference between the rich and the poor will become more strongly marked, and the number of the ignorant and

dependent greater in proportion to the rest of the community. . . . The tendency of the concurrent government is to unite the community, let its interests be ever so diversified or opposed; while that of the numerical is to divide it into two conflicting portions, let its interest be naturally ever so united and identified. . . . The numerical majority, by regarding the community as a unit, and having as such the same interests throughout all its parts, must, by its necessary operation, divide it into two hostile parts, waging, under the forms of law, incessant hostilities against each other. . . . To make equality of condition essential to liberty, would be to destroy liberty and progress. The reason is both that inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is at the same time indispensable to progress. . . . It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. . . . These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion, that all men are born free and equal, than which nothing can be more unfounded and false. . . . In an absolute democracy party conflicts between the majority and minority . . . can hardly ever terminate in compromise. The object of the opposing minority is to expel the majority from power, and of the majority to maintain their hold upon it. It is on both sides a struggle for the whole; a struggle that must determine which shall be the governing and which the subject party. . . . Hence, among other reasons, aristocracies and monarchies more readily assume the constitutional form than absolute popular governments.”*

This was written in the last years of Calhoun's life, and published after his death; but the ideas, though he matured them in the subsequent contest on slavery, guided him in the earlier stage of the dispute which developed nullification into secession, during the tariff controversy of the years 1828 to 1833. Many of those who differed from him most widely deemed that his resistance was justified by the selfish and unscrupulous policy of the North. Legaré, the most accomplished scholar among American statesmen, afterwards attorney-general, made a Fourth-of-July oration in South Carolina, during the height of the excitement of 1831, in which he said: “The authors of this policy are indirectly responsible for this deplorable state of things, and for all the consequences that may grow out of it. They have been guilty of an inexpressible

* Works, i. 7-83.

offence against their country. They found us a united, they have made us a distracted people. They found the union of these States an object of fervent love and religious veneration; they have made even its utility a subject of controversy among very enlightened men. . . . I do not wonder at the indignation which the imposition of such a burden of taxation has excited in our people, in the present unprosperous state of their affairs. . . . Great nations cannot be held together under a united government by any thing short of despotic power, if any one part of the country is to be arrayed against another in a perpetual scramble for privilege and protection, under any system of protection.”*

Brownson, at that time the most influential journalist of America, and a strong partisan of Calhoun, advocated in 1844 his claims to the Presidency, and would, we believe, have held office in his cabinet if he had been elected. In one of the earliest numbers of his well-known *Review* he wrote: “Even Mr. Calhoun’s theory, though unquestionably the true theory of the federal constitution, is yet insufficient. . . . It does not, as a matter of fact, arrest the unequal, unjust, and oppressive measures of the federal government. South Carolina in 1833 forced a compromise; but in 1842 the obnoxious policy was revived, is pursued now successfully, and there is no State to attempt again the virtue of State interposition. . . . The State, if she judged proper, had the sovereign right to set aside this obnoxious tariff enactment in her own dominions, and prohibit her subjects or citizens from obeying it. . . . The parties to the compact being equal, and there being no common umpire, each, as a matter of course, is its own judge of the infraction of the compact, and of the mode and measure of redress.”†

The President, General Jackson, had a strong aversion for the theory and for the person of Calhoun. He swore that he would have him impeached for treason, and that he should hang on a gallows higher than Haman’s. One of the nullifying declarations of his Vice-President reached him late at night; in a fit of exultation he had the law officers of the government called out of their beds, to say whether at last here was not hanging matter. He issued a manifesto condemning the doctrine of nullification and the acts of South Carolina, which was very ably drawn up by Livingston, the Secretary of State, famous in the history of legislation as the author of the Louisiana code. Webster, the first orator of the day, though not a supporter of the administration, undertook to answer Calhoun in the Senate, and he was fetched

* Writings of Legaré, i. 272.

† Quarterly Review, ii 522, i. 124.

from his lodging, when the time came, in the President's carriage. His speech, considered the greatest he ever delivered, was regarded by the friends of the Union as conclusive against State-rights. Madison, who was approaching the term of his long career, wrote to congratulate the speaker in words which ought to have been a warning: "It crushes nullification, and must hasten an abandonment of secession. But this dodges the blow by confounding the claim to secede at will with the right of seceding from intolerable oppression."

Secession is but the alternative of interposition. The defeat of the latter doctrine on the ground of the constitution, deprived the South of the only possible protection from the increasing tyranny of the majority, for the defeat of nullification coincided in time with the final triumph of the pure democratic views; and at the same time that it was resolved that the rights of the minority had no security, it was established that the power of the majority had no bounds. Calhoun's elaborate theory was an earnest attempt to save the Union from the defects of its constitution. It is useless to inquire whether it is legally right, according to the letter of the constitution, for it is certain that it is in contradiction with its spirit as it has grown up since Jefferson. Webster may have been the truest interpreter of the law; Calhoun was the real defender of the Union. Even the Unionists made the dangerous admission, that there were cases in which, as there was no redress known to the law, secession was fully justified. Livingston gave the opinion, that "if the act be one of the few which, in its operation, cannot be submitted to the Supreme Court, and be one that will, in the opinion of the State, justify the risk of a withdrawal from the Union, this last extremity may at once be resorted to."*

The intimate connection between nullification and secession is shown by the biographer of Clay, though he fails to see that one is not the consequence, but the surrogate, of the other: "The first idea of nullification was doubtless limited to the action of a State in making null and void a federal law or laws within the circle of its own jurisdiction, without contemplating the absolute independence of a secession. Seeing, however, that nullification, in its practical operation, could hardly stop short of secession, the propounders of the doctrine in its first and limited signification, afterwards came boldly up to the claim of the right of secession."†

Practically, South Carolina triumphed, though her claims were repudiated. The tariff was withdrawn, and a measure

* Elliot's Debates, iv. 519.

† Colton's Life and Speeches of Clay, v. 392.

of compromise was introduced by Clay, the leading protectionist, which was felt to be so great a concession that Calhoun accepted, whilst Webster opposed it, and it was carried. But the evil day, the final crisis, was only postponed. The spirit of the country had taken a course in which it could not be permanently checked; and it was certain that new opportunities would be made to assert the omnipotence of the popular will, and to exhibit the total subservience of the executive to it.* Already a new controversy had begun, which has since overshadowed that which shook the Union from 1828 to 1833. The commercial question was not settled; the economical antagonism, and the determination on the part of the North to extend its advantages, did not slumber from Clay's Compromise Act to the Morrill Tariff in 1861; and in his farewell address, in 1837, Jackson drew a gloomy and desponding picture of the period which is filled with his name. "Many powerful interests are continually at work to procure heavy duties on commerce, and to swell the revenue beyond the real necessities of the public service; and the country has already felt the injurious effects of their combined influence. They succeeded in obtaining a tariff of duties bearing most oppressively on the agricultural and labouring classes of society, and producing a revenue that could not be usefully employed within the range of the powers conferred upon Congress; and in order to fasten upon the people this unjust and unequal system of taxation, extravagant schemes of internal improvement were got up in various quarters to squander the money and to purchase support. . . . Rely upon it, the design to collect an extravagant revenue, and to burden you with taxes beyond the economical wants of the government, is not yet abandoned. The various interests which have combined together to impose a heavy tariff, and to produce an overflowing treasury, are too strong, and have too much at stake, to surrender the contest. The corporations and wealthy individuals who are engaged in large manufacturing establishments, desire a high tariff to increase their gains. Designing politicians will support it to conciliate their favour, and to obtain the means of profuse expenditure, for the purpose of purchasing influence in other quarters. . . . It is from within, among yourselves—from cupidity, from corruption, from disappointed ambition, and inordinate thirst for power,—that factions will be formed and liberty endangered."†

* 'Ο γὰρ δῆμος οὐ βούλεται εὐνομουμένης τῆς πόλεως αὐτὸς δουλεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐλεύθερος εἶναι καὶ ἄρχειν, τῆς δὲ κακονομίας αὐτῷ ὀλίγον μέλει· ὃ γὰρ σὺ νομίζεις οὐκ εὐνομεῖσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τούτου ἰσχύει ὃ δῆμος καὶ ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. Xenophon, *Athen. Respub.* i 8.

† *Statesman's Manual*, 953-960.

Jackson was himself answerable for much of what was most deplorable in the political state of the country. The democratic tendency, which began under Jefferson, attained in Jackson's presidency its culminating point. The immense change in this respect may be shown in a single example. Pure democracy demands quick rotation of office, in order that, as all men have an equal claim to official power and profit, and must be supposed nearly equally qualified for it, and require no long experience (so that at Athens offices were distributed by lot), the greatest possible number of citizens should successively take part in the administration. It diminishes the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, between the State and the community, and increases the dependence of the first upon the last. At first such changes were not contemplated. Washington dismissed only nine officials in eight years, Adams removed only ten, Madison five, Monroe nine, John Quincy Adams only two, both on specific disqualifying grounds. Jefferson was naturally in favour of rotation in office, and caused a storm of anger when he displaced 39 official men in order to supply vacancies for supporters. Jackson, on succeeding the younger Adams, instantly made 176 alterations, and in the course of the first year 491 postmasters lost their places. Mr. Everett says very truly: "It may be stated as the general characteristic of the political tendencies of this period, that there was a decided weakening of respect for constitutional restraint. Vague ideas of executive discretion prevailed on the one hand in the interpretation of the constitution, and of popular sovereignty on the other, as represented by a President elevated to office by overwhelming majorities of the people."*

This was the period of Tocqueville's visit to America, when he passed the following judgment: "When a man, or a party, suffers an injustice in the United States, to whom can he have recourse? To public opinion? It is that which forms the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority, and obeys it blindly. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and serves as its passive instrument. To public force? It is nothing but the majority under arms. To the jury? It is the majority invested with the right of finding verdicts. The judges themselves, in some States, are elected by the majority. However iniquitous, therefore, or unreasonable the measure from which you suffer, you must submit."† Very eminent Americans‡ quite agreed with him in his censure of the course

* Memoir of Webster, p. 101.

† Vol. ii. cap. 7.

‡ There is a remarkable passage in Story's letters on Tocqueville's cele-

things had taken, and which had been seen long beforehand. In 1818 Story writes: "A new race of men is springing up to govern the nation; they are the hunters after popularity; men ambitious, not of the honour so much as of the profits of office,—the demagogues whose principles hang laxly upon them, and who follow, not so much what is right as what leads to a temporary vulgar applause. There is great, very great danger that these men will usurp so much of popular favour that they will rule the nation; and if so, we may yet live to see many of our best institutions crumble in the dust."*

The following passages are from the conclusion of his *Commentary on the Constitution*: "The influence of the disturbing causes, which, more than once in the convention, were on the point of breaking up the Union, have since immeasurably increased in concentration and vigour. "If, under these circumstances, the Union should once be broken up, it is impossible that a new constitution should ever be formed, embracing the whole territory. We shall be divided into several nations or confederacies, rivals in power and interest, too proud to brook injury, and too close to make retaliation distant or ineffectual." On the 18th February 1834, he writes of Jackson's administration: "I feel humiliated at the truth, which cannot be disguised, that though we live under the form of a republic, we are in fact under the absolute rule of a single man." And a few years later, 3d November 1837, he tells Miss Martineau that she has judged too favourably of his country: "You have overlooked the terrible influence of a corrupting patronage, and the system of exclusiveness in official appointments, which have already wrought such extensive mischiefs among us, and threaten to destroy all the safeguards of our civil liberties. You would have learned, I think, that there may be a despotism exercised in a republic, as irresistible and as ruinous as in any form of monarchy."

The foremost of the Southern statesmen thought exactly like the New-England judge. "I care not," said Calhoun, "what the form of the government is; it is nothing, if the government be despotic, whether it be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many men, without limitation. . . . While these measures were destroying the equilibrium between the two sections, the action of the government was leading to a radical change in its character, by concentrating all the power
brated book: "The work of De Tocqueville has had great reputation abroad, partly founded on their ignorance that he has borrowed the greater part of his reflections from American works, and little from his own observations. The main body of his materials will be found in the *Federalist* and in Story's *Commentaries*." Life of Story, ii. 330. * Life, i. 311.

of the system in itself. . . . What was once a constitutional federal republic is now converted, in reality, into one as absolute as that of the autocrat of Russia, and as despotic in its tendency as any absolute government that ever existed. . . . The increasing power of this government, and of the control of the Northern section over all its departments, furnished the cause. It was this which made an impression on the minds of many, that there was little or no restraint to prevent the government from doing whatever it might choose to do.”* At the same period, though reverting to a much earlier date, Cobbett wrote: “I lived eight years under the republican government of Pennsylvania; and I declare that I believe that to have been the most corrupt and tyrannical government that the world ever knew. . . . I have seen enough of republican government to convince me that the mere name is not worth a straw.”† Channing touches on a very important point, the influence of European liberalism on the republicanism of America: “Ever since our revolution we have had a number of men who have wanted faith in our free institutions, and have seen in our almost unlimited extension of the elective franchise the germ of convulsion and ruin. When the demagogues succeed in inflaming the ignorant multitude, and get office and power, this anti-popular party increases; in better times it declines. It has been built up in a measure by the errors and crimes of the liberals of Europe. . . . I have endeavoured on all occasions to disprove the notion that the labouring classes are unfit depositaries of political power. I owe it, however, to truth to say that I believe that the elective franchise is extended too far in this country.”‡ In 1841 he described very accurately the perils which have since proved fatal: “The great danger to our institutions, which alarms our conservatives most, has not perhaps entered Mr. Smith’s mind. It is the danger of a party organisation, so subtle and strong as to make the government the monopoly of a few leaders, and to insure the transmission of the executive power from hand to hand almost as regularly as in a monarchy. . . . That this danger is real cannot be doubted. So that we have to watch against despotism as well as, or more than, anarchy.”§ On this topic it is impossible to speak more strongly, and nobody could speak with greater authority than Dr. Brownson: “Our own government, in its origin and constitutional form, is not a democracy, but, if we may use the expression, a limited elec-

* Works, iv. 351, 550, 553.

† Political Register, November 1833; Works, vi. 683.

‡ Memoir of Channing, 418, 419. § Ibid. 421.

tive aristocracy. . . . But practically the government framed by our fathers no longer exists, save in name. Its original character has disappeared, or is rapidly disappearing. The constitution is a dead letter, except so far as it serves to prescribe the modes of election, the rule of the majority, the distribution and tenure of offices, and the union and separation of the functions of government. Since 1828 it has been becoming in practice, and is now substantially, a pure democracy, with no effective constitution but the will of the majority for the time being. . . . The constitution is practically abolished, and our government is virtually, to all intents and purposes, as we have said, a pure democracy, with nothing to prevent it from obeying the interest or interests which for the time being can succeed in commanding it."* Shortly before his conversion he wrote: "Looking at what we were in the beginning, and what we now are, it may well be doubted whether another country in Christendom has so rapidly declined as we have, in the stern and rigid virtues, in the high-toned and manly principles of conduct essential to the stability and wise administration of popular government. . . . The established political order in this country is not the democratic; and every attempt to apply the democratic theory as the principle of its interpretation is an attempt at revolution, and to be resisted. By a democracy I understand a political order,—if that may be called order which is none,—in which the people, primarily and without reference to any authority constituting them a body politic, are held to be the source of all the legitimate power in the state."†

The partisans of democratic absolutism who opposed State-rights in the affair of the tariff, and led to the unhappy consequences and lamentations we have seen, were already supplied with another topic to test the power of their principle. The question of abolition, subordinate at first, though auxiliary to the question of protection, came into the front when the other had lost its interest, and had been suspended for a season by the Compromise Act. It served to enlist higher sympathies on the side of revolution than could be won by considerations of mere profit. It adorned cupidity with the appearance of philanthropy, but the two motives were not quite distinct, and one is something of a pretext, and serves to disguise the other. They were equally available as means of establishing the supremacy of the absolute democracy, only one was its own reward; the other was not so clearly a matter of pecuniary interest, but of not inferior political

* Brownson's Quarterly Review, 1844, ii. 515, 523.

† Ibid. i. 84, 19.

advantage. A power which is questioned, however real it may be, must assert and manifest itself if it is to last. When the right of the States to resist the Union was rejected, although the question which occasioned the dispute was amicably arranged, it was certain to be succeeded by another, in order that so doubtful a victory might be commemorated by a trophy.

The question of slavery first exhibited itself as a constitutional difficulty about 1820, in the dispute which was settled by the Missouri compromise. Even at this early period the whole gravity of its consequences was understood by discerning men. Jefferson wrote: "This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence."

In 1828, when South Carolina was proclaiming the right of veto, and was followed by several of the Southern States, abolition was taken up in the North as a means of coercion against them, by way of reprisal, and as a very powerful instrument of party warfare. Channing writes to Webster, 14th May 1828: "A little while ago, Mr. Lundy of Baltimore, the editor of a paper called *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*, visited this part of the country, to stir us up to the work of abolishing slavery at the South; and the intention is to organise societies for this purpose. . . . My fear in regard to our efforts against slavery is, that we shall make the case worse by rousing sectional pride and passion for its support, and that we shall only break the country into two great parties, which may shake the foundations of government."

In the heat of the great controversies of Jackson's administration, on the Bank question and the Veto question, slavery was not brought prominently forward; but when the democratic central power had triumphed, when the Bank question was settled, and there was no longer an immediate occasion for discussing State-rights, the party whose opinions had prevailed in the constitution resolved to make use of their predominance for its extinction. Thenceforward, from about the year 1835, it became the leading question, and the form in which the antagonism between the principles of arbitrary power and of self-government displayed itself. At every acquisition of territory, at the formation of new States, the same question caused a crisis; then in the Fugitive-Slave Act, and finally in the formation of the republican party, and its triumph in 1860. The first effect of making abolition a political party question, and embodying in it the great constitu-

tional quarrel which had already threatened the existence of the Union in the question of taxation, was to verify the prophecy of Channing. Webster, who had been the foremost antagonist of nullification in the affair of the tariff, lived to acknowledge that even secession was being provoked by the insane aggression of the North. In one of his latest speeches, in that which is known as his speech for the Union, 7th March 1850, he denounced the policy of the abolitionists: "I do not mean to impute gross motives even to the leaders of these societies, but I am not blind to the consequences of their proceedings. I cannot but see what mischiefs their interference with the South has produced. And is it not plain to every man? Let any gentleman who entertains doubts on this point recur to the debates in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832, and he will see with what freedom a proposition made by Mr. J. Randolph for the gradual abolition of slavery was discussed in that body. . . . Public opinion, which in Virginia had begun to be exhibited against slavery, and was opening out for the discussion of the question, drew back and shut itself up in its castle. . . . We all know the fact, and we all know the cause; and every thing that these agitating people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave-population of the South."*

Howe, the Virginian historian, in principle though not in policy an abolitionist, says: "That a question so vitally important would have been renewed with more success at an early subsequent period, seems more than probable, if the current opinions of the day can be relied on; but there were obvious causes in operation which paralysed the friends of abolition, and have had the effect of silencing all agitation on the subject. The abolitionists in the Northern and Eastern States, gradually increasing their strength as a party, became louder in their denunciations of slavery, and more and more reckless in the means adopted for assailing the constitutional rights of the South."†

Story writes, 19th January 1839: "The question of slavery is becoming more and more an absorbing one, and will, if it continues to extend its influence, lead to a dissolution of the Union. At least there are many of our soundest statesmen who look to this as a highly probable event."‡

At that time the abolitionist party was yet in its infancy, and had not succeeded in combining together in a single party all the interests that were hostile to the slave States.

* Works, v. 357.

† Historical Collections of Virginia, p. 128.

‡ Life, ii. 307.

Lord Carlisle, describing a conversation he had in 1841 with the present Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, says, "I find that I noted at the time that he was the first person I had met who did not speak slightly of the abolitionists; he thought they were gradually gaining ground."*

But in the following year the abolitionist policy rapidly grew up into a great danger to the Union, which the great rivals, Webster and Calhoun, united to resist at the close of their lives. Commercially speaking, it is not certain that the North would gain by the abolition of slavery. It would increase the Southern market by encouraging white emigration from the North; but the commerce of New England depends largely on the cotton-crop, and the New-England merchants are not for abolition. Calhoun did not attribute the movement to a desire of gain: "The crusade against our domestic institution does not originate in hostility of interests. The rabid fanatics regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union."†

In this view he is fully supported by Webster: "Under the cry of universal freedom, and that other cry that there is a rule for the government of public men and private men which is of superior obligation to the constitution of the country, several of the States have enacted laws to hinder, obstruct, and defeat the enactments in this act of Congress to the utmost of their power. . . . I suspect all this to be the effect of that wandering and vagrant philanthropy which disturbs and annoys all that is present, in time or place, by heating the imagination on subjects distant, remote, and uncertain."‡

Webster justly considered that the real enemies of the constitution were the abolitionists, not the slave-owners, who threatened to secede. To appeal from the constitution to a higher law, to denounce as sinful and contrary to natural right an institution expressly recognised by it, is manifestly an assault upon the Union itself. The South have the letter and the spirit of the law in their favour. The consistent abolitionists must be ready to sacrifice the Union to their theory. If the objection to slavery is on moral grounds, paramount to all political rights and interests, abolition is a peremptory duty, to which the Union itself, whose law is opposed to compulsory abolition, must succumb. It was therefore perfectly just to remind Mr. Seward, that in attack-

* Lecture on America, p. 27. † Works, iv. 386. ‡ Ibid. vi. 556, 561.

ing slavery, and denying that it could be tolerated, he was assailing the law to which he owed his seat in Congress. "No man," said Webster, "is at liberty to set up, or affect to set up, his own conscience as above the law, in a matter which respects the rights of others, and the obligations, civil, social, and political, due to others from him."*

Dr. Brownson says, with great truth, as only a Catholic can, "No civil government can exist, none is conceivable even, where every individual is free to disobey its orders, whenever they do not happen to square with his private convictions of what is the law of God. . . . To appeal from the government to private judgment, is to place private judgment above public authority, the individual above the state."†

Calhoun was entirely justified in saying that, in the presence of these tendencies, "the conservative power is in the slave-holding States. They are the conservative portion of the country."‡

His own political doctrines, as we have described them, fully bear out this view. But the conservative, anti-revolutionary character of the South depended on other causes than the influence of its master mind. Slavery is itself in contradiction with the equal rights of man, as they are laid down in the Declaration of Independence. Slave-owners are incapacitated from interpreting that instrument with literal consistency, for it would contradict both their interests and their daily experience. But as there are advanced democrats at the South as well as at the North, and as, indeed, they succeeded in resisting so long the Northern politicians, by using the jealousy of the Northern people against the wealthy capitalists, and the appearance of aristocracy, they find means of escaping from this dilemma. This is supplied by the theory of the original inferiority of the African race to the rest of mankind, for which the authority of the greatest naturalist in America is quoted. "The result of my researches," says Agassiz, "is, that Negroes are intellectually children; physically one of the lowest races; inclining with the other blacks, especially the South-Sea Negroes, most of all to the monkey type, though with a tendency, even in the extremes, towards the real human form. This opinion I have repeatedly expressed, without drawing from it any objectionable consequence, unless, perhaps, that no coloured race, least of all the Negroes, can have a common origin with ourselves." If this theory were not the property of the infidel science of Europe, one would suppose it must have been invented for the Americans, whom it suits so well.

* Works, vi. 578. † Essays and Reviews, pp. 357, 359. ‡ Works, iv. 360.

Webster spoke with great power against the projects of the North: "There is kept up a general cry of one party against the other, that its rights are invaded, its honour insulted, its character assailed, and its just participation in political power denied. Sagacious men cannot but suspect from all this, that more is intended than is avowed; and that there lies at the bottom a purpose of the separation of the States, for reasons avowed or disavowed, or for grievances redressed or unredressed."

"In the South, the separation of the States is openly professed, discussed, and recommended, absolutely or conditionally, in legislative halls, and in conventions called together by the authority of the law.

"In the North, the State governments have not run into such excess, and the purpose of overturning the government shows itself more clearly in resolutions agreed to in voluntary assemblies of individuals, denouncing the laws of the land, and declaring a fixed intent to disobey them. . . . It is evident that, if this spirit be not checked, it will endanger the government; if it spread far and wide, it will overthrow the government."*

The language of Calhoun about the same period is almost identical with Webster's. "The danger is of a character—whether we regard our safety or the preservation of the Union—which cannot be safely tampered with. If not met promptly and decidedly, the two portions of the Union will become thoroughly alienated, when no alternative will be left to us, as the weaker of the two, but to sever all political ties, or sink down into abject submission."†

His last great speech, delivered March 4, 1850, a few days before his death, opened with the words, "I have believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion." And he went on to say: "If something is not done to avert it, the South will be forced to choose between abolition and secession. Indeed, as events are now moving, it will not require the South to secede in order to dissolve the Union."‡

The calamity which these eminent men agreed in apprehending and in endeavouring to avert, was brought on after their death by the rise of the republican party,—a party in its aims and principles quite revolutionary, and not only inconsistent with the existence of the Union, but ready from the first to give it up. "I do not see," said the New-England

* Speech of 17th June 1850; Works, vi. 567, 582.

† Works, iv. 395.

‡ Ibid. 542, 556.

philosopher Emerson, "how a barbarous community and a civilised community can constitute one State." In order to estimate the extravagance of this party declaration, we will only quote two unexceptionable witnesses, who visited the South at an interval of about forty years from each other; one a Boston divine, the other an eager abolitionist. "How different from our Northern manners! There, avarice and ceremony, at the age of twenty, graft the coldness and unfeelingness of age on the disinterested ardour of youth. I blush for my own people when I compare the selfish prudence of the Yankee with the generous confidence of a Virginian. Here I find great vices, but greater virtues than I left behind me. There is one single trait which attaches me to the people I live with more than all the virtues of New England,—they love money less than we do."* Lord Carlisle says, in the lecture already referred to, "It would be uncandid to deny that the planter in the Southern States has much more in his manner and mode of intercourse that resembles the English country gentleman than any other class of his countrymen."†

Emerson's saying is a sign of the extent to which rapid abolitionists were ready to go. Declaring that the Federal Government was devoted to Southern interests, against Northern doctrines, they openly defied it. Disunion societies started up at the North for the purpose of bringing about separation. Several States passed laws against the South and against the constitution, and there were loud demands for separation. This was the disposition of the North at the presidential election of a successor to Pierce. The North threatened to part company, and if it carried its candidate, it threatened the Southern institutions. The South proclaimed the intention of seceding if Fremont should be elected, and threatened to march upon Washington and burn the archives of the Union. Buchanan's election pacified the South; but it was evident, from the growing strength of the republican party, that it was their last victory. They accordingly made use of their friends in office to take advantage of the time that remained to them to be in readiness when the next election came. Secession was resolved upon and prepared from the time when the strength of the republicans was exhibited in 1856. In spite of all the horrors of American slavery, it is impossible for us to have any sympathy with the party of which Mr. Seward is the chief. His politics are not only revolutionary, but aggressive; he is not only for absolutism but for annexation. In a speech on January 26,

* Memoir of Channing, p. 43.

† p. 35.

1853, he spoke as follows: "The tendency of commercial and political events invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere; that is, to become and remain a great Western continental power, balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe. The advance of the country toward that position constitutes what, in the language of many, is called 'progress,' and the position itself is what, by the same class, is called 'manifest destiny.' ""*

When Cass moved a resolution affirming the Monroe doctrine with regard to Cuba, Seward supported it, together with another resolution perfectly consistent with it, of which he said: "It is not well expressed; but it implies the same policy in regard to Canada which the main resolutions assert concerning Cuba."† Nor is this the limit of his ambition. "You are already," he says to his countrymen, "the great continental power of America. But does that content you? I trust it does not. You want the commerce of the world, which is the empire of the world."‡

When Kossuth was received in the Senate, he was introduced by Mr. Seward, whose European policy is as definite and about as respectable as his American. Speaking of Hungary, he writes, in December 1851: "I trust that some measure may be adopted by the government which, while it will not at all hazard the peace or prosperity of the country, may serve to promote a cause that appeals so strongly to our interests and our sympathies, viz. the establishment of republicanism, in the countries prepared for it, in Europe."§ And again, two days later: "Every nation may, and every nation ought, to make its position distinctly known in every case of conflict between despots and States struggling for the inalienable and indefeasible rights of independence and self-government, that when despots combine, free States may lawfully unite."

It is as impossible to sympathise on religious grounds with the categorical prohibition of slavery as, on political grounds, with the opinions of the abolitionists. In this, as in all other things, they exhibit the same abstract, ideal absolutism, which is equally hostile with the Catholic and with the English spirit. Their democratic system poisons every thing it touches. All constitutional questions are referred to the one fundamental principle of popular sovereignty, without consideration of policy or expediency. In the Massachusetts convention of 1853, it was argued by one of the most famous Americans, that the election of the judiciary

* Works, iii. 606.

† Ibid. 609.

‡ Ibid. 618.

§ Ibid. 505.

could not be discussed on the grounds of its influence on the administration of justice, as it was clearly consonant with the constitutional theory. "What greater right," says the *North-American Review* (lxxxvi. 477), "has government to deprive the people of their representation in the executive and judicial, than in the legislative department?" In claiming absolute freedom, they have created absolute power, whilst we have inherited from the middle ages the notion that both liberty and authority must be subject to limits and conditions. The same intolerance of restraints and obligations, the same aversion to recognise the existence of popular duty, and of the divine right which is its correlative, disturb their notions of government and of freedom. The influence of these habits of abstract reasoning, to which we owe the revolution in Europe, is to make all things questions of principle and of abstract law. A principle is always appealed to in all cases, either of interest or necessity, and the consequence is, that a false and arbitrary political system produces a false and arbitrary code of ethics, and the theory of abolition is as erroneous as the theory of freedom.

Very different is the mode in which the Church labours to reform mankind by assimilating realities with ideals, and accommodating herself to times and circumstances. Her system of Christian liberty is essentially incompatible with slavery; and the power of masters over their slaves was one of the bulwarks of corruption and vice which most seriously impeded her progress. Yet the Apostles never condemned slavery even within the Christian fold. The sort of civil liberty which came with Christianity into the world, and was one of her postulates, did not require the abolition of slavery. If men were free by virtue of their being formed after the image of God, the proportion in which they realised that image would be the measure of their freedom. Accordingly, St. Paul prescribed to the Christian slave to remain content with his condition.*

We have gone at inordinate length into the causes and peculiarities of the revolution in the United States, because of the constant analogy they present to the theories and the events which are at the same time disturbing Europe. It is too late to touch upon more than one further point, which is extremely suggestive. The Secession movement was not provoked merely by the alarm of the slave-owners for their property, when the election of Lincoln sent down

* 1 Cor. vii. 21. The opposite interpretation, common among Protestant commentators, is inconsistent with the verses 20 and 24, and with the tradition of the Greek Fathers.

the price of slaves from twenty-five to fifty per cent, but by the political danger of Northern preponderance; and the mean whites of the Southern States are just as eager for separation as those who have property in slaves. For they fear lest the republicans, in carrying emancipation, should abolish the barriers which separate the Negroes from their own caste. At the same time, the slaves show no disposition to help the republicans, and be raised to the level of the whites. There is a just reason for this fear, which lies in the simple fact that the United States are a republic. The population of a republic must be homogeneous. Civil equality must be founded on social equality, and on national and physiological unity. This has been the strength of the American republic. Pure democracy is that form of government in which the community is sovereign, in which, therefore, the State is most nearly identified with society. But society exists for the protection of interests; the State for the realisation of right—*concilia cœtusque hominum jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur*.* The State sets up a moral, objective law, and pursues a common object distinct from the ends and purposes of society. This is essentially repugnant to democracy, which recognises only the interests and rights of the community, and is therefore inconsistent with the consolidation of authority which is implied in the notion of the State. It resists the development of the social into the moral community. If, therefore, a democracy includes persons with separate interests or an inferior nature, it tyrannises over them. There is no mediator between the part and the whole; there is no room, therefore, for differences of class, of wealth, of race; equality is necessary to the liberty which is sought by a pure democracy.

Where society is constituted without equality of condition or unity of race, where there are different classes and national varieties, they require a protector in a form of government which shall be distinct from and superior to every class, and not the instrument of one of them, in an authority representing the State, not any portion of society. This can be supplied only by monarchy; and in this sense it is fair to say that constitutional government, that is, the authority of law as distinguished from interest, can exist only under a king. This is also the reason why even absolute monarchies have been better governors of dependencies than popular governments. In one case they are governed for the benefit of a ruling class; in the other, there is no ruling class, and

* Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis*, 3.

they are governed in the name of the State. Rome under the Republic and under the Empire is the most striking instance of this contrast. But the tyranny of republics is greatest when differences of races are combined with distinctions of class. Hence South America was a flourishing and prosperous country so long as the Spanish crown served as moderator between the various races, and is still prosperous where monarchy has been retained; whilst the establishment of republics in countries with classes divided by blood has led to hopeless misery and disorder, and constant recourse to dictatorships as a refuge from anarchy and tyranny. Democracy inevitably takes the tone of the lower portions of society, and, if there are great diversities, degrades the higher. Slavery is the only protection that has ever been known against this tendency, and it is so far true that slavery is essential to democracy. For where there are great incongruities in the constitution of society, if the Americans were to admit the Indians, the Chinese, the Negroes, to the rights to which they are justly jealous of admitting European emigrants, the country would be thrown into disorder, and if not, would be degraded to the level of the barbarous races. Accordingly, the Know-nothings rose up as the reaction of the democratic principle against the influx of an alien population. The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert. The Chinese in California inspire great alarm for the same reason, and plans have been proposed of shipping them all off again. This is a good argument too, in the interest of all parties, against the emancipation of the blacks.

This necessity for social equality and national unity has been felt in all democracies where the mass as a unit governs itself. Above all, it is felt as a necessity in France, since the downfall of the old society, and the recognition, under republic, charter, and despotism, of the sovereignty of the people. Those principles with which France revolutionises Europe are perfectly right in her own case. They are detestable in other countries where they cause revolutions, but they are a true and just consequence of the French Revolution. Men easily lose sight of the substance in the form, and suppose that because France is not a republic she is not a democracy, and that her principles therefore will apply elsewhere. This is the reason of the power of the national principle in Europe. It is essential as a consequence of equality to the notion of the people as the source of power. Where there is an aristocracy it has generally more sympathy and connection with foreign aristocracies than with the rest of the nation. The bonds of

class are stronger than those of nationality. A democracy, in abolishing classes, renders national unity imperative.

These are some of the political lessons we have learnt from the consideration of the vast process of which we are witnessing the consummation. We may consult the history of the American Union to understand the true theory of republicanism, and the danger of mistaking it. It is simply the spurious democracy of the French Revolution that has destroyed the Union, by disintegrating the remnants of English traditions and institutions. All the great controversies—on the embargo, restriction, internal improvement, the Bank-Charter Act, the formation of new States, the acquisition of new territory, abolition—are phases of this mighty change, steps in the passage from a constitution framed on an English model to a system imitating that of France. The secession of the Southern States—pregnant with infinite consequences to the African race, by altering the condition of slavery, to America by awakening an intenser thirst for conquest, to Europe by its reaction on European democracy, to England, above all, by threatening for a moment one of the pillars of her social existence, but still more by the enormous augmentation of her power, on which the United States were always a most formidable restraint—is chiefly important in a political light as a protest and reaction against revolutionary doctrines, and as a move in the opposite direction to that which prevails in Europe.



DR. WARD'S PHILOSOPHY.*

THE late theological lecturer at St. Edmund's commences his course, not with God, but with human nature, not because he fails to found moral obligation on the Divine nature and attributes, but because, after this foundation has been once assumed, the discussion of human nature can be conducted independently to the end. The trifling inconvenience of the assumption may be well pardoned in a teacher who feels a special predilection and vocation to the moral and anthropological side of theology.

The present volume contains the philosophical introduction to the theological course, and only treats of those truths which, though they may be enforced by revelation, are de-

* *On Nature and Grace. A Theological Treatise.* Book I.: *Philosophical Introduction.* By W. G. Ward, Ph. D. London: Burns and Lambert.

monstrable by reason alone, and which the lecturer judges necessary or useful to those who would rightly understand the course that is to follow: till we have this course, it is, he reminds us, impossible to say with what skill the foundation has been prepared for the superstructure. All that the critic can do is to examine its texture, and satisfy himself that there are no flaws in the workmanship.

The volume is divided into two main parts; one is ontological, or metaphysical, and shows that the notions of good and evil, and of moral obligation are real intuitions, subjectively necessary and objectively valid; so that by intrinsic necessity such and such acts are virtuous, and such and such vicious. The second is psychological, and shows that the constitution of our nature in its propensions, intellect, and will is adapted for the exercise of virtue and avoidance of vice; so that the first is natural, the other destructive of nature.

That the first part treats of no idle question may be soon shown. Three years ago, M. Proudhon published at Paris a book entitled *Justice in the Church and in the Revolution*. It was intended to destroy Christianity, by proving that justice and virtue must be something absolute, inherent in the intellect; that deriving it from God, or any other external source, makes it foreign to man's nature, accidental, arbitrary, capricious. Now, he said, the Christian doctrine is, that the soul is empty and dark, incapable of any morality but that of selfishness, and unable of itself to understand, far less to practise, the social law, which has no foundation in reason and the nature of things, like other truths, but is given solely by revelation; but the decrees of Heaven depend on God's wishes, which can never be calculated beforehand, which can be reduced to no system, because they follow no law, the motives of which cannot be penetrated, so that we should know how to apply and modify them as circumstances arise: hence these external decrees and commands are in themselves the moral light of man, and without them he is as incapable of morality as a beast; revelation is the only basis of virtue and justice, and there is no obligation to practise them before revelation; therefore society, which is founded on justice, is impossible without revealed religion.

This it will be readily seen is a caricature, not so much of Catholic doctrine, as of the peculiar tenets of the traditionalists, from whose writings exclusively Proudhon draws his proofs. The existence of a Christian school whose teaching is capable of being so perverted, shows the necessity of

clearing the true doctrine on this point, and of proving that moral good and evil do not originally result from any arbitrary appointment, or even from the necessary command of God; but that they are necessary ideas prior to all appointment and to all command, confining the Creator as well as obliging the creature, attributes of God, and therefore no more created or appointed by Him than His own eternity and omnipotence. This is the assumption from the course *De Deo* which Dr. Ward has to make in his course of moral theology. Not that he founds his argument entirely upon it; on the contrary, he proves the necessary character of moral truth by arguments which are not theological, especially by refuting those who hold the opposite theory, and who invest the principles of morals with a contingent character. In the following paragraphs we will attempt to develop some of his arguments.

He begins by showing that moral judgments are "intuitive;" to explain this term, he distinguishes between two classes of intellectual acts, judgments of consciousness and judgments of intuition. (1) The former, he says, "amount to no more than this—'my present feeling is what I now feel it to be;'" they are declarations that "I am at this moment affected in a certain way. The judgment begins there and ends there," *i. e.* has no consequences, and cannot be used as a premiss; it does not pass the bounds of mere impression or feeling; it is always subjective (p. 6), and it includes such acknowledgments of "intellectual impotence" as "I cannot help feeling that this is so." (2) The latter are acts of "intellectual perception" (p. 43), "declarations of reason" (p. 24), and are objective, or declarations of what we consider to be facts, independently of the present impression; and he gives, as examples of them, all acts of memory, the assertion of the validity of logical reasoning, mathematical axioms, belief in an external world, and the perception of objects (p. 8).

But he warns us to be careful in distinguishing judgments that are immediately evident from those which are only clear after a course of reasoning or inference. Thus, "this corn is in excellent condition," is a judgment that can only be formed after we have studied the marks which usually indicate good condition in corn; we "intue" the presence of these marks, and we infer thence the good condition of this corn. But these inferences are in no case intuitions; an intuition must be immediately evident, and not in any way inferred from other judgments. The interposition of any step of reasoning destroys the intuitive character; in-

tuitions must be ultimate truths. Hence the judgment "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," though it seems immediately evident to the experienced mathematician, is not intuitive, because it was originally inferred from ulterior truths. It is, however, intuitive to God, who is expressly said (p. 43) to "intue" it necessarily but for us men the word "intue" is confined to those judgments "which we elicit as true self-evidently, and not by way of inference" (p. 40). [Is it an obscurity of words, or a confusion of thought, or a tacit abandonment of an artificial distinction that has served its purpose, that after this we are said (p. 119) to "intue" various acts to be wrong "because they are contrary" to various virtues?]

Again, though the judgment, "this corn is in good condition," is not "intued," because we cannot see the "good condition" itself, but only the marks or signs from which it is inferred, yet in some true intuitions it may require a preliminary exercise of reason to see what is meant by the subject and predicate; the predicate by itself may not be immediately seen, but when seen its agreement with the subject (p. 66) must be immediately visible. In these cases, we suppose that no inference must come in, no interpretation of signs or marks must be allowed, in the investigation of the terms, for fear of destroying the intuitive character of the judgment.

Once more; intuitive judgments may be connected with judgments of consciousness, but they cannot be inferred from them. We may say at the same time, "I have the impression that I saw this before," and "I did see this before," but the latter is in no sense deduced from the former. The fact remembered is not inferred from the present impression on the sensibility, nor the external substance from the impression on the sight or touch, nor the truth of personal existence from the phenomena of life. In Dr. Ward's system the formula *cogito ergo sum* has neither place nor meaning, if for no other reason, because a judgment of consciousness can never be a premiss. Judgments of consciousness, then, being mere declarations of present impression, but intuitive judgments being declarations of objective facts of which we have immediate conviction, it follows that "many of these latter judgments are true, many are false," though, whether true or false, all are to be called intuitions, provided they are immediate, and not judgments of consciousness.

With these arms in his quiver, Dr. Ward is prepared to do battle with "philosophical scepticism," of which he declares the only exact enunciation to be: "We are unable to

know with certainty any thing whatever beyond the facts of our present consciousness, because no intuitive judgment can possibly carry with it its own evidence of truth." That is, if knowledge is possible, it must be founded on judgments of consciousness, which (by the definition) end with themselves, and cannot form the premisses of an argument; we may know that we are thinking, but cannot thence conclude that we exist, or if we did, it would not be an intuition, and as an inference would be discounted from the present argument; we may have the impression that we see this paper, but cannot affirm that we see it, either by inference, for that would be no intuition, or by intuition, which is denied by the hypothesis. According to Dr. Ward, then, scepticism is the declaration of our inability to assert with any certainty any fact beyond our present impression: while a kindred philosophy, which he calls semi-scepticism, admits the premiss that no intuitions carry with them their own evidence, but asserts that certain intuitions can be proved true "by means of some prior self-evident truth," *i. e.* by means of a further intuition; it thus asserts in the second breath what it had denied in the first.

Scepticism cannot be argued with, because the sceptic confines himself and his opponent to the inner world of their own impressions, without any means of certain communication; he cannot admit the certainty of his opponent's existence, or of his words having any meaning. Semi-scepticism is self-contradictory, and not worth arguing with; therefore we may profitably omit the logomachy of the debate against them, and at once admit the contradictory of their premiss, and affirm that "some intuitive judgments carry with them their own evidence," or, as Dr. Ward says, "it is fully possible that intuitive judgments may carry with them their own evidence of truth" (p. 18).

After overcoming scepticism, the lecturer seeks for some sceptics to vanquish. Mr. Mansel is his first antagonist, though we do not see why Dr. Ward should consider him an enemy. Our author as yet has only proved that while some intuitions are certainly false, others carry with them their own evidence. Mr. Mansel does at least as much: he affirms that arithmetic, geometry, and morals "rest on similar bases, and are confined within the same limits, all being equally *necessary* and *valid* within the legitimate bounds of human intelligence." And beyond these bounds, he says, there is "an absolute morality, based upon, or rather identical with, the Eternal nature of God," the conviction of which is "forced upon us by the same evidence as that

on which we believe that God exists at all.”* If Dr. Ward objects to this, it will probably be because he asserts that God’s “absolute morality” is identical with our morality, or, in general, that necessary truth is in God under conditions precisely similar to those under which it is in man; in other words, that we have a positive, not only a negative knowledge of what God is; that St. Athanasius was wrong when he said, “it is impossible to know what God is, possible to say what He is not;” or St. Augustine when he said, “Totum ex animo rejicite; quidquid occurrerit negate; dicite, non est illud.” But then Dr. Ward himself implies this theory when he tells us to think of “the one perfectly simple Being” as the “cumulus of all perfections,” and to ponder on one perfection after another, and reflect on His possessing all of them in infinite extent,” and thus to obtain a “highly complex idea,” which yet is “a very real knowledge as far as it goes” (p. 52),—that is, as far as complexity can be said to correspond to simplicity.

Yet, in spite of this substantial agreement, Dr. Ward accuses Mr. Mansel of scepticism for saying, “It may be, indeed, that the conditions of possible thought correspond to conditions of possible being; that what is to us inconceivable is in itself non-existent. But of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence. . . . In believing this, we desert the evident of reason to rest on that of faith, . . . [which] bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us: it cannot enable us to overleap them, or to exalt to a more absolute character the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers concerning finite objects of thought.” The question is only about asserting the “absolute validity” of our conditioned ideas, of giving our finite thought an “absolute character;” there is no thought of denying the validity of mathematical necessity for all objects in space, or of arithmetical necessity for all in time, only of questioning whether the ideas of space and time must necessarily apply to the idea of the Living God; whether “the conditions of possible thought correspond to the conditions of possible being,” and whether our idea of substance corresponds to the external reality of substance, or our idea of God to His real Essence.

But Dr. Ward chooses to interpret Mr. Mansel to mean that no possible thought, no laws, however necessary, can be known to be objectively valid within any limits whatever; and upon this he believes himself entitled to suppress

* *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vii. pp. 204, 206, 3d ed.

Mr. Mansel's instances, and to substitute one of his own, so as to make Mr. Mansel deny the validity of the laws of reasoning. That is, because Mr. Mansel doubts the absolute validity of intuitions, or their exact correspondence to the absolute truth, Dr. Ward insists that he shall also doubt their relative validity, or their correspondence to truth, "so far as they go."

And, next, to confirm this false assumption, Dr. Ward quotes and interprets Mr. Mansel's *Bampton Lectures*, settling in a very off-hand way what their argument must be, without taking the precaution to ascertain what it is. We slightly abridge Dr. Ward's sentences: "There are two totally distinct syllogisms, either of which would land us in the desired conclusion: 1. Whatever reason really declares is really certain; but reason really declares that we have no direct knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute; therefore it is really certain that we have no such knowledge. 2. No declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge (for none can carry with it its own evidence of truth); but all direct knowledge of the Infinite is merely the declaration of reason; hence we do not possess any certain knowledge of the Infinite." Mr. Mansel does not use the first syllogism, therefore he must use the second. We reply, first, that Dr. Ward owns that some intuitions are false, and therefore has as yet shown no right to call a man a sceptic for doubting of the absolute validity of the particular intuitions of the Infinite and Absolute: next, that his dilemma, though the two major premisses are contradictory, and therefore complementary, and apparently exhaustive, does not really exhaust the alternatives; for there is a third syllogism, which we may gather from the quotation made by Dr. Ward,—“the light which is in us is not darkness, only it cannot illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays;” that is, our intuition is valid within certain limits, invalid beyond them, in other words, “many of our intuitions are true, many are false,” and many uncertain; and Mr. Mansel's syllogism may be thus made: “No declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge of that which is beyond the reach of the rays of reason; but the Infinite and Absolute are beyond such reach; therefore no declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge of them.” This may be scepticism, but it does not come within Dr. Ward's definition, and is implicitly held by Dr. Ward himself.

We have no sympathy with Mr. Mill's philosophy, which Dr. Ward next attacks, but we have still less sympathy for unsound refutations of it. Mr. Mill, then, says that there

are "no truths cognisable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensation, and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge." In terms, this is a direct contradiction of Dr. Ward; but do both writers use the words "intuition" and "consciousness" in the same sense? Dr. Ward's judgments of consciousness only recognise the present *impression*; Mr. Mill reckons the consciousness of mental *acts* among the sources of knowledge. Acts are more than impressions,* and a consciousness of the act implies a consciousness of its quality; and this, we suppose, Dr. Ward would call an intuition, as when we say, "I am conscious that the mind necessarily attributes substance to all phenomena."

Up to this point Dr. Ward has only said that some intuitions are valid, without discriminating the valid from the invalid; and he has also allowed himself to use strong language against some persons who expressed doubts as to the validity of some intuitions, though they expressly admitted others, but perhaps under another name. Now, at length, he thinks it time to discuss the criteria by which true intuitions may be distinguished from false. It is strange that, after having accused a man of scepticism for not admitting any sources of our knowledge but sensation, and "consciousness of mental acts," Dr. Ward should have no better test of the validity of intuitions than the consciousness of the quality of the act by which we make them, viz. "the physical impossibility of doubting them for one moment" (p. 36); or the fact that, "so soon as any one has apprehended (the meaning of the subject and predicate), he forms by necessity that judgment which recognises that the subject and the predicate agree together. I am not aware," he continues, "that any further proof than this can be brought for the legitimacy of a mathematical intuition" (p. 66). In other words, though the judgment that "I cannot help thinking it," is only a "judgment of consciousness" (p. 6), and can have no results (p. 3), the judgment that "every one who understands the terms of the proposition by the constitution of his nature must assent to it," is the one legitimate test of intuitions. But I can only know what "every one" must assent to, through my consciousness of what I must assent to; the

* We are not sure that Dr. Ward would allow this, since (p. 400) he drops the distinction between *phantasia* and *intellectus*, and ascribes to the intellect every operation ascribed by the scholastics to the *phantasia*; at the same time he drops altogether the *intellectus agens*, and recognises no intellect but the *intellectus possibilis*.

constitution of other men's minds is only known to me through my own. Here, then, the most important of all intuitive judgments, that which is the test of the validity of all others, is represented to us as an inference from what has been already called a mere judgment of consciousness, "I cannot help thinking thus." Besides this, Dr. Ward adopts the three tests of Father Buffier; the first of which secures the immediateness of the intuition, the second appeals to universal suffrage for its validity, while the third appeals to the mind's consciousness of its own acts, and asks whether we must not conform our conduct to the truth which our reason affects to doubt? For, as Mr. Mansel says, our intuitive faith "has but a regulative and practical, not a speculative application." Would not, however, the following "intuition" satisfy Father Buffier's tests: "There is an upper and an under in space"? No insight can be more direct or immediate, none more universal, none to which it is more physically necessary to conform. Yet it is false.

We must not be understood to object to Dr. Ward's first criterion in itself; we only say that his other statements, contrived for the purpose of building up the charge of scepticism against Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, have cut away his ground, and annulled his right to use it. But let it be taken as proved that some intuitions are not only true and valid, but also universal and necessary: Dr. Ward's next step is to identify all these universal and necessary truths with God. And here few persons who have entered into the old controversy about the Logos and the Divine Ideas, will be disposed to object, except to two statements of Dr. Ward; for why should he seem to limit God's eternal gaze to "necessary truth" only? (pp. 43, 44); as if God did not as necessarily "intue" every real and every possible contingent existence as He "intues" mathematical or arithmetical truth: and, secondly, is it in accordance with common sense so to identify all necessary truth with God (p. 45), as to leave no place for a distinction between the truths of space and time, which are only necessary because He has contrived and created them, and the truths of absolute morality, which are prior to all contrivance and creation, as being God's attributes? The

* Whoever knows the perfect definition of a principle may evolve all the consequences of that definition with rigid logical necessity. Hence the range of necessary truth varies for each intelligence with the extent of his power of definition; but the power of definition is coincident with the power of creation, as we proved in the first of a series of articles on the "Forms of Intuition" in this Review. Hence, to the Creator of all things, all possible consequences of every law which He institutes are known with a necessity analogous to that with which we know the consequences of the laws of space and time.

ideas of space and time, like all other ideas of created things, are necessarily in God from all eternity, but need never have been realised externally. The ideas of absolute morality are of the very essence of God, and the living realisation is His eternal life.

Mathematical necessity in itself is but hypothetical. While space or the idea of space remains as it is, all its relations necessarily remain as they are ; for any change in any one of them would involve the destruction of the whole idea. This does not prove that there might not have been hundreds of other platforms besides space for the formation of a universe ; of course we cannot imagine such, for our mind is only formed to correspond to the actual world, not to create a new universe. But moral necessity depends on a deeper reality ; God is not space, but He is Love, and Mercy, and Justice ; and He could not create free creatures at all except on these principles. Hence for material necessity a double hypothesis is required,—that God should choose the platform of space rather than another, possible to Him, but unimaginable to us, and that He should actually create in this platform. In the moral creation the first hypothesis is inadmissible. If God creates free beings, there is no choice of platforms, they must be obliged by the laws which are His attributes. But the second hypothesis holds—"it is in no respect necessary that God shall create beings possessed of freedom and intelligence ; it is only necessary that if He do create such beings, they are subject to this or that moral obligation." Thus, in spite of the absolute necessity of the moral law, "God is the free Author of every single moral obligation to which any one of His creatures is subject" (p. 105).

And this freedom of the Creator introduces a contingency of another kind into the moral law that binds free creatures. He may give them various degrees of intelligence, or, in other words, may promulgate to them more or less of this law. More or less, both in degree and kind ; for the very nature of the moral law varies within certain limits when applied to creatures. For instance, the idea of Purity must be very different in a being with no propensions or passions whatever, and in a being to whom the only idea of purity is a virtue founded on the repression of passion, and the direction of the propension to a permitted end. The moral law of creatures, then, is not the absolute morality of the Creator, though this is its model and its source, but is determined both in extent, by the capacity and knowledge of the creatures, and in mode, by their constitution, both of which depend on the arbitrary will of God.

These distinctions, surely, ought to have been made before Dr. Ward entered on the question of the relation between God and moral truth; he should have told us whether he meant absolute moral truth, which is in the relation of identity with God, or moral truth as it is adapted to created natures, and promulgated to man;—the natural rule of morals, which stands in a double relationship to God, depending in one aspect on His attributes, and so independent of His appointment and command, and in the other aspect dependent on His free command, whether implied in the constitution of our nature, or revealed in any other way.

For want of this preliminary inquiry (Dr. Ward only enters upon it afterwards), it is impossible to tell whether the Catholics and Protestants, who derived morality from the free command of the Creator, and who said, or were supposed to say, that God “might as readily have commanded cruelty, lying, and impurity, as He has forbidden them,” were speaking (1) of God’s absolute morality, or (2) of the natural rule of human beings, so far as it depends on that absolute morality; or (3) of His natural rule, so far as it depends on the constitution God has been pleased to give us. With regard to the Catholic theologians here glanced at, including, we suppose, Duns Scotus, Occam, Gerson, and Pierre Dailly, the controversy would require an historical research for which we have neither room nor leisure; and without such research it must be fought out upon details and fragments with the positiveness and contentiousness of the mediæval schools. Viewed in its bearings on the other tenets of these schoolmen, the doctrine here blamed seems to hinge on the second or third of the above suppositions. Thus, when Scotus* proves that the attributes which we assign to God are not the true counterparts of His transcendent life and essence, but only inadequate types and representations, it follows that as such types they are capable of infinite variation, and that God’s transcendent wisdom or power might be represented by very different wisdoms and powers in different creatures, according to His mere will. So in morals God’s mere will would be the only rule of law (the word ‘law,’ as a check upon absolute power, being totally inapplicable to God, in whom power and right are one and the same, and only applicable to creatures who can do more than they ought). Hence there is nothing in law, that is, in the rule given to creatures, that cannot be altered, abrogated, or suspended, by the same will that imposed it. Still, Scotus contends that the two

* In Sent. i. dis. 8, q. 4.



first commandments of the Decalogue are of eternal, substantial, and absolute obligation upon all free creatures ; for he cannot imagine a conscience framed so as not to be bound to love and honour God. But it is possible to conceive circumstances, even for men, in which each material act forbidden by the other commandments might become obligatory in individual cases, through the command of God. In this case such acts would be meritorious, and expressive of love and devotion to God ; and they have been from time to time commanded in Scripture, as in the case of Abraham. Our understanding can only comprehend morality under the conditions of our own nature. But God is free to make other natures, and their morality would be otherwise conditioned, while the absolute morality of God can be subject to no conditions at all.* Occam, perhaps, is more consistent in making even our love to God a contingent and conditional manifestation of morality, and in saying that God might surround even *odium Dei*† with such circumstances as would make it meritorious, just as we might say that some Protestants, while their idea of Catholicism remains what it is, are morally bound to hate the Church. Could God create free creatures liable to such a false conception of Him as should oblige them to hate Him ? If Occam says yes, at least his answer assumes that there are eternal principles of morality which oblige a free being to hate a God whom he conceives to be bad.

So far as we have examined the Protestant writers, we are disposed to think that if the above distinction had been laid before them, they would have declared that they were only speaking of the third supposition, and that they meant, that if God had pleased, He might have so ordered our constitution that the physical acts which now display certain moral characters should have had a totally different moral signification. This seems the fair construction to put on the words of that most offensive writer Zwinglius,‡ where he compares the moral law to the domestic rules which a father enacts to keep his children from sensuality and sloth ;—touch not the honey-pot—tie your shoes ; the wife and elder children break these rules with impunity, but it does not follow that they are the less bound to avoid sensuality and sloth. Zwinglius clearly contemplated two laws : one derived from the eternal nature of God, which forbids sloth ; the other adapted to our weak nature, forbidding certain acts which in us lead to or mani-

* Scotus in Sent. i. dis. 44, q. 1, and in Sent. iii. dis. 37, q. 1.

† Sent. ii. q. 19.

‡ De Prov. c. v. lib. i. p. 364 B.

fest sloth. If he does not speak clearly, it is, as Möhler says,* because the Protestants did not rightly understand their doctrines; they were confused and muddy, and would not have owned their system as it was developed by controversial adversaries, or even by their own fanatical followers.

That Puffendorf, another of these writers, was arguing about the contingent natural rule, and not about the absolute moral law, is clear from his words as quoted by Gerdil (Ward, p. 464): "It depended absolutely on God's good pleasure to give man, in creating him, such nature as He thought fit. How, then, can human actions have any property that results from an internal and absolute necessity, independently of the Divine institution?" This shows that Puffendorf was looking at the moral code on its contingent side exclusively; but it will not justify us in saying that he considered God's justice to be a contingent quality, regulated by His arbitrary will.

We do not admire this school, which has the air of wishing that God had made us beasts, so that we might behave like pigs without pangs of conscience; but there is an aspect of things in which its doctrine is true. But the school which Dr. Ward next attacks is far nobler (p. 78); it holds that "the only sense in which an act can be called with truth 'morally evil' is, that such act is forbidden—necessarily however, forbidden—by the Creator." This school attempts to combine the two truths; the necessary character of the moral law as it exists in and radiates from God, the Sun of justice; and the contingent nature of the constitution of creatures, by which they are brought in various degrees within the sphere of these rays. Dr. Ward, however, without making any such attempt to fathom its meaning, takes the theory in a lump, and brings against it "six different arguments, any one of which by itself would be amply sufficient to refute it."

Let us examine one of these; perhaps the second (p. 80) is most characteristic of Dr. Ward's method. "Our opponents," he says, "maintain that in calling [lying, &c.] morally evil, it is only meant that they are forbidden by the Creator" [he should not have omitted to say, "necessarily forbidden"]; "we, on the contrary, maintain that they are intrinsically evil, apart from all reference to the Creator's will. Our opponents must necessarily say that when I speak of a man as morally good, I mean no more than this,—that he conforms his conduct to his Creator's wishes" [really, this is too bad, this method of manipulating an opponent's proposition, first

* Symbolism, c. iii. § xxv. vol. i. p. 270, Robertson's translation.

leaving out the most important word, "necessary," then changing "command," or "will," into "wishes;" as if to suggest that he was arguing with men who frittered up the necessary immutable Will of God into a multitude of unstable wishes]. "But we," he continues, "maintain, that when I speak of him as morally good, I mean that he possesses those qualities that are intrinsically virtuous, independently of the Creator's wishes We understand by holiness the possession of certain qualities intrinsically virtuous; they understand by it the habit of conformity to the Creator's wishes."

Hitherto the argument has had for its object to burk the idea and the phrase, "necessary command," and to substitute in its place the term "wishes." The next step depends on our willingness to confound the moral rule of the creature with the absolute morality of the Creator, to such an extent as to hold that our obligation and duty is an exact image of God's obligation and duty; so that if it is our obligation to obey the Creator, it is also God's obligation to obey Himself. Now, we may deduce our duty from the Creator's command, and yet refuse to look upon the absolute morality of the Creator as a command imposed by Him upon Himself, as though to guard Himself from crime. Where the creature is obliged, the Creator is necessitated. The moral law is His Nature, His Attribute; He cannot will otherwise, for it is His Will. The creature can will otherwise, and is therefore obliged, fenced in, defended by the law. It is, then, no good illation to transfer the idea of human obligation, with all its human conditions, to God. Dr. Ward, however, does so. After interpreting the proposition "The Creator is all-holy" to mean "He possesses in the most perfect possible way all qualities that are intrinsically virtuous," he proceeds: "But what must be our opponents' version of this proposition,—'The Creator possesses in the most perfect way the quality of always conforming to His own wishes'? Or, to put it otherwise, this most solemn and fundamental truth, the Creator's sanctity, becomes in their mouths no more nor less than this: 'The Creator does in every respect exactly as He likes.'" Now, even supposing that his opponents were forced to admit the illation from man to God, their proposition would only be, "The Creator is all-holy, because He universally and necessarily conforms to His own necessary commands;" what can be more monstrous than to call this equivalent to the other? This, so far from being "frightfully revolting to piety," is certainly innocent, whether it goes to the root of the matter or not. But if the

illation is not admitted, that is, if the moral necessity that binds the Creator's will is distinguished from the moral obligation which He necessarily imposed on the free creature by the very act of creation, then it will not follow that because the creature's holiness consists in conformity to the Creator's commands, therefore the Creator's holiness consists in conformity to His own commands; and Dr. Ward's argument, so to call it, will have no sense at all.

We shall not examine any further the first portion of Dr. Ward's volume. Our readers will gather from what we have said, that we are not satisfied with its execution. Entirely convinced of the truth of the thesis to be proved, that moral truth is an attribute of God, an uncreated light that necessarily illumines the wills of all free creatures according to their measure, we opened the volume with every hope of seeing so great a theme properly treated; but metaphysical speculation does not seem to be Dr. Ward's strong point; and it is difficult to decipher a system where the dogmatism of the ontologist and the subjective process of the psychologist alternate in a way that spoils both. We do not find any difficulty solved in this book; there is ample flow of rhetoric, and a logic that unfolds errors so clearly that they look like truth; but some of the most knotty points have been touched as if the writer did not realise their difficulty, and other points, whose obscurity results from the crossing of distinct principles, are factitiously solved by adjourning the consideration of one of the principles, and, when it comes on the carpet, treating it as a mere exception and modification of a truth already settled.

Is it the consciousness of this argumentative weakness that makes Dr. Ward seek a kind of compensation in the unfairness and violence with which he treats his opponents? It is surely a great defect in any controversialist to have so low an opinion of those with whom he argues, as to fancy that he can prove them in four paragraphs to be either atheists or idiots; but in Dr. Ward such a practice is suicidal, for his only proof of the validity of intuitions is the infallibility of human reason on certain subjects. But now, if by a few facile strokes of superior intelligence he can demolish a whole school of Catholic thought, which counts illustrious names among its supporters, can strip off its pretensions, and demonstrate that its characteristic principle is "frightfully revolting to piety," how crushing is the dishonour which he heaps upon that human reason which he pretends to invest with such high powers of insight into the nature of Necessary Being!

In Dr. Ward this style of argument seems natural, and it is accompanied in him with many high gifts, with great devotion to Catholic truth, with generosity, earnestness, laboriousness, and extensive learning. But suppose that it should be imitated by pupils without these gifts, what manner of men would this style of teaching be likely to make of them? What quickness or decision would ever make up for the want of that moderation and human sympathy which is ever ready to acknowledge the truth which underlies the error, before it denounces or ridicules the falsehood? How would such controversialists fare in the intelligent society of a country like England?

It is a comfort to escape from the metaphysical to the psychological portion of Dr. Ward's volume, where he seems more at home, and where his geniality more fully reveals itself. Not that we can expect the leopard to change his spots, or the controversialist to lose his former personality, by the mere passing of an ideal barrier. We have the same contemptuous treatment of opponents; the great Bossuet fares no better than Mansel, Mill, or Viva; for, in reference to his doctrine that the desire of happiness is the one motive of human action, Dr. Ward says: "It is really difficult to imagine what can have led *any sane person* to put forth a theory which stands out in such broad contradiction with the most familiar and obvious facts" (p. 404). But the absurdity is Dr. Ward's own, who insists upon making the words *beatus* and *heureux* always point to eternal happiness, without reference to that present appeasement and calm which is the end of action: a temptation may be yielded to either because we love it, or because it annoys us; as we might throw our dinner to a hungry hound that we feared, and as Pilate yielded our Lord to the monstrous demands of the Jews whom he despised. A present annoyance outweighs a future one, which we may trust to the chapter of accidents, or to our own subsequent efforts to avoid. But the easiest way to prove Bossuet a driveller is to give perverse or inadequate interpretations of his meaning!

Still the second portion of Dr. Ward's volume may be studied with much profit. If we especially point out the chapter on the adaptation of our nature to virtue, it is only because the author has evidently lavished all his care and predilection upon it. It shows that our nature was so contrived as to be an instrument of virtue, not of vice; if our nature has received no addition or subtraction by the Fall, then Adam in Paradise had all the same propensions and passions that we have; they were given him to use, and

consequently their activity was compatible with the innocent and virtuous life to which he was there called, and it was, and still is possible, to put them to their legitimate use, and to make them the ministers and instruments of virtue. Thus virtue, which in its *à-priori* aspect is fidelity to the obligation of shunning evil and doing good, in one of its *à-posteriori* aspects is the harmonious and equable application of all our propensions to their proper ends; not but that circumstances may impose on some men the duty of altogether foregoing the activity of some propensions; but, in general, virtue must be manifested through them by their legitimate use, not by their destruction. Dr. Ward then shows in detail how each propension may be made the handmaid of piety, and may be trained to the service of God. If we single out his criticism upon the propension to knowledge, or intellectual exertion, it is not as a specimen of the rest of the chapter, but as an exception to the general excellence of its treatment.

It is difficult to analyse Dr. Ward's sentiments upon the use of intellect; it is hard to suppose that a man who is so distinguished for power of thought and speech should be other than a friend to their use; yet, in spite of his practical manifestations of the love of intellectual exertion, he certainly speaks of it with a degree of hatred and terror that seems quite irrational. Of all the propensions, that which leads us to employ our minds Dr. Ward considers the most mischievous and the most useless, the most violent and the most intense; to prove its danger, he refers to "the very close and, as it were, natural connection between great mathematical power, and extreme infidelity" (p. 289), and then he assigns three reasons for this coincidence. First, intellectual pursuits have no periods of reaction, like sensual pleasures, but may be constantly followed; but if men do this "in a reckless inordinate way, simply for the sake of the pleasure, and with no reference to moral duty, they become more thoroughly obdurate, more thoroughly insensible to higher and more spiritual motives, than perhaps any class of men that can be named." Secondly, there ensues "diabolical pride, . . . the ordinary, nay the necessary, accompaniment of great intellectual power, whenever the humbling exercises of piety are neglected." Thirdly, pride and insensibility united lead men to unbelief: "the mysteries of the Gospel, nay, the doctrines of natural religion, appear to their blind, carnal, grovelling, and proud intellect quite low and contemptible, such as it is impossible to believe without doing violence to their whole nature." Still, even intellectual

power, though "it degrades men to the very lowest moral level possible on earth," may be made beneficial. First, "it gives the leisured classes the moral power of consistently obeying God," by affording them an occupation which they can direct to His service; next, even when they do not turn it to this devout use, it makes "the leisured classes the greatest benefactors of mankind; for they apply their energies, in fifty different ways, to the investigation of principles and truths from which spring the greatest advantages to society." And if they turn intellect to no material use, at least they may keep themselves out of mischief by intellectual amusements. The third benefit of the propension is "the assistance which it has given in forming the Church's theology;" and Dr. Ward wonders how the body of divinity would ever have been elaborated if the exercise of reason had been a pain instead of a gratification.

And what would have become of humanity, we may ask, if the exertion of that intellect which is the characteristic by which it is elevated above the nature of brutes, had been always disagreeable and painful, instead of affording the keenest pleasure that we are capable of? It would seem as reasonable to apologise for the intellect itself as to apologise for the propensity to use it. With regard to the temptations to infidelity which mathematicians and men of science feel, perhaps one of the greatest of them is the hatred, terror, and affected contempt which some believers feel for intellectual superiority, the suspicion of infidelity with which they regard the most obvious objections to certain popular prejudices, and the galling police regulations with which they would always fetter the exercise of the mind. The claim for the indirect power of the Church over all matters of thought, whether metaphysics, geology, or astronomy, and for her plenary "right of peremptorily interfering in all these investigations, whenever she judges that any scientific conclusions lead to consequences at variance with that doctrinal deposit which is committed to her keeping" (p. xviii.), is not likely to be less contested by men of science, than Bellarmine's claim for her indirect right of peremptory interference with temporal governments was by politicians. Nor are scientific men likely to be soothed by being told that those decisions of the highest ecclesiastical courts which for generations fettered or perverted the course of science in several parts of Europe, were only illusory, and did not claim the interior assent of Catholics, but only compelled philosophers to teach that which they were neither able nor obliged to believe. To say that the intellect requires some external

standard (p. xxii.), is not to the purpose, unless it can be shown that the external standard of the truth of natural science is in the intuitions of theologians, not in nature. Neither are philosophers edified by the contrast between the fetters imposed on them, and the liberty which they sometimes see enjoyed by a teacher of religion to discuss, with a dogmatism which is only equalled by his ignorance, the subjects which belong to the sphere of science. St. Augustine declares this to be one of the sorest trials and scandals of intellect.*

We do not forget that this volume is addressed to those who are to be clergymen, otherwise we should have to object very strongly against a view of religion which seems to reduce it to a trade or profession, squabbling for precedence with other occupations, and either disparaging every other business of life, or admitting its legitimacy only as a method of passing away time which it would be impossible to devote to direct religious exercises (p. 383). Dr. Ward seems to regard the secondary ends of human action, not as occasions for man to exhibit his religion, but as necessary competitors against religion; and would have us reckon "national greatness, or intellectual power, or ancient family, or acquired wealth, to be worthless as the seaweed, except so far as they affect (for good or evil) the advance of sanctity." He had before owned that, without any relation to devotion, intellectual exercise had procured "the greatest advantages to society," and made its votaries "the greatest benefactors of mankind;" but now it appears that patriotism, or science, or nobility, or commerce is "worthless as the seaweed," that inferior objects of human action are not worth working for, and that where religion is not concerned we may as well sit with our hands in our lap as "labour instantly at whatsoever our hand can do." Combine this notion with that of religion being rather a set of functions apart than a quality of our every-day life, and the apology for the *dolce far niente* of Neapolitan blackguardism is complete. Patriotism, philosophy, and industry are placed in opposition to religion, and the business of life is confined to an inglorious non-intervention, to keeping the hands clean by doing nothing, or to securing the mind from evil thoughts by filling it with nugatory ones.

These whims and crazes are great disfigurements to the psychological part of the book, but still, after subtracting them, enough remains to form a remarkable work, which no discriminating person can read without learning much, and

* De Gen. ad lit. ii, 18.

clearing his thoughts on many subjects that were before obscure. It would be idle to praise Dr. Ward for his devotion to his subject, and for his industry in getting up his treatise; and if we have been reluctantly compelled to draw attention to its weak places, it is with no thought of undoing the labour of years by a fortnight's critical examination. Still, we think that the book abounds with faults which no critic can honestly overlook; and if we have devoted our Article to discovering some of these, it is from no want of an honest appreciation of the valuable matter that still remains behind, after all drawbacks have been allowed and discounted.

Communicated Article.

EDMUND CAMPION.—No. III.

CAMPION's biographers, Parsons, Bombinus, Bartoli, and More, who write rather to edify their readers than to trace the character and opinions of the subject of their memoirs, tell us nothing of what occurred to him at Rome beyond his conformity to the pious usages of pilgrims, his gradually-formed conviction that he was called to be a Jesuit, and his admission into the order at the end of April 1573. It appears, however, by his own statements, that he had already made up his mind about his vocation when he first arrived; so that all the stories about the interior voice which miraculously directed him in answer to his protracted devotions, and the severe trial which he made of its authenticity, are shown to be at least great exaggerations, if not pure fancies.

"On my first arrival into Rome," he said at his trial, in November 1581, "which is now about ten years past, it was my hap to have access to [Cardinal Gesualdi, of St. Cecilia], who, having some liking of me, would have been the means to prefer me to any place of service whereunto I should have most faculty; but I, being resolved what course to take, answered that I meant not to serve any man, but to enter into the Society of Jesus, thereof to vow and to be professed."

Then Gesualdi began to question him about the Bull of Pius V. against Elizabeth. Not that any hesitation was felt at Rome about its propriety, or any doubt of the ultimate success of the policy; the Cardinal simply wished to know what had been the effect of this step. If it had failed, like the Bull of Paul III. against Henry VIII., that failure was not calculated to produce discouragement. Had not the Israel-

ites, when they marched by God's express command against the men of Benjamin, been twice overthrown before they conquered? Still, there was some wish to make its bearings on the Catholics as easy as possible. "Being demanded farther," Campion continues, "what opinion I had conceived of the Bull, I said, it procured much severity in England, and the heavy hand of her majesty against the Catholics; whereunto the Cardinal replied, that he doubted not it should be mitigated in such sort as the Catholics should acknowledge her highness as their queen without danger of excommunication." This, Campion urged, could not be construed as an offence, much less as treason. But it was objected to him, that he had only asked for a mitigation of the Bull in favour of the Catholics, leaving the excommunication of the queen still in force and undetected; and his privity thereto was treason. "My privity thereto," he replied, "enforceth not my consenting, nay, rather it proved my disagreement, in that I said it procured much severity: and therefore, being here published before I could detect it (for who knew not that the Queen of England was excommunicated?), it excused my privity and exempted me from treason."

Campion urges that his conduct rather implied dissent from than agreement with the Bull. That this disagreement was a fact, not a mere plea, he might have proved from his *History of Ireland*, had the book been forthcoming. Just as the writers of the sixteenth century show that Otho of Freising disagreed with the temporal policy which had been pursued by Gregory VII., because he persisted in calling the risings against the excommunicated emperor by the name of "rebellion," so Campion might have produced the strong terms of condemnation in which he had spoken of those Irishmen who had risen against Elizabeth and Henry VIII. Shane O'Neil is a "wretched man," who "quenched the sparks of grace that appeared in him with arrogancy and contempt against his prince." Lord Thomas Fitzgerald, Deputy of Ireland, who, upon the receipt of false intelligence that his father had been put to death in England, had risen in arms, is represented by Campion as saying: "If all the hearts of England and Ireland that have cause thereto would join in this quarrel,—as I trust they will,—then should he (Henry) be a by-word—as I trust he shall—for his heresy, lechery, and tyranny, wherein the age to come may score him among the ancient princes of most abominable and hateful memory." This is language quite in conformity with that of the Bull of Paul III.; yet Campion's comment on it is, "With that he rendered up the sword (of

state), and flung away like a bedlam, adding to his shameful oration many other slanderous and foul terms, which, for regard of the king's posterity, I have no mind to utter." Can we doubt how the man who spoke in these terms of the risings in Ireland would have qualified the rebellion of the North in 1569, if it had been necessary for him to mention it in his history? Or can we doubt why, in his history of the divorce, he simply mentions the excommunication of Henry without a word about the sentence of deposition, which was the real focus of the controversy?

It is not to be supposed that Campion had shut his mind against the great Roman question of the day. His History of Ireland proves that he was fully instructed in the claims of the Popes to the temporal supremacy of all Christian kingdoms. He not only narrates but he believes, that "when Ireland first received Christendom, they gave themselves into the jurisdiction, both spiritual and temporal, of the See of Rome;" and he tells how Adrian IV. conferred the temporal lordship upon Henry II.; how that Pope, "an Englishman born, who, having in his youth taken a painful pilgrimage into Norway, and reduced the whole land unto Christianity, learned distinctly the state of Ireland" from the Norsemen who repaired thither, through whose intercourse with the wild and furious natives religion ran great danger of being defaced; "for though Christ were believed and taught, yet the multitude eft-soon grew to a shameless kind of liberty, making no more of necessary points of doctrine than served their loose humour." Moreover, "Henry II., building upon the Pope's favour, his born subject, had sent ambassadors to Rome in the first year of his reign, asking leave to attempt the conquest of Ireland." Adrian had such trust in the king, that he not only gave him leave to conquer the island, but conferred on him a kind of legatine power of correcting its religious abuses. Accordingly, the invasion took place; the reformation was enacted in the eight articles of the synod of Cashel; and the Irish clergy, in obedience to the papal Bulls, "denounced curse and excommunication to any that would maliciously gainsay or frustrate" the temporal right over Ireland that the Popes had given to Henry.

In the authentic documents connected with this transaction, we do not find a word about the self-donation of the Irish to the Pope; the right that he claimed over Ireland he derived from the alleged fact that "all the islands which are enlightened by Christ, and have submitted to the doctrine of Christianity, are unquestionably St. Peter's right, and belong to the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Church." But

John of Salisbury, who was Henry's envoy, tells us the ground of this "unquestionable" right. "At my prayer," he says, "Adrian IV. granted Ireland to Henry II., to be held by right of inheritance. . . . For by ancient right all islands are said to belong to the Roman Church *by the donation of Constantine.*"

All that we find expressed in the Bull is, that the Popes had an unquestionable right over all Christian islands; the grounds on which this right was rested varied with the variations of public opinion. At one time the pretended donation of Constantine was alleged; but when there was a growing disposition to question the right of Constantine to give, if he ever had given, a right which he had never possessed, and which perhaps he could not transmit to his successors if he had possessed it, the claim was grounded on the vote by which the people had once for all exercised their right of electing their lord, and then abdicated it for ever. But the Popes themselves seem to have founded their right, first on the feudal law, then on the ground of divine right, because they were Vicars of Christ in His temporal as well as in His spiritual power; and then on the ground of the necessity of this right for the government of the Church, after controversialists had shown that they were Vicars of Christ in those powers only which He had exercised while upon earth.

If the Pope could give Ireland to Henry because "all islands belonged to the Roman See," the same reason was equally applicable to England. But Campion was far from allowing this. He mentions the fact that King John "made a personal surrender of both his realms in way of submission" to the Pope; "and after his assoilment received them again. Some add," he continues, "that he gave away his kingdom to the see of Rome for him and his successors, recognising to hold the same of the Popes in fee, paying yearly therefore a thousand marks. . . . Sir Thomas More, a man in that calling and office likely to sound the matter to the depth, writeth precisely, that neither any such writing the Pope can show, nor were it effectual if he could." Sir Thomas More was clearly a favourite of Campion. In his history of Henry's divorce he talks of the "incredible experience in affairs and penetration of intellect" which the chancellor displayed, and of his "sublime and almost divine wisdom;" and this appeal to his authority on the subject of the Pope's rights over England is decisive of the appellant's opinion.

The Bull of Paul III. against Henry VIII. was not published in More's lifetime; indeed, Paul was not yet Pope. Still,

More knew of the right of the Pope to settle the legitimacy of marriages and of their issue, and his claim to adjudicate upon the succession of the crown. Nevertheless, both More and Fisher were willing enough to bind themselves to obedience to the law of succession defined by the statute, which gave the crown to the issue of the union of Henry with Anne Boleyn, though they refused to swear that the marriage of Catherine had been null and void from the first; and More, after his condemnation, avowed his belief that Parliament had gone beyond its province in the two questions of the supremacy and the divorce. That is to say, they recognised the right of Parliament to give the crown of England to whom it chose, legitimate or not, but did not recognise its right to define the spiritual questions of the sacrament of marriage, and of the ecclesiastical supremacy. They must have held the opinion that the Church had power only over spiritual things, and not over civil and temporal matters.

That this opinion was deeply rooted in the English laity of the day, is clear from what we read in Hall's Chronicle about the general fast ordered by Wolsey on occasion of the sack of Rome by the Constable Bourbon in 1527, that the clergy in general neglected it; while the laity, to show their grudge against the spirituality, not only refused to observe it, but said that the Pope was worthily served for being such a "ruffian" as to exceed his powers in meddling with temporal dominion.

Accordingly, when Paul III., in 1538, deprived Henry of his realm; laid all places where he might go under an interdict; declared all his children by Anne, and the children of his supporters, to be infamous, illegitimate, and incapable of inheriting; forbade his subjects to obey him; forbade all Catholics to have any commercial dealings with him or his party; ordered all ecclesiastics to depart the realm, and the nobles to rebel; declared all treaties between him and other sovereigns null and void, and ordered that all his supporters, wherever caught, should be made slaves to the person capturing them,—his Bull found very little response in England. Not so, however, in the parts nearer the Scottish border, where, as an eye-witness tells us, even down to 1550, the name of the Pope of Rome was so venerated by the people, that whatsoever they were told he had said or done was to them as good as an oracle, or a dispensation of Providence. But in other parts of the country the Bull was entirely disregarded.

When Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, she took good care to profit by the experience of her father. She took the

line of comprehension, not of exclusion, and required obedience only, not a conscientious conviction of the purity of her origin. She founded her rights to the crown solely on the authority of Parliament, which had confirmed her father's testament. In the act of February 9, 1559, for recognising the queen's just title to the crown, there was no clause to assert the validity of her mother's marriage, which had been declared null in 1553; she contented herself with her parliamentary title: thus leaving liberty of conscience to those who, like More and Fisher, maintained the Pope's supreme right in spiritual matters, but at the same time acknowledged the supreme right of the civil government in all temporal matters, to the extent of bestowing the crown even on persons of base birth, though there were legitimate candidates for the throne. On a similar principle, Elizabeth claimed her ecclesiastical supremacy, not as a right inherent in the crown, but as a grant expressly made by the authority of the Legislature. Here Fisher and More would have stopped; they could never concede the right of Parliament to make such a grant, though they might possibly have come round to Margaret Roper's distinction, and admitted the king's supremacy over all ecclesiastical persons, so far as "the Word of God permitted," in opposition to the extravagant claims of the canonists.

But neither Paul IV. nor St. Pius V. were disposed to admit any compromise; they both joined issue with Elizabeth in maintaining that as illegitimate she could only succeed to the throne through their dispensation; and they were both ready to make all sacrifices to maintain the theory of the indefinite supremacy of the Pope, not only over spiritual affairs, but (directly or indirectly) over temporal matters also. When Elizabeth, on her accession, ordered Sir Edward Carne, the English agent at Rome, to notify the fact to Paul IV., and to assure him of her determination to offer no violence to the consciences of her subjects, the Pope, to whom the French ambassador had been talking of the rights of Mary of Scotland, replied that, "as a bastard, Elizabeth was incapable of succeeding to the English crown" (a curious decision in the teeth of the precedent of William the Conqueror, and Alexander II.); that "by ascending the throne without his sanction she had insulted the authority of the Apostolic See," which claimed feudal suzerainty over England; but that nevertheless, "if she could consent to submit herself and her claims to his judgment, he was still desirous of extending to her whatever indulgence the justice of the case should allow." Elizabeth, as might have been expected, instantly ordered

Carne to quit Rome, and the Pope did not mend matters by refusing the permission to depart. He had managed to set the quarrel with England on a political basis, in which the queen, whatever might be her conduct, would be sure to have the overwhelming majority even of the English Catholics in her favour. Paul died in 1559; and his successor, Pius IV., tried to reopen communications with Elizabeth, and sent two ambassadors, Parpalia, in May 1560, bearing a letter, in which the Pope exhorted her to obedience, and promised her "whatsoever she might desire for the establishing and confirming her princely dignity, according to the authority, place, and office committed to him by God." But neither Parpalia nor his successor, Martinego, in May 1561, was allowed to enter England, chiefly on the ground that it was "manifest that, allowing the authority of the Pope according to such jurisdiction as he claimeth, there will follow a great peril to the security and truth of her majesty's undoubted title to the crown," and that, though Martinego swore that he would do nothing prejudicial to the crown or state, yet the thing was already done. "The Pope hath, even at this instant time in Ireland, a legate who is publicly joined already with certain traitors, and is occupied in stirring a rebellion, having already, by open acts, deprived the queen of her right and title there;" and it was believed that the envoy was to try to "stir up a rebellion in the realm by colour of religion."

While the Pope thus encroached on Elizabeth's political rights, she and her council were more than even with him in encroaching on the spiritual liberties of her subjects. There was no moderation; in the midst of the blind passions of the moment, it appeared necessary to force men to renounce the Mass, in order to demonstrate to the Pope how little authority he had over the succession of the English crown; and the establishment of heresy by civil violence seemed the natural answer to the attempt to control the civil succession of the crown by ecclesiastical power. The passions of both parties were excited, and there was no room for moderate counsels to gain a hearing. To disapprove of the Pope's civil proceedings, was to approve of Elizabeth's ecclesiastical alterations; to take up a moderate line insured persecution from both parties.

Among those who were driven from England by the ecclesiastical violence of the first years of Elizabeth, by far the greatest theologian was Thomas Stapleton, who attempted to introduce some moderation at least into the theory of the relations between the papal authority and civil governments. He denounced the two extremes,—the opinions both of those

who claimed for the Pope authority over princes, because all temporal power was derived from him, and of those who derived this papal authority from the gift of the emperors. He disclaimed any temporal suzerainty of the Pope over princes, and he denied that the Pope had any right to dethrone them for any merely civil cause. The Pope could not justly interfere with temporal governments, except when they were hostile or detrimental to the Catholic religion; and in this case he had precisely the same right of interference as one state has in respect to another state whose internal condition is such as to be a serious danger to its neighbours. He may intervene either against the people, when they are about to elect a prince who will probably tamper with their religion, or against such a prince when he is on the throne. And he has two methods of interfering against the prince; first indirectly, through the people or parliament, whom he may excite to throw off the authority of their prince, and to dethrone him; and secondly, in case this does not succeed, through want of power or want of will on the part of the people, then he must take a more direct method, and give the realm to some Catholic prince, or proclaim that the first man who can conquer it shall have it.

Stapleton did not adapt his theory to the beginning of the quarrel with Elizabeth, but to the situation, as he found it existing after the lapse of a few years; and at Rome his theory, though it was not based on the broad ground occupied by the Popes of that age, yet served quite as well as theirs for the course they were following. It did not signify whether a theologian declared them to have a direct, or only an indirect, right of interfering in the temporal affairs of other states, provided interference was defended; and Stapleton was as acceptable as a Bozius would have been, when his practical conclusion tallied so exactly with that of the most fervid adherents of the direct right of the Pope in temporal matters. His programme was carried out to the letter; and, indeed, he is mentioned by subsequent writers as one of those English divines on whose information Pius V. chiefly relied—Harding, Stapleton, Morton, and Webbe.

Pius V. then, knowing how his predecessor's attempts to send an agent to Elizabeth had failed, changed his plan, and began to address himself to the people; and for this purpose (I quote Dr. Sanders), in 1569, he sent Dr. Nicolas Morton into England, "to declare by Apostolic authority to certain illustrious and Catholic men, that Elizabeth, who then wore the crown, was a heretic, and therefore had lost all right to the dominion and power which she exercised upon the Catho-

lies, and might be properly treated by them as a heathen and publican; and that they henceforth owed no obedience to her laws or commands. By this declaration many of the higher classes were led not only to consult their own interest, but to consider by what means they could deliver their brethren from the tyranny of the heretics. And they hoped that all the Catholics would join them with all their forces in this pious design. But though the affair turned out contrary to their hopes, either because all the Catholics did not yet properly know that Elizabeth was legally declared a heretic, or because God had determined to punish still more heavily the revolt of England, yet their design was a praiseworthy one, and was by no means without a certain success."

The success attained was the rebellion of the great earls of the North, in 1559. Its failure did not discourage the English advisers of Pius V. They soon picked up a new leader, the Duke of Norfolk, whom they assumed to be a sound Catholic, and to whose standard they fondly expected the whole realm to rally; it only required that the Pope's pleasure and censure should be once authentically known to the Catholics, and there would be no place for resistance; and afterwards the whole difficulty might be settled by a marriage between the Duke of Norfolk and Queen Mary of Scotland.

Persuaded by these representations, which had more weight with the Pope than the prayers of Maximilian and other princes, who were likely at least to know something of the probable political issues of the course, Pius V. launched his Bull against Elizabeth, in which he reasserted in the strongest terms all the papal claims which had ever found their strongest antagonists in England. The Pope alone is appointed "prince over all nations and all realms, to pluck up, to destroy, to dissipate, to crush, to plant, and to build." The conduct of Elizabeth, the "pretended queen," is contrasted with that of her sister Mary, the "legitimate queen," of England, whose policy had made all foreign connection hateful even to the Catholics. Elizabeth is declared a heretic, and therefore excommunicate, and "deprived of her pretended right to the said kingdom, and all and every dominion, dignity, and privilege;" all her subjects are for ever absolved from all allegiance to her; all are commanded "not to dare to obey her, and her monitions, commands, and laws;" all who do so are anathematised with her.

This Bull, says Sanders, was obeyed by one or two Catholics (*unus et alter*), who sacrificed their lives in publish-

ing or asserting it. The rest, either because they did not acknowledge the legality of its publication, and observed that the neighbouring princes and commonwealths made no difference in their relations with the queen; or because, when Pius V. died, they did not know that his successor had renewed and confirmed the Bull; or, at least, through fear (though they alleged the former excuses),—remained in their obedience; and their opponents braved the whole thing as a bugbear to fright babes with.

A very able Catholic lawyer of the period will add to Sanders' list of reasons. "I have been often told," says William Barclay, "by noblemen and men of good life, that the divine precept of honouring kings had struck such deep root in their minds, that no Bulls or indulgences to the contrary could alleviate the scruples they felt, or give them a feeling of internal security in violating so clear and plain a precept of natural and divine right as the allegiance they owed and had sworn to their prince." And he represents the people telling the Pope, "that as he is not the superior of the king in temporals, he cannot forbid their temporal obedience to the king. He is but the interpreter, not the enactor, of the Divine law, and therefore his interposition is only requisite when something obscure has to be cleared up, not in cases which need no explanation. Therefore, when the command is "to render to Cæsar what is Cæsar's, and to God what is God's," and "to be subject and obedient to princes and powers," it is the Pope's business to define what is Cæsar's and what is God's, but not to forbid subjects to give any thing whatever to Cæsar, for this is not to interpret but to abrogate the law. To define that our obligation of obedience to the prince is comprised within the limits of temporal matters, while all spiritual affairs are reserved to the jurisdiction of the Vicar of Christ, or that no king is to be obeyed when he commands things contrary to the law of nature or of God, or to good manners, is the Pope's right; but when he merely commands men "in no way to obey their prince, or his monitions, commands, and laws," he cannot be obeyed, because this is not interpreting but annulling the divine precept, and beyond the papal power, as determined by the canons. The same reasoning applies still more strongly to the abrogation of allegiance. When men are commanded to withdraw their allegiance from a prince, because obedience to him may hinder their spiritual good, they may reply, that this evil is merely an accident, which may be lamentable, but cannot be hindered. God's command is to obey the prince "with patience in well-doing." If he misuses

his power, God will punish him; his subjects may not transgress God's plain command for any presumed advantage. Again, the Pope's absolution from the oath of allegiance only breeds a scruple about his power; for it is known that he cannot dispense with the Divine law. God commands obedience to the Pope in spiritual matters, to the king in temporal affairs. This obedience will still be paid in spite of the denunciations of the Bull, which are fearful enough; but the fear of an unjust excommunication will never force people to do that which they know to be against the law of God." Sanders (whom Camden follows, p. 186) and Barclay are sufficient witnesses of the reasons which induced the Catholics of England to treat the Bull as a dead letter. That Campion shared the common opinions of his brethren I have, I think, made evident. Like them, he at least hesitated about the Bull; he doubted whether it justified Catholics in throwing off their allegiance; it put him into the same sceptical attitude which precluded any kind of decisive political partisanship.

Its effect on Elizabeth and her government was, on the other hand, most decisive. That persecution which drove Campion first from Ireland and then from England was the immediate result; and within two years it had produced a crop of penal laws, the first instalment of that sanguinary code which in process of time nearly effaced the Catholic Church from this island. No wonder that Campion, when asked his opinion about the Bull, declared that it procured much severity in England, and the heavy hand of her majesty against the Catholics. But no representation that Campion could make was likely to procure the reversal of a policy that was carried out in spite of the most earnest remonstrances of the emperors and kings on whom the Popes chiefly depended.

I do not know whether Campion went so far as to think, with several Catholic politicians of the period, that Paul III., Paul IV., and Pius V. sacrificed the Church of this country to their desire of maintaining in their integrity all the temporal prerogatives exercised or claimed by their predecessors, and that if they had frankly relinquished that temporal suzerainty which was the chief ground of the hesitations of their adherents, they would have given confidence to their friends, and disarmed their merely political foes. As affairs were managed, they rendered simply impossible the coexistence of the government of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth with the obedience of their subjects to the supreme authority of the Pope; and those princes had no

choice but either to abdicate, with the hope of receiving back their crowns, like King John, from the papal legate, or to hold their own in spite of the Popes, and in direct and avowed hostility to them. After the indications which those princes had already given, it must have been a singular view of human nature which could lead St. Pius V. to expect Elizabeth to take the first course, as he did, even so late as 1571.

This expectation of success, founded on the enthusiasm of the English exiles at Rome, is the real answer to the charge, that in this business the Popes showed themselves equally ignorant of the teachings of history, and forgetful of the principles which the canon law lays down, after St. Augustine, for the excommunication of mighty delinquents: "Censures do no good, except when the person censured has few followers. When the disease has seized multitudes, the good have no remedy but grief and groans; . . . otherwise in plucking up the tares they may chance to pull up the wheat also; . . . indeed, when the contagion of sin has infected a whole multitude, the severe discipline of Divine mercy is necessary; for counsels of separation are both futile and hurtful, and sacrilegious; for they become impious and proud, and cause more disturbance to the weak good than correction to the determined bad."

But the evil had spread too far, and so in endeavouring to preserve a temporal prerogative that had always been disputed, and had more often failed than succeeded in practice, while in theory it was open to grave objections, those Popes lost England to the faith, and were so far from securing the prerogative for which they contended, that in the controversy with France in the next century it was resigned, not without debate, but without any great struggle. If Henry VIII. and Elizabeth had been treated with the same delicacy and circumspection that Lewis XIV. experienced, the end might have been very different to what it was; and if Lewis had been treated like Henry VIII., the Eldest son of the Church would probably have proved as bad a churchman as the Defender of the Faith.

The long sojourn of Campion in Rome before he attempted to carry out his resolve of entering the Society of Jesus, is accounted for by the Society being then without a head, while its third great congregation was assembled to elect a successor to St. Francis Borgia, the third general, who had died October 1, 1572, very soon after Campion's arrival in the city, and exactly five months after the death of St. Pius V. The choice fell upon Everardus Mercurianus, of Liege, April 23, 1573; and a few days afterwards Cam-

pion presented himself as the new general's first postulant. No further trial of his vocation was required than the probation he had imposed upon himself; he was forthwith accepted; but as there was then no English "nation" in the Society, the various provincials disputed who should have him, and he was at last allotted to Lawrence Maggi, or Magius, of the Austrian province. "He was incredibly comforted," says Parsons, "with this battle of the provincials for the possession of his body, because he saw that he was no more his own man, but in the hands of others who, under God, would dispose of him better than he could do for himself; he was perfectly indifferent to all functions, and all countries; but as his own inclination was for a country where he might strive against heresy, he was glad that Bohemia had been allotted to him. He thought that England owed some reparation to a country which had been first infected by the disciples of Wicliffe."

Campion was a man of common opinions, which he could urge and adorn with all the resources of rhetoric and the wealth of eloquence, and was consequently more dependent on authority for his ideas than upon any depth of research or originality of thought, and must have hailed the new obedience he had undertaken as a happy deliverance from himself. In England he had held, as we have seen, the popular opinions upon the papal sovereignty which had been inherited by the English Catholics, through Sir Thomas More, from generations of politicians. At Douai he must have found these opinions treated as nearly heretical, and the contrary doctrines energetically preached; still we find him at Rome with his old opinions, refusing any political place that Cardinal Gesualdi had to offer, and taking refuge from the storms of debate in a society where all his energies might be devoted to his own religious perfection, and to those scholastic employments which he ever cultivated, even in the midst of his greatest religious difficulties. In this I trace the same character which so long drowned scruples at Oxford in various employments, good in themselves, but then used to put off that important inquiry which ever loomed threateningly upon his horizon. So now by his entrance into the Society of Jesus he adjourned, but he did not solve, the question of the temporal supremacy of the papal sovereignty, which was once again to confront him, and to claim a decision which he could not give though he was to die for refusing it.

The congregation of the Society came to an end in the middle of June 1573. Soon afterwards Magius, the Austrian provincial, with certain Spanish and German fathers, and

Campion, left Rome for Vienna, where they arrived in August; Campion was immediately sent on to Prague, where the novitiate then was, in the company of Father James Avellanedo, the newly-appointed confessor to the empress. This father was afterwards known to Parsons at Madrid, and often told him "how exceedingly he was edified in all that journey with the modesty, humility, sweet behaviour, and angelical conversation of F. Campion," for whose sake "he remained ever after much affectioned to our whole nation."

It would take me too far out of my way to trace the importation of the half political heresy of Wicliffe into Prague; its adoption and propagation there by John Huss; the tumults to which it led; the overthrow of the famous university, which, indeed, was a natural result of a doctrine which taught that "universities, studies, degrees, colleges, and professorships are pagan vanities, and of no more use to the Church than the devil;" and at last the persecution in which a remedy was sought for these evils, and which Campion thus defends: "Huss would not have been punished except the pestilent liar had been captured in the act of running away, which the Emperor Sigismund had forbidden him to do on peril of his life, and except he had violated the conditions which he had accepted from the Emperor, and had thus nullified his passport. Huss's malice was too hasty, and he was caught. He was commanded to present himself at Constance to answer for the barbarous tragedies he had enacted in his own land of Bohemia; he despised the prerogative of the council, he sought security from Cæsar; Cæsar signed the agreement, the Christian world, greater than Cæsar, rescinded it; the heresiarch would not repent; he perished. Jerome of Prague stole to Constance with nobody's protection. He was taken, he made his appearance, he spoke, he was treated with great kindness, he went freely wherever he liked, he was healed, he abjured his heresy; he relapsed, he was burnt."

Cochlæus, in the first quarter of the next century, had still to deplore the fall of the University of Prague, that had once been the boast of Bohemia, but also that of the Catholic religion, which was so low that it would be difficult for it ever to recover its ancient state. Still half a century passed, and in 1570 religion had made no advance; men doubted whether it ever could. The Bohemian Catholics were few, and all of the poorest classes; the only wealthy persons of that religion at Prague were the Italian merchants, who united in a confraternity to assist the priests. The emperor also was Catholic, and had sent the Jesuits to the town,

bidding them rely on his assistance in case of any tumults. But the influence of the new order was only gradually felt. The toil of all the labourers only produced a harvest of seventy souls in 1573, in 1574, of fifty; in 1575 a few apostate priests were reconciled, one or two Hussite ministers, and forty-three laymen; and so on till 1580, when the whole influence of the court was lent to them, and 584 converts responded to their call. That was the first year of any distinct significance. A few years before Campion had exclaimed, "Surely this commonwealth will either return, through God's mercy and the help of the saints, to the unity of the Roman Church, or else, through the wrath of God, Satan will triumph, and it will be overwhelmed in the thick and horrible darkness of new sects, and will perish." So evenly did the balance seem to hold itself. But within another fifty years the restoration of religion was carried out in such a rough-and-ready way as probably sowed the seeds of calamities still to come; for minds forced into acquiescence will always hand down the tradition of the original wrong, and future generations will avenge the persecution of their fathers. "In 1620," says Cardinal Carafa, "the delegates began to restore religion in Bohemia, first at Prague, where they were not entirely without success, though it fell short of their hopes; yet the people could not complain of want of instruction; every one might converse with a monk or a priest as long as he chose. But the people did not seem to want him; they were more impressed when some of the chief inhabitants were exiled: it was hard to leave their property, harder to leave their friends, hardest of all to be sent to live in an unknown place. Several of the higher classes were converted in this manner, and many of the stiffer religionists followed in their wake; but the rest, though forced to close their shops and to forego all trading, only sought to gain time, though every now and then some few became Catholic. The Archbishop's toil was strangely unproductive; many laid the blame on the Calvinists; but the Hussites and Lutherans were as slow: the real truth was, they were waiting to see which side would prevail, when Tilly's victory at the White Mountain put an end to their doubts." The Cardinal afterwards records how much easier it was found to convert the fanatical Calvinists and Lutherans of the Rhenish provinces than the indifferent people of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria. For "it is easier to pass from one extreme to another than to move from the middle point of equilibrium. A conceited Calvinist or stiff Lutheran will sooner become Catholic than a lukewarm and easy

Lutheran, who always promises well, but never seriously inquires for the truth, for which he does not care."

Campion's first residence at Prague was of very short duration; within two months of his arrival there the novitiate, into which he had not yet made his formal entrance, was removed to Brünn in Moravia, a city where the prospects of Catholicism were even more gloomy than at Prague. The very names of Pope and Catholic were in execration; magistrates and people were alike Protestant, the latter riotous and unruly. The clergy of one of the great churches was Catholic, that of the other alternated between the two religions: in 1570 a single energetic Jesuit had been sent there, who continued to preach in spite of the tumults that his presence excited. But the Bishop of Olmütz, the diocesan, saw that one father was not sufficient for the work, and had therefore procured the removal of the novitiate from Prague to Brünn, in hopes of being able to utilise the exercises of the novices and the spare time of the fathers.

Accordingly, Oct. 10, 1573, John Paul Campanus, Master of Novices, and John Vivarius, his socius, conveyed Campion and five other novices from Prague to Brünn, where they were soon joined by six more from Vienna. But in the following January the Bishop died, and for ten years the establishment was in continual peril: its goods were seized, its funds confiscated, its members accused before the tribunals, and its suppression decreed by the emperor, though the commissioners would not promulgate the edict. But after much inconvenience and continual changes of residence, the foundation was gradually consolidated, and in process of time was able to erect an enormous college with seven quadrangles, now turned into a barrack.

Here Campion spent the year of his probation. One of the first acts required of him was to inscribe in the album or blank book of the novitiate certain particulars about himself, his family, and his education, as prescribed in the third and fifth chapters of the Constitutions of the Society. I have already extracted most of the details, so I shall only print here that which I have omitted. "I have a deliberate intention," he says, "of living and dying in this Society of Jesus. And this is my present determination, even although I had not determined it before, by no man's advice, but of my own proper motion. . . . I have a tolerably happy memory, an understanding sufficiently penetrating, and a mind inclined to study. For this purpose, as also for the other duties of the Society, I am tolerably robust." The rules of the Society were such as to make the novitiate an

institution of great power and influence in a town like Brünn. The "six experiments" can mostly be turned to missionary purposes. According to the rule, the novice was to spend one month in complete retirement, during which he was to perform St. Ignatius's spiritual exercises; another month was devoted to the hospitals, where he had to make himself a slave to the sick inmates; for another month he had to beg alms for the novitiate from door to door, and to learn to bear the insults and the practical jokes of vagabonds; for another month he had to take his turn in all the most menial employments of the house; and at least a month was to be spent in catechising children and ignorant persons, either publicly or privately. This was precisely that for which the Bishop of Olmütz wished to have the novitiate at Brünn; this exercise therefore superseded many of the others, and the novices were scarcely settled before their master began to send them round into all the neighbouring villages to teach the Catechism. All had great success, but Campion was ever noticed to be the most successful, and the villages around Brünn contained many converts that he had led to the Church.

To show with what hearty fervour Campion entered into these exercises, and how utterly he gave himself body and soul to the new life he had undertaken, I need only quote the two following letters, which he subsequently wrote to the novices at Brünn, after he had taken his vows, and had returned to the college at Prague.

"How much I love you in the bowels of Jesus Christ, my dearest brethren, you may conclude from this, that in spite of my daily occupations, which scarce leave me time to breathe, I have managed to steal time from the midst of my functions and cares to write to you. How could I do otherwise, directly I heard of a sure messenger to Brünn? How could I help firing up with the remembrance of that house, where there are so many burning souls, fire in their mind, fire in their body, fire in their words—the fire which God came to send upon the earth, that it might always burn there? O dear walls, that once shut me up in your company! Pleasant recreation-room, where we talked so holily! Glorious kitchen, where the best friends—John and Charles, the two Stephens, Sallitzi, Finnit and George, Tobias and Gaspar—fight for the saucepans in holy humility and charity unfeigned! How often do I picture to myself one returning with his load from the farm, another from the market; one sweating stalwartly and merrily under a sack of rubbish, another under some other toil! Believe me, my dearest brethren, that your dust, your brooms, your chaff, your loads, are beheld by angels with joy, and that through them they obtain more for you from God than if they saw in your hands sceptres, jewels, and purses of gold. Would that I

knew not what I say ; but yet, as I do know it, I will say it ; in the wealth, honours, pleasures, pomps of the world, there is nothing but thorns and dirt. The poverty of Christ has less pinching parsimony, less meanness, than the emperor's palace. But if we speak of the spiritual food, who can doubt that one hour of this familiar intercourse with God and with good spirits, is better than all the years of kings and princes ? I have been about a year in religion, in the world thirty-five ; what a happy change, if I could say I had been a year in the world, in religion thirty-five ! If I had never known any father but the fathers of the Society ; no brothers but you and my other brothers ; no business but the business of obedience ; no knowledge but Christ crucified ! Would that at least I had been as happy as you, who have entered the vineyard of Christ in the morning of your lives ! I almost envy Cantensis and Charles, who have been brought in so young that they can spend their childhood with the child Jesus, and can grow up with Him, and increase to the perfect strength of the fulness of Christ. Rejoice therefore, my brethren, at the good you enjoy, and at the greatness of the honour God has done you. Let the remembrance of this be ever present to you, to resist the devil, the world, the flesh, and the difficulties and storms of all temptations. If we are not very stupid and senseless, let us say from our hearts, ' It is no great thing that I should serve God ; but it is really a great thing that God should have willed to have me for a servant.' I thank you all most heartily for the extraordinary charity which I experienced when with you, and when away from you, by your letters and remembrances, and at my departure as I was setting off ; especially I thank Melchior—and who else is it that I named before ?—my dearest brother, my friendly rival, my compeer in the society, but how high above me in merits ! His letters gave me and will give me the greatest pleasure ; so did the things he spoke about in his two epistles. I will join with the Father Rector in drawing up a plan, and after the affair is set in order, I will write out the whole for him, before the feast of the Annunciation, I hope. Stephen the Hungarian said that he would write, but has never written a word. With my whole heart I congratulate George and Charles, who have lately made their vows. These are strong chains, my brethren, and most strongly do they bind you to our Lord. Who shall tear you from His hands ? Shall this triple cord be broken by that miserable devil who is so impotent that he could not even drown the swine without leave ? Who, then, is he that he should be able to overthrow the image of God ? Never can he do so, unless we ourselves blot out the image, and conspire with him to our own mischief. I have spent a long time in writing to you—is that the first bell for schools ? I must leave off ; and to-morrow is the feast, when I shall be fully occupied, so I don't think I shall be able to write more ; however, I will take the next opportunity. I thank my dearest brother Cantensis, whose letter gave me the greatest pleasure, and I thank my God who has given him so good a mind at his age. I received from him the pictures,

the Agnus Dei, and the relics of our holy father Ignatius—a great treasure, for which I return great thanks. I salute you all in Christ Jesus from the bottom of my soul. My last request is, that you would humbly beg F. Rector and F. Aquensis to pardon my long silence; they must ascribe it to my fault, and not to my forgetfulness of their kindness to me. I commend myself to the prayers of you all. Farewell.

Prague, Feb. 26, 1575."

"Although the words of men, my dearest brethren, ought to have much less weight and influence with you than that Spirit who without sound of words whispers in your ears, yet since this work of love is not altogether useless or unnecessary, your charity will cause you to receive this fraternal letter, the witness of my love and duty, with your usual kindness. I write not to you as though you required the spur, for wherever you go your hearts are ever set upon every virtue; but that I, while I employ my time in writing to you may spur myself, and may enjoy the perfume of the remembrance of your affection, and may testify my affection towards you. And I would that as I speak, and as you perform, so you might speak and I perform. For I know what liberty there is in obedience, what pleasure in labour, what sweetness in prayer, what dignity in humility, what peace in conflicts, what nobleness in patience, what perfection in infirmity. But the difficulty is to reduce these virtues to practice. And this is your work, to run over a portion of your earthly course in the chariot of Paradise. I, as the poet says, will follow as I can, *non passibus equis*. My dearest brethren, our life is not long enough to thank Christ for revealing these mysteries to us. Which of us would have believed, unless He had called him and instructed him in this school, that such thorns, such filth, such misery, such tragedies, were concealed in the world under the feigned names of goods and pleasures? Which of us would have thought your kitchen better than a royal palace? your crusts better than any banquet? your troubles than others' contentment? your conflicts than their quiet? your crumbs than their abundance? your vileness than their triumphs and victories? For I ask you whether, if you could all your lives, as they would like, feed your eyes on spectacles, and changes of scene and of company, your eyes would be the stronger? If you fed your ears with news, would they be the fuller? If you gave your mind its lusts, would it be richer? If you fed your body with dainties, could you make it immortal? This is their blunder who are deceived by vanities, and know not what a happy life means. For while they hope and expect great things, they fancy they are making vast progress, and not one in a hundred obtains what he dreamed; and if perchance one obtains it, yet after making allowance for his pains, and his loads of care, the slipperiness of fortune, his disgraceful servility, his fears, plots, troubles, annoyances, quarrels, crimes, which must always accompany and vex the lovers of the world, he will doubtless find himself to be a very base

and needy slave. One sigh of yours for heaven is better than all their clamours for this dirt; one colloquy of yours, where the angels are present, is better than all their parties and debauched drinking-bouts, where the devils fill the bowls. One day of yours consecrated to God is worth more than all their life, which they spend in luxury. My brethren, run as you have begun; acknowledge God's goodness to you, and the dignity of your state. Can any pomp of kings or emperors, any grandeur, any pleasure, I will not say equal, but even shadow forth your honour and consolation? They (I speak of the good among them) fight under Christ their king, with their baggage on their back; you are eased of your burdens, and are called with the beloved disciple to be familiar followers of your Lord. They are admitted to the palace, you to the presence chamber; they to the common pasture, you to the choicest banquets; they to friendship, you to love; they to the treasury, you to the special rewards. Think what difficulties they have who even live as they ought in this naughty world; then you will more easily see what you owe to His mercy in calling you out of infinite dangers into His society. How hard it is for them to follow Christ when He marches forth in haste against His enemies, who have wives in their bosoms, children on their shoulders, lands on their backs, cares on their heads, whose feet are bound with cords, whose spirits are well-nigh smothered. Is not your happiness great, whom the King marshals by His side, covers with His cloak, clothes and honours with His own livery? What great thing is it for me to have left friends for Him who left heaven for me? What great thing for me to be a servant to my brethren, when He washed the feet of the traitor Judas? What wonder if I obey my fathers, when He honoured Pilate? What mighty thing for me to bear labours for Him who bore His cross for me? What disgrace if I a sinner bear to be rebuked, when He an Innocent was curst, spit upon, scourged, wounded, and put to death? Whenever we look into the glass, my brethren, we see clearly that the temptation of no pleasure, the fear of no pain, should pluck us from the arms of such a Master. You see I have nearly filled my paper, though I have plenty to do; it is time to check myself, and to remit you to that Teacher who by His sacred influences can impress these things much more strongly than I can on your minds. Hear Him, for He hath the words of eternal life.

For my part, I kiss not you only, but the prints of your footsteps, and I beg you to give a poor needy wretch an alms of the crumbs that fall from your table.

Prague, Feb. 19th 1577."

Such was the spirit in which he performed these services, "poor in seeming, rich in fruit, and in discipline for minds elated with success; they break the assaults of pride, they dispel the fanciful clouds of vanity, and remind poor unstable humanity of its worthlessness and mortality. To visit the hospitals, to attend to the sick, to follow them to their graves;

to endure the peevishness of the sufferers, their dirt, their groans, their stink ; and to learn to feel horror and disgust at no poison, no filth, no corruption but the filth of sin." In these exercises the political difficulties of Campion were not solved, but overshadowed for the time by the overwhelming importance of the business of religion. For grace does not supplant nature, nor dispense with the necessity of worldly prudence and common sense.

R. S.

Correspondence.

CATHOLIC EDUCATION.

SIR,—As you are desirous that the educational controversy may close as soon as possible, I will not introduce any new matter into my present letter, but will confine myself to answering the objections which have been brought against me by your March correspondents.

I will not even attempt so much as this, in regard to the preliminary question, how far the discussion itself is legitimate and permissible. On this, as it is unhappily no longer a matter for practical debate, I will make but one remark. Your March correspondents are all for the affirmative answer to this question ; though one of them, "F.," with some reserve and hesitation. Yet none of them has attempted a reply to my very intelligible inquiry. If the course which has been taken be indeed defensible, would it be equally defensible, I asked, that some anonymous correspondent should argue against the celibacy of the clergy ? If these writers think *not*, they should lay down some clear mark of distinction between the two cases. But if they think that such a letter *would* be defensible, let them expressly say so.

I turn, however, to the actual controversy : and at starting, I must comment on the few lines now contributed by "X. Y. Z." He first complains that I "have carefully omitted to discuss that part of his letter which refers to classical studies, and thereby done grave injustice to his argument and himself." From his mode of expression in the remainder of his sentence, your readers may have derived an impression, which I am confident he never intended to convey. They may have thought, that a considerable part of his two letters was occupied with the advocacy of classical studies ; and that my non-reference to those studies must have originated therefore in some reluctance to express my own opinion. But the fact is far otherwise. In his first letter he does not make any allusion whatever to classics ; and in his second, out of seventeen pages there are not three which refer to them directly or indirectly. Nor indeed was any more detailed notice of them to be expected. He wished to comment on certain particulars, in which he considered the

seminary system to be mistaken and injurious. But on classical studies he had no fault to find with that system ; and it would have been strange, therefore, had he said much about them. His comparative silence, however, accounts for mine. As the classics were not included in his assault on the seminary system, so neither were they in my defence of it. Afterwards, finding that my omission of the subject had led to misconception on my real convictions, I stated those convictions, in a letter addressed to the Catholic newspapers, with the greatest clearness which a due regard for brevity would permit. I have no wish whatever to keep back any part of what I think. On the contrary, if any person for a practical purpose wishes to know my opinion on any point on which I have formed one, I shall be only too delighted to express it.

"X. Y. Z.'s" second remark is, that "in nearly every reference to his letters I have more or less misconstrued, in some cases quite metamorphosed, their actual drift." He by no means implies that such misrepresentation has been intentional ; and I can assure him that I took the greatest pains to understand him rightly. At the same time, where divergence is so extreme as between him and myself, it is no easy matter for either of us to understand the other. I most cordially, therefore, second "X. Y. Z.'s" entreaty, that readers "will judge him by what he has himself written, and by that alone." I have already urged this in private, on one or two persons who had read my letter but not his ; and I will only add, that in the request which he now puts forth, he is but asking the commonest justice.

I felt it my duty, for various reasons, in my former letter to state fully and openly the unfavourable judgment which I had formed, on his propositions whether expressed or implied. I did this, however, fully expecting at his hands a vigorous and unsparing reply. Now that "personal reasons" have led him to retire from the controversy, I shall not be misconstrued if I adopt a different procedure. It will be absolutely necessary, indeed, in order to make clear the meaning of various statements in my January letter, that I should refer pretty frequently to the sense in which I had understood him ; but I will abstain most carefully from any attempt to argue for the correctness of my impression, or to fasten on him any view which he may wish to disclaim. Since the promotion of truth (so far as I am aware) is my one end in the whole controversy, it would be a simple pleasure to be convinced that he approaches, more nearly than I had supposed, to what I consider a sound view of the case : except, indeed, so far as my pleasure would be alloyed by deep regret at having judged him unfairly.

"X. Y. Z." further alludes to the fact, that my letter was more than double the length of his. Yet the real difficulty was, to prevent it from being much longer still. Surely it will be admitted by all, without any personal reference whatever to "X. Y. Z.," that in regard to any deeply important institution or principle, a plausible attack may be immeasurably more brief, than a satisfactory

defence can possibly be made. Take, *e. g.*, the rule of clerical celibacy, to which I just now referred. A very few pages would amply suffice, to state the obvious objections to that law of the Church in a most telling and powerful way. Yet how many pages would be enough for expressing, with any kind of adequacy, its deep and solid grounds of defence?

The remarks, which I have to make on your other correspondents, will naturally arrange themselves under three heads. First, I will consider what was the real point at issue; secondly, I will treat those objections which have been made against my general course of argument; and thirdly, those which have been made against my individual arguments one by one. First, then, what was the real point at issue? or, in other words, what was the precise thesis which I undertook to maintain?

In every human institution which has been formed with deep wisdom for some important end, if it continue for any considerable time, there will be frequent alternations between a period of comparative torpor and a period of active revival. Those who have originally devised the various details have passed away; and they are succeeded, perhaps, by others, far less clear-sighted in their views, and far less energetic in their character. These men are often worthy and excellent in their generation; they keep together in substance the system which they have inherited; and a considerable amount of substantial good quietly proceeds under their direction. But since they are not the persons to fix their gaze firmly and perseveringly on the desired end, and still less to discriminate among the various means conducive to that end, the good is alloyed by very serious evils. Various usages and habits are allowed by degrees to rise up, accidentally and at random, which are out of harmony with the spirit of the whole; and no serious attempt is made at progress in that vitally important task, the adapting old principles to new facts, the changing what is transitory and accidental in order the better to preserve what is permanent and essential. These men in their turn are succeeded by others, more congenial in spirit with the original founders; and thus this alternation proceeds, of which I spoke at starting.

Now whether such an institution be going through a period of torpor or a period of revival, in either case there are certain principles at work, which the most superficial observer will recognise as essential parts of its very idea. Still more will these be so recognised by one trained under its shadow. Such a man, even if Providence have cast his lot in the worst days of the institution, is able most readily to discriminate, between the principles themselves and their exceptional abuse or corruption. Nay his very appreciation and love of them may make him unduly impatient of their inadequate realisation. Meanwhile another man of different character regards with hostility these very principles themselves. In this manner there arises the well-known and world-wide distinction, between the conservative and the revolutionary reformer; between

him who would strengthen an existing institution by the more effective application of its recognised principles, and him who would overthrow it altogether and build another on its ruins. And often it happens that the conservative and revolutionary reformer, to their own great discomposure, are thoughtlessly confounded with each other, and placed in the same category; whereas either of them would greatly prefer the *status quo* itself, to such changes as his more extreme opponent would desire to introduce.

These remarks apply no less to the Church's seminaries than to other institutions. And if I had understood "X. Y. Z." to write as a conservative reformer of them,—if I had understood him merely to raise the question whether their recognised principles had been effectively carried out,—I should have felt myself wholly incompetent to take a part in the discussion. I have no personal knowledge of any seminary in Europe except one; and I suppose the extremest advocate of free discussion will hardly expect me to put forth a public criticism, on the practical excellences or defects which may be discernible in that particular college. But I understood "X. Y. Z." most differently. If there are two principles which (more than almost any others) would be admitted by the most casual observer as characteristic of Catholic seminaries, these would be the two: that youths are to be trained in the ecclesiastical spirit, (1) by the direct and constant agency of superiors; and (2) by a strict check on their reading of miscellaneous literature.* I understood "X. Y. Z." to protest against both these principles, as productive of the gravest evils; and accordingly to this controversy of *principle* I confined my argument. I applied myself to this question: in the ordinary diocesan seminaries, is it desirable that these two principles shall be religiously preserved, and that any necessary reform shall take the shape of carrying them out more vigorously, discriminatingly, consistently? Or is it rather preferable, that the principles themselves shall be abandoned, and superseded by those others which are suggested in their stead?

Your correspondent "S. A. B. S.," however, takes quite a different view of the point at issue. He considers that I "defend things as they are, or as they are supposed to be." "The question proposed," he says, "was, whether the education . . . that is given in Catholic colleges and seminaries . . . is altogether satisfactory in its results;" and he adds in effect that I gave an affirmative answer to this question. Yet it is really difficult to imagine, how I could have expressed myself more clearly than in the following passage, with which I conclude my whole reasoning. "I have only aimed at treating *part* of the question: 'X. Y. Z.' has attacked the fundamental principles on which the whole Catholic system of ecclesias-

* So, on one of these particulars, the *Quarterly Review*: "The Roman Catholic ideal, which is developed in its greatest perfection in their priestly seminaries, is to bring the mind of the ruling power to bear with the greatest, the most constant, and the most equable force, on the will and the intellect of its subjects." October 1860, p. 404.

tical training is founded, . . . and I have wished therefore . . . to illustrate and defend them. There is, of course, another totally different question, that of *fact*; how far this or that seminary . . . is conducted effectively *upon* those principles" (p. 271). But indeed I had implied the same thing throughout the letter. Thus "X. Y. Z." alleged (as I understood him) a certain very defective method of enforcing discipline, as prevalent in England. I did not attempt to argue the question of *fact*: I said that such a method would be "disastrous;" and that it would be "a most serious practical corruption, clamouring for reform;" but I added that "no seminary ever advocated it *on principle*" (p. 241). Here is the very distinction between the *theory* and the possible *practice*. On quite a different matter, I say that if a certain allegation be true, "it is a mere practical corruption requiring reform" (p. 246). I also "agreed heartily" with "X. Y. Z." "wherever he argues on the great desirableness that Catholic views and principles should be brought far more efficiently into contact with the general current of thought than is now the case" (p. 264). And I advocated a very important practical change, as conducive to this purpose. Is all this the language of one, who is simply wishing to "defend things as they are"?

In regard also to those various criticisms, which your correspondent "F." has made on me in so kind a spirit, I think he will find that most of them are sufficiently answered, by this account of the thesis which I was maintaining. And he will admit, I am sure, (whatever weight your other two correspondents may attach to the fact), that this thesis is of especial importance at the present time; since on two solemn occasions the English Episcopate has publicly expressed the strongest wish, that a much closer approximation to the full seminary system shall be carried out in England, than has hitherto been the case.*

The next matter which I am to consider, is the general course of argument pursued in support of my thesis. The objections to this will be exclusively found in the letter of "S. A. B. S.;" but they arise so simply from his misapprehension of that thesis, that any detailed criticism is unnecessary. Fortunately, indeed, for me, he has given an illustration of his meaning. He calls the seminary system "a system which educates men for zeal and devotion, and keeps them aloof from the movements of thought;" he refers to

* The first Synod of Oscott speaks thus (cap. 26): "*Summopere religionis augmento profuturum putamus, si seminaria, in quibus seorsim educarentur clerici, possent fundari.*" These acts have received the papal sanction.

The acts of the third Synod have not yet come from Rome: but in their "synodical letter" to the whole English Church, the Bishops there assembled thus express themselves: "For this we have determined to labour, for this (if it please God) to suffer, until we see accomplished the strong desire, or rather fulfilled the wise injunctions, of the holy Council of Trent, that each diocese should have its own seminary; episcopal in name and in character, dear to the Bishop as the apple of his eye, and jealously reserved to his own superintendence."

some statement of the immense practical evils which have followed from this; and he adds, that "the reply given" by me "to this statement has been drawn, not from facts, but from principles." Why, I fully *concur* in the statement; how, then, could I possibly think of *replying* to it at all, whether by means of facts *or* principles? I have no doubt whatever that results, the most extensively pernicious, must ensue from any such system as "S. A. B. S." describes; though I have no means of forming any definite opinion, how far it is true that the French seminaries adopt it. So far as England is concerned, I ventured, in my former letter, to make two practical suggestions, for the express purpose of averting so calamitous a state of things. First, I urged it as "very desirable . . . that a certain select number of priests should be duly prepared to cope with the great questions of the day; to help in fixing our controversial position; and to influence the most highly educated, whether of Catholics or Protestants" (p. 264). If these priests were trained "to cope with the great questions of the day," I suppose they would not be "kept aloof from the movements of thought." Moreover, the influence of such priests would make itself felt in every corner of the diocese: and nowhere more than in the seminary; for they could form the most trustworthy possible judgment, on the special qualifications to be desired for ordinary priests. This, then, was one of my proposals; and another was, that the whole subject of contemporary popular literature should be systematically treated in our ordinary diocesan seminaries (p. 258).

But perhaps "S. A. B. S." would mean to say, that the seminary principle, of prohibiting all indiscriminate perusal of worldly books, is in itself incompatible with a priest's requisite intellectual cultivation. If this be his allegation, any one who has read the remarks on literature, which I made in your January number, will understand the grounds on which I confidently deny that allegation. But as your correspondent "Derlax" has taken great exception to those remarks, I must rejoin in a later portion of this letter. When I come, therefore, to that portion, I will incorporate my answer to "S. A. B. S." with my answer to "Derlax." Meanwhile, on the question *immediately* before us, viz. the objections raised by the former to my *general* course of reasoning, I have said what is abundantly sufficient for their refutation.

I pass, then, from my general course of reasoning, to my individual arguments. And here my chief opponent will be "Derlax;" though there must be one or two occasional allusions to "F." also.

The first question is the suitable relation between superiors and students. "Derlax" says that "the real point of the discussion" turns on "the relative claims of the public and private school system:" and I most fully accept his statement. I gave, in my former letter, what I believed to be a true account of the system pursued in Protestant public schools; and after my remarks were in your printer's hands, I found my statement more than corroborated by one of the most unexceptionable possible witnesses, an able writer

in the *Saturday Review*. The theory of public schools, I said, was this, that "students should be left without the presence of superiors for a very considerable portion of each day" (p. 239). "The separation of masters from boys," I added (p. 244), "is no accident of that system; it is the one fundamental idea, on which it is founded, and on which it is defended. Those who praise those institutions . . . boast that a Protestant youth is really educated for his future position; that he learns the invaluable art of pushing himself forward in the world, and holding his own, from the very fact that at school he is *obliged* to hold his own; that he has practically no appeal to the masters, and must trust therefore for defence to his own courage and spirit. *To introduce the familiar intercourse of masters and boys would simply be to revolutionise the whole.*" The *Saturday Reviewer* colours the picture still more highly. "Boys, like nations, can only attain to the genuine self-reliance which is true manliness, by battling for themselves against their difficulties, and forming their own character. . . . The object of a public school is *to introduce a boy early into the world, that he may be trained in time for the struggle which lies before him;*" that is, the struggle not for a heavenly but an earthly prize. "At public schools, as they now are, a boy lives . . . *subject to a law whose provisions he knows beforehand,* and to a public opinion which he himself has a share in forming. He enjoys a freedom, limited indeed and provisional, but genuine as far as it goes: and as other boys enjoy the same freedom, he must expect to be bullied and fagged by those who are stronger than himself, and to be misled by those who are deeper than himself. . . . *But the moment the master begins to supervise his manners and pursuits out of school, the whole character of the institution is changed*" (Dec. 8, 1860). On the other hand, according to the seminary theory, the students are never, or hardly ever, left simply to themselves; they are in the constant society, either of the superiors, or of others "commissioned by the superiors, imbued with their spirit, and enjoying their confidence." Every one must see at once, that the difference between these two opposite systems is as deep and radical an opposition of *principle* as can possibly be imagined. The latter is a parental, the former a constitutional, government: the students of a seminary are theoretically regarded, as spiritual children, the objects of tender and discriminating love; the inmates of a public school are theoretically regarded, as free and independent citizens, subject only to a code of laws, which is, however, fixed, definite, and inflexible. The reasons for immeasurably preferring our own system to the Protestant are, I think, most numerous and unanswerable: but as I am not to introduce any new matter, I will confine myself to the vindication of those which I assigned in my last letter. And first, on far the most important.

The object, dearer to the Church in a youth's education than all the rest put together, is the preservation of purity; nor need I add a word on its peculiar necessity in those who are trained for celibacy. In regard to this virtue, "Derlax" takes up a position, which no one

could have expected in a Catholic. He says, "it is unhappily too true, that the sacred virtue of purity is little prized and seldom pursued by the majority of Protestant boys and youth, wherever they may be" (p. 413). Since, therefore, "Derlax" was educated at a public school (p. 412), he was educated among youths, the majority of whom little prized purity, and seldom preserved it.* It is difficult for a Catholic to imagine a more hapless lot, than that of one who, at the most impressible period of his life, is exposed without protection to so foul an atmosphere. What, then, is our amazement, when we find that "Derlax," at this moment calmly viewing the past, says, "I spent there some of the happiest, and (*I hope*) most profitable, years of my life" ! The only mode one can imagine of spending a "profitable" time at such a place, would be to live all the more exclusively to God, because of the awful perils ever externally imminent. But "Derlax" is led by experience to recommend these horrible institutions for our imitation. What his meaning therefore can be in the above sentiment, I am at a loss to think.

Let us consider the question, however, simply on its own grounds. And if your readers are disposed to think such a question not very fit for public discussion, let them remember how such discussion has become necessary. When a revolutionary change is publicly advocated, it is necessary that its opponents should *as* publicly state the evils which they anticipate as its certain result. It happens again and again, that painful things must be said, if we wish to struggle against evil things being done.

It is undeniable, then, that the constant intercourse of youths with each other, unchecked by the presence of those in authority, tends most powerfully to result in evil imaginations, and through them in external sin. It is undeniable, that even in the case of laymen such actions and imaginations, if long permitted during the period of youth, throw a blight over the whole later earthly existence. It is undeniable, that in the case of those trained to celibacy they are so overwhelmingly calamitous, that no proposed advantage could offer the slightest compensation. If any writer on ecclesiastical education wishes to revolutionise that system, which is our present protection for clerical purity, the first, the second, the third thing which we should expect from him would be, that he be most express, most earnest, most anxious, in explaining the safeguard which he suggests in substitution. I wish I could see in "Derlax's" letter any due stress on the preëminent and unapproached importance of this virtue in ecclesiastical students. I can find, indeed, but one suggestion on the subject : he says that "Confession would do more to purge the moral atmosphere . . . than the most skilfully-devised system of" surveillance. Here, however, at all events is a definite statement; let us endeavour, therefore, to appreciate its value. And I am confident that my only difficulty in the argument consists in the strength of my case. The very completeness with which the

* When, indeed, it is said that the "majority seldom" preserved it, I suppose it is meant that *few* preserved it.

present system does its work in the matter of purity, will make it most difficult, for those trained under it, to imagine the possibility of such a picture as I am about to draw.

It is strange that two of your correspondents criticise me as building up a theory irrespectively of facts, when one of the two is so egregious an offender in that very way. The seminary system has at least had in its favour, on this particular head, the experience of several centuries : for no one will deny that, on the whole, clerical purity has resulted under it most extensively. But as to "Derlax's" proposal, in what quarter of the world has any thing like it been ever attempted? He is calling on our Bishops to abandon a mode of discipline, which long experience has proved to be most successful in securing this all-important requisite ; he is calling on them to adopt in its stead another system most violently opposed ; and all this on mere faith in his own utterly unverified and most paradoxical theory.*

In Protestant schools there are several youths, no doubt, who have really a wish to preserve unsullied purity, but find the greatest moral obstacles in the way of complete success. Such youths, I grant, would receive inestimable benefit, from the Sacrament of Penance and free communication with a confessor. But "the majority" of these youths, as "Derlax" himself tells us, "prize" that virtue but little, and are very indifferent therefore to its attainment. How these would be benefited by having access to sacramental Confession, it passes my comprehension to understand. Let us endeavour, however, to trace the results of "Derlax's" proposal in a Catholic seminary. I will make, then, the impossible supposition, that some Catholic Bishop has adopted it, and that in his seminary the system of surveillance has come to an end. I will further suppose that some four or five years have elapsed, and that accordingly the spirit generated by the old discipline has had full time to evaporate. Some youth, whose imagination is already polluted, obtains entrance. Under the existing system, if at all effectively carried out, it will be impossible for him to begin corrupting the rest, without speedy detection and expulsion ; but this is the very provision which, by hypothesis, will have been abolished. Some of the boys are shocked, and betake themselves the more earnestly to prayer and the Sacraments ; but a considerable and ever-increasing number gladly and eagerly imbibe the poison. How is this to be prevented? As things are now, even those boys who most heartily detest tale-bearing on other matters, regard it as a sacred duty to inform the superiors, if impurity in any shape is beginning to spread ; nor (whatever the college discipline) could any Catholic confessor give them absolution, unless they promised to do so. It is one of the innumerable advantages derived from surveillance, that this most heavy and trying

* This combination *on paper* of two elements, so grotesquely heterogeneous as the public school and the Confessional, can only remind a sober thinker of the well-known passage : "humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam," &c.

obligation is but rarely imposed on the boys : for the superiors themselves so soon become acquainted with whatever passes. "Derlax" would wish, perhaps, to revolutionise that doctrine of Catholic morality, which *imposes* the indefeasible obligation of thus warning superiors. But unless he is able to do so, in what does his scheme result ? He is resolved that a superior shall not be a "spy" over the students ; and in order to avoid this, he brings about a state of things, in which they are under the strict obligation of being informers against each other.

"Derlax" himself would admit, I am perfectly certain, that such a check to impurity as would be obtained by a superior's surveillance, is bought at the price of far less evil, than that which would result from the repeated and habitual information of students against each other. Since, therefore, he wishes the former to be removed, much more must he desire a complete absence of the latter. What, then, would be the course of events on such a supposition ? It is notorious that the one hope of successful conflict against the evil which we are now considering, is to take it in time. "*Principiis obsta : sero medicina paratur, cum mala per longas convaluere moras.*" But under these circumstances it will be *impossible* "*obstare principiis.*" The evil will have risen to a terrible height,—our wicked students will have gone on day after day, week after week, delighting in these evil imaginations,—before its existence is even suspected by the ruling body. The confessors, indeed, will have arrived at an early knowledge of what is going forward ; but they must not give the slightest hint, outside the sacred Tribunal, of the knowledge which they have there obtained. They will impose on their penitents the obligation of revealing such facts to the superiors ; but this, as we have seen, is a circumstance which "Derlax" would regard as a greater evil than surveillance itself. Nay, as to those superiors who are themselves confessors, it will be impossible for them to take any steps whatever in the matter, whether sooner or later, out of the Confessional : for (1) they cannot distinguish between the knowledge which they have gained *in* confession and *out* of it ; and, (2) even if they could, since they disavow all surveillance, they would always be *suspected* of acting on their sacramentally-acquired information. A more deadly blow than this last would be, to the whole practice of sacramental Confession, it is impossible to imagine. Still, through the increasing paucity of confessions, the other superiors will in time begin to suspect, that some very serious evil is at work : though even then they will be altogether ignorant of its precise nature ; and will not be able even to guess, as to the relative demerits of those, who have for some time been absent from Confession.

I say, then, (1) that before they have arrived even at this general suspicion, the evil will have reached most alarming dimensions. I now ask, (2) What steps will it be possible for them to take ? The only remedy which "Derlax" even suggests, is the Sacrament of Penance ; but how is this remedy to be brought into practical ope-

ration? I see nothing for it, except to put earnestly before a student that he cannot be ordained hereafter, unless he is now regular at Confession; or, in other words, that his whole future earthly prospects depend on it. Here, then, is the issue of this ingenious scheme! All his ordinary life out of school is to pass on the free-and-easy method, without external surveillance; *the one* vigorous discipline, exercised on him by superiors, is to thrust him, as it were by main force, into the Confessional.

We are treating the case, it will be remembered, of youths who, by this time, will have become reckless and abandoned in sinful thoughts and habits. Without their sincere and efficacious repentance, without their radical change of heart, the Sacrament avails them nothing; nay, according to the great majority of theologians, there is no Sacrament at all. Can any thing be more improbable, than that such change of heart will be produced, by the mere fact of finding themselves pushed (as it were) into the presence of a Confessor? Several would probably refuse to enter the Confessional, and would give up all intention of being ordained. Others would plainly tell the priest that they have no sufficient dispositions; nor can he take any notice of this, out of Confession. Others will be driven to sacrilegious Confession; and these will take refuge in the sophism, which prevails extensively among Protestant youths in the matter of enforced "communion," that the responsibility is on the shoulder of those, who have put upon them this stringent pressure.

And this is actually the scheme for preserving ecclesiastical purity, which has been devised by one who piques himself on being "practical," and who complains of me for being "ideal" and theoretical!

It has been suggested to me, that some may regard my remarks as disparaging to the Sacrament of Penance. Let me use, then, an obvious illustration. I maintain most earnestly, that the one divinely-appointed type of education is the parental relation. This simple statement will of itself suffice, to meet the few plausible objections which may be made against the seminary system. For instance, it is sometimes thought that the constant intercourse of superiors and students would produce so much restraint, as to be inconsistent with that affectionate relation which is so desirable. Do we find this, I ask, between parent and child? On the contrary, the good parent checks external evil by his presence, and inflicts punishment where it is found necessary, while yet inspiring the most affectionate confidence by his whole demeanour.* I will apply this illustration,

* Lancicius, the well-known Jesuit writer, has a beautiful treatise, "*De Conditionibus boni Superioris*," in which the parental relation is throughout taken as the true model. He remonstrates with those superiors who "*loco paterni amoris*" exhibit "*novercalem asperitatem et pompaticam quandam gravitatem*" (n. 11). He protests against any unwillingness to grant a subject some indulgence, which he may regard as necessary to his health; such unwillingness being grounded on the supposition, that he *fancies* himself ill for the sake of self-indulgence. Lancicius points out how differently *parents* act (n. 72). He tells superiors that when any subject is accused to them

then, to the objection before us. Suppose some parent were to act on the principles so graphically described in the *Saturday Review*; suppose he were to take care indeed that his children attend regularly at certain hours of study, but were to abstain altogether from "super-vising their manners and pursuits out of school." On remonstrance being made, he replies, that no serious evil can ensue; for that he himself escorts them to Confession, once a fortnight or once a month as the case may be. Various comments on his conduct are imaginable: one comment is *not* imaginable; viz. that he is favourably distinguished from other parents, by his greater value and reverence for the Sacrament of Penance.

So much on this primary virtue of purity. The other dispositions, which I mentioned as the end of ecclesiastical training, were such as these: constant recollectedness; the practically recognising interior perfection as *the* one really valuable attainment; burning love of souls; deep sense of sin (p. 241). I gave reasons for my opinion, that towards such an end the seminary system is the only possible means. So little has "Derlax" attempted any *argument* against me on this head, that I cannot even guess which premiss of my syllogism he denies. Does he deny that such *are* the ends of ecclesiastical training? or does he assert that the public school will achieve such ends? I doubt if this last proposition be maintained by any one; I am quite confident that all the more prominent defenders of public schools would as earnestly repudiate it as I should myself. It cannot be repeated too often: the real question between seminaries and public schools, is not one of means, but of ends.

It remains to speak of college rules. The public school leaves students to themselves out of study time, and inflicts punishment when transgression of rule is discovered; but the seminary aims at establishing so close a surveillance, that transgression of rule shall be almost impossible. Each acts conformably with its own end. It is held in seminaries to be an important means of sanctification, that the student should obey these rules for God's sake; and it is of great moment, therefore, to remove, as far as possible, the temptation to break them.

Surveillance, then, it appears, is of two different kinds. First, there is what we may call external surveillance, as in the case of purity and of college rules; where the end desired, is to guard against certain external acts or words: and secondly, there is moral surveillance; where the end desired, is to implant, by means of influence and example, a certain interior spirit. In answer to "F.," I will add, that the former should become gradually less, in proportion as the students are trained in conscientious habits; whereas the latter

of any offence, they should at once inform him of the accusation, and ask for *his* account of the matter (n. 76). I wish I had room for longer extracts from this admirable work; for a very influential member of the Society told me, that it is quite recognised as containing their true principles of government. Now Jesuit seminaries, more than any others, have been suspected of the "police" or "regimental" administration, which is so different from the parental.

should be even more assiduously brought into operation, in dealing with the more matured. On the true method of influencing youths, I must express my unreserved and most hearty agreement with "F." There has been no more important contribution to the controversy, I think, than his treatment of this matter, both in this and in his former letter. I quite admit, also, that during those periods of comparative torpor which I mentioned at starting, there will ever be a tendency to certain grave mistakes in connexion with surveillance. I mean particularly, such as the aiming at mere external regularity and the exclusion of gross sin, without any constant effort towards discriminating character and training carefully the interior man. "F." thinks that in my former letter I ignored the possibility of such development; but, on the contrary, I spoke of it as "disastrous," and as "a most serious practical corruption which clamours for reform" (p. 241). No one can be more alive than I am to its great injuriousness; yet the arguments, which I have stated in this and in my former letter, lead me most confidently to this conclusion. Take the worst corruption of the seminary system which is practically possible: I am sure that, for the real ends of ecclesiastical education, it is immeasurably superior to the public school in its highest perfection.

"F." further asks my opinion on the case of lay students; and as I think that none of your correspondents has hit the exact point of distinction between lay and clerical education, I will briefly respond to his inquiry. Before the clerical student, it is perfectly safe, and therefore most desirable, to display a high standard of perfection, and urge it earnestly on his acceptance. If the worst comes to the worst, he falls back into the rank of laymen, and the Church is saved from the calamity of an indevout priest. But the lay student has no inferior position on which he *can* fall back; and if too much religious admonition is attempted, there is the greatest fear lest he abandon in disgust all attempt at avoiding mortal sin. Yet it is most desirable that those lay students, who are willing to coöperate more fully with the solicitations of grace, should have adequate scope and guidance. This, therefore, is the great practical end to be borne in view: to make higher views and rules of life readily accessible, without importunately obtruding them. But happy at last is the parent, whose children are called to the higher state and correspond to the call! And this whole consideration gives great argumentative support to the solemn declaration of the Holy Father, in union with the English Bishops, that it would conduce *extremely* (*summopere*) to the increase of religion, if seminaries could be founded in which clerics should be separately educated.

Let us next proceed to the second matter at issue, the treatment of the affections: and here "Derlax" saves me some trouble, by arguing ably in behalf of my conclusion. I maintained that "our existing system affords both great scope and great encouragement to the healthy development of human affection" (p. 247). I protested against what I understood to be "X. Y. Z.'s" statement,

that those who have warm human affections are on that account in a lower state of perfection. And I further explained, that the rules against "particular friendships," so far as I understand them, by no means imply any discouragement of those manly friendships, founded on the love of God, which are in many ways so advantageous. "Derlax" represents me as holding the precise contrary to this ; and with great simplicity says, that a certain quotation which I make from Father Newman "tells entirely against" me. It tells entirely against the thesis which "Derlax" ascribes to me, and for that very reason is in favour of the thesis which I maintained. There is much more which I would say on this matter, if space permitted ; I will here only observe, that what I have just said must be understood with one proviso. I certainly implied, as a truth which would be admitted by all Catholics, that in ecclesiastical education the CHIEF means of eliciting the affections should ever be, impressing both the intellect and imagination vividly and efficaciously with religious truth.

We now enter on the question of general literature : and on this head so little has "Derlax" attempted to meet my real argument, that a sufficient answer to his remarks will be obtained, if the reader will but peruse again that portion of my former letter which they criticise. My statements are contained in pp. 248-9, and from p. 253 to p. 259 ; both passages resting on certain principles, drawn out from p. 237 to p. 239. In order, however, that I may explicitly face "Derlax's" objections, I will here give a brief analysis of those statements.

1. There is but one true standard of right and wrong, in reference to human action. It is that found in the Catholic ascetical writers ; and it may be briefly summed up by saying, that men are more commendable, in precise proportion as they make it more the one end of their earthly life to grow in the love of God and in interior perfection.

2. It is so essential a part of education that hardly any other except preservation of purity can be more so, to train youths in the realisation of this doctrine ; in the habit of practically measuring all human action by this one standard.

3. It is most difficult so to train them : (1) because of the flesh, and (2) because of the world ; or in other words, (1) because of our violent tendency, since the Fall, to value things by a worldly standard, and (2) because we are so closely hemmed in and surrounded by a world which does so.

4. All writers on human life and conduct, who do not imply this standard of praise and blame, must imply some other inconsistent with it ; for no one will be so wild as to maintain the other alternative, viz. that they do not imply praise or blame at all. I am not at all meaning that such men, in every page and corner of their writings, express or imply praise or blame on some course of human action ; for I have expressly stated the reverse (p. 259). But they do so in their general drift and spirit.

5. The free and unrestricted study of able and attractive writers, who imply some standard of praise and blame inconsistent with the Christian, tends in the greatest degree to imbue youths with the same detestable standard ; and that indeed the more injuriously, in proportion as the more unconsciously.

Of these five theses, it is the fourth alone which "Derlax" even professes to combat ; and in repelling his attack, I must make one preliminary remark. I expressed an opinion (p. 249) that some few writers are inconsistent with themselves, in their implied standard of morality.* Take, *e. g.*, Scott, one of those cited by "Derlax." Will "Derlax" himself gravely assert, that Scott ordinarily implies the doctrine which I have mentioned ? the doctrine, that men are only commendable, in proportion as they make the ascertainment and fulfilment of God's Will the one predominant aim of their whole life ? And yet, when Scott is describing Jeanie Deans, through his artistic sympathy with his own mental creation, many parts of his novel almost contain that implication. A remark altogether similar may be made on Shakespeare ; and I think that a still more favourable judgment may be formed of Southey, if I can trust my memory of works which I have not opened for very many years.

I now reply to "Derlax ;" and I shall be really surprised if, on reflection, he adheres to his own argument. Of the nine writers whom he mentions, I will say nothing of Keats and Tennyson, because of my very insufficient acquaintance with their works. But as to the rest, let it be clearly understood what "Derlax's" course of reasoning requires him to maintain. He must maintain that Thackeray, and Macaulay, and Shelley, and Byron, and Scott and Shakespeare according to their ordinary drift, measure human action by a standard, which is in no important respect at variance with that set forth in the *Imitation of Christ*, and in the *Spiritual Combat*. If he do not maintain this, his objections are not merely irrelevant but unmeaning. If he do maintain this, he is far beyond the reach of argument.

He says that according to my view "all books . . . which deal with secular subjects . . . as a religious man would deal with them, are religious books." Not so : I mentioned (p. 248) five very comprehensive classes of secular books, in regard to which no such statement is implied in my reasoning. But I do think that where the matter handled is *human life and conduct*, the opinion ascribed to me by "Derlax" is a true opinion : those books, which imply praise and blame according to the Christian standard, are "religious books ;" those which do so according to any other standard, are (so far) antichristian and detestable. This is the very lesson, which it seems to me so inestimably important that ecclesiastical students shall fully learn.

But "Derlax" considers that I would wholly debar youths (if I could) from using these books at all for purposes of recreation. I

* My words were : "Some few books . . . belong partly to one" class "and partly to the other" of those which I had mentioned.

said the direct contradictory : I said that "many selections might be made from" them which would be invaluable for purposes of recreation (p. 259). How far recreation was even any part of the end proposed by "X.Y.Z." in his recommendation of them, is a question which I am not to discuss ; certainly I *understood* him in a sense totally different from that ascribed to him by "Derlax."

It is of vital moment, then, that an ecclesiastical student shall be carefully preserved from all sympathy with those views on the standard of morality, which are implied by such writers as those cited by "Derlax." But this implies no objection at all to his studying those very books ever so carefully in the spirit of *antipathy*. It is desirable, as I said in my former letter, that he shall be trained (so far as time and circumstances will admit) to admire in them whatever may innocently be admired, while preserving unsullied his detestation of those evil principles, which underlie almost every thing there expressed or implied on the relative value of human actions. And thus I answer the objection raised by "S. A. B. S.," to which I have already referred ; viz. that on the restrictive system a priest would never be trained to cope with "the great movements of" secular "thought." On the contrary, it is that system alone which will *enable* him to cope with them. So far as he is himself unconsciously implicated in the same worldly snare, he will ever be joining irrelevant issues, and meeting the great errors of the day in a paltry and narrow spirit. To detest vice while knowing it, is a student's problem in applying himself to Moral Theology ; to detest the *world* while knowing it, is but another application of the same principle. I would but explain, that it is only those "movements of thought" which extend over the general mass of society, with which an ordinary priest need know how to deal : if they are confined to the educated and thoughtful class, it will amply suffice that a certain select number of priests be fitted to encounter them.

I have now rejoined, on all the more important matters of principle which have been brought into controversy. There is not a single objection, indeed, raised by any of your March correspondents, to which I am not perfectly ready with an answer ; but I am so reluctant to encroach on your space, that I will forbear. I will conclude, therefore, when I have referred to one further particular, on which I laid stress in my former letter ; a particular, which, though involving no principle, is most intimately connected with every practical detail from first to last. *Our seminary students must have completed their education by the age of twenty-three years.* If it were possible for our Bishops to defer their ordination some six or seven years, it is hardly too much to say, that every single detail in their course of instruction would reasonably be affected by the change. But every one knows that this is altogether impossible ; and the question, therefore, is simply this, how the few years given may be most profitably employed.

It is absolutely requisite, then, for the due discharge of his future

obligations, that by the age of twenty-three the student shall have mastered various most important branches of knowledge. (1) He must be so completely versed in the more primary portions at least of Dogmatic, he must have so definite an impression of the various doctrines contained in the Catechism, and so ready a power of reproducing that impression, that he shall be able to bring home those doctrines deeply and persuasively to the imagination and affections of the young and of the uneducated; and to train such persons in habits of familiar acquaintance with the great Objects of faith. This is at all times of most primary importance; but under present circumstances, considering the constant tendency now existing of secular knowledge to supplant religious in the poor man's education, such a training of the ecclesiastical student is our only hope against evils, the alarmingness of which it is difficult to exaggerate. (2) He must be so firmly grounded in the principles of Moral Theology, and in their application to the various circumstances of ordinary English life, that he may be ready to pronounce with prompt discrimination on an indefinite number of more or less complicated cases, which are ever coming before him without a moment's notice. Results the most disastrous may at times ensue from a mistaken decision. (3) He must be so imbued with the spirit and the details of Ascetical Theology, that he may coöperate with the Holy Ghost wherever a soul is being drawn to higher perfection; and that he may be able, in all ordinary cases, to give solid practical advice, as to the kind and degree of prayer, meditation, and the like, which should be practised. (4) He must possess some sufficient knowledge of human nature: without such knowledge, the first of the three above-named qualifications will give him but little power of really teaching doctrine, and the last will be as likely to lead him wrong as right. (5) He must know so much of Scripture, not only as may suffice for the spiritual edification of his flock, but also for their protection against those anticatholic deductions from Scripture, which abound in England through all classes, except perhaps the very lowest and most uneducated.* (6) He must be sufficiently grounded in elementary controversy. He must be acquainted with those Protestant heresies which still prevail among our poorer countrymen, not only in that abstract and unreal shape which they assume in theological manuals, but as they are practically held in real life; united not unfrequently with much that is good and admirable. He must be further well acquainted with those more modern semi-infidel

* I need hardly say, that if an ordinary priest is found by Protestants to be insufficiently acquainted with the text of Scripture, such a fact increases their prejudice against Catholicism more than almost any other imaginable circumstance. Considerations of controversy alone make it highly important that a seminary student shall at least be made thoroughly conversant with text and context of the New Testament. I think indeed that this is most highly important, for reasons far higher than controversial; but I am now dwelling on what must be admitted by all, who will give their mind to the matter.

I feel most deeply how unfit these things are for public discussion; but it is not I who began this controversy.

"movements of thought," which at this moment are so widely prevalent in the half-educated and even uneducated classes.

I might with ease add considerably to my list of requisites, but I have said enough for my purpose. Nor am I entering at all on the truly arduous question, how sufficient knowledge may best be secured to an ordinary Church-student; for my business is merely to comment on your correspondents' suggestions. And the fact being (so far as I can see) quite obviously and undeniably as I have stated it, that "practical" man "Derlax" considers that "a full and systematic classical education" should be given "previous to any direct theological course" (p. 411). A full and systematic classical education!!! Why, under any view of the case, the classical education must end (as it always ends) at the age of 18, never to be resumed; and "Derlax" is surely scholar enough to know, that at that very time the mind is but just beginning to be sufficiently mature, for any of the *highest* intellectual advantages which classical study has to bestow. Accordingly "F.," who is evidently an excellent scholar, does not even think of stating, but implies as a matter of course (p. 410), that if classical education, really worthy of the name, shall be imparted, it must proceed "*pari passu* with the strictly ecclesiastical course to the very end." And Father Campion, as we see in your March number (p. 366), proposes that secular studies shall be *exclusively* pursued to the very age of 23, when *our* students receive ordination.

"Derlax" says that I have preserved a "politic reticence" on my "view of what should be the intellectual method of education" in our ordinary diocesan seminaries. I have preserved no "reticence" whatever, "politic" or otherwise; see p. 261 in your January Number. If it is on the question of classical studies that he desires a more explicit statement of my opinions, I am most happy to give it. I think that a reasonably good *grammatical* mastery of Latin and Greek is attainable, and for many reasons very desirable. I think that the pagan classics are the best instrument for imparting that mastery; but I also think that any attempt to carry classical studies beyond this point, so long as the education ends at the age of 23, must necessitate the omission of matters, which are far more important for the future career.

As this will, I suppose, be my last letter on this momentous question, I cannot more appropriately close it, than by that very sentiment with which my old opponent, "X. Y. Z.," takes leave of the controversy. He entreats his readers "to bear in mind the vital importance of the interests at stake; before which all mere personal considerations shrink into comparative insignificance." I cannot express the earnestness with which I concur in the same entreaty. This is no mere episodic or subordinate inquiry; it concerns the very heart of Catholic life. Since the discussion *has* taken place, God grant that it may have a salutary result, and that His real interests may be promoted.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

W. G. W.

SIR,—You have kindly allowed me, with the writer's sanction, a perusal of "W. G. W.'s" second letter before its publication, with the view of my preparing any reply I may think necessary for appearance in the same Number of the *Rambler*. You request me, however, to condense my observations into as short a space as can be conveniently managed; and with that request I shall gladly comply, in charity to your readers, who must already be wearied out by a protracted controversy, and because I quite agree with a correspondent in your last Number, that where differences run so deep down any understanding between the disputants becomes hopeless. A few words, however, and they shall be as few as possible, must be said in reply to "W. G. W." And, as this is to be the final letter on the subject, I hope he will allow me to apologise by anticipation for any unintentional misconstructions of his meaning I may fall into, though I shall do my best to avoid them.

As regards his general comments on myself and your other correspondents, I still think, notwithstanding his pointed and of course perfectly sincere disclaimer, that he has in fact missed the real point at issue by confining himself to building up, what I called in my first letter, his own "ideal of a Catholic college," and avoiding the question raised by his opponents as to what experience teaches of the practical working and results of various systems. For it is not, be it remembered, merely the question of how far his ideal is or is not carried out at this or that particular college, but how far the "seminary system" where it is carried out produces the results which he anticipates from it, or the reverse. And if it should be replied, that it is not consistently carried out any where, there could scarcely be a stronger proof of its practical failure.

1. I am greatly surprised that "W. G. W." should think it possible for "X. Y. Z.," or any one who agrees with "X. Y. Z.'s" high estimates of the value of classical studies, to have no fault to find with the working of the "seminary system" in that particular. It is surely notorious that the classical education imparted at seminaries, whether English or foreign, is greatly inferior to that of a good Protestant school. Were this a mere temporary accident, it would be both ungenerous and foolish to notice it at all; but it is a very different matter when "W. G. W." argues that "nothing beyond a reasonably good *grammatical* mastery of Latin and Greek" is attainable or desirable under that system. On the general question I will add nothing to what has been said with equal force and elegance in "X. Y. Z.'s" second letter. But on the question of *time* I will say a word. The canonical age for ordination is twenty-four. Priests are not unfrequently ordained in England at twenty-three by dispensation; sometimes they are not ordained till later than twenty-four. I will take the standard age, and allowing as at present three years for theology, the general education of a student, which would include, of course, "philosophy," might still be pursued up to twenty-one. At that

age many of the students at the English Universities graduate. I see, therefore, no impossibility, as far as time is concerned, in prefixing what is called a "liberal education" to the special and professional course, though I do not deny that a longer time would be an advantage. Let me add, at the risk of being accused of stating a truism, that a man who had had a thoroughly good intellectual training will master any special subject (and especially such a subject as theology) more *rapidly* and more *effectually* than a man who commences his special studies earlier with a less matured and cultivated intellect. To train a select number of priests, as "W. G. W." proposes, by an exceptional process, for controversial purposes, may have its advantages, but it clearly would not at all obviate the importance of a good intellectual training, not for a select few, but for the general body. In his first letter "W. G. W." said that a man who had had no University education appeared to one who had "like a barbarian." Without committing myself to so extreme a statement, I can understand its force, and I think it would be very deplorable that an ordinary priest should be liable to be regarded in any such light by the educated portion of his congregation. And, with respect to "W. G. W.'s" six requisites of knowledge for a priest, I would ask him if he imagines them to be usually attained, even in a moderate degree, under the existing system? If the opposite is notoriously the case, and he will hardly deny it, he might at least pause before urging that argument against any modification of the existing system.

2. I come to a far more fundamental point, the distinction of the public-school and private-school systems. And here I really think that "W. G. W." has wholly failed to meet my arguments in defence of the former, though he quotes a description of it from the *Saturday Review*, which is tolerably correct, though somewhat coloured by that passion for epigrammatic smartness which is the darling sin of *Saturday Reviewers*. It does not, however, go his length in the matter of friendly and familiar intercourse. First, I wish to repeat my conviction that every one, or nearly every one, who has been at a public school will agree with me in considering "W. G. W.'s" picture, or rather caricature, of the moral condition of such schools enormously overdrawn. Secondly, I must repeat, what has been already urged by myself, and, I think, by "X. Y. Z." (for I have not his letters by me), and cannot of course be denied, that our public schools, in origin and essential character, are not Protestant but Catholic. The system was inaugurated at Eton and Winchester long before the Reformation; from them later institutions have copied it; it was an outgrowth of English character, and is not a Protestant invention, but a Catholic bequest. It lost at the Reformation, not the freedom and confidence which are its leading features, but the Catholic tradition, Catholic teaching, and Catholic Sacraments, without which no human system, however admirable, can be expected to preserve Christian purity. This

brings me to my third point, in which, in fact, the whole weight of my opponent's argument is made to rest. And here I feel that he gains an immense and unfair controversial advantage by assuming, as he necessarily does, the "completeness with which the present system does its work in the matter of purity." It is obviously out of the question to enter on such a matter in detail here, it is invidious to touch on it at all. But it is also impossible to allow an assumption to pass unchallenged on which the whole issue of "W. G. W.'s" argument really depends; and which, at least, ought to be proved before it is made the basis of argument at all. My words shall be as few as possible. If we may credit the universal testimony of friend and foe as to clerical immorality in certain parts of Europe and America, the "seminary system" is not so sure a guarantee for its prevention as "W. G. W." seems to imagine. And in regard to the particular class of moral evils apprehended from the unrestricted intercourse and friendship of boys, I have no hesitation in stating my conviction, and I confidently appeal to the experience of public-school men in confirmation of my statement, that they are almost or entirely non-existent at our great public schools. I further believe, and here too I speak from good authority, that such evils flourish, and while human nature remains what it is always will flourish, in proportion as such free intercourse and friendship is put down by the strong arm of force, or subjected to a worrying *espionage*. Less than this I could not say in the interests of truth, after "W. G. W.'s" comments on my former letter; but I pass most gladly from a very disagreeable part of the subject. He is perfectly correct in supposing I did not intend to substitute for *espionage* a political use of the confessional; indeed, I should regard it with horror as a shocking and odious profanation of that holy Sacrament. I have asked several priests, who assure me that a confessor is not bound or authorised to require his penitents to turn informers as a condition of absolution. To myself such a notion appears not only most "disparaging to the Sacrament of Penance," but the surest means of deterring men, and still more boys, from coming to the Sacrament at all, were it once understood to be openly avowed and acted upon.*

3. On the matter of "particular friendship," I am utterly and honestly puzzled to understand what "W. G. W.'s" view really is, taking into account his various statements on the subject. To avoid any danger of misconstruction, I will merely say that, *if* I am to infer from his present letter his agreement with my own opinion, as expressed in my last, I am sincerely glad of it, for I attach great importance to the subject. At the same time I have

* It cannot, therefore, be so "grotesquely heterogeneous" to the confessional as "W. G. W." supposes, and if it were, it would tell equally against that system for lay schools. Far more reasonably ought it to be said that the world and the confessional are grotesquely heterogeneous, yet most of the persons who resort to confession are persons living in the world.

learnt, for the first time, from his second letter that he supposed "X. Y. Z." to hold the view that those who have "warm, human affections" are in a lower state of perfection, or that he had "protested against" what I (erroneously) imagined from his first letter to be his own view, and the precise opposite of which I understood "X. Y. Z." in his first letter to maintain. I may add that the free toleration of particular friendships seems hardly consistent with a system of close *surveillance*, and is certainly understood to be very strongly discountenanced by the "seminary system."

"W. G. W." has done little more than recapitulate some of his former observations on "literature," and it is sufficient therefore for me to refer to my reply to them. He enumerates seven false principles as generally stated or implied in non-religious books, to which criticism I venture to take exception. But I meant nothing so absurd as that the standard of the *Imitation of Christ* or *Spiritual Combat*, is habitually maintained in such works. They seldom touch at all on the class of subjects those treatises deal with; nor do I see the force of the objection, as I never recommended such reading for the formation of the religious and ascetical temper, but for recreation, refinement of taste, and enlarged knowledge of human nature and human thought.

Your correspondent expresses surprise that nobody has noticed his analogy between a discussion of clerical education and clerical celibacy. I suppose it was because nobody recognised the existence of any analogy between the discussion of a fundamental principle of ecclesiastical discipline based on the universal tradition at least of western Christendom from the earliest ages, and the discipline of the details of an educational system which had no existence till three centuries ago, which has never obtained universally, and is considered by many to be a failure where it has been tried, and which does not now exist in England, as "F." has pointed out, in any form which can lay claim to direct ecclesiastical sanction; not to say that the discussion did not refer only to *clerical* education. After all, the real question lies in a nutshell. Are the clergy to be, as a writer in your last Number worded it, "only machines for distributing the Sacraments," or are they *also* to aim at influencing the social, civil, and educational life of their generation? I am not to start any fresh grounds of argument here, and will say nothing therefore of my reasons for holding the latter view to be true, and, under existing circumstances, of inestimable importance. But I may just observe that it is the one which, as a matter of fact, always has been acted upon, with various degrees of consistency and success, and probably always will be. And if the clergy are to aim at such a result, it is surely clear as daylight that a close and restrictive system, even *if* otherwise desirable, would be alarmingly inadequate to fit them for accomplishing it. There are many other points in "W. G. W.'s" letter which I could willingly have touched upon, but I will content myself, before concluding, with a brief recapitulation of certain facts which have been

brought out on one side in the course of the controversy, and have not been disproved or even denied on the other. It has been repeatedly asserted, and cannot, of course, be denied, that the public-school system of this country is Catholic in origin and essence, and is distinctly English, not distinctly Protestant, nor has it been denied that it possesses some very great advantages. On the other hand, it is notorious that the "seminary system," so far as it exists here at all, was introduced from Douai, the nursery of our clergy during the ages of persecution, and is in its peculiarities distinctly French, and therefore, in the judgment of many, very ill adapted for the training of English youths. It is again notorious that in France itself the "seminary system," however well it may have succeeded as regards the character of the clergy, has egregiously failed as regards their work. They influence the women, but, as a general rule, they do not influence the men, the exceptions being, just as we should have expected, among those who have been differently trained, like Gratry, Ravignan, and Lacordaire. As regards the important matter of purity, there is some difference of opinion among your correspondents (perhaps there will be less among your readers) as to the facts; but even supposing them with "W. G. W." to tell entirely in favour of the "seminary system," its defenders have failed to account for the manifest unfairness of ascribing to a particular method of school-discipline a distinction which is abundantly explained by the difference of religion, and which accompanies the difference of religion, and not the particular discipline, in general society no less than in schools and colleges. In taking leave of this controversy, I cannot do better than reëcho the sentiment which has been already expressed by the principal writer on either side, and add the humble utterance of my own hearty desire that this great question may receive the attention it deserves, and that its discussion may promote the solid interests of the Catholic Church in England.

Your obedient servant,

DERLAX.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have read an article on Eton in the current *Edinburgh*, which complains of the number of masters there as insufficient for the requisite amount of familiar intercourse with the boys. Whatever be thought of the justice of his criticisms, it is evident that the writer does not consider this deficiency as any part of the public-school *system*, but merely as an accidental fault in the present arrangement at Eton.

SIR,—Will you do me the favour of giving insertion, in your May Number, to the following brief correspondence, which, by obviating a possible question on my last letter, may help to shorten the educational controversy?

Your obedient servant,

March 18.

F.

(No. 1.)

SIR,—You will observe that in a letter of mine which appears in the current *Rambler*, on the subject of ecclesiastical education, I have presumed you, when you speak of the use to be derived in such education from the cultivation of the affections, to have more immediately in your view the *relations between superiors and students*. I do not understand you to exclude (as you will see by my words) other “developments of affection,” such, for instance, as that implied in the term “particular friendships.” Still, it was under the idea that you were speaking more immediately of the treatment of boys and young men by those intrusted with their education, that I expressed my cordial agreement with you in that part of your subject. The difficult question of “particular friendships” in ecclesiastical education seems to me to stand upon a distinct footing, and, at any rate, was not present to my mind when I was commenting on your letters.

The more carefully I examine your words, the more strongly I am confirmed in my original impression of your meaning. Neither do I think it possible that, since I distinctly implied, and argued upon, that impression of it in my first letter, you would have so plainly acquiesced in my construction in your reply, in the *Rambler* for November last, had I mistaken, or materially understated, the drift of your words.

However, as “W. G. W.” has assumed you to refer exclusively to the subject of “particular friendships,” and as a writer, who signs himself “Derlax,” in the current *Rambler*, has confined my own argument on the “affections” to that portion of the subject, to which he thereby appears to give a more prominent place in your meaning than I had presumed it to occupy, it would be a satisfaction to me, if, after having attentively read that part of my letter in the *Rambler* for March which relates to this question (pp. 405-7), you would kindly state whether, on the whole, I have correctly understood you.

I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,

F.

March 15.

(No. 2)

SIR,—In reply to your note of the 15th inst., I have no hesitation in saying that you have taken a perfectly correct view of my meaning in the matter to which you refer. You allow, I observe, both in your note and in your letter to the *Rambler*, for my having intended to include other developments of the affections, such as that implied in the term “particular friendships,” which is certainly true. But it is none the less true that I had very specially in mind the evils to be apprehended from an indiscriminate mode of government in those intrusted with the education of youth, and the immense advantages to be expected from their tempering discipline by personal influence, and striving to cultivate an affectionate and confidential intercourse, grounded on a spirit of hearty sympathy with those placed under

them, which should distinguish their rules alike from the stiffness of mere official routine, and the vexatious interference of a system of minute inspection.

I may take this opportunity of saying that, although you had no other assistance in arriving at my meaning than such as my letters themselves supplied, your construction of it, when you have undertaken to interpret me, is throughout your letter substantially correct.

As I understand that, contrary to my expectations when I wrote my concluding letter in the current *Rambler*, the controversy is likely to be continued, you will perhaps allow me to make one further remark, which certain portions of your comments upon "W. G. W.'s" letter naturally suggest. I am unable to comprehend how the delineation of an imaginary picture, whatever its merits,—for on that point I offer no opinion,—can be put forward as a defence of systems materially different from it both in theory and in practice. Still less can it be regarded as an *answer* to observations having for their exclusive scope, not the construction of a theoretical optimism, but the realities and requirements of actual life.

One word I will add of a more personal nature, not in petulance, but in explanation. I have written gravely on a serious subject, with the sole motive of doing what little in me lay towards the great work of raising the tone of Catholic education in England. I have not urged random views hastily adopted, but have stated convictions which represent the gradual and accumulated growth of the thought and observation of past years. In reply, I have been met with little of argument, with not a little of ribaldry, misconstruction, and abuse. Of that I do not complain. To bear, however humble, a part in such a cause, a Catholic may well consider it an honour to toil, and even to suffer, though his first reward be kicks and cuffs from those he seeks to aid. On the good feeling, the strong common sense, the honest love of fair play, which I am sure are characteristic of English Catholics, I rely for ultimately gaining a kindlier and more generous appreciation of my motives and my aims.

I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,

March 17.

X. Y. Z.

SIR,—As a priest of very many years' standing, and who passed a number of years in one of our chief ecclesiastical colleges, both as a student and a superior, I feel desirous of expressing the great pleasure I have derived from the perusal of three interesting letters, on the subject of ecclesiastical education, which appeared in your last Number.

If out of those three letters I select that which bears the signature of "F." as the one that has especially attracted me, it is not because I am otherwise than most sensible of the value of the others, but because "F." has fallen upon a line of argument which exactly tallies with my own course of thought and experience.

Since he appears to disclaim any great personal knowledge of the character of college students, as distinguished from other lads of the same class and age, I deem it to be a bare act of justice to state that my seventeen years' experience as a college teacher and officer entirely coincides with all that he has said upon the dispositions and habits of boys and young men under education, and upon the mode of treating them which is most likely to insure for superiors that esteem and confidence, without which mere discipline can do but little. I allude particularly to the dangers of dealing with young men upon rigid and indiscriminating principles. Such a system I agree with your correspondent in thinking to be rather foreign than English; but, at all events, I have witnessed many lamentable applications of it by men whose memory, for the sake of their deep piety and moral worth, is deservedly cherished in affectionate veneration.

In conclusion, allow me to thank you, sir, for the good service you have done to the public by opening your pages to this most interesting and, as I think, most profitable discussion. Surely if it were wrong in an anonymous writer to start it, it is as unwarrantable for anonymous writers to denounce it. But, for my own part, I cannot bring myself to believe that such a discussion, conducted as it has been in a spirit of submission to authority, and with great moderation of tone (on one side at least,—the fervid vehemence of one of your correspondents inclining me to suspect some recent revolution in the writer's opinions, or to prognosticate some future one),—that such a discussion, I say, is in any wise inconsistent with the objects, or external to the province, of a "lay periodical," if I clearly understand what is the precise meaning of the phrase.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

March 16, 1861.

P. Q. R.

Current Events.*

HOME AFFAIRS.

THE foreign policy of the Government, its really vulnerable point, has escaped the attacks of the Opposition, who feared a victory which would be unpopular, and who had no grounds of principle on which they could found an argument. When an Italian debate was provoked by several of the Catholic members, and by some Radicals who were happy to break a lance in a cause which is adopted by the whole country, the Tories held aloof, and the motion was therefore so made that it could lead only to a demonstration, not to a trial, of strength. The policy of such a measure was altogether defective. The Catholic members might have founded their right to protest against the foreign policy on its hostility to the interests of the religion of so large a part of the empire; or they might have held out a hand to all the Whig and Conservative, as opposed to the Radical and Tory, opinions in the House and the country, by taking their stand upon the analogy of our own constitution, and the examples of our history. In one case they would have appealed to the principle of religious liberty, in the other, to the real interests and duties of the country. But they could not have agreed among themselves on either point, and they were compelled to adopt a line in which the greatest sacrifices to public prejudices could not command a single Protestant ally. The result was not at all to the advantage of the cause which it was intended to benefit, nor conducive to the political reputation of the House of Commons.

The policy which has made itself popular in this country proceeds on the assumption that the old Italian governments were bad and the people unhappy. Their subversion, therefore, was justified by their faults and by their weakness, by the attempt

and by the event. Good government and order could, under the circumstances, be restored only by the free, constitutional State of Sardinia. England, therefore, though restrained by the fear of war, or by the theory of non-intervention, from direct interference, was bound to throw her moral weight into the scale in favour of a people justly revolting against intolerable oppression, and of a power justly aggressive, in the sacred interests of order and of national prosperity.

It would have been possible to meet ministers upon each point at every step of their defence. It might have been argued that, under some at least of the fallen sceptres, the people were prosperous, and without just grounds of discontent or of rebellion; and it might be made clear to every understanding, by recalling the defects of our government a few generations ago, when rebellion would have been justified neither in the eyes of contemporaries nor in our own, that such evils are an insufficient excuse for cashiering sovereigns; with still greater effect it might have been shown that the Sardinian constitution is very far from satisfying English notions of freedom, that its effect and its purpose have been to make the government more powerful, not the people more free. Such an argument would have been possible, and with Protestants it would have been effective; but for the Catholics it was not practicable. It might have placed them at the head of the political thought of the country, and have enabled them to mould to a large extent the views of existing parties. But that is a position we are unable and incompetent to occupy, for the reason that we are not in possession of a political system, nor even of a comprehensive political principle.

* In consequence of want of space, we are obliged to confine our notices of current events to those of special Catholic interest, necessarily omitting several of the highest political significance, as the affairs of Poland, the Austrian Empire, of the American States, and of Schleswig-Holstein and Germany.

We are not so united in a common doctrine respecting authority, liberty, and right, that we should be ready to pursue it to its consequences, and to accept its results. We stand, not upon a political principle, but upon a religious interest, which we are unwilling to avow, and which we seek to disguise by whatever arts seem most specious, most popular, most suited to the audience, or to the occasion. We have therefore not even the pretence of agreement, nor the reality of consistency, nor the appearance of sincerity.

March 4th. Mr. Hennessy opened the debate in a very elaborate and spirited speech of more than two hours, which was heard with great favour by the House, and in which he argued, with the help of statistics, in favour of the conquered against the conquering power. This mode of argument is fallacious in two respects. Statistics, to be worth any thing at all, must be complete. It is a science in which there is no concluding from examples, no generalising from special, selected instances. A statistical account must be very comprehensive in order to be in any degree instructive. A few figures no more enable us to institute political comparisons than a brick serves as a sample of a house. It is clear that nobody will allow himself to be convinced against his will by an arbitrary selection of figures. Unfortunately, Mr. Hennessy appears himself to believe, not only in the efficacy of this weapon in debate, but in its value for inquiry. He considers it not only as an argument, but a proof. Now, it is certain that in a period of war and revolution, commercial prosperity must suffer. But at no time is it necessarily a sign of good government. It is a great error to trust to material tests in the ethical order. Material well-being may coexist with the worst moral and political evils. Despotisms often succeed in encouraging trade and industry. No governments have more conspicuously failed, or rather more ostentatiously disregarded the real objects of political existence, than the Directory and the Second Empire. Yet in all material things, in all things most easily reducible to figures, they immeasurably surpassed nearly every government

of the Continent. Viewed in this light, good government really loses its value. The moral and political sense is suspended, we learn to look with favour on Irish and Radical aspirations after French institutions, and to sympathise with the Israelites longing for the fleshpots of Egypt instead of the prize that was to crown their trials.

Sir George Bowyer replied to Mr. Layard, apparently without preparation, and therefore without arrangement, precision, or effect. He simply condemned what has occurred in Italy, and threatened England with the consequences. Unfortunately a passage was quoted from a pamphlet he had written in 1848, expressing sympathy with the Italian movement at that time, which he did not repudiate; and the belief in his sincerity, the quality by which he commands the respect and patience of the House, was entirely dispelled. For at that time Sir George Bowyer sympathised with the Italian movement, of which Pius IX. was the indirect author, and for a time the hero and the chief. He would not, therefore, condemn the late events, so far as they have been inspired by hatred of foreign domination in Lombardy, and we suppose in Tuscany. But in the Roman and Neapolitan dominions he utterly condemns them. Yet the imputation of misgovernment, the only one on which revolution is justifiable, was directed with much greater force against the Southern than against the Northern States. It was never asserted that the Tuscans, for instance, were oppressed. It has, on the other hand, been clearly shown, from his own statements, that the late King of Naples governed upon a system as thoroughly in contradiction with the first elements of political right as that of the French Convention. Therefore, the just revolution would be condemned, the unjust revolution approved. Instead of a principle of political ethics, the supposed interests of the Holy See were assumed as the standard of right and wrong. The expulsion of the Austrians might be rejoiced at, if it was the result of a movement favourable to the influence of the Pope. The destruction of the Neapolitan tyranny must be deprecated, because it would

place the Pope in a position of extreme difficulty.

The different opinions that divide European society with regard to the Italian revolution are not very numerous. There are the Legitimists, as they are called, a dynastic party, who in their prosperity sacrificed the Pope to the King, and now serve the Pope for the sake of the King. Their sentiments were those which prevailed among the aristocracy after the aristocracy had become dependents on the court, and they have formed a league of late with those who are absolutists among Ultramontanes. With this party authority alone has rights, and the right of the State is restrained solely (but absolutely) by that of the Church. They adhere, not to the *fait accompli*, but to the *status quo ante bellum*. Whether resistance is lawful on behalf or by command of the Church, is a question they have luckily not had to decide, for it is one which would dissolve their union. They agree only on the practical question that a legitimate government may not lawfully be resisted by the people for popular ends. Consequently the Austrians at Milan, the Pope at Bologna, the Bourbons at Palermo, ought all to be maintained or restored. Strictly speaking, this is the counter-revolutionary party, which is but a phase of the revolution. At the opposite extremity stand the simple revolutionists, who are known in Europe by the name of Liberals. In their eyes the people are the supreme arbiters of their own destinies, and government can subsist only subject to their consent and approval, for it subsists only for their benefit. The State has no objective distinct ends of its own; if it suits the people, it fulfils its object, and the object of all government, says Sydney Smith, is "roast mutton, potatoes, claret, a stout constable, an honest justice, a clear highway, a free chapel. . . . *Erin go bragh!* A far better anthem would be *Erin go bread-and-cheese, Erin go cabins that will keep out the rain, Erin go pantaloons without holes in them!*" To persons in this frame of mind, it is absurd and monstrous that Venice should be ruled by an army of hateful foreigners, or Romagna by a body of unpopular clerics. Piedmont offers

a popular representative government, therefore let Italy belong to Piedmont. This is, if not a very elevated or intelligent, a very consistent and intelligible view. There is another party which does not stand so high as this, which seeks to reconcile feelings of religion with modern notions of freedom, and to effect a compromise between the Liberals and the Legitimists. They uphold the cause of freedom wherever they discern it, as a safeguard for the interests of religion. They make no harmonious union of religious interests and political doctrines, but make one subserve the other. Liberalism suits them only when it does not clash with Catholicism. They have no political theory that cannot clash with religion. By an honourable inconsistency they sacrifice politics to religion, where they feel the antagonism, and do not understand that between political and religious truths antagonism is as impossible as between scientific and religious truths. This party is to blame as much as any other for calamities which it is the first to deplore, for it hushed the conscience of the Catholic world at the first acts which led to the present disasters. Those who applauded the invasion of Lombardy have no right to lament the annexation of the Marches and Romagna; for those events are connected as cause and effect, and if the guilt in both cases is not equal, it was greatest in the first. But there is one error even still greater than that of the liberal Catholics of France. It is wrong to be inconsistent and to put religious interests in contradiction with popular rights. But Sir George Bowyer has contrived to sacrifice the just rights of the government in one case, and the just rights of the people in the other, and by a comprehensive ingenuity to identify the cause of the temporal power with an infamous revolution in the North of Italy, and with an infamous tyranny in the South. No other combination of error could be devised more exhaustive or more mischievous.

March 7th. The debate was resumed by Mr. Edwin James, as the advocate and familiar friend of Garibaldi, and as a conscious partaker in a fair share of the eulogy bestowed

upon him. Against the system of police under the late government he spoke with power and effect. He vindicated the Dictator from the charge of piracy, because he robbed no treasure, and appears to be as incorruptible as Robespierre. This was very far from the question, which was as to the justice of the invasion of Southern Italy by Piedmont.

Mr. Maguire and Mr. Monsell also spoke, but both seemed to be endeavouring to make out such a case for the Roman Government as might be received by the House of Commons, an endeavour which it is impossible not to feel to be derogatory and hopeless.

The strangest episode was a speech by Mr. Roebuck in defence of Austria, for which he afterwards had to account to his constituents at Sheffield, who are sufficiently advanced Liberals to prefer democratic absolutism in France to representative government in an aristocratic state like Austria. It was evident that Mr. Roebuck was not master of the subject, that he knew little of the internal condition of Austria, and that his judgment had been only very recently formed. He was also open to the imputation that he had believed the favourable reports given him at Vienna by men in power, and that he had commercial reasons for both thinking and speaking favourably of them. His speech was heard with cool surprise by the House. The Radicals jeered at him, and the Catholics, some of whom had tried to serve the Pope by throwing obloquy on the Austrians, could hardly be gratified at the courage of a man who took higher ground than theirs.

Mr. Gladstone uttered a vehement declamation against the governments of Naples, Romagna, and Modena; but he committed the great rhetorical error of supporting his statement with facts which failed to bear them out, whilst it would have been easy to cite better instances. Under the direction of Mr. Gladstone's friend Farini, when governor of Æmilia, a publication was commenced of documents from the archives of the late government, in order, by exhibiting it in the worst possible light, to justify the revolution by which it fell. The work was intrusted to the advocate Gennarelli, already known in literature as an ardent enemy of the Pope's. It contains valuable

and authentic information, but as an argument in justification of the revolution it is a *petitio principii*. It cuts away entirely and irrevocably the ground on which the Roman Government has been commonly defended, so far as that was not already done by the Lyons papers; but it affords no more than they did a defence of the revolutionary party. Nobody who read the official conversations of Cardinal Antonelli, as reported in the English despatches, can reasonably speak with favour of his system of government, and no Catholic entitled to authority has done so since their publication. At the same time they throw the darkest shadow on the insurrectionary party. The collection of Gennarelli is made on the fallacious assumption that disaffection implies misgovernment; that no government is overturned that does not deserve to be overturned; and that severity of repression is the cause, not the consequence, of resistance. As a rule, it cannot be said that an insurrection is a proof, or a natural consequence, of maladministration alone. Material suffering from pressure of taxation, servitude, a defective system of economy, or any other cause, has often led to ill-will or violence against a particular class, against nobles, capitalists, Jews, but hardly ever to the subversion of the State. This has more commonly been brought about by speculative causes, by the enthusiasm for a doctrine, such as inspired the Reformation and the Revolution, and sacrificed the existing state to theories. Distress originates no revolutions, and theory justifies none. France teaches that the vindication of national independence is a just motive of revolution; England claims the same for constitutional government, America for democracy. We have seen in modern times as many movements of this purely theoretical character as movements provoked by wrong. The great difficulty we have in distinguishing the character of an insurrection comes from the mixture of motives and objects which combine to produce it. There is no *primâ facie* presumption either in favour of an insurrection or against it; for there is no general reason to assume that authority represents right. Toryism and Liberalism are alike incompetent to solve the problems of the day; indeed,

in each case we must distinguish the merits or demerits of the government from those of the revolutionary party. We cannot, for instance, support the Neapolitan government because it was attacked on the indefensible ground of Italian unity; nor can we defend the aggression of the Sardinians because it was directed against a government which deserved destruction as richly as that of Naples. Genarelli's documents prove great harshness on the part of the authorities, and great discontent on the part of the people in Romagna. They do not show whether the harshness or the discontent was originally without justification, or that it was always the former that produced the latter. But they show distinctly that the general disaffection proceeded from home causes, not from foreign influence; that it was well known to the authorities, and that the revolution there was not the work of corruption, as at Naples, or of intrigues, as at Rome. Cardinal Massimo writes from Imola, 12th August, 1845, that there were no hopes of the present generation, that there were very few above the age of eighteen, even among the country people, who were well disposed towards the government, and he rightly attributes it to the consequences of the French occupation for nearly twenty years. A judge writes from Ferrara, 15th September 1843, that the whole population is hostile; and from Ravenna the agents of the government report that there are not above thirty men in the town who are well disposed, that almost all might be included in the designation of 'Liberals.' The delegate Folicaldi writes from Ferrara, 10th December 1849, that the dislike of ecclesiastical rule makes many wish to be Austrian, although, he says, the Austrians not only did not intrigue for the purpose, but would be opposed to it. And yet in 1857, when the Pope was at Bologna, it was the opinion of those who best knew the state of the country, that within three years it would be an Austrian province.

April 19th. Lord Ellenborough brought the Roman question before the House of Lords in the form of a question, whether, the temporal sovereignty having been lost, any thing had been done to secure the spiritual independence of the Holy See. This

was a point which had not been raised in the House of Commons; and it is obvious that it is a matter in which Protestant powers are more interested than Catholic powers; for Catholic governments have been more jealous of the independence of their national churches in respect of Rome than solicitous for the independence of the Pope. They have desired to influence the Holy See rather than to deliver it, and have been interested in preventing the influence of others from exceeding their own, not in preserving the Papacy free from all influence. During many years of foreign occupation, the chief Catholic powers have evenly balanced each other. After the revolution of 1831, the occupation of Ferrara by the Austrians was followed by that of Ancona by the French; since 1848 the same balance of power has been renewed on a larger scale. Prussia and England are excluded from the kind of influence obtained by services rendered to the temporal interests of the Church, but they have the best reasons to desire that the spiritual authority should be perfectly free. As they are Protestant countries, they cannot reasonably share it; as they are free States, they cannot consistently abridge it. They can neither claim the same concessions which the Church makes to Catholic powers, nor impose the conditions which she accepts in absolute States. The despotic system in France, and the Josephine system in Austria, may rejoice at any thing which trammels and hinders the Papal power, for they have both much to fear from it. But England and Prussia must desire that in the vast sphere of religion, in which they cannot influence a large minority of their subjects, they should obey an authority which is free from all temporal considerations and from all political motives. They were therefore interested above all others in providing for the spiritual independence of the Head of the Church, and they alone could mediate between the parties that are contending for power in Italy.

After saying that the revolution has not destroyed a single power that had been for centuries of the smallest use to Europe or to civilisation, or which existed apparently for any good purpose, and that the Italians rose for the purpose of vindicating rights reserved

to them by nature, Lord Ellenborough proceeded to say: "The French went to Rome for the purpose of giving the hand to the Pope, and obstructing the progress of democracy. They remain there—not intentionally, but practically—with the effect of giving the hand to democracy, and of degrading the Pope. . . . France might, in the first instance, have declared that the whole of the Roman States should be preserved under the dominion of the Pope; but that would have been an extreme measure. She did not adopt that course in the first instance, and to do so now is too late. The Emperor could not adopt it in the first instance, because it would have been inconsistent with the principles on which the French empire is founded. The French Emperor is in a very different position from Louis XIV. Louis XIV. claimed to have the whole power of the State, but the Emperor has declared that he owes his power altogether to the people, and he cannot contradict himself; he cannot act in contravention of the principle on which his government is founded, for there are moral limits to the action of all monarchs. He therefore could not adopt the extreme course of declaring that the whole of the territory of the Roman States should be placed under the dominion of the Pope. The clergy of France have expressed their sympathy with the Pope; and I will say nothing whatever against the feeling which has been manifested by them towards the Pope. On the contrary, I respect those feelings; I think they are natural and generous, not only as expressions of sympathy with misfortune such as the Pope has been subjected to, but that they are feelings of sympathy hallowed by religion. But what I think the French clergy, and most of the Roman Catholics in Europe, desire is, not that the Pope should continue in the state in which he now is, but that he should be restored to all his old powers. That is impossible; and the question is, is it desirable that the Pope should remain in the position in which he now stands, and is it desirable for France or for Europe that he should do so? . . . In point of fact, my lords, the Pope is in a position such as no clergy in France—no clergy any where—no Roman Catholics any where—could wish the head

of their Church to remain in. It is an object not only to the great Catholic States, but to all States in which there is a large Catholic population, that the Pope should be permanently established in a state of entire spiritual independence." It is remarkable that the portion of his speech which was most loudly cheered was that relating to Austria. "My lords, Austria has not been fairly treated in this matter. At the Congress of Vienna she gave up the Netherlands, and in exchange she received Italy. I say Italy, because, though Austria herself only got a portion of that country, princes of the Austrian house were established in other portions; and it was perfectly understood that it was the mission of Austria to maintain Italy against the French. Genoa was given to Piedmont for the same purpose. The Italian territory of Piedmont was to be the advanced guard of Austria against France. That was the intention of the Congress of Vienna. Whether it was a wise one or not I shall not now inquire; but with that intention Austria was established in Italy, and in endeavouring to maintain and extend her influence in that country, she only performed her original mission and fulfilled obligations which she contracted at Vienna. . . . I must say that of all things I do deprecate any attempt on the part of any body of Italians whatever to interfere by arms in the differences which may now exist between Austria and Hungary or any other States. (Loud cheers.) Austria, in her integrity and in her strength, is absolutely necessary to the safety of every State in Europe. (Renewed cheering.) It would be impossible to preserve the balance of power if her integrity were assailed (cheers); and any man who now entertains a desire of raising commotions and of creating a war against Austria in Hungary, would be criminal in the presence of Europe, and the enemy of every man within its boundaries." (Loud cheers.) It is evident from the whole course of the debate that these remarks, and the cheers with which they were received, proceeded from no real hostility to the revolution, but from hostility to France.

Lord Clarendon gave the best defence of a neutral policy in the question of the spiritual power, when he

said that the Pope "might very fairly say that on the political part of the question we are not impartial, because we are determined at almost any price to secure the unity of Italy; and that on the religious part of the question our interest as Protestants inclines us to regard with favour whatever will weaken his power." Of the French occupation of Rome, he said: "Having reference to the events which have since occurred, particularly considering the feelings and opinions which have recently been manifested in the French Chambers, and the natural impatience of the existing state of things which notoriously exists at

Rome, I think that the Emperor of the French may well say, that if he were now to withdraw his garrison from Rome, not alone Catholic France, but Catholic Europe, would hold him personally responsible for any insult or injury which the Pope might sustain. . . . For this I do not blame the present Pope or any of his predecessors, because, without destroying the basis on which the Papacy has always rested, and without departing altogether from the system which has prevailed for centuries, I believe it to be impossible for any Pope to grant those reforms which the spirit of the age and the exigencies of the times require."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The draught address of the French Senate, Feb. 25, in reply to the speech from the throne, was in favour of the Imperial policy, which seeks to improve the material condition of the French clergy, while it tramples upon their higher interests. It speaks with lively satisfaction of the efficacious solicitude of the government in promoting religious education, in improving the condition of the clergy, multiplying parishes and curacies in the rural districts, and aiding the communes to build or repair the churches, presbyteries, and the schools. While in Italy, it says, "two interests of the first order, which the Emperor wished to conciliate, have clashed, and Italian liberty is struggling with the Court of Rome." To the first the Emperor suggested a course of legality, and to the second a compromise, and washed his hands both of unjust aggression and of impolitic resistance. The Emperor's filial affection has been unceasingly remarked in the defence and maintenance of the temporal power of the Pope; and the Senate fully adheres to all the acts of his frank, moderate, and persevering policy, and will continue to place its confidence in the monarch who covers the Papacy with the French flag, and has constituted himself the most vigilant and most faithful guardian of Rome and the Pontifical throne.

The project of the address of the Legislative Body, adopted in committee Feb. 27, says that "diplomatic documents, and the last despatch of troops to Rome, have proved to the whole

world that the Emperor's constant efforts have secured to the Papacy its safety and independence, and have protected its temporal sovereignty, as far as possible, considering the force of facts and the resistance opposed to wise counsels. The Emperor has thus fulfilled the duty of the eldest son of the Church, and responded to the religious sentiment and political traditions of France; and the Legislative Body leaves the solution entirely to the Emperor's wisdom."

In the Senate, the Catholic party proposed an amendment tending to pledge the Emperor more distinctly to remain at Rome. It cannot be denied that the first speakers for the amendment, by placing the questions of all the dispossessed Italian sovereigns on the same footing, and thus implying the Legitimist doctrine, gave a real opening to Prince Napoleon, who, in his remarkable speech of Feb. 28, said that the amendment came from some "holy council of Legitimists and clergymen," and that the policy of the speakers might be summed up thus: "A second expedition to Rome, war with Piedmont, Italy thrown into the arms of England, war between France and England; and all this to gain the alliance of the Pope, whose policy we disapprove; of the Duke of Tuscany, who fought against us at Solferino; of the Duke of Modena, who would never recognise our dynasty; of the King of Naples, who could not keep his own crown; of those whose influence in Italy we have destroyed; and of a few bishops who will approve a policy

that will find an echo in a certain party, but never in the nation." The Prince afterwards showed the folly of supposing that the King of Naples and the Pope were so intimately linked together, and he cited from the yellow book a despatch to show that, when the Neapolitan government was asked to concert measures with Piedmont to reëstablish the temporal power of the Pope, the answer was, "We cannot;" not that the Neapolitan government was opposed to the vicariat of Victor Emmanuel over Romagna and the Legations, because those provinces were ill governed: but the Marches and Umbria being governed just as ill, the Neapolitan cabinet would consent to the King of Sardinia governing the former, if the King of Naples might govern the latter. M. de Martino wished, in fact, to divide the Papal States between Piedmont and Naples. The Prince next attacked the policy of Cardinal Antonelli, which he treated with great disdain, and asked, "Does so childish a government deserve all the consideration with which we surround it?" He then accepted M. Larochejaque-lin's argument against the union of the temporal and spiritual powers in the same hands, and declared that but for this consideration he should be for national churches, of which the sovereign was the head; but that he would not admit for Rome that which he rejected for Paris. He did not like to see a policeman by the side of the priest to compel people to spiritual obedience. The Prince then pronounced himself in favour of Italian unity, and proposed to reconcile the Pope's independence with the subjection of Rome to a new sovereign by dividing Rome into two, and giving the Trastevere and Vatican to the Pope, and the old Rome to the King of Italy. Here the Pope should have a garrison, and a budget furnished or guaranteed by all the powers. "Thus the Pope, encircled with the reverence of Christendom, with a special jurisdiction, and his own flag, would have all his independence; Rome would become, so to say, the sanctuary, the oasis of Christendom." M. Billault said that the Papal government would have every thing or nothing, and refused all compromise. It would not accept a budget from the Catholic powers, but it demanded first annates, and then, when these were

found impracticable, the Peter's pence: but there is no element of regularity in these, and the resources of charity always dry up after a certain time. The only solution was that proposed by M. Rossi in 1832: "There is a complete incompatibility between the Roman government and the people; the future only presents one solution to preserve the temporal power, the suzerainty of the Pope, and the endowment of the Holy See by the Catholic nations." M. Billault, however, steadily refused to give any assurance that the French occupation of Rome would be continued; but the progress of the debate two days later forced M. Baroche to assure the Senate, that there was not the slightest intention of recalling the troops, and it was only on this assurance that the address was at last voted, and the "Cardinal's amendment" lost by the narrow majority of nineteen votes: nine ministers, two members of the privy council, two prefects, and seven other great office-holders more than made up this majority.

In the Legislative Body several new speakers made a great sensation by their defence of the Papal sovereignty, or their demonstration of the crookedness of French and Piedmontese policy, which is scarcely the same thing. But it was clear that no policy could be founded on the recommendations of MM. Flavigny, Kolb, Bernard, Plichon, Segur, and Keller; and, on the assurance of M. Billault that "France recognises in the maintenance of the absolute independence of the Holy See one of the fundamental principles of its policy, which it can neither neglect nor abandon," the address was carried with only thirteen dissentient votes. M. Jules Favre's amendment for the immediate withdrawal of the French troops only found five supporters.

It is clear, then, that the policy of France, so far as it is public, extends only to the continued occupation of Rome. No plan is proposed for securing the independence of the Pope in any other way.

At Turin the Government has been much more honest in declaring its end, but equally dark about the means by which it was to be accomplished. "We must go to Rome," said Cavour, in the first Italian Parliament, that had already conferred

on Victor Emmanuel the title of King of Italy,—“we must go to Rome, but without trenching upon the independence of the Pope, without bringing the Church under the domination of the State.” A united Italy is impossible without Rome for its capital; those who would be content with Florence, only accept it as a temporary expedient; sooner or later they will have Rome. And if France still occupies it, if the French Government has even pledged the Senate and Legislative Body that the troops shall not be withdrawn from Rome, this pledge means nothing; the French will go, not by compulsion, but by persuasion.

The first step in the process of persuasion is to prove to Catholics that a united Italy, with Rome for its capital, will secure instead of compromising the independence of the Church. If it would deprive the Pope of much of his independence, or reduce him to be grand almoner of the king, it would be fatal, not only to Catholicism, but to Italy. The union, however, of spiritual and temporal power in the hands of one man is a caliphate that is impossible in Italy. But it will not hurt the Pope, because (1) the temporal power is no real guarantee of his freedom. It was so, “when sovereigns, resting on divine right, regarded their domination as a right of absolute property over men and things;” but since 1789 governments have reposed upon the consent of the people, and a government by divine right has no possibility of existence; there is too great an antagonism between the people and the ruler. (2) And no reforms are able to salve over this fundamental antagonism; the principle of divine right must be given up, in order to satisfy the people. But the Pope cannot give up this principle; and all reforms which are substituted for such a renunciation are mere shams, can never be really and honestly intended. Indeed, Cavour says, the Pope “cannot grant” them without “violating his duty as Pontiff: he only tolerates them while he cannot abolish them; he can never carry them out, and give them fair play; his refusal to grant them is not obstinacy but firmness, for which Catholics ought to be grateful to him.” (3) But if the incompatibility between popular rights and

the papal or clerical government is thus evident, nothing remains but to separate absolutely the spiritual from the temporal functions, and in this the Pope will regain his freedom. “It is precisely the separation of the powers which will give him the independence of which he stands so much in need. When the Church is once emancipated from all connection with the temporal authority, and separated from the State by distinctly-marked limits, the Holy See will no longer be shackled by concordats and the prerogatives of the civil power, which up till now have been rendered necessary by the temporal power of the Pope;” (4) and this independence shall have “ample guarantees.” “We will inscribe the principle of the reciprocal independence of Church and State in the fundamental statute of the kingdom, and we will insure, by all possible means, its complete realisation. But the surest guarantee is the thoroughly Catholic character of the Italian people. Italy has often made great efforts for the reform of ecclesiastical discipline, but she has never raised her hand against the religion with which it is connected. The country of Arnold of Brescia, of Dante, of Savonarola, of Sarpi, of Giavnone, has ever, like them, sought only the reform of the Church, that the Church, purified, should subsist, and become more free.” (5) If all negotiations upon these principles have hitherto failed, this is perhaps because they have never been fully explained before. But they will be carried out, whether the Pope likes it or not. “Arrived in Rome, we shall proclaim the separation of the Church from the State, and the liberty of the Church.” After it has been done, “the great majority of Catholics will approve, and will cause to fall upon the right head the responsibility of the struggle into which the Court of Rome would have sought to enter with the nation.” But perhaps Pius IX. will remember the first aspirations of his reign, and will “seek to acquire the immortal glory of having reconciled the Italian nation with the Church, and religion with liberty.”

The “reciprocal independence of Church and State,” as interpreted by the acts of the Italian government, means the secularisation of education, the suppression of religious orders,

the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the exile or imprisonment of Bishops and priests who protest against this new liberty, and the total suppression of all ecclesiastical immunities and privileges. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Church and State can be mutually independent, except when the Church holds the position she occupies in England or the United States, where the civil government does not recognise the Church as a corporation at all, and where the clergy have exactly those civil rights which the laity have, and no more. But what revolution, what spoliation, must take place in Italy, before the Church is reduced to such a condition!

There is, however, no idea of entirely dispossessing the clergy of their property; but rather, as in France, of binding the secular priests to the State, by endowing them with a portion of the confiscated property of the regulars, and of estranging them from their Bishops, partly by keeping the sees vacant, partly by making it the interest of the inferior clergy to support a system which the Pope and Bishops denounce, and partly by interposing between them in the exercise of that absolute power which has lately developed in continental episcopacy. The appeal of a priest against his Bishop is received with as much favour by the State as with disfavour by the Roman congregations. As in France, they will still be in the pay of the State, and the State, as paymaster, will encroach on their liberties. The pittance which the clergy receive in France justifies the imperial Government, in its own eyes, in imposing upon the French Church the heavy yoke of those Gallican "privileges" which grew out of the relations of the wealthy and powerful Church of France with the Bourbon monarchs; the wealth has perished, but the servitude is to remain. The State names the Bishops, and has all the direct rights that it ever had; but it also supervises the Bishop's pastorals, takes care that they do not step over the line that divides religion from politics (which line it belongs to the State only to define), and orders the prefects to punish them when they do so (Circular of M. Delangle, April 9). It revives old laws founded on narrow national

prejudices, and banishes all foreign fathers belonging to orders not legalised from the French soil; as if France was too good and too great to receive missionaries, as if France teaches, but is not taught. Under such pretexts the Redemptorist houses of Lille and Douai were closed last month, and the House at Boulogne lost its best members; while the provincial journals only lament the expulsion of the Redemptorists in a way that is meant to provoke the expulsion of the Jesuits also. This act is evidently intended to show the interpretation that a revolutionary government puts upon the phrase "reciprocal independence of Church and State."

There is no wonder, then, that, in spite of passing indications of a willingness to treat with Piedmont, through the Abbate Passaglia, the Pope should have definitively declared his inability to come to terms with a "modern civilisation" of this lopsided kind, in his allocution of March 18. Between Rome, France, and Italy, the case stands thus: France keeps Rome; Cavour goes there to give liberty to the Pope; the Pope excommunicates him, and departs to another land.

After the fall of Gaeta, the declarations of France against the temporal power, and the vote of the Parliament at Turin that Rome should be the capital of the new kingdom, no human resource remained to which the Pope could look for deliverance. His army and his revenues were gone; the Austrians could no longer uphold him; the surrounding territory was in the hands of the Piedmontese; he alone stood in the way of Italian unity, and the expulsion of foreigners from the Italian soil; while the power that kept him in Rome declared that it could not restore him, or permanently prolong its occupation. Whilst the conflict lasted, Pius IX. enjoyed in full measure, as a temporal sovereign, the sympathies of the Catholic world. The policy to which his power fell a prey was felt to be instigated by an iniquitous ambition quickened by religious rancour, and the whole Church protested against it. It is not difficult to understand why the protest was of no avail. A large part of the people in Italy deemed themselves politically justified

in taking part in the movement against their rulers. Thousands to whom their religion is a sacred treasure, acted for mere temporal reasons irrespective of her interests. For political wrong can no more be excused than moral wrong by considerations of expediency to the Church. The interests of religion can no more be cited as an apology for tolerating a tyrannical government than as an excuse for robbery. The law by which the right must be vindicated, and the divine order preserved, against the sovereign and the subject alike, is as peremptory as any obligations of the moral code, and the duty of supporting right and opposing wrong cannot be suspended in favour of any supposed advantage to the Church. Her claims as an institution cannot be opposed to her precepts as a doctrine. Whilst the Italians had political motives to take advantage of the revolution, the Catholics of other countries felt no paramount religious obligation to arrest its progress. Efficient support came from the Legitimists in France, from the Austrians, whose political interests were identified with those of the Papacy, from Ireland, and from parts of the Continent which were the ancient recruiting grounds of the pontifical mercenaries. It would neither be easy to show that any of these fractions of the volunteers acted from motives exclusively religious, nor possible to discern in such moderate action proofs of a profound and universal feeling of the necessity of the temporal power. Whatever the political wrong of the revolution might be, it was not universally felt that it affected the interests of the Church in a manner that demanded, on religious grounds, an energetic resistance. In this way we can explain the general inaction, in spite of the unanimous expressions of reverence for the person of the Holy Father, and of the very general disapproval of the whole movement by which he was menaced, and in spite of the efforts of a portion both of the clergy and of the laity to supply more efficient aid. The temporal power was lost at Castelfidardo; there is no apparent prospect of its immediate restoration, and during the whole winter the Head of the Church has been in the most disastrous position. The problem addresses itself

now to the reflections of all Catholics, what efficient substitute can be provided for that which is, at least temporarily, lost.

The common abhorrence of the means by which this event has been brought about, has commonly taken the expression of at least general attachment to the temporal power. It belonged of right to the Holy See, and there was therefore no room and no occasion for the inquiry whether it was enjoyed for the benefit of religion. Even if there had been a common sense that it was in truth injurious, and that the Church would be better governed without it, it was not competent to the Holy See to volunteer the surrender of rights sanctified by the prescription of more than a thousand years, or becoming in the faithful to propose a sacrifice for which there was no compensation. Nobody could presume to speak with confidence whilst the will of God, expressed in the facts of history, was not made manifest. No man could say that what had been lawfully acquired, and what God permitted to be retained, ought to be given up. The freedom of the Church would be in danger, and it was certain that the solution of the difficulty would be shown only when it became inevitable. It could be taught only by the logic of events, not by the logic of reflection. A decision could be brought about only by compulsion. The sacrifice of power, like the sacrifice of property, could not be the spontaneous act of the Church. Not a voice was raised within her pale to weigh spiritual interests against temporal rights. In the midst of the general demonstrations, the masters of religious thought maintained an impressive silence. Whilst the body of the faithful gave utterance to an indefinite, and therefore inadequate conviction, the teachers of the Catholic world held aloof. They did not anticipate the decrees of Providence, or set up a higher criterion than that by which the Holy See was obliged to regulate its conduct, or, by combining considerations which it was impossible to reconcile, confuse the conscience and damp the zeal of the faithful. Yet they did not despair of the wisdom and the mercy of God, and did not believe that the trials and changes in the Church were with-

out just reason or providential end. Those who sought for the first signs of the coming light should have looked to the high places of theology. There they would have been struck by a strange coincidence of conduct, and by a wonderful unanimity of thought. The Catholic hierarchy exhibited, indeed, an almost universal agreement in a matter on which they were officially compelled to speak in support of the words of the Pope. Several religious orders were silent because they were not compelled to speak, and because their members could not disengage themselves from the general responsibility. Yet even here no serious difference of opinion has been shown among those who are personally most competent to judge. In France the immediate impression of the political guilt and of the religious hypocrisy of the government has given a more aggressive, polemical, and consequently a less apologetic or spiritual character to the Catholic writers. Many of them, indeed, have incapacitated themselves from judging the Roman question by their patriotic approval of the Italian war. The tone of the eloquent and bitter writings of the Bishop of Orleans is so destitute of applause for the condition of the Church in Rome, as to show that the writer knew its great defects, whilst he repelled unjust attacks. Lacordaire and Gratry have spoken more decidedly against a superstitious reverence for the externals of the Church, a timorous reliance on material advantages, and the dependence of the spiritual on the temporal power. Each of these eminent men anticipated the deliverance of the spiritual power by means of a crisis such as at last arrived. In America the republican habits of thought diminish the respect for the outward splendour of a court, and the freedom of religion accustoms men to dissociate its prosperity from the temporal power of the Church. For some time, therefore, Dr. Brownson, who generally speaks in harmony with several, at least, of the American Bishops, has confessed that he has no better argument for the temporal power than the declared will of the Pope himself, and has carefully distinguished the question of right from the question of expediency. Arguing on grounds of right,

not on grounds of religion, he declares himself in favour of the subjects against the temporal power; and his argument would be complete if his vision were not distorted by the theory of nationality, which is inseparable from republican politics, and if he did not forget, in attributing authority to the Pope in disputes between kings and subjects, that the State is older than the Church, and that political philosophy is altogether independent of Christianity. Speaking of the Sovereign Pontiff, he says, "We have always maintained that, as temporal sovereign, he stands on the same footing with all legitimate temporal sovereigns, that his temporal sovereignty is a proper temporal sovereignty, not a spiritual sovereignty, or altered in its character by the fact that he holds also the spiritual sovereignty of the Church. . . . Are the Roman people to be deprived of the exercise of rights which the Church recognises, or does not condemn in other people, because their sovereign is Supreme Pontiff?"

In Italy it is not so easy to set aside entirely religious considerations. In many places the clergy have suffered by the revolution. Several of the religious orders are so identified with the old *régime* that their property is confiscated where it prevails; others are proscribed by the Sardinian laws. Moreover, it is very difficult to separate oneself from one party without adopting the other, and excommunication threatens all who abet the spoilers. Yet it cannot be doubted that the influence of Gioberti would lead men into the camp of the Piedmontese, although the spirit of their laws would have been most hateful to him. The influence of Rosmini is still greater among the clergy; for though a reformer, he never put himself in antagonism with authority, and he was, what his rival was not, a priest of extraordinary sanctity. Where his influence can be most distinctly traced, a sense of the peculiar evils and disorders of the Church in Central Italy prevails over the desire to preserve the temporal rights. Several of the religious orders feel in like manner. From the nature of things, our knowledge of the sentiments of the Italian clergy rests upon private communications more than on public expressions. It is enough

to say in general that, those who know Rome best are the least disposed to regret the temporal power. In this country we will only say, that the personal reverence towards the Pope in his tribulation is the strongest feeling; that it is joined to a sense of the evils which come from the impossibility of adapting the Roman system to the wants of the time, and of an urgent necessity for such a change as that which seems to be at hand. The same causes which imposed a necessary reserve on all, until the decisive moment came, have prevented among us the expression of these sentiments. There are not many among those to whom we listen with the greatest attention who have had opportunities of judging the condition of the Church in Italy, or who are sufficiently familiar with the character of modern society to use those opportunities well; and the joint responsibility of religious communities incapacitates others. Yet England is no exception to the rule, that where the greatest sanctity and the greatest wisdom are united, there is a belief that the revolution which has overthrown the temporal power has been directly a blessing to the Church.

It was easy to foresee that the silence so scrupulously observed, and yet so ominous in its contrast with the current of popular feeling, must come at length to an end. In a time of extreme confusion, it was not possible that the faithful should be permanently deprived of the voice of those to whom they were most prepared to listen; and since the capitulation of Ancona it has been a constant subject of anxious thought whether the time for silence had gone by, and the time for speech was come. On the one hand, all have felt that it was not possible to oppose or to divert the course of Catholic feeling, and the efforts of the episcopate to discourage with admonitions which were not yet verified an enthusiasm which was generous in its source and in its aim, and neutralise by resistance and warnings a demonstration of unanimity. The churchman had no right to interfere with the sense of political duty, and the historian could not assume the office of the prophet, or justify by anticipation the ways of God with His Church. However fortunate the de-

struction of the present form of government in Rome might be deemed, there was no excuse for contributing to it on the ground of its benefit to the Church. It was undertaken from very different motives by men with whom there could be no alliance, whose means and whose ends were criminal. No earnest Catholic could, for religion's sake, accept the complicity of the revolution; and in considering, not the object or the mode, but the result of its action, the utmost he could say was, *Felix culpa*. The time to say it was when the contest was over. In speaking too soon there was a danger of encouraging the design, instead of accepting the event; yet it was equally important that the right moment should not be allowed to go by. It would have been idle to say for the first time, after the Pope had left Rome, that it was well he should go. The conscience of the Church would have appeared to be at fault, and the justification of his flight would have been as arbitrary, and would have seemed as puerile, as that commonly given for his resistance. Even those who are now most constant in affirming that the States of the Church are essential or necessary for the authority of the Pope, would then say with the same ingenuous optimism, that the Church could be as free without such accessories as with them, and might be more powerful in consequence of her losses. The Catholic body would have lost their own confidence, and would have incurred the imputation of thoughtless insincerity, if between the loss of the political independence of the Holy See, and its deliverance from the grasp of the revolution, none amongst them had spoken of consolation, by pointing out the providential character of the events as they occurred,—the evils of the past and the hopes of the future,—and had communicated to all the confidence which is felt by the divines to whom we have referred, that there is far more to rejoice at than to deplore in the crisis which the Church has experienced.

It would have been inconsistent with the character and position of the German ultramontanes if the earliest and most authoritative declaration of these opinions, in all their integrity, had not proceeded from among them. The same spirit in which they culti-

vate ecclesiastical science guides them in all the practical interests of the Church. It may be simply from the confidence which the superiority of German science confers, that they hold conscience supreme over policy, that they do not sacrifice truth to expediency, and that they observe no regard for persons or opinions, and no conditions in dispensing it. So accordingly it has been. All that we have referred to yet has been a political justification of the Italian movement. The religious question involved in it is a more important consideration.

In the first of a series of public lectures on the present state of religion in the world, delivered at Munich, Dr. Döllinger spoke of the position of the Holy See in Rome. Two things are clear in judging of the nature of the temporal power. The policy of France and Sardinia towards the Holy See cannot be defended either in their acts or in their demands; and the Pope is not free to make the surrender demanded of him, because he holds the rights of his office in trust, and is bound by his oath and by his elective character. The Papacy has been in the actual enjoyment of these rights from the end of the fifteenth century. That which is understood by the temporal power was acquired about the time when other monarchies arose out of feudalism, and suzerainty grew into sovereignty. Until then the Popes had never been secure in their possessions, and during the first 700 years of Christianity exercised their highest ecclesiastical authority and the widest political influence without any temporal basis whatever. Of all the 1800 years of modern history, the Popes have only had 300 years of quiet. In many cases the Popes who did most for the spiritual benefit of the Church were those who relied the least on the territorial security for their power. The mode of succession on the pontifical throne which the Church requires is not suited to prolonged political existence. Monarchy which is not hereditary is not generally durable, and the Popes had an additional disadvantage in the shortness of their reigns. No elective sovereignty strikes roots in the attachment of the people, and that of the Popes could do it less than any; for the change of system was frequent, as the Popes were generally old men, and it was often ex-

treme, as they succeeded each other from different countries. In our time reforms in matters of detail have been continually made, and the government has been less oppressive than in most Continental States; yet it has been unpopular, and unable to maintain itself without foreign aid. For forty years it has been in opposition with the feelings of its subjects, and with the aspirations of the Italian people. Government, in the modern sense, is repugnant to the ecclesiastical character; and local self-government, such as subsisted in the old municipalities, was made impossible by the French. Most of all, the office of judge is unsuited to the office of a priest. Not a voice was raised in 1814 for the restoration of the ecclesiastical princes in Germany. They had not been oppressive, yet they were not regretted. Both as an elective monarchy and as a priestly monarchy, the Papacy now stands alone. It cannot resist the current of the age, and only strengthens it by concessions. By a natural consequence of the political development of the modern world, the position of the Pope as a temporal sovereign has become intolerable and untenable. The destruction of the Austrian supremacy in Italy has made a change inevitable. Without foreign aid the Papacy cannot stand against the disaffection of its subjects and the strong tide of national unity. During the joint occupation by French and Austrians, the suspicion of influence was avoided by the balance of the two great powers, and the freedom of the Holy See was at least preserved. But that security is gone while the French alone uphold the Pontifical throne; and even the fall of the Piedmontese monarchy could only lead to the restoration of a state of things not endurable for many years, and ruinous to the finances and the authority of the Roman government. The time has arrived when the Papacy must be delivered from the protection and the designs of France.

This is the substance of Döllinger's discourse. The idea which runs through it is, that the temporal government, never of real substantial necessity to the Church, ceased to be a benefit when Consalvi accepted the inheritance of the French, and that it has become an obstacle instead of a security to the liberty of

the Holy See since the revolutionary movement has prevailed. The lecturer looks at it simply as a religious question. He condemns all the causes that have led to this conclusion, and which are the pretexts for the abolition of the Roman government—the institutions introduced by the French under the first Napoleon, the revolutionary and the national movement in Italy, the political ambition of the Piedmontese, and the plans of the French Emperor for a change in the condition of the Church. All this he condemns, and accepts the surrender of the temporal dominion simply as a spiritual necessity. For the sake of religion he rejoices at an event to which politically he is opposed. We have seen only one lecture, and of the second we only know that he justified the first on the ground that it was based not on opinions but facts—proved and known facts, which could not be refuted, and might easily be substantiated. We do not know whether it proposed any plan for the safety of the Pope. It is not difficult to see to what the above observations point. There is no security for freedom in the French occupation, which cannot be permanent. Still less could it exist in a united Italy, with laws opposed to the spirit and rights of the Church. The recovery of the Austrian power would not introduce a state of things in which the court of Rome would be saved from the dangers by which she is now surrounded. Flight is the only alternative. It is clear that Döllinger does not contemplate a long duration of Italian unity, or a permanent exile, or the restoration of the temporal power. We cannot tell what securities for liberty and independence he would demand when the Pope should return to his See, except that Italy should be divided, that there should be no independent authority in Rome, and that the revenue should be supplied by the old system of domains from which the political power arose.

Exactly simultaneous in time, and conformable in substance, though widely different in spirit with this lecture of the great German divine, a pamphlet appeared, written by the the first of Italian divines. Passaglia undertook his mission to Turin with a view to prepare the way for the surrender of the political power of the Holy See, on condition of obtaining ample securities for the free exercise of the spiritual power. After his return—whilst enjoying very highly the confidence of the Pope—he was esteemed in Rome the leading advocate of the policy of conciliation and compromise, and his pamphlet is written to recommend it. He too thinks that the temporal power must be abandoned, but imagines that it is possible to preserve perfect independence in the midst of a united Italy. He speaks like a patriotic Italian, whilst Döllinger's lecture is virtually a protest against nationalising the Church.

It appears to us a very serious question whether there has not been too great a delay in coming forward on the part of those whose votes are better weighed than counted. The hopelessness of saving the Roman State was evident many months ago, when the Piedmontese invaded Naples, and the Pope was preparing for flight. A very serious responsibility has been incurred by Catholics in allowing the expression of their reverence and attachment to the Holy See to silence so completely the sense of the dangers and evils of the Roman government, and of the urgency of a great reform. It may have helped, in conjunction with the hostile fanaticism of the revolutionists, to delude the advisers of the Pope into the belief that in their policy of passive resistance they were defending what was regarded by the Catholics of every country as the common cause of the Church, and it may have led thousands into the belief that the triumph of the Italian revolution is a victory over an essential bulwark of their faith.

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PART XIV.

CAVOUR.

CAVOUR was the most thoroughly practical of the Italian statesmen. It is the special character of his career that his success was due to his own ability, not to the idea or the party he represented; not to his principles, but to his skill. He was not borne to power on the wave of public enthusiasm, nor by the energy of an opinion incorporated in him, nor by the personal attachment of a mass of followers. He was not a representative man in the domain of thought, not a great partisan in the domain of action, not a popular favourite trained in agitation, or sustained by the prestige of great achievements. Yet he acquired and kept a position in which men who were his superiors in genius, in character, and in eloquence,—Balbo, Gioberti, Azeglio,—successively failed; in which men who were identified with the chief memories and hopes of Italian patriotism,—Manin, Mamiani, Farini, La Farina,—were content to be his subordinates and assistants; and where all his rivals sacrificed or suspended their own principles, animosities, and aspirations, in order to increase his power and his fame. The statesman who could blend such materials, and make of them the instrument of his greatness; who could withstand at the same time the animosity of Austria and the ambition of France; who could at once restrain the Catholics whom he injured and insulted, and the republicans whom he condemned; and who, standing between such powerful enemies and such formidable allies, almost accomplished the unity of Italy to the Mincio, and increased fourfold the dominions of his king,—must always

remain one of the most conspicuous figures, as he is one of the most distinct characters, in the history of his country.

He was connected by descent with the family of St. Francis of Sales. His mother, who belonged to a patrician family of Geneva, was originally a Protestant, and the old-fashioned political Calvinism of Geneva, which moulded the character of Guizot, exercised from a very early age a profound influence upon Cavour. Events connected with his family position inspired him with a precocious dislike for the priesthood; and whilst his brother, the Marquis Gustave de Cavour, grew up into an ardent defender of religion, Camillo was looked on unkindly by his father, a politician of the old school, whilst the authorities regarded him with a suspicion proportioned to his cleverness and his petulance. The position was intolerable to a man of his disposition, and he left his country almost as soon as he was his own master, carrying with him two sentiments already deeply rooted in his soul, animosity towards the Catholic hierarchy and towards the political system which was combined with it in the reverence of the people, and in the hatred of the liberals. Time and experience appear to have wrought no change for good or evil in these opinions. He satisfied his vengeance on the Church without ever exhibiting unbelief, and he consummated a great revolution without ever accepting the revolutionary doctrines. But he confessed in the days of his greatness, consistently with his whole career, that the impulse of his policy was derived from personal motives rather than from public principles.

Yet undoubtedly his opinions grew into maturity and harmony during the period which preceded his entrance into public life. He spent several years in France and England, attentive to things of practical material interest, and adding to the cosmopolitan temper of his order a warm appreciation and sympathy for the society of both countries. He returned to Turin in 1842, where the spirit of the Government kept him away from public affairs, and where he devoted himself to the development of the prosperity of the country through the Agricultural Society, which he helped to establish and to conduct. Like similar associations in other countries, where the absence of freedom, obliging government to seek a substitute for public opinion in espionage, and the people to seek it in secret societies, gives to every recognised society a political character, the *Associazione Agraria* became, from its organisation, an important channel and instrument of political influence. When the Italian movement began, it became a centre of political action; "and," says Brofferio, in his auto-

biography, "in more than one discussion on the felling of timber, the germs of an imperfectly understood democracy revealed themselves."

Besides articles on agricultural and economical questions in the journal of the society, Cavour published during these years several essays on political subjects, not brilliantly written, but remarkable for grasp of thought, and because they are authentic memorials of the views by which he was guided in his after career. In the paper on the Communistic theories, there is a character of Pitt, closely resembling that given by Macaulay, some touches of which have been applied to Cavour himself. "He was not one of those who seek to reconstruct society from its foundations with the aid of general, philanthropic theories. A cold, deep intellect, free from prejudice, he was animated solely by the love of glory and of his country." And at the conclusion of this essay occurs a passage which distinguishes him favourably from those modern economists whose inflexible abstractions give an easy victory to the Communists. "To every one his own work. The philosopher and the economist, in the seclusion of their studies, will confute the errors of Communism; but their labour will bear no fruit unless men practise the great principle of universal benevolence, and act upon the hearts, while science acts upon the intellects." It is no small merit to have understood that political economy is as much an ethical as a material science in an age when philanthropists and economists agree in condemning each other's efforts, and when both seem to have forgotten that the same holy doctrine which teaches the precept of charity supplies the basis of economical science, by inculcating alike the duties of benevolence to the rich, and of industrious independence to the poor; for the poor we have always with us, *but if any man will not work, neither let him eat.*

In 1847 the reforms of Pius IX. produced a reaction against absolutism throughout Italy, which was soon felt in Piedmont; and in September Charles Albert began to follow the footsteps of the Pope in the path of concession. At the end of the year, Cavour, in conjunction with Balbo and others, took advantage of the new liberty of the press to found the paper *Il Risorgimento*, which he conducted with great ability. Whilst others were demanding reforms, he was the first to insist on a Constitution, and in January 1848 he petitioned the king "to remove the controversy from the dangerous arena of irregular agitation to a scene of legal, peaceful, and regular discussion." On the 5th of February, his friend Santa Rosa carried a similar vote in the Municipal

Council of Turin; and on the 7th, a Constitution, based on the French Charter of 1814, was granted by the king. Cavour was not elected at first; when he obtained a seat in the Chamber, his friends Balbo and Boncompagni were ministers, and he joined the Right. The war against Austria was undertaken by the ministry, with the condition that Italy should owe her deliverance to herself. France was at that time a Republic, and her aid, it was apprehended by the monarchical advisers of Charles Albert, would cause the triumph of the Republicans at Milan and elsewhere, and would deprive the Sardinian monarchy of every advantage. The ambassador at Paris, the Marquis Brignole, declared in words which later events have made still more remarkable, "The essential character of the movement which agitates Italy, that distinguishes it from all that went before, is that it aims at being above all Italian. Each party deems itself called upon to direct it, and to concentrate in one last attempt all the scattered efforts which would be fruitless separately; but there is no one that desires to substitute France for Austria. It is necessary that it should be well understood in France, that if the army of the Republic crosses the Alps without being summoned by events, by interests, and by desires, the influence of France and of French ideas would be lost in Italy for a long time. Throughout Northern Italy, as at Florence, at Rome, and at Naples, every where except among the Republicans of Milan, they will not have the military aid of France until the day when a tremendous defeat has proved that Italy is unable alone to drive the Austrians over the Alps." Cavour was opposed to the Republican party, which sympathised with France, but he condemned the policy of the maxim *L' Italia farà da sè*. "Republics," he said, "have always pursued a policy of selfishness, and were never promoters of civilisation." His hopes were directed towards England. "My confidence in England rests partly on the honourable character of the statesmen to whose hands the reins of power are committed—on Lord John Russell and on Lord Palmerston. Lord John Russell, I will say it openly, at the risk of being considered more and more an Anglo-maniac, is the most liberal minister in Europe." As the war went on, the democratic party gained power, and Cavour was thrown out at the elections in January 1849. In December he recovered his seat. Azeglio was minister, and Cavour supported him, separating himself further from his old leader Balbo. That great man was opposed to the laws proposed by Siccardi on the civil condition of the clergy, which Cavour supported in a speech by which he gained great

popularity, and which placed him in closer connection with the Left Centre, the party of Ratazzi, than with his original friends.

Hitherto he had not stood in the front rank. The revolutionary period afforded no opening for a man of his stamp. He was too far from the Conservatives to join in their resistance, and from the democrats to join in their movement. In revolutions the extremes prevail, and Cavour detested both extremes. But the new reign opened a new career for men of the Centre, after Balbo had been thrust aside by the revolution, and Gioberti by the reaction, and the candidates for the leadership of the new party were Azeglio and Cavour. Less scrupulous both as regards political and ecclesiastical rights than the real Conservatives, but decidedly hostile to democracy and disorder, they nearly agreed in opinions, whilst they differed widely in character. The energy, boldness, and ambition of Cavour inevitably placed him in a victorious opposition to his dignified, careless, and somewhat indolent rival. He became Minister of Commerce in October 1850, and Minister of Finance in April 1851. His first administration was devoted chiefly to reforms in the fiscal system, which always bore with him a political character. "The political regeneration of a nation," he said, "is never separate from its economic regeneration. The conditions of the two sorts of progress are identical."

The commercial reforms of Sir Robert Peel had filled him with interest and admiration, and he had written an essay upon the consequences they would involve for Italy. The lesson he learnt was the same as that which has been since put in practice in England by the ablest of Peel's disciples—to make the laws of economic science subservient to considerations of policy. Accordingly he concluded a series of commercial treaties, both for financial reasons and for the purpose of making friends for Sardinia in other states. In one respect his position differed remarkably from that of Mr. Gladstone. The chief opponents of his commercial reforms were the democratic party. In Piedmont, finance is an instrument for democratic purposes; in England, questions of finance have reared democracy.

The Government was opposed, therefore, by the extreme Left, and also by the extreme Right, in consequence of its ecclesiastical legislation. Azeglio relied on the support of the Right Centre, and sought to conciliate the Left by reforms in Church matters. The Left Centre, headed by Ratazzi, cared less for internal reform than for external aggrandisement; they were the aggressive party in the Parliament. During

the war of 1848, Ratazzi, then in office, demanded the suspension of all securities of liberty, saying that there would be no greater danger of abuse of power in the absence of those laws than with them. At that time Cavour had declared that the Left wished to rule in Piedmont, as the Emperor Nicholas ruled at Petersburg. But when he had attained a leading position, the principles of these men suited his bold and active mind. A party who in the desire for power were ready to make a sacrifice of freedom, was the natural ally of a statesman who was ambitious of acquiring power by heroic means. Azeglio had nothing but the canon law to sacrifice to them; Cavour offered them the destruction of international law; and they took the higher bribe. Hence, under Azeglio, the religious reforms were the question of the day; under Cavour, they became secondary and subsidiary to the question of national aggrandisement. The alliance was concluded on the occasion of the *coup d'état*. The new despotism seemed to menace its feeble neighbours, and a law on the license of the press was proposed by the Government at Turin. "Sardinia," said the prime minister, "has gained great renown; now it must be our object to obtain obscurity. . . . We are passing by a sleeping lion, and must tread softly. If one amongst us refuses to take the necessary precaution, we must compel him to be quiet; if the lion attacks us, we must defend ourselves." The Right wished to go farther than the ministers—to introduce into Piedmont the system of the 2d December, to curtail liberties, to alter the electoral law, and to abolish the National Guard. These events determined the breach between Cavour and the reaction, and his alliance with Ratazzi; an alliance similar to that by which, ever since the Reform Bill, the Whigs have obtained their majorities. On the 5th of February, without consulting his colleagues, Cavour, in a speech in defence of their proposal, publicly invited Ratazzi to combine with him, promising a national policy as the prize. The excitement was extreme; but no breach ensued until, on the 11th May, Cavour proposed and carried the election of Ratazzi as President of the Chamber. He became by this manœuvre the leader of the most powerful party in Parliament, but he lost his place in the Government, and Azeglio formed a new administration without him. There was no event of his public life, he said afterwards, of which he was prouder than this. "So long as the Republic continued in France, so long as the fate of that nation seemed uncertain, and the phantom of the Revolution was not put down, I could be sure that the reaction at home would undertake nothing for the destruction

of our constitutional freedom. But when the 2d December removed the danger of disorder in France, when the red phantom had vanished, I thought that from that time forward the Constitution was more seriously menaced by that party than it had formerly been by the revolutionary faction. For this reason I deemed the formation of a great liberal party not only right, but necessary and essential; and I invoked for that purpose the patriotism of all who agree in the great principles of progress and of freedom, and who differ from each other only on subordinate questions."

He had already gained the good will of the Emperor Napoleon by his conduct in the debates on the freedom of the press. During his retirement he visited Paris, and appeared with Ratazzi at the Tuileries. That was the beginning of the league between the two friends, who projected a national policy, and the ally who was to profit by their enterprise. Cavour's dread of an alliance with Republican France did not apply to the alliance of Imperial France. The difference of principle had disappeared. Meantime Azeglio attempted to prolong his tenure of power by new ecclesiastical changes, and by introducing a law on civil marriage; but the dismissal of Cavour had deprived him of the energetic support of the Radicals, and he could not prevail against the resistance of the Holy See and of the Catholic party. He persisted, even after the Sardinian envoy in Rome had come to Turin without leave, to press on the ministers the necessity of modifying their policy. At length, 26th October, he resigned. The condition of the accession of the new ministry was an altered tone towards Rome. Charvaz, Archbishop of Genoa, who had full instructions from the Pope, was at this critical moment the chief counsellor of the king. He wished that Balbo should succeed Azeglio; and when that hope failed, a fruitless attempt was made by Alfieri di Sostegno. Cavour's turn then came. First of all an attempt was made to bring about an understanding between him and the Archbishop. It failed, and the difficulty of the crisis seemed insuperable. But Cavour was master of the situation, and on the 4th November he formed an administration untrammelled by any condition, which was joined twelve months later by Ratazzi. The programme of this famous ministry was to use the Italian movement and the friendship of Napoleon III. for the advantage of Sardinia. The ecclesiastical policy of Azeglio and Siccardi would be pursued or suspended, according to the exigencies which might arise in the pursuit of that more ambitious design. In reality there was a close internal connection between aggression abroad and the oppression of the

Church; and in Cavour's mind, as in that of many Italians, there was a strict union between Rome and Austria. From the speeches and writings of the minister, we can discern how both were connected in his policy.

One of his biographers and admirers affirms that Cavour's notions of government and of freedom were English, not French; but he adds that he never displayed them in his policy, because circumstances hindered him from carrying them out beyond the department of finance—*quantunque le quistioni ora di finanze, ora di politica, gli abbiano preoccupato l'animo, ed impedito di attuarlo in altro che nelle sue conseguenze economiche*. In truth his policy was directed to the greatness of the State, not to the liberty of the people; he sought the greatest amount of power consistent with the maintenance of the monarchical constitution, not the greatest amount of freedom compatible with national independence. To this question of State, this *ragion di stato*, every thing else but the forms of the government were to be sacrificed.

Tocqueville has shown that the French Revolution, far from reversing the political spirit of the old State, only carried out the same principles with intenser energy. The State, which was absolute before, became still more absolute, and the organs of the popular will became more efficient agents for the exercise of arbitrary power. This was the work, not of the Reign of Terror and the period of convulsion, which was barren of political results, but of the ideas of 1789 incorporated in that Constitution of 1791, which continued for seventy years the model of all foreign constitutions, until Austria returned to the mediæval originals which England alone had preserved. The purpose of all the continental governments, framed on that pattern, is not that the people should obtain security for freedom, but participation of power. The increase in the number of those who share the authority renders the authority still more irresistible; and as power is associated with wealth, those who are interested in the augmentation of power cannot be interested in the diminution of expenditure; and thus parliamentary government generally results in an improved administration and increased resources, but also in addition to the pressure and the expenses of the State. All this was singularly verified in Cavour's administration in Piedmont.

Like most of the continental liberals, and like most men who are not religious, he considered the State as endowed with indefinite power, and individual rights as subject to its supreme authority; whilst, like the revolutionists in France, he accepted the legacy of absolutism left by the old *régime*,

and sought to preserve its force under contrary forms. Societies are really divided not into monarchies and republics, but into democracies and aristocracies; whatever the form of government, there are, in fact, only two types, organised and atomic society, and the commonest and most visible sign of the two is equality or inequality. The real basis of inequality is the privilege of a part as contrasted with the rights of the whole, and its simplest essential form is the privilege not of class, but of age—that is, inheritance by primogeniture. Nothing else is required for an aristocracy; nothing else can create an aristocracy. Cavour, though a noble, and an enemy of democracy, was a decided assertor of its fundamental principle. “Civil equality,” he wrote in the *Risorgimento*, “is the great principle of modern society.” The statute gave the nomination of senators to the king; he wished to make them elective. “Often accused of blind admiration for England, and of secretly entertaining the guilty design of introducing amongst us the aristocratic portion of their institutions,” he loudly declared “that to imitate Great Britain in this respect would be a fatal error, and would introduce into the constitution the sure germs of future resolution. To attempt to institute a peerage similar to that of England, would be the height of folly.” On the other hand, he was opposed to the sequestration of Church property; for he had learnt from the theories of Lamennais, perhaps from the experience of the countries he had studied, that a clergy dependent for support on the people is emancipated from the influence of the State, and directly subject to the authority of the Holy See. He desired that religious liberty should be one of the foundations of the constitution; and in this he approached the French more than the English type, for he understood by it not that one religion should be favoured and the others tolerated, but that the State should be indifferent to religious diversities.

The constitution, by altering the position and distribution of authority, rendered it necessary that the relations between the State and the Church should undergo a revision, and should obtain the guarantee of the nation’s consent. The passage of a State from absolutism to constitutionalism involves a great alteration in its position towards the Church, and the manner in which her rights are respected is the test by which we may determine whether the constitution is a step towards liberty, or a new and popular form of absolutism. For the Church is affected not by the form of government, but by its principle. She is interested not in monarchy or republicanism, but in liberty and security against

absolutism. The rights and duties which she upholds are sacred and inviolable, and can no more be subject to the vote of a majority than to the decree of a despot. In many cases constitutions have been her protection against tyranny; but in many cases also constitutions have imposed on her a new tyranny. The period which immediately succeeded the revolution of 1848 has been rich in conflicts between the Church and the States, for the liberty which it sought to obtain was understood in two different ways. The Catholics saw in it the triumph of religious freedom and of independence for the Church; the liberals, in most cases, used it as a transfer of power to their hands. Between these contrary interpretations of the movement and of its institutions, frequent conflicts were inevitable. In Austria, in Holland, and in Wirtemberg the Catholic opinion prevailed. In Baden and in Piedmont the revolution only added to the power of the State. The theory of liberty insists on the independence of the Church; the theory of liberalism insists on the omnipotence of the State as the organ of the popular will. It was accordingly affirmed by Azeglio, that there was no necessity to treat with Rome, and that the ecclesiastical reforms which had become necessary through the civil reforms, belonged exclusively to the jurisdiction of the civil power. He reversed the ancient theory that the Church alone decides on all things that trench on the domain of conscience and religious life, and declared that the State alone might determine all questions affecting civil society. The quarrel that ensued was not so much on account of the reforms themselves, as of the principle on which they were made. The Church resisted not so much the changes that were introduced, as the principle of arbitrary authority. But among the laws proposed by the ministry under Azeglio was a law introducing civil marriage, and it was under discussion when the change of government occurred. Cavour had never insisted on this measure; and when the senate resolved to modify the bill, he consented to withdraw it. The spirit of the ecclesiastical legislation remained unchanged at Turin, but it was not pressed forward at first by the new ministers, for they had a more popular bait to throw out to the Liberal party.

To the Conservative patriots of 1848 the war with Austria was a war of deliverance, not a war of principles. Balbo wished the Austrians to be expelled, not out of hatred against them, but for the sake of Italy; and he wished that Austria should obtain on the Lower Danube and in the Turkish dominions an equivalent for the loss of her Italian provinces. With Cavour, the patriotic cause became an antagonism of

political principles. The Austrian system was diametrically opposed to his ideas, not only when it was oppressive under Metternich, but when the great internal changes were commenced by the Concordat which have been carried out by Schmerling in the constitution of the empire. The Austrian notions of liberty were as hateful to him, in their way, as the Austrian absolutism had been; and the strength of his hatred increased as the emperor proceeded with his reforms. "Thanks to our political system," he said, in the Parliament, 6th May 1856, "which King Victor Emmanuel has introduced and maintained, and which you have supported, we are farther removed from Austria than ever." In opposition to the policy of Balbo, he wrote in favour of the union of the Danubian Principalities. "Austria has long had her eye fixed on the banks of the Danube. . . . Can it be believed that two small states, weakened by separation, will be able to resist her ambitious and aggressive policy? The influence of the Cabinet of Vienna will produce in the Principalities, especially at Bucharest, effects similar to those which are exhibited in the secondary states of Italy." The relations between Austria and Piedmont grew more and more unfriendly and bitter, when the Crimean war broke out, and the Western Powers became most anxious for the support of the Austrian arms. In the course of negotiations it was made a condition of the Austrian alliance that the safety of her Italian dominions should be guaranteed whilst her armies marched against the Russians. Sardinia would thus have been overreached; and the proposal of Lord Clarendon, that she should join the Western Powers, was extremely welcome. The arrangement with Austria was concluded 22d December 1854; that with Sardinia, 26th January 1855. The Western alliance, said Lord Palmerston, thus became a league against tyranny. The first proposal having come from the Great Powers, Piedmont, having no prospect of immediate advantage, was able to make tacit stipulations for a later reward. The same condition which had been granted to Austria was also conceded to Sardinia, and thus a defensive alliance was formed.

In immediate connection with the strain which this ambitious policy laid on the finances, came the secularisation of the religious orders. The debate began 9th January 1855, in the midst of the negotiations with the Western Powers. The Budget, said Cavour, could no longer provide for the support of religion. Financial reasons made an extreme measure necessary, in order that the expenditure of the State might be diminished and its resources increased, whilst the

large number of poor and active priests would be enriched out of the property of the useless orders, and out of the superfluity of the wealthier clergy. The moment was also perilous, from the combination of the democrats with the Conservatives against the Crimean war. Brofferio declared that they ought rather to have allied themselves with Russia, which was the only power in Europe representing national independence. The act of spoliation was an instrument against this alliance. "If we did not present," said the minister, "a measure demanded by the majority of public opinion, we might have lost at a critical moment the support of the Liberals as well as that of the Reactionists. The postponement of this measure would alienate the first without conciliating the second. By presenting the law we secure the support of the Liberals, and the country will be united and powerful against every trial." It is obvious that, whenever similar conjunctures should recur, the same policy would be pursued against all Church property. The bill became law 25th May 1855; and 26th July the Pope declared that all who had proposed, approved, or sanctioned it had incurred excommunication. The ideal of Cavour was the French system of dependence of the clergy on the government as their paymaster. He was with the king on his journey through Savoy, when the Archbishop of Chambéry concluded an address in these words: "Your Majesty has seen in France a noble example of intimate union between the authorities and the clergy, and we trust that you will bestow this great benefit on your country by putting an end to the persecution of the Church by the Government." Victor Emmanuel, in his reply, took advantage of the opportunity afforded by this imprudent speech: "You are right in quoting the relations between Church and State in France as a good example. I am so thoroughly convinced of it, that I am resolved to place the clergy of my kingdom on the same footing as that of France."

The union between the ecclesiastical and the Austrian question was made closer by the conclusion of the Austrian Concordat. The oppressed clergy of Piedmont looked to Austria as the ally of the Church, and doubly therefore the enemy of Piedmont. On the other hand, the Government believed that the Holy See, strengthened by its recent triumph, would be little disposed to give way to Piedmont, and would be more uncompromising than before. Whilst, therefore, the abandonment of the Josephine system at Vienna widened the breach with a government which was walking in the footsteps of Joseph II., it heightened at the same time the antagonism between Turin and Rome. Boncompagni went to

Florence with the mission to prevent the conclusion of a Tuscan Concordat, and to support the revival of the Leopoldine laws. Cavour said: "We must wait till an improvement in the Roman Government reconciles people's minds with the Sovereign of those States, confounded in popular opinion with the Head of the Church. This opinion is shared by the eminent men of France and other countries, who formerly blamed, but who now approve, our conduct on these questions. This result we owe to the Austrian Concordat; and for this reason we must rejoice at that act." The discontent of Romagna afforded a convenient diversion in the contest with Rome, which was ingeniously used at the Congress of Paris. The Sardinian plenipotentiary took no share in the negotiations on the peace; he was waiting for an opportunity to obtain the reward for which he had joined in the war. When that opportunity arrived, he used it solely to discuss the state of Romagna. That was where the Papal and the Austrian interests were combined, and where he could strike both his adversaries with the same blow. Minghetti sent him from Bologna the materials for his memorandum, in which he recommended things grateful to French ears—secular administration, conscription, and the Code Napoleon. It must be remembered that at that time the belief was gaining ground in Romagna, and was shared by the informants of Cavour, that it would soon be annexed to the Austrian dominions. On his return to Turin, he said of his mission to Paris: "We may rejoice at one great result. The Italian question has become for the future a European question. The cause of Italy has not been defended by demagogues, revolutionists, and party men, but has been discussed before the Congress by the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers." Mamiani declared that the Holy Alliance was at an end, and Italian nationality recognised, as the minister of an Italian state had been heard in the Congress pleading for Italy.

Whilst the reforms in Austria increased the bitterness with which she was regarded by the Liberal ministers in Piedmont, their position towards Russia became extremely friendly. No incompatibility of political ideas was felt at that time between them. The intensity with which Austria was hated by Prince Gortschakoff made him recognise an ally in the Cabinet of Turin; and a marked difference was made at Moscow, after the peace, in the consideration shown to the Sardinians, compared to their former position, as well as to their English and Austrian colleagues. Hatred of Austria was not, however, the only recommendation of Piedmont in the eyes of Russia.

The period which followed the Congress of Paris was marked by a great increase in the Catholic party at Turin. They threw out, in May 1856, a bill placing all education under the control of the State; and, in order to diminish their opposition, Ratazzi retired from office. In 1858, the crime of Orsini obliged Cavour to introduce a conspiracy bill, like our own, in which he encountered the resistance of the Left, but by which he strengthened the bonds of union with Napoleon.

This measure called forth a letter from Mazzini to Cavour, dated June 1858, in which the writer exhibits his own character and system as truly as he describes that of his antagonist, and which is one of the most expressive documents of the Italian movement. "I have long known you," he begins, "more solicitous for the Piedmontese monarchy than for our common country, a materialist worshipper of the event more than of any sacred and eternal principle, a man of an ingenious rather than a powerful mind. . . . To that party whose extraordinary vitality is now admitted even by yourself, in the teeth of your friends who declared it at every moment dead and buried, Piedmont owes the liberty she enjoys, and you owe the opportunity of making yourself the useless and deceitful defender of Italy." This is so far true, that the notion of Italian unity belonged originally to Mazzini, not to the Italian Liberals; and that the success of the Roman movement, which the sect encouraged and then diverted, gave the impulse to the reforms of Charles Albert. The tone of Cavour, in speaking of the sanguinary practices of the sect, provoked a passionate but elaborate vindication of their theory. "I loved you not before, but now I scorn you. Hitherto you were only an enemy; now you are shamefully, infamously my enemy. . . . I believe that in principle every sentence of death—no matter whether applied by an individual or by society—is a crime, and if it were in my power I should deem it my duty to abolish it. . . . The abolition of capital punishment is an absolute duty in a free country. . . . But so long as war for the deliverance of one's country shall be a holy thing, or the armed protection of the weak against the powerful tyrant that tramples on him, or the defence by every means of the brother against whom the assassin's knife is raised, the absolute inviolability of life is a lie. . . . I see among your supporters, among those who cry out against the newly-invented theory of the dagger, men who, before 1848, were active leaders of the Carboneria. But Young Italy banished the dagger, and condemned even the perjurer only to the

horror of his brethren. . . . There must be law or war, and let him conquer who can. Where every bond is broken between the law and the people of the State, force is sacred wherever it undertakes, by whatever means they may be, to reconnect the one with the other. Where the equipoise is lost between the power of one and the power of all, every individual has the right and the mission to cancel, if he is able, the occasion of the mortal defect, and to restore the equipoise. Before the collective sovereignty the citizen reverently pleads his own cause; before the tyrant rises the tyrannicide—*davanti al tiranno sorge il tirannicida*. . . . Is there not between the tyrant and the victim of his oppression a natural and continual war? . . . To despatch the tyrant, if on his death depends the emancipation of a people, the welfare of millions, is an act of war, and if the slayer is free from every other thought and gives his life in exchange, an act of virtue. . . . If the malediction of a tortured people, miraculously concentrated into poison, could, instantly and without time for resistance, destroy all those who contaminate with their stupid tyranny, with the tears of mothers, with the blood of honest men, the soil that God has given us, the malediction would be sanctified before God and man.” This theory, that a tyrant is an outlaw, is an ingenious adaptation of the old doctrine of tyrannicide, which was borrowed from pagan and Jewish antiquity, and maintained of old in the schools from John of Salisbury to Mariana. The distinction between the two theories is, that whilst the divines held the tyrant condemned by actual law, and implicitly sentenced by a visible tribunal, Mazzini, by means of his doctrine of popular sovereignty, invokes no higher decision than the individual subjective will. Unfortunately, guilty acts may be very easily justified by an obscure theory; and the crimes of Clément, Ravailac, Guy Fawkes, were as horrible as those of Milano, Pianori, or Orsini; and it is not easy for the vulgar mind to distinguish between killing and murder, between the assassination of William the Silent or of Wallenstein, and that of Henry IV. or of Rossi. The doctrine is pernicious and perilous at best: as Mazzini defines it, it is untenable, because it is founded on the democratic principle. An outlaw may be slain; and it may be said that a sovereign who unites the guilt of usurpation with the guilt of tyranny is an outlaw at war with society; but he must be tried by public law, not by private judgment, and the act must be in acknowledged obedience to the laws by which society is bound, not to an arbitrary code. Private vengeance in a savage community is the commencement of civil

law; in a civilised society, it is the inauguration of barbarism. The crime of Mazzini lies not so much in the theory of the dagger, as in the principle by which that theory is applied; and he sacrifices even the speculative basis of his view by denying, with Robespierre, that society has any jurisdiction over life and death.

"Victor Emmanuel," he declares, "is protected, first by the statute, then by his insignificance—*prima dallo statuto, poi dalla nessuna importanza*. Even mutilated and often betrayed by you, the liberty of Piedmont is protection enough for the days of the king. Where truth can make its way in speech, where even, though by sacrifices, the exercise of one's duties is possible, regicide is a crime and a folly." He defines the difference between himself and the party of Cavour, of the monarchical revolutionists, in a manner extremely remarkable. "If life is sacred, how as to war? . . . Did you not send forth two thousand of our soldiers' lives to be lost on the fields of the Crimea in battles not your own, solely because you discerned in that sacrifice a probability of increasing in Europe the lustre of the Sardinian Crown? . . . So long as I behold your laws constructed to protect the life of the man who was at war with his country and with the liberty of Europe, and who reached the throne over thousands of dead, and not for the good of the slaughtered people,—so long as I see you silent and inert before every crime crowned with success, and without daring for nine years once to say to the invader of Rome, 'In the name of the rights of Italy, quit this land that is not yours,'—I shall deem you hypocrites, and nothing more . . . Did they not conspire with me for ten years in the name of a regenerating faith—the men who in your Chamber quote Machiavelli to prove that politics know no principles, but only calculations of expediency and opportunity? Do not the journalists of your party recite the daily praises of Bonaparte, the tyrant in possession, whom they contemned when he was merely a pretender? Are not you ready to betray your country, and to cede Southern Italy to Murat, in order that the empire may secure to you a compensation in land which is beyond your frontier? Partisans of opportunity, you have no right to invoke principles—*Partito d' opportunisti, voi non avete diritto d' invocare principii*; worshippers of the *fait accompli*, you may not assume the garb of priests of morality. Your science lives in the phenomenal world, in the event of the day—you have no ideal. *La vostra scienza vive sul fenomeno, sull' incidente dell' oggi; non avete ideale*. Your alliances are not with the free, but with the strong; they rest not on notions of right and wrong,

but on notions of immediate material utility. Materialists, with the name of God on your lips, enemies in your hearts, but ostensible venerators of the words of the Pope, seeking by desire of aggrandisement to break those treaties of 1815, on which you rely to deprive the people of the right of insurrection,—between you and me there is no difference but this one: I say, holy is every war against the foreigner, and I reverence him that tries it, even though he succumb; you say, holy is every war that succeeds, and you insult the fallen. You heaped insults on the bold people of Milan on the 6th of February; you would have proclaimed them magnanimous saviours of their country if they had prevailed. Surely you do not deem that a people subject to foreigners, and capable of delivering itself, may not do it, simply because the arms that are left in its hands have not a given length. . . . If the people of Italy brandished their knives to the cry, *Viva il rè Sardo!* and conquered, you would embrace them as your brethren. And if they conquered even without that cry, you would embrace them the next day, in order to take advantage of their success.” And then in that tone of prophecy which he often affects, but has seldom assumed so successfully, he says, “Piedmont is not a definite, limited state, living of its own vitality. It is Italy in the germ. It is the life of Italy, concentrated for a time at the foot of the Alps. . . . Italy, whatever happens, cannot become Piedmont. The centre of the national organism cannot be transferred to the extremity. The heart of Italy is in Rome, not in Turin. No Piedmontese monarch will ever conquer Naples; Naples will give herself to the nation, never to the prince of another Italian province. The monarchical principle cannot destroy the Papacy, and annex to its own dominions the states of the Pope.”

In all this declamation there is not a little truth. It is hard to show the error of the conclusions drawn by Mazzini from premises which he holds in common with Cavour. There is a vast difference between the amount of misery inflicted by the French Revolution, and by the absolutism of the old monarchy; but there is an intense similarity of feature and character between the crimes of the Revolutionists and the crimes of the Legitimists. The ancient monarchy does not stand higher in political ethics than the republic, and it is only from the habits and sympathies of a society accustomed to monarchy that we judge more leniently the partition of Poland, the suppression of the Jesuits, the *lettres de cachet*, and the royal police,—which enforced, like the master in the fable, a perpetual tribute of the daughters of the de-

fenceless class of Frenchmen,—than we judge the horrors of the period of vengeance. There is not much to rejoice at that the same wrong should be committed by a constitutional minister instead of a republican, for the sake of monarchy instead of democracy. Monarchy is not essentially connected with order, nor democracy with disorder, nor constitutionalism with liberty. Blinded by our superstitious belief in forms, we forget that the destruction of the faith of treaties, the obliteration of the landmarks of states, the spoliation and oppression of the Church, the corruption of religion, the proclamation of unjust wars, the seizure of foreign possessions, the subversion of foreign rights,—all these are greater crimes and greater calamities than the establishment of republican institutions,—and all this has been done by a constitutional minister; and Mazzini, who has seen the best part of his purpose accomplished for him by those who denounce him as a criminal and a fanatic, has no instrument of agitation remaining to him but the Republic. Cavour made him powerless, simply by making him superfluous, and allowed him to do nothing, by doing his work for him. He triumphed while he lived, because the governments are as corrupt as the demagogues, and because the revolution was his weapon instead of his foe. But he saved Italy from no evil except the Republic, and the highest praise that men can give him is, that he died like Mirabeau, when he alone could yet preserve the monarchy. He had destroyed things more precious than monarchy, and he had trampled on rights more sacred than the crowns of kings.

The crime of Orsini was skilfully turned to account by the Italian refugees, who surrounded the Emperor. On his return from the opera he saw the prefect of police, Pietri, who has since been so instrumental in advancing the designs of his master in Italy. Pietri was received with a storm of frantic rage; and the calmness which the Emperor had exhibited in the moment of peril, and during the time that he remained in public, gave way to a passion of anger such as terror alone can inspire. Pietri, an old conspirator, perceived in this unwonted humour an occasion for the realisation of those schemes for which he and Prince Louis Napoleon had formerly intrigued, and for which Orsini had just exposed his life. There was no security for the Emperor, he said, until he had achieved something for Italy. Then the instinct of self-preservation and of ambition coalesced with the projects of Cavour, and Napoleon resolved to promise the aid which had been so long and so earnestly demanded. The Piedmontese Minister had succeeded in preparing his country for

war, by erecting new fortifications, and in persuading the more politic of his friends that the danger of bringing French armies into Italy would be balanced by the resistance of England and of the other powers. In July he accepted the Emperor's invitation to Plombières; and on his return he gave to his countrymen the signal for action. Then began that vast intrigue of the party of national union in Central Italy, by which the popular insurrections were organised which broke out simultaneously with the war, and by which one part of the French designs was effectually baffled. Service in the National Guard was made compulsory on all men under thirty-five, and a severe system of discipline was introduced. On the occasion of the marriage of the Princess Clotilda, the Deputy Sineo made a declaration of political principles, which were those of his leader. "In accepting this union the ancient dynasty of Savoy pays a new homage to the principles consecrated in France in 1789, which constitute to this day the basis of the public law of that nation. . . . Let us endeavour to seal anew the solemn and indelible compacts by which Charles Albert united his dynasty with the cause of the liberty and independence of nations." Mamiani spoke quite as suggestively: "If there is provocation, it exists on both sides; it is not in the facts only, but in the moral order. On this side of the Ticino there is liberty; beyond it, slavery. Here every thing is done to secure the dignity of our country; there, to oppress it. That is the real provocation, which cannot be prevented." In order to identify himself entirely with the event, Cavour took every thing into his own hands; at the opening of hostilities he was President of the Council, Minister of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of War. His resignation after the Peace of Villafranca added vastly to his popularity, and he returned to office afterwards with redoubled power, but at a time of still greater difficulty. It was now his part to finish the work which France had left undone; to accomplish alone, and in defiance of his ally, what Napoleon had pronounced impossible; to conclude the revolution, without permitting the triumph of the revolutionary party, which had been deemed so formidable on the morrow of Solferino; to prepare for the treaty of Zurich the fate which had overtaken the treaties of Vienna.

A paper was circulated among the Great Powers, bearing no signature, and appealing to their interest in the independence of Italy from France, in order to justify the annexation of the Duchies. It was the last attempt to save Savoy and Nice, which the principles of annexation by popular suffrage,

and of national unity, required as a penalty for the Italian revolution. By a just retribution, it happened that the conduct of the ministry in the course of the negotiations in which this sacrifice was made, was as ignominious and dishonourable as that by which they had gained their ambitious ends in Italy. Circumstances rendered their position hopeless; they themselves made it infamous. On the 10th of January 1860, the new Governor of Savoy received the Municipality of Chambéry, with the assurance that "in Turin there had never been a question of surrendering Savoy to France." On the 18th the organ of the annexionists, the *Avenir de Nice*, declared: "We repeat with still greater confidence, that the annexation of Nice to France is certain: the time of its accomplishment is a question not of months, but of days." The editor was told to leave the country, and then forgiven. On the 29th the Governor of Savoy said: "The policy of the Government is sufficiently known; it has never entertained the design of surrendering Savoy. As to the party which has started the question of separation, it is useless to give it an answer." On the 3d of February Sir James Hudson writes that he had seen Count Cavour, who expressed his astonishment at the report about the annexation of Savoy, and declared that he did not know how it could have arisen. He wondered, he said, at the change of opinion among many people in Savoy, who wished to join France before the war, and were now against it. Sardinia, he averred, had never had the remotest intention of surrendering, selling, or exchanging Savoy. On the 24th the French Government wrote to Turin, that if Sardinia incorporated in her dominions part of Central Italy, the possession of Savoy became a geographical necessity for the protection of the French frontier. Sardinia lost no time in replying, March 2d: "We feel too deeply what Italy owes to the Emperor, not to consider most earnestly a demand which is founded on the principle of respect for the wishes of the people. At the moment when we are loudly insisting on the right of the inhabitants of Central Italy to decide on their own fate, we cannot refuse to the subjects of the King beyond the Alps the right of freely expressing their will, and we could not refuse to recognise the importance of their demonstration, expressed in a legal way and consistently with the directions of Parliament." The last words were omitted in the *Moniteur*, as France did not wish the transaction to be left to the Chambers, to which Cavour looked as the last resource, to prevent the loss, or to share the blame.

These matters were hardly settled, when a prospect of

compensation opened out in Southern Italy. Early in the year, Mazzini had offered to Victor Emmanuel to create a rising in the Neapolitan dominions, on condition of receiving indirect assistance. The Government of Turin was not ready to incur the chances of a new war; time was needed to consolidate the State and to reorganise the army. But it suited the policy of France, that the delivery of the South should not be the work of Sardinia, and that she should not enjoy the fruit of it. Cavour could not resist the pressure of the Republicans supported by the connivance of France, and he determined so to conduct himself as to turn the enterprise to his own advantage. This he accomplished in a way which was a triumph of unscrupulous statesmanship. Garibaldi went forth as the instrument of a party that desired a Republican Italy, and of a power that desired a Federal Italy, and he did the work of monarchy and unity. When Palermo had fallen, the Piedmontese party insisted on annexation. Garibaldi refused to surrender the dictatorship, which he required in order to complete the conquest of the mainland. "Garibaldi," said La Farina, "wished the annexation to follow only after the deliverance of all Italy, including Rome and Venice." He thought that by retaining the power in his own hands, he would be able ultimately to compel the Turin Government to follow him against the Pope and the Quadrilateral; and his Mazzinist allies supported him, in order that the deliverance might be achieved by the revolution alone, and that the revolution might then be master of Italy. La Farina, Cavour's agent with Garibaldi, and the head of the national party organised by Manin, which aimed at unity without democracy, was forced to give way. "I openly and quietly informed the General," he says, "of the reasons of my discontent. He treated me kindly at first, but he reproached me with my friendship for Cavour, my approbation of the treaty of cession, and my opposition to his design on Central Italy." Garibaldi sent him to Genoa, and declared that he would retire rather than annex Sicily to Sardinia before his work was done. "I came to fight for the cause of Italy, not for Sicily alone." If the annexation of Sicily had been obtained, Cavour could have postponed the attack on Naples, and the imminent quarrel with the power that held Rome. At Naples Garibaldi was entirely in the hands of the Republicans, and in open hostility to the Turin ministry, and he declared that he was resolved to go on to Rome, and to deliver Italy in spite of them,—"*piaccia ó non piaccia ai potenti della terra.*"

In this extremity, with the Mazzinists masters of the

situation by their influence over Garibaldi, with the prospect of a breach with France, of an attack on Rome, which would make peace with the Catholics impossible for ever, of a great democratic movement, and an untimely war, Cavour took that desperate resolution, which, next to the introduction of the French into Italy, is the most important of his whole career. In defiance of the angry protests of all the great powers, and of the traditions and forms of the law of nations in time of war, he decreed the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan dominions. "If we are not in La Cattolica before Garibaldi," he wrote, 11th September, "we are lost; the revolution would spread all over Italy. We are compelled to act." On the same day Cialdini entered the Marches; and Cavour found himself at last master of Italy, reaping where Mazzini and Napoleon had sown. His triumph was completed when Garibaldi carried his opposition into the Chamber.

Our purpose has been, not to give a biographical account of the life of Cavour, but to point out the words and deeds most illustrative of his character. He conducted the Italian revolution with consummate skill, and his means were, on the whole, better than his end. The one great reproach against his foreign policy is, that he was the author of the Italian war; that he sought to deliver Italy from foreign oppression. And yet, great part of Italy was atrociously misgoverned, and the misgovernment was due to the presence of the Austrians. A vast pressure weighed down religion and literature; society was penetrated with corruption; self-government was almost unknown. Down to 1848 this was due to the Austrians. Their policy has to answer for the degradation of Italy, and for the perils which have befallen the Church. Nor has the change that has passed over the empire in the reign of Francis Joseph brought any serious improvement in the condition of Italy. For this the Italians alone are responsible; for they have rejected every advance, and have feared nothing so much as Austrian concessions. The war of 1859 had not the moral excuse of the war of 1848. The justification of a rising against the old *régime* did not apply to the new. In the recent war Austria was attacked, not because of misgovernment, but because of national antagonism. The first plea was fiercely repudiated by the Italian patriots, and that which they substituted is absolutely revolutionary and criminal. The fall of the other thrones followed, by the law of gravitation, when the Austrian supremacy was removed; and the reason urged against the government of the Pope and of the King of Naples, whether

rightly or wrongly applied, was sound in principle; whilst Tuscany and Lombardy were taken from the Austrians on grounds which are in all cases false. The real charge against Austria was, that she prevented reforms in the states which she influenced; the misgovernment of these states was the chief weapon by which she was expelled. That Austria alone should be expelled, whilst the other sovereigns remained, would have been an inversion of the order both of ideas and of things. The events of the last two years are secondary to the Italian war, and possess neither the same importance in principle, nor the same proportion of guilt, which give to that event its foul preëminence in modern history.

But the policy of Cavour was revolutionary at home as well as abroad; and it is his notion of government and of the position of the State, more than his ambitious policy, that brought him into collision with the Church. He was not intentionally a persecutor, or consciously an enemy of religion. Nothing in his whole life could justify a suspicion of the sincerity of his Christian end, or lead us to imagine that he would make any retractation. The writings of Gioberti show how bitter a hatred of the clergy may, in Catholic countries, coexist with an earnest faith. Such sentiments, in the years that preceded the Reformation, were common among men who recoiled with horror from the heresy of Luther. In the mind of an ambitious and keen-sighted statesman, inspired with the ideas and with the knowledge of his own age only, and aware of its aspirations and feelings; who finds that in all great questions of secular interest which he knows that he understands he is opposed by almost all the priesthood, and supported by the ablest men out of the Church; who has been accustomed from his youth to connect the clergy with a system of government which excites his just and honest indignation,—is not necessarily an unbeliever if he cannot distinguish between the party and the cause, and fails to discover the true solution of the great problem in which better men have gone astray. He thought he could reconcile religion and modern society without injury to either, and he was mistaken; but not more grievously and fatally mistaken than the mass of those by whom he was denounced. His ignorance of religion has been a great calamity, but not a greater calamity than his ignorance of the true nature of liberty. The Church has more to fear from political errors than from religious hatred. In a state really free, passion is impotent against her. In a state without freedom, she is almost as much in danger from her friends as

from her enemies. The annexation of all Italy under the Sardinian Crown would not have been, perhaps, so much an evil as a blessing to religion, if the political system of Sardinia had been sound. The incompatibility of the Piedmontese laws and government with the freedom of the Church, is the real danger in the loss of the temporal power. If Cavour had been what he believed himself to be, a liberal statesman, the Roman question would have lost much of its complication. A state in which rights are sacred, in which the independence of the two orders is a fundamental and essential principle,—in which property is secured, and in which government usurps no social functions; where, in short, the episcopate is safe in the discharge of its duties and in the enjoyment of its rights from the encroachments of a hostile or patronising sovereign, and from the changes and caprices of popular will; and where the sphere of religion is removed from the interference of the legislative as well as of the executive power,—in that state—if such there be—it would be possible for the Holy See to enjoy perfect independence, and immunity from even the suspicion of influence, supported by a system of domains, and guaranteed by the public faith of Europe.

But Piedmont was more remote than many foreign countries from the character of freedom. The spirit of her institutions was profoundly hostile to the Church, and she did great injury more by her laws than by her policy: of these Cavour was not the author; Azeglio and others are as deeply responsible as he. It is the common policy of foreign Liberals, founded on those ideas of 1789, which are in irreconcilable opposition with liberty and with religion. Unfortunately those among the Italian clergy who, considering religious interests, ardently desire an extensive change, seem hardly aware of the real nature of that constitutional government which promises so much but commonly fulfils so imperfectly its promise; and there is as much to deplore in the partiality of one party of Catholics for the internal policy of Cavour, as in the injustice of others towards his feelings of religion.

Cavour had seen the clergy in alliance with a tyrannical government, and he dreaded their influence in the State. He deemed that the Austrian supremacy and the temporal power must stand and fall together, and he united them in the same attack. He was a stranger to that fierce animosity which inflames so many of his countrymen, and especially that party whom he most resolutely opposed. But he did much of their work for them, impelled by very different motives,

and aiming at a widely different end. At any time he could have been ready to sacrifice ecclesiastical as well as any other rights, if they were obstacles to the accomplishment of his purpose. He had been minister for several years when Gallenga wrote of his administration, "Since the legislative power was taken from the hands of the Crown, gaming, theft, robbery, and all other crimes have increased greatly; the Government plays and sports with public morality. Whilst whole bands of robbers steal with impunity, the ministry says that the police are not yet organised. One minister coolly proposes to sacrifice the fat monks, and to spare the lean ones for a time, and makes of every sacred principle a mere question of finance. . . . Our constitution was dictated by haste and uncertainty, not to say by confusion, despondency, and disorder. Never before was there a real tyranny in the land." His enthusiastic biographer, writing in the last year of his life, says: "Certainly the internal administration does not proceed with order and expedition in any of the Italian provinces. Assuredly in every part of it there are many errors, old and new, to be repaired. . . . Assuredly the decay of the finances is appalling, and makes it necessary to require the people to make sacrifices for liberty before they have felt and discovered from her benefits that she is a goddess."

The political ideas which have led to so much evil are common to the majority of Liberals with Cavour. But whilst few possessed his ability and courage, he was more free than many others from passion and from ill-will towards those whom he thrust aside from his path; and whilst he was resolute in the pursuit of certain practical ends to which he was enthusiastically devoted, he disliked extremes, and was never carried away by the wish of realising a theory and completing a consistent system. In all this he was far superior to the men who are to carry on his work, and he is justly regretted by all parties. While the Revolutionists have to fear that the cause of national unity will fail in less powerful hands, the Catholics have to fear that many fierce passions will be let loose which he restrained, and that principles will be carried to their worst results which had no power over the practical mind of Cavour.

REASON AND FAITH.

A GREAT authority amongst us has remarked, that "the intellectual condition of England at this moment is amply enough to alarm the least anxious, as to the divergence of sacred and secular science, and the unnatural opposition in which they appear to stand." Indeed the great duel between reason and faith has now come to this point, that the men of progress refuse to religion any other domain than that of the sentiments and feelings. Its right to guide any department of pure or practical science is denied; it is warned off the field of politics as haughtily as from the regions of astronomy; and those departments of labour which have hitherto been left to the energies of religious associations—education and charity—are now invaded by the politician, who declares that he can improve their organisation, develop their utility, and lop off their redundancies. It is not, however, the social, but the scientific side of the contest that we are about to consider.

The opposition to religion is in many quarters only an opposition to the men who claim to govern in the name of religion, and who have been content with their title, without seeking to qualify themselves for the duties which it implies. No one could wish to reimpose upon speculative and practical science and art the dictation from which they have emancipated themselves. It would be as preposterous to deny a scientific fact because it is inconsistent with Dr. Pye Smith's interpretation of Genesis, as it would be to deny an historical fact or to oppose a political movement because it ruined Dr. Cumming's edifice of apocalyptic tribulations. Yet this sort of thing is done frequently, and not only among the co-religionists of Dr. Cumming and Dr. Pye Smith. Not only among the unlettered, whose prejudices may be excused, but among those who have received a liberal education, and might be supposed to know the mind of the Church, there may be found men who import all kinds of exploded fancies into the circle of sciences, and who resolutely denounce all new discoveries, on the ground of the supreme authority of Scripture and tradition. When we see the principle of authority thus intruded into the domain of experimental science, we cannot be surprised if experimentalists retaliate by intruding their inductive process into the domain of authority.

It will probably be long before authority and induction enter into a mutual concordat to respect each other's limits. Authority, four centuries ago, had its own way in all

branches of knowledge. It not only (as is right) grounded religious dogmas on the Church and Scriptures, but also (as is wrong) grounded scientific dogmas on the books of Aristotle and Galen, and the tradition of the schools. The authoritative method had for ages been applied equally to religion and science. When it was superseded by the inductive method for scientific purposes, the philosophers could not understand why the new method should not succeed to the prerogatives of the old in religion also.

But though the methods of investigation and proof are different for religion and the other sciences, the same intelligence is called upon to accept both, without self-contradiction, and without making that divorce between them which characterised the expiring paganism of Rome, when, as Lactantius says, "philosophy and religion were quite distinct; for neither did the professors of religion attempt to lead men to the gods, nor did the priests think of teaching wisdom." Christianity would come in for the same reproach if Christians were to be content to acknowledge the eternal hostility of science and faith, and to allow to science the attributes of truth and utility, reserving only a kind of sentimental attractiveness for faith.

It is true that there are two poles, as it were, of the mind, two functions of the reason; one which is specially conversant about all those things which depend on the forms of space and time, while the other takes note of all questions that concern the spiritual forms of power, reason, and will. It has been the fashion since Kant's days to call the first the pure or speculative reason, the second the practical reason; when the province of the pure reason was reduced to the phenomena of space and time, of course the great questions concerning the origin of the world, the destination of man, and the being of a God, were taken out of its sphere, and given to the practical reason; and men were told that no speculation could throw light on the discussion, which could only be decided by the conscience and the feelings. Thus has religion been wrongfully opposed to science, as if it belonged to a different department of the soul, to a part which does not see truth, but only feels pleasure and sentiment.

Those who think thus give too little rationality to the "practical reason," and too much to the "pure reason." The former is occupied not only with sentiments, but with all questions that concern real being and substance, soul, force, reason, liberty. The latter has to do with all things that can be reduced to measure, shape, or number, velocity, weight, or motion. Whatever transcends these transcends

the limits of the "pure reason," but is not therefore banished from the sphere of reason into that of the feelings. Our reason is divided into two poles, the inferior being conversant with the phenomena of time and space, and mathematical in its method of proof; the superior being conversant with the manifestations of real being, and more complicated in its processes, more subject to be influenced by the will and the feelings. But it does not follow from this that our practical reason is unreason, its conclusions sentiments, or its convictions only feelings. Allowing the distinction between the speculative reason and the practical, it does not follow that the former is to override the latter, as if it had no relation to truth, the great object of the intellect.

Though the practical is as strictly reasonable as the scientific intellect, yet the latter faculty forms, as it were, the outer envelope of our mind, and none of the thoughts of our innermost intelligence can be expressed or considered till they are painted on the outer sphere: the idea of force must be reduced to terms of space and number, and the idea of morals must be embodied in phenomena or examples before they can be reasoned upon. The world of substance is mute till it can find its expression in the world of phenomena; phenomena therefore are presented to us in a double aspect: to the speculative reason, to be numbered, tabulated, and generalized into laws; to the inner intellect, to be read as symbols and hieroglyphics, or as vehicles and envelopes of the spiritual realities which lie within them or beyond them.

Most men regard phenomena in both these aspects; but generally one view predominates. The divine thinks little of natural science, but he is obliged to go to nature for his symbols and his language; the naturalist cares nothing for divinity, but trenches on it whenever he holds forth upon the hidden forces and origins of nature. And the divine may give a wrong representation of nature, and the naturalist a wrong explanation of it, and yet each may be true and sound in his own particular walk. The theology may be true, though it builds on the phoenix and the winged dragon. The observation of nature may be accurate, though the naturalist uses them to prove atheism. For each science may be right in its own sphere, wrong only when it wanders beyond it.

Though the naturalist is under no necessity of passing beyond his own sphere of sensible phenomena, the theologian must discourse about the realities of his science in terms of phenomena; for all language is moulded on these terms: thought is only to be expressed through images, and all

images are originally derived from phenomena. Hence the theologian is supposed to run through the whole series of natural sciences, and to cull from each those facts or theories which serve best to express supernatural truths, and to prove the analogy of nature with revelation. Thus all known or supposed truths of the natural order are made, as it were, steps to the temple, and come to be looked at by divines as subordinate branches of theology, the daughters and the handmaids of the mother and mistress of all sciences. Divines have supposed that because the science of nature is the quarry whence they take their stones, that therefore they have a right to control its progress, and to judge of its conclusions. "The faith," they say, "is the foundation of all sciences;" therefore all sciences must derive their first principles from the faith, and must be controlled in their course by theology.

Naturalists, on the contrary, assert that the more we know of truth in any order, the more we know of God. He, therefore, that knows most sciences is the best theologian, and may claim to control divinity. Theology, they say, is the harmony of the sciences, the blossom which crowns their stem, the boss into which their vaulting-ribs converge; they are the base and column, theology is the ornamental capital; they give the premises, theology is the conclusion. If this were true, then the sciences would necessarily control theology, and philosophers would be the legitimate judges of the conclusions of divines.

No truce in the contest of science and faith is possible till both parties in this dispute lay aside their exaggerated claims, and own, on one side, that the province of faith is not the world of phenomena, but the world of spirit; that the articles of faith are not conversant with subjects on which mathematical proof is forthcoming, but with subjects about which human reason can give no apodictically certain response, and which it can therefore neither prove or refute with demonstrative evidence; and that on the other hand all phenomena, with all particulars of their place, their magnitude, their time, their succession, and their number, belong exclusively to the scientific reason, and are properly out of the province of faith, which is exclusively conversant with invisible things.

But though faith, so far as its substance is concerned, is external to the sphere of the reason and the senses, yet as the Christian faith rests upon revelation, and as all revelation must offer us some criterion or sign of its truth, and as this sign must be within the province and subject to the

tests of our speculative reason, it follows that accidentally revelation becomes complicated with the world of phenomena. Nevertheless the phenomena, thus interwoven with revelation, are not removed from the realm of reason and observation; on the contrary, it is through them that revelation appeals, and, if one might say so, submits to the reason and judgment of man. An asserted revelation, speaking about heavenly things, may speak truly or falsely; we have no direct means of testing its accuracy. But if it is accompanied by a sign; if the prophet divides the sea, or raises the dead, or foretells what shall happen to-morrow, next year, or next century; or tells something that has happened, which he could never have discovered by natural means, but which may be afterwards verified,—then we have a means of putting his veracity and his supernatural mission to the proof; and the conclusion which we draw is preliminary to faith. No man is bound to have faith in the sign before it is proved. But having once on its evidence given credit to the prophet's mission, we are bound to believe his testimony concerning invisible things, even though their truth is not otherwise brought home to our understanding.

Still, the understanding is not merely passive in receiving the articles of faith. As the reason has its own innate laws in the spheres of space and time, to which phenomena must conform themselves, or be pronounced impossible, so the understanding has its own innate laws in the spheres of power, knowledge, and will, any contradiction to which ought to be fatal to the pretensions of so-called truths in the spiritual order. As no testimony, no sign, could force us to believe that a thing both is and is not at the same time and in the same sense, or that black is white, so nothing could force us to think that impurity, injustice, passion, falsehood, or impotence is the highest manifestation of power, reason, or will. The preliminary requisites to faith are therefore that *in their substance* its articles should not contradict, but should agree with, the fundamental principles and innate laws of our understanding; and that *their signs or evidences* should be found true when tested by observation and reason. These preliminaries being fulfilled, there ought to be no further struggle.

It must be, then, in these two provinces that the alleged "eternal contest and incompatibility of faith and reason" is to be looked for. In that case, either faith must be incompatible with the very structure and innate laws of our understanding, or else its signs and evidences must have been proved to be either impositions or delusions. Outside these limits the alleged contest is a mere dream.

The words *faith* and *reason* are used by disputants in a very loose way. *Reason* is taken to mean either (1) the mind or understanding, which distinguishes man from beast; or (2) the intellectual principles and logical laws, which are the foundation and method of reasoning; or (3) the love of scientific pursuits, the curiosity and interest which make a man a philosopher; or (4) science itself. So *faith* means either (1) a peculiar faculty; or (2) the law of belief on testimony; or (3) a habit of mind prone to absorb itself in religion, and apt to believe in the supernatural; or (4) the *credenda*, or the dogmas believed. Now we say that in none of these senses is there any essential opposition between reason and faith.

I. Between *reason*, in the sense of mind or rational faculty, and *faith*, or believing faculty, there can be no opposition, because faith is no such faculty, and therefore cannot be contrasted with the faculty of reason. Faith is no independent power; it can only be a function of the reason, for the reason is our only faculty capable of believing. To believe, is to know after a certain sort. But all that can be known is known by the reason; there is no other faculty of knowledge in the human soul, nor can we form any idea of such a power. Therefore whatever we know in any sort, certainly or uncertainly, by faith, science, or opinion, we know by the reason, or not at all. Hence to oppose faith to reason as a rival faculty is only possible to a fanaticism, like early Lutheranism, which asserted faith to be a new faculty supernaturally added to the mind, a new member of the understanding, unlike any of its natural faculties, and therefore incomprehensible to the natural man, but a superadded gift, standing in the same relation to the spiritual world as the reason to the natural world. This fanatical opinion has caused many of our difficulties; for philosophers hearing Christians boast of a new faculty above reason, and incomprehensible to all who had it not, came to consider it as a mystical transcendental dream-land, the asylum of all the innocent delusions and dangerous impostures which lie beyond the sphere of reason. But even so there is no separate faculty for impostures and delusions; the same sense both sees and dreams; the same reason is the place of knowledge clear and confused, and of opinion true and false. Faith is no faculty, but a habit; it is an education, a use, ease, readiness, illumination, and direction of a faculty, but no new limb added to the mind. A dog or cat cannot have faith, because it has no mind to make the act of faith; but if faith were a new and independent faculty, a superfetation

of the brain, it might be grafted on animal instinct as easily as on human reason. Hence the faculty of reason stands in no opposition to faith, because faith is only a function of reason, one of its modes of working, and no more possible without reason than geometry or mechanics. Before reason and faith can be usefully contrasted, they must be reduced to the same denominations; there is no profit in comparing things that have no common definition.

II. Is there, then, any necessary opposition between *faith*, or the intellectual principle of belief and reliance on testimony, and *reason*, or the principles and laws of reasoning? The very terms of the question compel us to answer "No." For though faith and reason are brought nearer together, yet faith is here only a species of reason, and so incapable of being contrasted with it; we may contrast cow and horse, but not cow and animal. Faith, as now defined, is only a subordinate species, comprehended under the more general notion of reason; and who can deny that the principle of reliance upon testimony is one of the first laws of reason, whether practical or speculative? If testimony were rejected, science would be nowhere. Next to nothing could be scientifically known of geography, or history, or politics, or geology, or any other inductive or mixed science. The character of our intellect, as well as of our heart, depends on our education, reading, conversation, and sympathies. He who mistrusts all truth till he has tried it for himself has but a narrow field of knowledge, and has yet to show why his own senses are so much more trustworthy than other men's. The wider our field, the more we must use others' eyes, and trust their witness. But every such act is, as the early Christian apologists pointed out, an act of faith; and whether faith is given to human or to superhuman testimony, the act is of the same genus. This is the fundamental idea of faith; it is a wide genus of mental operations, and of this genus religious faith is one species. To treat this species as if it were a new abnormal and unnatural state of mind, is to open the gate to a prolific brood of errors. *Faith*, then, in this second sense, so far from being opposed to reason, is the name for a highly important habit and act of our reasoning powers.

III. Faith, in its third sense, may be contrasted with reason in the sense of the *cultus* of science—the love of nature, and the curiosity to find out the reasons of things. Faith, in general, is belief on testimony; Christian faith is belief in virtue of the Christian testimony. In it we seem to distinguish three elements. The basis is the prejudice, pre-

sumption, or suspicion that God exists, that He is no Epicurean deity, but one who personally interferes to reward or punish the good or the evil. This suspicion of the mind branches into an anxiety that questions and a good-will that is ready to receive any testimony that may answer the question which the pure reason cannot solve, "Who is this God?" And this anxiety and good-will are the foundation, the first element of faith. Next comes a purely rational act—the discussion of the credentials of the witnesses who bring us the testimony. This is the true office of reason; by itself it is incapable of solving the question about the Nature and Personality of God. An apostle is as unable to discover the answer as any other man; it would therefore be foolish to believe the apostle's testimony about it, unless he could bring proofs of having received a special communication from the being whom the understanding presages and divines, but whom the reason cannot find, or feel, or see, or describe. These proofs are the special *signs* of revelation, and it is in discussing these that reason has its rights and its prerogatives, even in the presence of an alleged communication from God. And this is the second, or rational element of faith. The third element is the submission of the understanding to the message after the reason has countersigned the credentials. The intellect, in submitting, admits the new doctrine into its code of laws as a new principle of thought and action, a touchstone of philosophy, a rule to distinguish good and evil, a principle of development and life, a mould for its opinions, habits, and conduct. Though after this the substance of the mind remains only what it was before, yet the new horizon which is opened to it appears to it like a new creation and a new life. The soul which believes that it has received the truth from God can scarcely help proceeding a step further, to the belief that it receives other help besides the new light. The Almighty and All-Good has more to give than a dry proposition, a definition, or an axiom. If we communicate at all with Him, the communication cannot end with mere dogma. The soul here catches a glimpse of the system of grace, which it finds impossible to confine to the supernatural functions of religion; besides attributing its faith and its charity to God, the soul sees that what it before reckoned to be only natural acts were all performed with His concurrence. Of ourselves, we are non-existent; the same creative hand and force which is needed to call us into being, is needed every moment to sustain us in being. Our existence is a perpetual creation; every pulse of life requires the free concurrence, the grace, of the Creator. To the eye of faith,

then, all nature is transfigured, and becomes in one sense only the continuation and complement of the creative and supernatural Providence of God.

(1.) Now faith has to be compared with reason in each of these three elements, the first of which is the presumption of the being of a God. This feeling is partly due to the understanding, partly to the affections, for its object is one towards which our whole nature yearns; and the question is, whether the presumption that there is a God, a rewarder and punisher, and whether the hopes and fears that secretly prompt our affirmation of His existence, are rational or irrational. Can reason overthrow them, or do they overthrow reason? The presumption that there is a God arises from the very structure of our understanding, to which the conceptions of power, reason, and will are at least as original and fundamental as those of space and time. If we are necessitated to affirm space and time, we are equally forced to affirm power, knowledge, and will. If we can set no limit to the former, neither can we to the latter. We are as much forced to suppose a power transcending all other powers, a reason comprehending without being composed of all other reasons, and a will supreme over all other wills, as we are to suppose a space that comprehends all parts of space, and a duration that comprehends all moments of time. These are fundamental assumptions of the mind, which are presupposed in every act of thought; the mind has no demonstration of them, for they are before all argument, the necessary prejudices and pre-judgments of reason, and therefore in perfect harmony with reason. Neither can the presumptions which spring from the misgivings of conscience, and from our hopes and fears, be said to be against reason. They do not lie in the same plane with reason, and so there can be no true comparison, and therefore no essential contradiction between them.

But there may be much fortuitous interference, if only from our inability to do more than one thing at a time.

“One fire drives out one fire; one nail, one nail;

Rights by rights founder, strengths by strength do fail.”

Love or ambition, or any other hopes and fears, religious or irreligious, may drive out philosophy, may interfere both with our thinking and our acting. They are the internal obstacles which “give us pause,” and “puzzle the will;” through them “the native hue of resolution is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.” But science does not lose by religious hopes and fears more than by any other. The progress of science is not worked out by the million, but by

the tens and units. The multitude whose "talk is of bullocks," or who return weary from the field, desk, shop, or parade, or from the ball-room or billiard-table, have no wish or power to attend to scientific pursuits. The person who gives up all his time to religious exercises would not find himself in any more disadvantageous position.

Moreover, as pleasure and facility in operation are generally the test of a man's particular talent, those who take much pleasure in devotion and little in science show that they have no special capacity for the latter occupation. The faithful mind, which has true religious tenderness and facility in receiving divine impressions, is not usually found to be the best instrument for philosophical investigation. The ever-present presumption that there is a God, and that He has revealed Himself to man—the deliberate preference of the unseen to the seen—the depreciation of that which, however true, is only temporary below that which is believed to be eternal in its consequences,—all these dispositions are difficulties in the way of such a total immersion in science as is generally requisite for eminence. Nevertheless, so far from religion being more detrimental to the pursuit of science than any other absorbing passion, it is the least so of all; because the act of religion is compatible with every human act; it is nothing separate; it is only the crown, the perfume, the direction of our action. Every faculty may be directed to God's glory; every pursuit, scientific or other, may be followed in a religious spirit.

In order to realise precisely where the contrast lies between science and faith, imagine two minds, one endowed with faith without science, the other with science without faith. Each of them will come to an opposite conclusion about the relative worth of the cultivation of the intellect, or of the inventive faculty on the one hand, and of the practice of religion on the other. While one holds that man's only business is to please God and save his soul, and retires into the desert to pray and meditate, the other is persuaded that knowledge is the only substantial good, the only rational object of man. These different feelings characterise two well-defined classes of men. Persons in whom the religious element prevails may possibly have a scientific genius and success in the pursuit; but they will never make science the end of their existence—it will always be a mere means to further religion. But persons in whom the scientific temper prevails would postpone all interests to those of science, and sacrifice wealth, health, family, friends, and life itself to their habitual and absorbing study. They become enthusiasts

for their own pursuits; they are irritated with every thing that seems to interfere with them. They grow suspicious as misers, who see a thief in every stranger. They are jealous of rival branches of knowledge, and invent contradictions where none exist. They exemplify the real nature of the contradiction between science and faith, which can only spring from the narrow-mindedness of the faithful or of philosophers. All pursuits that can absorb the mind may be destructive of one another. Matrimony may interfere with mathematics, and rifle-shooting with book-keeping. So may religion interfere with science. But by this rule any possible pursuit ought to be a pretext for irreligion, and it ought to be necessary to adopt infidel views before beginning algebra or astronomy. Yet it has been found very possible for a man to say his morning and evening prayers, avoid sin, and fulfil his duties, at the same time that he was devoting twelve hours a day to history, statistics, or chemistry. There is nothing in botany to make a man deny purgatory or the power of the keys; nor is there any reason why a good Catholic may not be as profound in science as he may be eminent in art. Columbus, Copernicus, and Pascal are no bad pendants to Leonardo da Vinci, Michael Angelo, and Raffaele.

Religious faith is only one kind of faith; and the philosopher and discoverer must have their faith, as well as the theologian and the moralist. A cold scepticism and undue caution, a fear of venturing beyond the immediate horizon, are elements of character as fatal to scientific as to religious greatness. The scepticism that men call caution in religion they would call nonsense in other spheres of thought or action; but religion is the only territory where impossibilities are found not only credible, as Tertullian says, but practicable also. Though fatalism is impossible in practice, it survives as a religious creed; and though the scepticism which refuses to own the obligation of acting till one's own arbitrary conditions of subjective certainty are fulfilled is found impossible in domestic or social life, and is banished even from philosophy, yet it has its snug corner in religion, from which no proof of its absurdity can draw it forth. Scepticism, hissed off every other stage, has found a home in the sanctuary, and sensible men are not ashamed of professing a religion with which each act of their lives is in notorious contradiction. For where there is real action there can be no scepticism. The adventurous confidence of faith is the characteristic of all great men:

“They wrought in faith,” and not “They wrought in doubt,”
Is the proud epitaph inscribed above

Our glorious dead. . . .
Because he did believe, Columbus sailed
For that new world his inner eyes had seen.
He found ;—so faith its new worlds yet shall find,
While doubt shakes its wise head and stays behind. . . .
Because we have believed our knowledge comes ;
Belief, not doubt, will touch the secret spring.”*

Faith, then, or a generous and confiding temper, is as necessary for science as it is for religion. Sceptics are bound to show how science would be possible if it was approached with that doubt, mistrust, and dislike which they recommend in matters of religion. Science and religion may be, and often are, separated, and then the mind which is intent on the one is very likely to be inattentive to the other ; but in neither can any real progress be made without that liberality of mind which ventures all in pursuit of the object. They that seek self, and go about to establish, not the laws of nature, but their own theories, are hypocrites both in science and in religion. The first element of faith, then, is a presumption of reason, and a moral venturesomeness in risking something for the inner aspirations of the soul ; and as this is an element indispensable for all the higher processes of reason, there cannot be here any essential incompatibility between reason and faith.

(2.) The second element of faith follows naturally from the first. The understanding presumes that an infinite power, wisdom, and will exist ; the conscience presumes that there is a Supreme Judge, who will finally reward all merit and demerit ; and the reason, incapable of finding a direct demonstration of these presumptions in the world of natural phenomena, is naturally driven to seek an indirect one in testimony. It presumes that a revelation of God to man is possible ; and the man who knows that it has not been made to himself, seeks it “at second-hand” from others. Mr. F. Newman refuses all validity to this “faith at second-hand,” on the grounds, first, of the impossibility of proving the revelation ; secondly, of the possible immorality of the things revealed. We are, he says, unable to know the meaning of such assertions as those of St. Paul, that “Christ appeared to him,” or that “he had received of the Lord” certain dogmas, or that his Gospel was “given him by revelation.” “If any modern made such statements to us, and on this ground demanded our credence, it would be obligatory on us to ask what he meant by saying he had a revelation. Did he see a sight or hear a sound ? or was it an inward impression ? and

* Gerald Massey.

how does he distinguish it as divine?" The *ground* of our credence is not the manner in which the revelation is given to the prophet, but the reality or truth of the *sign* which seals his mission. Though the prophet could give no account of how the revelation came to him, yet if he could work a miracle to show that it had come, he would be credible. If a prophet suddenly came among a party of persons all undecided about, but anxious for, a decision on the questions of God and the soul, heaven and hell; and if he declared that he was commissioned to answer their doubts; that the knowledge which they sought had been given to him, how he knew not; but that to prove the reality of the communication he was able to raise a dead man to life, to cure a paralytic, to utter a prophecy,—every body would believe him on the ground of the sign, and accept his message as coming from God, though he could give no account of the method of its communication. Thus this method is no part of the ground of credit, and the critical faculty is under no obligation to examine it before giving assent.

But suppose the substance of the communication is immoral. "Shall I slay my wife" (as Abraham would have slain his son) "in obedience to a voice in the air?" Certainly not, except in such a case as that of Abraham's, every great step of whose life had been in obedience to such a voice, the infallible accuracy of which he had been long ago convinced of. The isolated case of Abraham can never be made a general rule; for a revelation, by the very force of the term, is not meant to teach what we know, but what we know not. No one is ignorant that it is immoral to murder one's wife. But before revelation we do not know what are the sanctions of the law against murder, what supernatural penalties the murderer must expect. Revelation enforces the known, clears the doubtful, and indicates the unknown means of communication between God and His creatures. A pretended revelation, which contradicts known facts and universal principles of morals, is an imposition which refutes itself.

Hence, in contrasting reason with the second element of faith,—the discussion of the evidence,—we may pass by, as immaterial, the method by which the mind of the prophet was illuminated, and we need only attend to the *signs* which prove his commission, and to the *matter* of his message so far as it agrees with or contradicts those principles of understanding and conscience which are already established by the light of nature.

(3.) The third element of faith is the reception of the re-

vealed message into the mind as a new principle of thought and action, and a touchstone of truth and goodness. This is the submission of the intellect. As soon as this act has been once performed, we have renounced, as Christian doctors teach us, all our rights of doubting about the doctrines we have thus received. And this renunciation is construed into an invincible and eternal opposition between reason and faith. Henceforth their methods, and the habits of mind which they engender, must, it is said, be quite incompatible. For science submits all its doctrines to reason, faith requires the submission of the reason to the doctrine; science proceeds by doubting, faith dies by doubt. Science is ever ready to review its most positive assertions; but an act of faith would be impossible if we reserved the liberty of doubting under given contingencies, for to make provision for future doubt is to confess present uncertainty. Now a system which cuts off all future inquiry, and puts a barrier to reason by making doubt a sin, is pronounced to be destructive of all philosophy and science.

The question is, whether faith forbids doubt in any legitimate subject of speculation? Christians, as well as infidels, know that doubt is the instrument of knowledge, or rather the hungry void that strives to fill itself with learning. Dante, with the scholastics, calls doubt the sucker at the root of truth, which naturally pushes us on to the summit of knowledge.

. . . . "nasce, a guisa di rampollo
 Appiè del vero, il dubbio; ed è natura
 Ch' al sommo pinga noi di collo in collo."

"Il faut avoir ces trois qualités," says Pascal, "Pyrrhonien, Géomètre, Chrétien sounis; et elles s'accordent et se temperent en doutant où il faut, en assurant où il faut, en se soumettant où il faut." Doubt is the great incentive to study; without "modest doubt, the beacon of the wise," there is no curiosity, no questioning, no response, no philosophy. Yet philosophy herself forbids doubts on certain points. The first principles and axioms of the understanding are not subjects for discussion. The grounds of any science are assumed as unquestionable by that science. He that has once determined to act, must resolutely put down all doubts that trouble him while acting, unless he would be like Hamlet, continually resolving to do, yet doing nothing but resolve. But in most of these cases the certainty is only provisional, not absolute; whereas faith requires an absolute surrender of the right of doubt, not for a time, but for ever. But there are plenty of analogies for this. No man reserves

the right of doubting the axioms of mathematics, or any other universal and necessary truths. So also, in the sphere of the contingent, no man pretends to doubt about his present consciousness, the events of his past experience, or the evidence of his senses, and of unquestionable testimony. There are thousands of truths stored up in our minds concerning which we never can claim the right of doubting, and yet science and philosophy are safe. It may be that reason is equally uninjured by that renunciation of doubt which faith requires.

Faith only requires us to renounce certain doubts. We may freely examine the signs under the sanction of which credence is demanded; and we may compare the *creed*, or matter proposed to our belief, with the fundamental axioms of our understanding and conscience, not in order to see whether it agrees with our preconceptions of what it should be, but in order to convince ourselves that it is not inconsistent with those axioms. Therefore, as a great apologist writes, "though objections against the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous."

Still the question recurs, Does not faith, after a man has once submitted to its dogmas, with or without this previous examination, denounce all fresh inquiry, and make doubt a sin to be avoided and cast out like other sins, to be treated with no more respect or management than impure thoughts, or the desire to pick a neighbour's pocket? And does not this course produce an unreasoning habit of mind, eminently hostile to science?

It seems that each class of doubts should be reviewed on its own merits. To classify them first by their subjective characters: some doubts are mere scruples, fidgety reviews of what has already been often determined, reproductions of objections long ago sufficiently answered. Reason no more claims the right of continually reëxamining these points, than of continually making fresh experiments to prove once more whether fire burns or arsenic poisons. Weak, irrational, scrupulous doubts need not be treated as rational, but should be exorcised in the roughest and readiest way, by an act of will, or by attending to other things.

But when doubts are attended with opposite characteristics; when the mind is unable to answer objections, to see its way through the labyrinth of argument, and to find the foundation of its faith,—then it appears that human reason requires a different treatment. For if such doubts are shirked, instead of their being expelled, the throne of reason is ab-

dedicated to them; they do not depart, because we simply refuse to see them. The reason is not like the passions. In the warfare of the flesh, cowards are the victors; a passion neglected dies out; but a thought that has once importuned the mind takes root there, and ramifies by some obscure process which physiologists call "unconscious cerebration." The instincts of the flesh, being irrational, and incapable of understanding reason, must be treated as slaves of the reason, and commanded without the right of reply; for "the slave knows not what his lord does." If the reason argues with the instincts, it "makes all things known unto them," as its friends and counsellors, and abandons itself to their guidance. But the rational doubt must be overcome rationally, not by inattention, carelessness, dissipation, or business, but by reasons. This, presumably, is the meaning of the precepts, "prove all things," and "be ready to give a reason of your hope."

If we were writing a moral essay, we should here enlarge upon the humility and other moral qualities with which the solution of such doubts should be accompanied. But we must mention one condition, which is almost as much intellectual as moral, namely, patience. If it is foolish to overwhelm doubts with business, it is equally foolish to overwhelm business with doubts, and to refuse to eat one's dinner, shave the beard, wash the face, or change the shirt, till the mind is set at rest. Patience of difficulties is one of the first principles of reason, and is quite distinct from the attempt to suppress difficulties by refusing to see them. Keep your eyes open to them, but at the same time remember that the course of mental enlightenment is extremely slow; its progress is counted by ages; its single steps require years and decades. It is idle to forestall the solution of a problem which cannot be determined for the next century. But gradually, by patient suspense of judgment, and by the insensible action of an unconscious brooding of the mind over its object, many a silent change is effected within us, our difficulty assumes its right proportions, exaggerations disappear, and so at length, with altered views and enlarged experience, we clear up the obscurities which perplexed us. In this way discoveries which at first seemed subversive of Christianity have gradually been found only to destroy some opinions that had accidentally been mixed up with Christian philosophy, and to be more capable of combining with it than the opinions which they displaced. The outcry with which Christendom greeted Galileo and Cuvier has died away, and their science has been found to harmonise with Christian belief. We con-

fess that these outcries have shown the believers in revelation, Catholic and Protestant alike, to be singularly deficient in the intellectual patience for which we are pleading. We have wearied ourselves with battling against opinions that were both true and harmless to Christian faith. We have cried "wolf" too often, and our cries have served

"Only to show with how small pain
The wounds of faith are cured again."

Proudhon is not altogether without justification in saying, "Though Christians have been beaten in all their battles, they still subsist, ready to feign a reconciliation between reason and faith, to accommodate their biblical texts to the data of science, to introduce a little more reserve into their morals, and a semblance of toleration into their government. Like the reed in the fable, they bend and break not. In the fight with their foolish rivals, they will last, by bending, another eighteen centuries. Before philosophy, they bend and live; before science, they bend and live; in the presence of revolution, they bend and live; and they will live on till they are attacked in their fortress," till atheists can prove that man can live better without God than with Him. Christians have been always overcome, but only because they have always fought for more than the Christian dogma; because at any given moment they have failed to recognise that all except the central core of revealed truth is human addition, and therefore fallible, changeable, and obnoxious to decay; and because they have defended the accidental and temporary vestment of truth with as much obstinacy as they defended the truth itself, till misfortune opened their eyes to their error, and they adopted the opinion which they had sought to repress: thus have they always "bent and lived."

But if we are bound to be patient with philosophers, they must also be patient with us. They must not ask us to change the accidents and clothing of our faith with every new hypothesis. When Christian doctrines are admitted into the mind as principles of judgment and action, and tests of truth and goodness, they necessarily become incorporated with all our theories and principles. Hence it becomes our interest to maintain the stability of these theories, because while they are in continual flux the faith that is mixed up with them can scarcely remain steady. We cannot then regard them with indifference, or lightly abandon them at the first puff of doubt. But this hostility to doubt and to change is not peculiar to religion. Common to all practical systems, it shows the contrast between practice and speculation, not the contest between reason and faith. Speculation

is both dogmatic and diffident; for while its laws are only generalisations of facts positively known, a new discovery may modify them, or a fresh hypothesis supersede them. Speculation also is quite independent of practice; a man may change his theories daily, while he treads the same round of custom for years. Faith, on the contrary, is both a speculative view and a moral principle. Hence it makes the same demands as other practical philosophies or arts. The moment a theory becomes an art, and is put in practice, it must resign its right to continual fluctuation, and conservatism becomes the medium in which it breathes. We must be content with the language, the grammar, and vocabulary of our forefathers; we must use the decimal notation, in spite of any private prejudice in favour of a duodecimal one; watches might easily be improved but for the obstructiveness of the watch-makers; we might easily make better standards of mensuration, but observers still stick to Fahrenheit, to feet and inches, to pints and quarts, as the buying and selling public sticks to its shillings and pence in preference to florins and mils. Physicians and agriculturists are as hostile to innovation as Christians to new theories in science. When an opinion obtains the crown and sanction of practice, it must pay for its preferment by giving up its right to change. Faith then finds its justification in that common intellectual Toryism which attaches itself to old institutions with all their appurtenances, opposes reform for reform's sake, and hates the liberalism that would always be tinkering our convictions as if they were intended for nothing else than to be mended.

Hence follows a practical rule: that faith, once received as an operative principle in the heart, does not cease to be binding whenever an unsolved doubt or difficulty is suspended in the intellect. The mind must work at the solution with patience and circumspection, and without prejudice to Christian practice.

Next, to classify doubts by their objects, we find two elements in our belief,—the dogmas which we believe, and the evidence which makes them credible. The latter element is human, and can never be the formal object of theological faith. The dogma rests on divine authority, and is that object. This distinction shows how the rule just given is easily applicable; though we originally come through the human to the divine, yet after having attained the divine we may hold it in security, even while the human is suffering under a temporary obscurity and uncertainty. Once attained, the divine element is independent of the human, and

does not vary with its changes. A man may still hold fast the formal object of his faith, even while he is reviewing with the most anxious misgivings the road by which he came to it, or the instrument through which he received it, as he may still enjoy his property, though a lawsuit is pending about the title. The enjoyment is somewhat marred, but the possession is real and valid till the suit is decided against him. If this is true, it follows that no Christian is debarred by his faith from the fullest examination and consideration of all that is human in Christianity—its evidences, its polity, its history, its action on the world of morals, politics, arts, and sciences. He may hold fast to the faith, while all else is in a state of confusion and transition, because the dogmas of the faith are addressed to those powers of the intellect which transcend the sphere of phenomena in time and space, to which science is confined.

Mere knowledge does not make up faith; it is always something stronger than the simple logical result of the evidences. However well proved our religion may be, these proofs do not make a man a Christian. Belief is not only in "wisdom and signs." The Samaritans believed, not through the woman who bore evidence, but through Him whom they saw. There is something deeper than Christian knowledge, which we may call Christian understanding; the knowledge is a positive faculty, that observes and classifies its observations, and deduces the laws of their succession. It is, therefore, in a constant state of flux and reflux, and is dependent on external and internal accidents. But the understanding is an intuitive discernment, that reads the hidden reality beneath the husk of phenomenon, that refuses to be content with the phantoms of imagination or the tricks of logical wrangling, but strives to view the Deity in spiritual vision, as an actually existing reality, intimately present around us and within us, independently of all thought or consciousness of His presence. Hence, as we may be logically convinced of God, and yet not fix our soul's eye upon Him, so, conversely, our soul's eye may be fixed upon Him, even while the reason is assailed with the darkest temptations and doubts. Arguments against His existence may be presented to the mind with the most vivid force, while those for it may seem to have lost all point and power; the Christian knowledge may have become a chaos, while the Christian understanding remains clear and unclouded.

This truth will become clearer if we analyse the religious function of the mind. It is not merely a religious sentiment, but it is both an anxious search for an answer to the absorb-

ing questions about our future life and destinies, and also a demand for an unchangeable sanction of the moral law. These demands are not mere wants, vacant spaces in our nature passively waiting to be filled, but they are active, searching forces, tentacles which stretch themselves forth to meet the expected answer, to hug it close, and to digest and assimilate it; or they are abundant fountains springing up in the soul, violently repressed for a time, till education forms a channel for their flow, but, in default of this, ready to seize on the first channel that accident presents. Souls with these yearnings come to the Church, accept her teaching, and then direct all their streams into the channels she points out, live the Christian life, and find it able to satisfy all their spiritual needs. The faith of these souls can never be measured simply by the amount of external evidence by which the Church was first approved to them, any more than our faith in the Creator's infinity is bounded by our imperfect knowledge of His finite creation. The internal element of faith is stronger than the external one; the void, the aspiration, the endeavour to find a religion, convince a man that there must be a religion to find—that there must be a God; but if this God has never communicated Himself, there could be no religion. There must be such a communication, then, and the soul is ready on the slightest proof to admit it. If after I have believed and practised my belief, you tell me that I am all wrong, and only attempt to prove to me that God cannot have revealed Himself, I answer that I have tried, and have known; it is too late to disturb that conviction; it is useless to attempt to destroy my faith. Show me a better faith, and I may follow you; tell me that none is possible, and I know that you are speaking falsely. The absolute certainty of there being some religion arises from the very mechanism of the soul; the kind of religion is determined by external education and evidence. If the religion thus determined flows on calmly in my soul, meets with no internal opposition, but proves adequate for all my aspirations, no external reasons can compel me to reconsider it. Logical difficulties seem only argumentative puzzles; the evidence on which religion was first received may be inadequate, but there may be other adequate evidence in existence; whether the steps of the reasoning were true or false, the conclusion is true in fact. Such is the rational resolve of the soul, the whole torrent of whose religious nature is an internal force, only originally directed by the external evidence. Disturb this evidence as you will, the impetus remains the same, and flows on in the same bed, till you dry up the source while you are

digging a new channel. While the waters are flowing, they must find or make an outlet. Till it is made, there may be a balance of probabilities in the evidence ; but this is only the provisional stage. As soon as one scale kicks the beam, the weights therein retain no value whatever ; as soon as a nation is exterminated, its resistance is as though it had never been ; victory may have been long uncertain, but when it came it was decisive. So in the soul,—the torrent could not divide, or make a compromise between two channels ; it was forced to choose one, and though the original choice was made on slight probability, even this external direction, when added to the imperious internal necessity, is sufficient to explain and to justify the obstinate certainty of faith.

Bearing in mind the distinction between “knowledge” and “understanding,” and the fact that science is exclusively engaged in the department of “knowledge,” it is clear that the claim of the philosopher to the right of meddling with revealed dogma, or the divine part of faith, cannot be entertained. Any contest between science and faith on this ground must be a usurpation on the part of science. Revelation once accepted, no man has a right to alter that which he owns to be revealed. Yet English society, weak in the Christian element that resolutely adheres to the unchangeable tradition, is rife with philosophers who claim the power of criticising revelation as well as science, because religion, like other social and political institutions, has been reformed, and may be again renewed and improved by human agency. Now, to justify this claim of the right of reformation, it is necessary to hold one of two propositions: either that revelation is divine, and then only an enigma, left to be gradually elucidated by reason ; or that it is not divine at all.

What is the idea of revelation ? Our understanding is so formed as to be able to ask some questions which it can never answer ; its curiosity reaches farther than its investigation. Man has glimpses of spaces, the contents of which he cannot distinguish. And yet he is most profoundly interested in these questions—Is there a God ? Is the world eternal, or created by God ? Have I a soul ? Is my soul deathless, or will it die with my body ? Is this my true place ? Am I to look for my highest happiness here, or in another life ? Am I in my original condition, as it was first planned ? Was man created in and for this ignorance and uncertainty, or, if not, how did he fall into it, and how may he deliver himself from it ? Revelation seems to answer these questions, but if its answer is only an enigma it does no more than seem. Nature, without revelation, gives us as

many enigmas as we please. To reduce the teaching of revelation to the progressive elucidation of a riddle, is to confound natural science and revelation. The distinction of their teaching is not that one instructs by things, the other by words,—for revealed tradition may be perpetuated in symbols and ceremonies,—but that, whereas the lesson of nature is obscure, dubious, capable of various interpretations, suggestive of questions that it either cannot answer or cannot with the answer afford any criterion of its truth, the lesson of revelation clears the obscurity, answers the doubt, fixes the sense, and provides the criterion. If this is denied, it will be difficult to distinguish between revelation and nature; revelation will come to be considered a phase of nature, a natural and instinctive utterance of the understanding.

When revealed truth is made to depend upon and vary with the interpretation of Scripture, and when criticism is continually modifying this interpretation, it soon comes to be understood that revelation is a rough ore, which needs to be smelted and refined, that man may render it clearer, improve it, and alter it. But if man can mend it, the original can hardly have been of more than human contrivance. "If Christianity," says Mr. George Combe, "was freed from many errors by the revival and spread of mere scholastic learning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, much more may we expect that the interpretations of Scripture will be purified, corrected, and elucidated by the flood of light which the modern sciences will one day shed upon religion." What our forefathers could reform 300 years ago, we and our children may reform again and again. "What thought can think, another thought can mend." Religion, considered as a subject for mending and patching, must always be open to reconsideration and doubt. Though the original datum, whether a revealed or a natural enigma, is not the pure issue of the brain, yet the whole interpretation is so; and in this religion consists, just as science is the deduced law, not the natural fact. Religion, then (according to this theory), is investigation; but wherever investigation is a duty, doubt is a duty. But to acknowledge a proposition to be revealed by God, and then to doubt of its truth, is impossible: thus a new definition of revelation is found needful—it must be derived from man, not from God. Both revelation and science must be supposed to be equally human: revelation must be the happy guess of a mind guided by its fellow-feeling with nature; science, the generalisation of the results of our observation of nature. One is hypothesis, the other experiment. Revelation is the prophetic dream of what should be; science

is the demonstration of what is. Revelation is the vague, terror-stricken feeling of the force of nature; science is the clear picture of the Cosmos. Man's hopes and fears helped him to the revelation of the spiritual world; science purifies his view, and gives a natural explanation of what appeared above nature. "Revelation," says Miss Martineau, "only anticipates man's knowledge, and therefore when the knowledge is arrived at in natural course the revelation expires; it is an instrument of temporary use, and falls to pieces when done with." Science examines the vague presentiments of revelation, and verifies or explodes them. Thus revealed religion becomes a "branch of philosophy," the philosophy of the hypothetical, with Mr. Combe; or a poetical reverie, with Mr. F. Newman, "created by the inward instincts of the soul, and afterwards pruned and chastened by the sceptical understanding;" or, with Raymond Lully, a blind groping in the dark, soon to be superseded by the daylight of science. "Faith is the instrument of cognition for the rude and unlettered, reason for the educated and subtle mind; faith is blind and blundering, like the touch; reason nimble and sure, like the sight." Thus does the theory that revelation is a divine enigma gradually solved by reason, soon lead to the conclusion that it is not divine at all.

"Still," it may be said, "is there not a progress in Scriptural criticism? Are not several interpretations, formerly received, now exploded? Is there not a perpetual variation in the opinions of Christians about history, science, and philosophy, and a perpetual application of Scriptural language to each new view?" This is true. But in the midst of all these inconstancies there may be, and there is, a constant element, a nucleus of unvarying dogma, which is the essence of the revelation and the true object of faith. The variations, at most, only affect the proofs and illustrations of these dogmas, not their substance. Without this invariable element revelation would be destroyed, or confounded with the variable element which each man may interpret as he sees good. The supposition that all religion may be reformed, that man may discuss on their own merits doctrines which he can only know by revelation, and that the progress of religious illumination grows out of the advance of science, confounds revelation with nature, and makes it only an impression or symbol of God's attributes, left to man to interpret as he can. If nature and revelation are to be contrasted, we must own that the truths revealed are really revealed—are told plainly, and may be known infallibly. To maintain that they were imperfectly understood in former times, is to

imply that revelation was a deceitful oracle, pretending to answer a question that it really left unanswered; it is to affirm that God propounded to our fathers a riddle which He left for us to solve. But is a riddle a revelation?

Kant has proved from a criticism of the reason itself, and the history of philosophy proves experimentally, that reason alone can give no secure answer to the great questions of the soul. Natural science does not pretend to answer them: it catalogues facts, makes statistical tables, and generalises the results, but at last has no more than a classified index to the book of nature, and an inventory of sensations. Not a step has been made towards a knowledge of the origin, essence, and destination of the world and man. "No power of genius," says Emerson, "has yet had the smallest effect in explaining existence; the perfect enigma remains." "The human mind," says George Combe, "is incapable of penetrating to a knowledge of the substance or essence of any being or thing in the universe; all that it can discover are qualities and modes of action." But our minds are so constituted as to be continually and urgently asking for more than this—"What am I? what is the world? who made me, and why?" Science has no answer, and owns her ignorance. But scientific men often couple with the confession of their impotence the assertion that these questions are absolutely unanswerable, that phenomena are the only realities, and that whoever professes to have learnt about substance is either a fool or knave. But is it conceivable that man *must* ask questions to which there *cannot* be an answer? If a man comes forward to answer them; if his answer is found by those who receive it wonderfully adapted to the wants of the soul, opening like a key the most intricate wards; if moreover the man says, "This is no happy guess of mine—it was revealed to me, no matter how; but in proof of the fact of revelation I am commissioned to give these signs;" if upon this he heals diseases by a word, raises the dead from the tomb, stills the winds and waves, predicts future events which duly come to pass,—then is not the mind forced in spite of itself to believe? Under these circumstances, is it not an absurd puzzle to say that though the mind can ask the questions, it cannot receive the answer?

And to this answer Science can have nothing to object. She has already put herself out of court by confessing that she neither knows the essence of things, nor can discover it; she cannot, then, object to what revelation tells us about this essence. If the answer had come from the mind that asked the question, Science might criticise the powers of the mind;

but when the answer comes from one who proves by signs that he is in communication with the supernatural world, Science has only to examine his credentials; to object *in limine* that the communication is impossible is to beg the question. All her real rights are comprised in this office—to examine whether the credentials or signs are true, and whether in the articles proposed to our faith, or in the modes by which they are made known and recommended to us, there is any thing contradictory to the principles of the understanding, or the demonstrated truths of science.

We have no space left to consider the relations between the faith in its fourth sense of the dogmas of religion, and science considered as the whole body of known natural truth. The subject is a vast one, and well deserves an attentive analysis.

EXPECTATION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

THERE is nothing which so favourably distinguishes modern from ancient historians as the importance which they allow to the immaterial metaphysical agents in human affairs, and their attempts to trace the progress of ideas, as well as the succession of events, and the reaction of one upon the other. Among those ideas which are at once causes and effects, which influence one series of events by reflecting another, the most important, but the most difficult to estimate, are the ideas which a nation entertains of its history. In its interpretation of its own experience it forms and expresses its notion of its own character and destiny, of its appointed part in the world and in the designs of God, and the lessons, the warnings, and the tendencies, by which it consents to be guided. These notions become a part as well as a result of its nature and of its history, and irresistibly direct its conduct. It is not, therefore, without reason that a living historian has reproduced in its legendary and poetic garb the story of early Rome, not so much in opposition to the conclusions of modern criticism, but because, in order to understand a people's history, we must know its own idea of it, and must give a just weight to fables, not as truths, but as forces. So much truth there is in the saying that a people would be in the power of the man who should have the making of its ballads.

The present derives its explanation from the past, as the past becomes intelligible from the present; causes must be

examined in their effects, and effects understood in their causes. Neither is intelligible when considered alone.

“What is the present but the shadow cast,
Part by the future, partly by the past?”

There is a prophetic office in history, and our notions of the future are shaped according to our experience of the past. A people that has a consistent view of its career and of its position inevitably forms, in harmony with this view, some idea of the things that are to come. It discerns its ideal in the direction it has previously pursued, and its memories justify its anticipation. All these are part of the influences that form its character and spirit, and deeply modify its bearing. The past acts upon our conduct chiefly by the views of the future which it suggests, and the expectations it creates. It influences the present through the future. In their own glorious or mournful recollections nations found the hopes, the aspirations, and the fears which guide their course. Not because men act in unconscious conformity with their expectations, and bend their conduct according to their notions of fate, but forasmuch as history is not a result of human design, because there is something deeper than interest or conjecture in popular instinct, because patience and longanimity are attributes of the Providence which leads by long but sure preparation to great results, and conducts innumerable streams by the same current to the same goal, because intelligible warnings precede great catastrophes, and nations read as it were in their consciences the signs of the times; therefore there is a teaching in history which is equivalent to prophecy, and in which the historian recognises both a power and a token.

Yet this is an element of their science which modern historians have altogether neglected. Many of the chapters of the famous history of human error have been written, and the imponderables and curiosities of history have been specially cultivated; but none have cared to trace the influence of prophecy on events, or rather of events on prophecy, and the reality of ideas of this kind has not been admitted. We have had writers who delight in portents and prodigies, and writers who believe in nothing but fixed laws; but none have adopted into their inquiry the influence of that sort of prescience and prediction which ought to have been attractive to both, because it is a great instance of divine mercy, and at the same time the highest effort of human wisdom. Marvel-mongers have discouraged sober men from inquiring for reasonable instances of a faculty which degenerates easily into the marvellous, and prophecies have been

noted and remembered in proportion to their unreasonableness and incredibility. But they are really both instructive and characteristic when they are founded on the signs of the times, and are uttered by men capable of discerning and exhibiting in the circumstances and conditions of their own age the seeds and causes of impending change. And this foresight, the privilege at first of the highest minds, gradually extends, as the development of things converts the speculation of the few into the instinct of the many; that which was at first a prediction becomes a proverb and a commonplace, and the truth, which the wisest had divined, grows into a power when it is believed by the mass.

No instance of this can be found which is more remarkable than the gradual rise of an almost general expectation of the Revolution, which had almost a hundred years of preparatory growth, and which was ripened and announced in every sphere of society and in every region of thought, in France. For it proceeded from no isolated cause, but came as the result of the whole political, social, religious, and intellectual progress of the age; as a judgment on the Church and on the State, on the Court and the Parliament, on the administration of justice and on the administration of finance, on errors of philosophy and politics, ethics and literature; and in every department in which the great convulsion was prepared, we may discover, along with the germ, the anticipation of what was to come; in every step of that downward course, at each period of that century of decline, from the time of Leibnitz to the time of Burke, as the consequence became more inevitable, the prospect became more distinct, and the presentiment more positive.

"What must appear most strange," says Tocqueville, "to us who have before our eyes the wrecks of so many revolutions, is that even the notion of a violent revolution was absent from the thoughts of our fathers. It was not discussed, it was not even conceived. . . . In that French society of the eighteenth century which was about to fall into the abyss, nothing had yet given warning of decline."* It is surprising that so great a writer should have been betrayed into such a mistake. True it is that the blindness and ignorance of many was one of the marvels and one of the calamities of that age; but it is astonishing, not so much if we consider the danger that was really approaching, as the alarm with which it was expected.

"A thousand horrid prophecies foretold it :

* *L'ancien Régime et la Révolution*, p. 219.

A feeble government, eluded laws,
A factious populace, luxurious nobles,
And all the maladies of sinking states,—
When public villany, too strong for justice,
Shows his bold front, the harbinger of ruin.”

At the time of the greatest prosperity of Lewis XIV., when the French monarchy had reached the moment of its utmost splendour, the consequences of absolutism began to be foreseen. It made itself felt at the close of the seventeenth century in every way, and every where it created instruments by which retribution was to come. The Church was oppressed, the Protestants persecuted or exiled, Jansenism converted by severity from a party into a sect, from an adversary into a disease; the aristocracy was degraded, the people exhausted by taxes and wars, society corrupted, literature rendered unproductive by a selfish and haughty patronage. In all these things men saw omens of ruin. Racine, in 1698, lost the favour of the king by a memoir which he presented to Madame de Maintenon, on the state of the nation. “Does he think,” cried Lewis, “that he knows every thing because he knows how to make admirable verses? and because he is a great poet, does he want to be minister?” A hundred years later, Napoleon, who was no patron of literature, declared that if Corneille were living, he would make him minister; but Lewis was accustomed to see in poets only an object of patronage. Duclos relates that the Bishop of Limoges (Charpin) wrote to the king with so much power on the sufferings of the people, that Lewis was touched to such a degree that his health suffered. Soon after another appeal for the nation was made by a man who was the foremost in another line. In 1707 Vauban published his *Dîme Royale*, in which he describes the misery of the people, and demands a total revolution in the system of government. Ten per cent of the population lived by alms; fifty per cent were too poor to give alms; thirty per cent were *fort mal-aisées, embarrassées de dettes et de procès*; about one per cent he reckoned *fort à leur aise*. Yet at that time there were no signs of communism, or even of sedition, among the poor. The revolutionary ideas had not gone down from the palace and the study to the cottage, so that it did not occur to men to question the right by which they suffered. Next to Vauban the loftiest character in the French army was a Huguenot, Marshal Catinat, and he was the first to perceive that the evils of the State were leading to a revolution. “France,” he said, “is rotten from head to foot; it must and will happen that she will be thrown upside down.”

But the most earnest and prophetic protest against the

system of Lewis XIV. was that of Fénelon. In the war of the Spanish Succession the ambition of the king had involved him in an enterprise far beyond the resources of the country, and which raised to a tyrannical pitch the requirements and the authority of the State. After nine years of unsuccessful war, the defeat of Malplaquet brought the State to the verge of ruin, and Lewis opened negotiations for peace at Gertruydenberg. He offered Alsace and Spain as the condition of a treaty; he even agreed to pay subsidies to the allies for the purpose of expelling his grandson from his Spanish throne; and the conferences were only broken off when his enemies insisted that he should also send his armies to fight against the cause which he had upheld for so many years. In this extremity the disgraced Archbishop of Cambray wrote a memoir on the state of the country, and on the means of saving it.

“For my part, if I were to undertake to judge of the state of France by the traces of government which I see on this frontier, I should conclude that it exists only by a miracle; that it is an old broken-down machine, which continues by the force of the impetus it formerly received, and which will be destroyed utterly at the first shock. . . . The people no longer live the life of human beings, and their patience is so hardly tried that it can no longer be relied on. . . . As they have nothing to hope for, they have nothing to fear. . . . The nation is falling into contempt, and is becoming the object of public scorn. There is no longer in the people, in our soldiers, or in our officers, either affection, or esteem, or confidence, or hope of recovery, or awe for authority.”

The remedy which he proposed was the restoration of constitutional government by the convocation of Notables; the remedy which was resorted to after eighty years, when it was too late. “I would have it left to the wisest and most considerable men in the nation to seek the resources necessary to save the nation itself. . . . It would be necessary that every body should know how the funds are applied, so that all might be convinced that nothing should be employed on the expenses of the Court. I admit that such a change might disturb the minds of men, and carry them suddenly from an extreme dependence to a dangerous excess of liberty. It is from fear of this drawback that I do not propose that the States-General be convoked, which would otherwise be very necessary, and which it would be most important to restore.” But two years later Fénelon insisted on the absolute necessity of triennial sessions of the States-General.

Taking a wider survey than that which his great con-

temporary confined to his own country, Leibnitz considered the preference which was already given to the natural and the exact sciences over historical studies as the commencement of a vast revolution. He is speaking of historical criticism, and goes on to say, "I believe that if this art, which was so long forgotten, has reappeared with brilliant effect, and has been so carefully cultivated in the last two centuries, . . . it is an act of Divine Providence which had chiefly in view to spread more light on the truth of the Christian religion. . . . History and criticism are really necessary only to establish the truth of Christianity. For I cannot doubt that if the art of criticism were ever totally to perish, the human instruments of divine faith, that is, the motives of credibility, will perish at the same time. . . . I believe that the great obstacle to Christianity in the East is that these nations are completely ignorant of universal history, and do not therefore feel the force of those demonstrations by which the truth of our religion is established. . . . I see with regret the class of critical scholars daily diminishing, so that it may be expected to disappear altogether. . . . The disputes on religion encouraged and excited this sort of study, for there is no evil that does not give birth to some good. . . . But at length, these disputes having degenerated into open war, and wise men seeing that after such long discussions and great bloodshed nothing had been gained, it happened that they began to make peace, and many persons grew disgusted with these questions, and in general with the study of former ages. Then ensued a revolution which was a new epoch in learning. Writers celebrated for splendid discoveries and successful systems turned men's minds to the study of nature, giving them the hope that with the help of mathematics they might succeed in knowing her. . . . Since that time ancient learning and solid erudition have fallen into a sort of contempt; so that some authors affect to employ no quotations in their writings, either to hint at their genius, or to disguise their indolence. . . . It is in the interest of religion that sound learning should be preserved. Casaubonus gave a warning in his English writings, where he says with reason that he has great fears for piety, if the study of antiquity and classical literature is neglected for the sake of natural science." Elsewhere he speaks of "the general revolution which menaces Europe with the destruction of all that remains in the world of the generous sentiments of the ancients."

These opinions were amply confirmed by the events of later times. La Harpe, one of the few conspicuous infidels whom the Revolution converted, once said in his lectures at

the Lycée, "Atheism is a pernicious doctrine, the enemy of social order and of all government." He was denounced by Lalande, the great geometrician, who declared that he hoped this abomination had been uttered, not "par scélératesse, mais par imbécillité." Condorcet says of algebra, "It includes the principles of a universal instrument applicable to every combination of ideas." And in another passage he shows in a striking way the truth of what Leibnitz said concerning the social and political influence of mathematics and natural philosophy: "All errors in politics and morals are based on philosophic errors, which, again, are allied to physical errors. There exists neither a religious system, nor a supernatural extravagance, which is not founded on ignorance of the laws of nature."*

It was in reference to the same class of phenomena that Du Bos wrote in 1719: "The philosophic spirit will soon do with great part of Europe what was formerly done to it by the Goths and Vandals, provided it continues to advance at the same rate as for the last seventy years." But there were few who could distinguish at that early period the dangerous tendencies of a species of literature which was but just beginning, and which was still overshadowed by the reputation of the Augustan age, and many years went by before the ideas of the 18th century manifested to the world their destructive character. During the Regency other fears predominated, and the general discontent displayed itself by an address to the King of Spain, praying him to deliver France from the evils that threatened her from a despotism exercised by Dubois on behalf of the Duke of Orleans.

The conspiracy, which was discovered and suppressed, aimed at the union of the French and Spanish crowns. The States-General were to be summoned; and in their memorial to Philip V. it was intended that they should express themselves in the following terms: "We do not vainly flatter ourselves, sire, in feeling persuaded that we shall hear from your mouth these consoling words,—'I feel for your sufferings; but what remedy can I apply?' You will see, sire, that union which is so necessary to both crowns accomplished in a manner which would render them irresistible. By this means you will restore tranquillity to a people who look on you as their father, and who cannot be indifferent to you. By this means you will prevent misfortunes which we dare not contemplate, and which you are compelled to foresee. How your majesty would reproach

* *Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des Progrès de l'Esprit humain*, pp. 285, 313.

yourself, if that should happen which we have so much reason to apprehend!" The long and peaceful administration of Fleury postponed the evil day, and the alarm subsided; whilst Marshal Saxe even gave a transient lustre to the reign by the victory of Fontenoy. But while there was an apparent interruption in the decline of the State, the decline of religion was evident; and from time to time the clergy drew attention to it, and pointed out the danger which would ensue to the whole fabric of society from the increase of unbelief. For fifty years before the revolution their warnings were incessant.

In a panegyric on St. Augustine, pronounced 1736, Father Neuville said: "Let these detestable systems continue to extend and to strengthen themselves, and their devouring poison will end by consuming the principles, the props, and supports which are necessary to the State. . . . Then, however flourishing the empire, it must all fall asunder, sink down, and perish. To destroy it there will be no need of the thunders of God; Heaven may trust to the earth for the accomplishment of its revenge. Carried away by the frenzy of the nation, the State will be plunged into an abyss of anarchy, confusion, slumber, inaction, decline and decrepitude." Twenty years later, Caveirac wrote: "The revolution of which I speak has already made great progress, and I pray the reader's attention to it. . . . The enemy is at our gates, and nobody sees him. He has confederates in the place, and all men are asleep. Bishops and magistrates, what will your astonishment be, when, at your waking, you will see the revolution accomplished!" A few years before this was published Lord Chesterfield had made the same remark. "All the symptoms which I have ever met with in history previous to great changes and revolutions in government now exist and daily increase in France." This was in 1753. In 1763 Labat preached a sermon at Paris, in which he spoke of the decline of religion and the progress of philosophy, in consequence of the character of the government, from which, he said, "a revolution must sooner or later ensue, and it is not far distant."

On many occasions, but especially at the Conference of 1770, the clergy invoked the protection of the government against the progress of unbelief; and they showed, with great justice, that the Church was not free while there was no restraint upon the publication of the most dangerous books. "It is this fatal liberty," they said, "which has introduced among our island neighbours that confused multitude of sects, opinions, and parties, that spirit of independence and

rebellion, which has so often shaken the throne or stained it with blood. Amongst ourselves it may produce still more fatal consequences; for it would find, in the inconstancy of the nation, in its activity, its love of change, its impetuous and inconsiderate ardour, additional means for causing the most strange revolutions, and for precipitating it into all the horrors of anarchy." It was at the instance of the Bishops that Séguier, the Attorney-General, delivered his celebrated discourse to the Parliament demanding the condemnation of certain books. In several parts it resembles, almost literally, the paper we have just quoted. But he cited so many of the most powerful passages from the works he was assailing, and met them with such feeble replies, that it was supposed the whole thing was an act of perfidious irony. The following sentences show how clearly the position was understood. "A sort of confederacy unites a number of writers against religion and the government. . . . With one hand they have tried to shake the throne, with the other they have sought to overturn the altar. . . . The government ought to tremble at the toleration of a sect of ardent unbelievers, who seem to wish to excite the people to sedition, under pretence of enlightening them. . . . Their desires will be satisfied only when they have placed the executive and the legislative power in the hands of the multitude; when they have destroyed the necessary inequality of ranks and conditions; when they have degraded the majesty of kings, made their authority precarious, and subordinate to the caprice of an ignorant crowd; and when, finally, by means of these strange alterations, they have thrown the whole world into anarchy, and the evils that are inseparable from it. Perhaps, in the troubles and confusion into which they have brought the nations, these pretended philosophers and independent spirits intend to raise themselves above the common level, and to tell the people that those by whom they have been enlightened are alone fit to govern them." Séguier lived to witness the 17th July 1789, when Lewis XVI. was brought to the Hôtel de Ville, and he said, "Those are his first steps towards the scaffold."

When the great school of pulpit eloquence had died out in France with Mascaron, the Abbé Poulle became the most popular preacher in the South. Preaching on the duties of civil life, he said: "Suffer patiently that decency and morality shall be outraged, and you will introduce a boundless license which will destroy society. Those who boldly break the laws of God do not fear to break human laws; and bad Christians will always be bad citizens." In his last sermon

ne said : "All is lost, religion, morality, civil society. You deemed formerly that our prophecies were the exaggerations of an excessive zeal. We ourselves did not imagine that they would be so soon fulfilled."* The Abbé de Boulogne, who became a Bishop under the Restoration, said in the *Eloge du Dauphin*, which he published in 1779, "He saw the fatal revolution preparing ; the invasion of the impious, more fatal than that of the barbarians ; and, as a consequence, the national spirit spoilt and degraded."

The Bishop of Lescar published a Pastoral in the year 1783, in which he rebuked both the clergy and the nobles, and foretold the approaching retribution. "Do you wish that, armed with the law, and led by the magistrates who are its depositaries, the poor should demand of you, rich men of the world, the portion of the inheritance of which you deprive them? Do you wish that they should enter into our temples,—for the temple is made for man, not for God, who needs it not,—and strip the sanctuary of its most precious ornaments, whilst the ministers of the altar have no right to prevent it or to complain? Do you wish that they should pass from the house of the Lord to that of the priest and the Levite, and that, finding them plunged in abundance and luxury, they should grow indignant at the sight, break out in reproaches, and summon them to judgment as ravishers of the goods intrusted to them for a worthier use? . . . I see the reformers bear a sacrilegious hand on the ornaments of the sanctuary, load themselves eagerly with its spoils, close the doors of the house of God, or change its destination ; throw down our temples and drag from them the priests employed in the sacrifice ; pursue outside its walls their impious victory ; insult our grief by their triumphs and feasting ; and desecrate by their impure libations vessels consecrated for the celebration of our most awful mysteries. . . . And will you ask for signs and portents of the revolution which the Holy Spirit desires you to fear? Do you want more than the revolution itself, which, long prepared, advances with rapid strides, and accomplishes itself before your eyes?"

The abominations of the reign of Lewis XV. were such that men marvelled less at the general consciousness of

* La Harpe quotes the following sentences with just praise (*Cours de Littérature*, xiv. 86, 112, 113): "La piété est si méprisée qu'il n'y a plus d'hypocrites." "Nous savons que toute ignorance volontaire et affectée, loin d'être une excuse, est elle-même un crime de plus." "Nos instructions ont dégénéré; elles se ressentent de la corruption des mœurs qu'elles combattent; elles ont perdu de leur première onction en perdant de leur ancienne simplicité. Nous nous le reprochons en gémissant, vous nous le reprochez peut-être avec malignité; mais ne vous en prenez qu'à vous-mêmes."

danger than at the duration of the State. "I know not," said Benedict XIV., "what can be the power that sustains France over the precipice into which she is ever ready to fall." And Clement XIV. said: "Can any other proof of the existence of a Providence be required than to see France flourishing under Lewis XV.?"

There was one who did not fear to give expression before the King himself to the universal indignation and hatred. This was the Abbé de Beauvais, afterwards Bishop of Sénez, who preached at Versailles during the Lent of 1774. The boldness and severity of his first sermon astonished and offended the court; but Lewis *a déclaré qu'il faisait son métier*. He spoke, say the *Mémoires Secrets*, which we are quoting, of the misfortunes of the State, of the ruin of the finances, and of the abuse of authority.* On Maundy Thursday his sermon terrified the king. He spoke of the troubles of the poor, of the corruption of the rich, of the love which the people had shown the king when he was in danger thirty years before; and he told him that that love had grown cold; that the people, oppressed with imposts, could do nothing but groan under its own trials. This made a deep impression on Lewis XV.; he spoke graciously to the preacher, and reminded him of his engagement to preach at court in the Lent of 1776. A few weeks later he was dead, and Beauvais had to preach at his funeral. He had obtained, by his courage at Versailles, the right to speak without disguise at St. Denis; and he declared that the day of punishment for the nation was at hand. "There will be no more superstition, because there will be no more religion; no false heroism, because there will be no honour; no prejudices, because there will be no principles; no hypocrisy, because there will be no virtues! Audacious spirits, behold the devastation caused by your systems, and tremble at your success! Revolution more fatal than the heresies which have changed around us the face of several states! They have left at least a worship and morals, but our unhappy children are to have neither worship nor God."

The Pastoral of the Bishop of Alais on this occasion contains a striking picture of the misery of France. "Let the monarch love God, and he will love his people; and from the foot of his throne he will carry his beneficent view into the provinces, where the miserable inhabitants are sometimes without bread, or often wet it with their tears. . . . And we shall no longer see the kingdom divided as it were into two classes, in one of which the spoils of the provinces serve

as a trophy to the luxury and splendour of a few families, as contemptible by their origin as by their lives, who never see any superfluity in their opulence; whilst in the other thousands of families hardly obtain what is necessary from painful toil, and seem to reproach Providence with this humiliating iniquity." Meantime, La Luzerne, the Bishop of Langres, delivered a panegyric of the dead king at Notre Dame, in which he compared the various reigns of French kings, and concluded that the people had never been so happy as under Lewis XV.

In the reign of Lewis XVI. no preacher was more renowned than Beauregard, who seems beyond all others to have been gifted with a presentiment of definite calamities. "The axe and the hammer," he said on one occasion, "are in the hands of the philosophers; they await only the favourable moment to destroy the altar and the throne." A passage in one of his sermons at Notre Dame became famous by the literal fulfilment, in the same place, a few years later, of the prophecy it contained: "Yes, O Lord, Thy temples will be pillaged and destroyed, Thy festivals abolished, Thy name blasphemed, Thy worship proscribed. But what do I hear? Great God! what do I behold? The holy hymns which made the sacred arches resound in Thy honour are succeeded by profane and licentious songs! And thou, infamous divinity of paganism, obscene Venus, comest here to take audaciously the place of the living God, to seat thyself on the throne of the Holy of Holies, and to receive the guilty incense of thy new adorers." On Passion Sunday 1789 he preached before the king, when, interrupting his sermon for a moment, he suddenly exclaimed, "France! France! thy hour is at hand; thou shalt be convulsed and confounded!"

Parallel with these vaticinations of the clergy of France, and abundantly justifying them, we find in the writings of the infidels similar expectations, and a constant desire to accomplish that which their adversaries so much dreaded. It has been much questioned whether they really desired such a revolution as ultimately ensued. Many of them became its victims; and Rousseau, the master of the Jacobins, had a horror of bloodshed: the establishment of liberty, he said, would be too dearly purchased if it cost a single human life. It has been said with some truth that if Voltaire had lived to behold the effect of his writings, he would have taken a cross in his hand, and preached against himself; yet he well knew, and rejoiced to know, that in pulling down the Church of France he was destroying the State. In 1764, April 2, he writes: "All that I see is sowing the

seeds of a revolution, which will inevitably ensue, and which I shall not have the happiness to behold. The French arrive slowly at every thing, but at least they do arrive. The light has been so widely spread, that there will be an explosion at the first opportunity, and then there will be a famous row." In the following year, April 5th, he writes to D'Alembert, "The world is growing less green at a furious pace. A great revolution in men's minds announces itself on every side." And, 15th October 1766, he writes to the same correspondent, "Can you not tell me what will be the result in thirty years of the revolution going on in the minds of men from Naples to Moscow?"

Rousseau had not the same ferocity of temper; he was animated by ideals, not by passion; and when he wrote, "We are approaching a state of crisis, and the age of revolution," he did not know that it would be the fruit of his own doctrines. The *Contrat Social* had an immediate success in France. The entry in the Journal of Bachaumont is as follows: "3 September 1762. The *Contrat Social* is gradually becoming known: it is highly important that a book of this kind should not ferment in heads easily excited; it would lead to very serious disorders. . . . However, he merely develops the maxims which all men have graven in their hearts." At the beginning of the same year he says, that the *Gazette de France* owed its popularity, not to its veracity, but to its republican tone. It is easy, therefore, to understand the success of Rousseau's book in France. At Geneva the secular authorities condemned it, and a great disturbance ensued. The ministers of the Reformed Church declared that the government had acted from party spirit, because the *Contrat Social* maintains the real democratic principles in opposition to the aristocratic system, which they were seeking to introduce. We are told that the French Dauphin censured the *Emile* because it attacks religion, disturbs society, and the civil order; and can only serve to make men miserable. Somebody said that the *Contrat Social* had also been considered very dangerous. "That is a different thing," said the prince; "it attacks only the authority of sovereigns; that is a thing that will bear discussion. There is much to be said; it is more open to controversy."

Raynal expressed the sentiments of Rousseau, with the cynicism which was peculiar to him, in his History of the Indies: "When will that exterminating angel come who will cut down every thing that lifts its head, and will reduce all to a common level?" Helvetius, disgusted at finding his

country so hopelessly remote from his ideal state, augurs as follows in the preface to his work *De l'Homme*: "This degraded nation is the scorn of Europe. No salutary crisis will restore its liberty; it will perish by consumption; conquest is the only remedy of its misfortunes." Condorcet, who may have changed his opinion before he destroyed himself in the midst of the Revolution, whose advent had filled him with joy, was more sanguine than Helvetius: "Is not this nation destined by the very nature of things to give the first impulse to that revolution which the friends of humanity expected with so much hope and impatience? It could not fail to begin with France."* In another place he describes the influence and position of the infidel philosophers in France. "Often the government rewarded them with one hand, whilst it paid their calumniators with the other; proscribed them, and was proud that fate had put their birthplace on its territory; punished them for their opinions, and would have been ashamed to be suspected of not sharing them."†

The *Système Social* of Mustel, published in 1773, is an elaborate satire on France, and a plea for revolution: "The condition of a people that is beginning to be instructed, to desire enlightenment, to occupy itself with great and useful things, is by no means desperate. Whilst tyranny makes continual efforts to divert men's minds from reflection, its strokes lead back to it at every moment; and this reflection, aided by circumstances, must sooner or later succeed in destroying the tyranny. It cannot long survive among a people that reasons. . . . If a people is wholly degenerate, oppression incites it to fury; its ignorance prevents it from reasoning; and as soon as it loses patience, it destroys without reasoning those whom it considers the instruments of its sorrows. Slaves without enlightenment exterminate without foresight or reflection the blind tyrants who oppress them."‡ In another book,§ which was condemned by the Parliament in 1773, he says: "A people that undertakes to throw off the yoke of despotism risks nothing, for slavery is assuredly the last degree of misery. It has not only the right of refusing to receive that form of government, but the right to throw it off."

The fanatical opinions of Diderot are well known. He not only desired the destruction of Church and State, but believed that it was not far distant. Broglie seeing him in

* Esquisse, p. 279.

† Ibid. p. 263.

‡ Pp. 60, 61.

§ *Réflexions philosophiques sur le Système de la Nature*.

mourning, asked him whether he wore it for his friends the Russians. "If I had to wear mourning for a nation," said Diderot, "I should not go so far to find one." D'Alembert was less of a politician, and understood only the changes that occurred in science and literature. "It is difficult," he says, "not to perceive that a remarkable change has taken place in many respects in our ideas; a change which seems by its rapidity to promise a still greater. Time will fix the object, the nature, and the limits of this revolution, of which posterity will know better than we do the drawbacks and the advantages."

Next to the partition of Poland, there was no event which gratified the infidel party, and prepared men for the Revolution, so much as the suppression of the Jesuits. When the news came from Spain, Frederic the Great wrote to Voltaire: "Cruel revolution! What may not the age which is to succeed our own expect? The wedge is put to the root of the tree. . . . That edifice, sapped at its base, is about to fall; and the nations will inscribe in their annals, that Voltaire was the author of this revolution." There was a real bond of union and amity between the despotic king and the revolutionary writers. The object of Voltaire and his friends was not the destruction of all monarchy, but of all authority connected with divine law. They were aristocrats and courtiers, and hated the old *régime* because of its alliance with the Church. The democratic school of Rousseau withstood the blandishments of Frederic, Joseph, and Catherine, and affected a republican austerity. Yet the horrors of later years were due less to the speculations of Rousseau than to the ribaldry of Voltaire. There were others of the infidel school who saw the approach of great public disasters without desiring it.

Condillac, the only metaphysical genius among them, published in 1775 his *Cours d'Etude pour l'Instruction du Prince de Parme*, in which we find passages which prove that he saw the coming storm: "Revolutions never happen suddenly, because we do not change in one day our mode of thought and feeling. . . . If a people seems suddenly to alter its habits, its genius, and its laws, be sure that this revolution has been prepared long before, by a long series of events and by a long fermentation of passions. . . . The discomfort we feel in society is a warning to inform us of our faults, and to invite us to repair them. . . . When the government falls into decay because morals have become corrupt; when the new passions can no longer tolerate the old laws; when the commonwealth is infected with avarice,

prodigality, and luxury ; when minds are occupied in seeking enjoyments ; when wealth is more precious than virtue and freedom,—reform is impracticable.” His vision extended beyond the outburst of the Revolution, and embraced its consequences : “The troubles of a people generally excite the ambition of its neighbours, who despise it, insult it, and at last declare war, because they hope to conquer and to subdue it. If the strangers spare it, it will fall beneath a domestic enemy. The success of intriguers, who obtain offices of which they will not discharge the duties, will soon call into existence ambitious men who will openly aspire to sovereign power. There is no tyrant yet, and yet tyranny is already established. Exhausted by the movement, the agitation, the difficulties, and the disquiet that accompany an expiring liberty, men desire repose ; and in order to escape the caprice and the violence of an agitated and tumultuous oligarchy, they will give themselves a master.”*

What was announced by the clergy and foreseen by philosophers was present also to the minds of statesmen who watched the course of public affairs from the middle of the century. In the year 1757 the Archbishop of Paris issued a Pastoral on the crime of Damiens. A reply appeared to it in which the following words occur : “Let us open our eyes to the present condition of the kingdom. Do we not see in every part an unsteadiness which betrays a plan of subversion on the point of being executed?”† Four years later, in 1761, an anonymous letter reached the king, and left a deep impression. “Your finances, sire, are in the greatest disorder, and the great majority of States have perished through this cause. . . . A seditious flame has sprung up in the very bosom of your parliament ; you seek to corrupt them, and the remedy is worse than the disease. . . . All the different kinds of liberty are connected : the philosophers and the Protestants tend towards republicanism, as well as the Jansenists : the philosophers strike at the root, the others lop the branches ; and their efforts, without being concerted, will one day lay the tree low. Add to this the Economists, whose object is political liberty, as that of the others is liberty of worship, and the government may find itself in twenty or thirty years undermined in every direction, and will then fall with a crash.”‡

Choiseul, who for several years exercised an unlimited power in France, wrote a character of the Dauphin, in which

* Vol. xvi. pp. 272, 284, 304, 305.

† Lettre d'un Solitaire, in *Recueil de Pièces sur Damiens*, 1760, p. 146.

‡ *Mémoires de Mme. Hausset*, p. 37.

he said: "If this prince remains what he is, it is to be feared that his imbecility, and the ridicule and the contempt which are the consequence, will naturally produce in this empire a decline which might deprive your majesty's posterity of the throne."* When Choiseul was dismissed, the Duke of Chartres called on him, and expressed his regret at what had occurred, declaring that the monarchy was lost. After the disgrace of Choiseul, his successor Maupeou banished the Parliament of Paris, and destroyed the only remnant of independent authority and of freedom in France. The effect on the public mind was immense. A war of pamphlets followed, and in a few months ninety-five were published in defence of the minister. One of the arguments in favour of the *coup d'état* was, that the jurists were the authors of the despotism of the French government: "Tous les jurisconsultes français avaient érigé la monarchie en despotisme." We read in one of the numerous writings on the other side, called *Le Maire du Palais*: "This is a barbarous flattery, which will cost France many tears, and perhaps blood. For all men are not equally submissive to the decrees of Providence. The seditious teaching of the infidels raises up in the State serpents, who will be easily irritated by hunger, and the standard of revolt will soon be unfurled. . . . Thousands have already succumbed beneath the horrors of famine. . . . When the people believes itself strongest, it rises in revolt; if it is not, it murmurs and curses the tyrant. Hence so many revolutions in despotic states."†

This act of tyranny added to the execration which was heaped on the last years of the reign of Lewis XV. In the year in which it occurred the unpopularity of the king was so great, that when he appeared at Neuilly nobody cheered him, and a wit said, "When the king is deaf, the people are dumb." The effect of Maupeou's measure was to convert the magistracy from an instrument of despotism into an instrument of revolution; for, when they were recalled in the next reign, they had become the enemies of the throne. This was understood by the Count of Provence, the most intelligent member of the royal family; and he addressed a memoir to Lewis XVI. against the proposed recall. "When they have recovered their places," he said, "they will be lions instead of lambs; they will use as a pretext the interests of the State, of the people, and of our lord the king. In the act of disobedience they will declare that they do not disobey; the

* Soulavie, *Mémoires de Louis XVI.*, i. 95.

† See the collection: *Les Efforts de la Liberté contre le Despotisme de Maupeou*, 1772, pp. 70, 75, 83.

populace will come to their assistance, and the royal authority will one day fall, crushed by the weight of their resistance.”*

The first minister of Lewis XVI. was Maurepas, who had been Secretary of State under Lewis XIV., but had been in disgrace under his successor. In the first year of his administration he received an anonymous letter on the state of the nation, in which he was told: “You know that the whole kingdom is in a flame, that the administration of justice is almost suspended every where, . . . that the minds of men are embittered beyond the possibility of reconciliation, and that civil war is in the hearts of all.”

Maurepas was asked whether he or the Foreign Secretary, Vergennes, had formed the project of the American war. His answer shows how little prudence there was in the ministers of that school, and how little they endeavoured to provide against the evils they foresaw. “Neither of us,” he said; “at my age no plans are made, one is occupied only with the present, because one cannot reckon on the future. . . . Vergennes and I lived from day to day, and but for Franklin’s threats we should still be amusing England, and should have concluded no treaty with the United States. . . . I hope to live long enough to see the independence of America recognised, and England humbled; that is all I promised the king.”†

Turgot considered that the war would be the ruin of France. He wrote to the king in April 1776: “We must confess that it ought to be avoided as the greatest of misfortunes, as it would render impossible for a long time, and perhaps for ever, a reform which is absolutely necessary for the prosperity of the State and the relief of the people.”‡ The dismissal of Turgot at the end of two years was considered by many a great misfortune. Lacretelle says: “Le parti philosophique s’alarme, et prédit une révolution; la guerre en retarda l’explosion.”§ No speech of that day is more characteristic than what was written by Vergennes to the king after the American war, in 1786: “There is no longer a clergy, or a nobility, or a third estate in France; the distinction is fictitious, purely representative, and without real consequence. The monarch speaks; all the rest is the people, and all obey. Is not France, in this position, arbiter of her rights abroad and flourishing at home? What can she desire more?”|| These were the ideas of government

* Soulavie, ii. 208. † Moniteur, i. 45. ‡ Œuvres de Turgot, iii. 195.

§ Art de vérifier les Dates depuis 1770, 1821, i. 18.

|| Montgaillard, Histoire de France, 1827, i. 345.

which guided one of the most influential ministers in the last years before the fall of the monarchy. They are not a prediction of the Revolution, but an anticipation of that state of things which it was to introduce—absolute sovereignty on the one hand, and on the other equality in submission.

Lewis XV. had said: "It is I who name the ministers of finance, but the public sends them away." Necker was twice raised to office by public opinion against the wishes of the king and court. When he was first proposed to Maurepas, the minister said: "He is a republican; *il voudra nous républicaniser.*" The freedom of his manners, and his ignorance of etiquette, first revealed to the queen the imminence of some dreadful change. At his first audience he took her hand and kissed it without asking leave. This, we learn, was deemed a more significant and alarming circumstance than the attacks on the royal authority.* And the Maréchale de B. made the same discovery when the advocate T. took snuff in her presence, "*sans aucune politesse préalable.*" The recall of Necker after his first disgrace was extremely distasteful to the king. "Then," he said, "I must surrender my throne to him." When he had yielded, he said to his family, "They have compelled me to recall Necker, which I was unwilling to do; but it will not be long before they repent. I shall do all he tells me, and you will see the consequences."† He was still more reluctant to appoint Brienne. At length he gave way, saying: "You are determined; but it may happen that you will be sorry for it." That frivolous minister had an uneasy foreboding of evil ludicrously inadequate to the event. At the death of the Cardinal de Luynes he obtained as much as he could of the benefices which had belonged to him. "I take my precautions," he said; "for I fear that before long the clergy will pay the penalty of all that is going on, and I shall deem myself fortunate if I retain half of what I am taking."‡ He wrote to the Archbishop of Lyons: "I have never been a partisan of the States-General; this resolution will be the occasion of a discussion in the three orders, and of troubles without remedy throughout the State. . . . I should not be surprised if disorder and anarchy were to ensue, rather than settlement and union." His friend the Abbé de Vermond saw deeper when he wrote to him: "For the clergy the rods are preparing, and they may expect a bloody scourge."§

* "Cette familiarité impertinente du Genevois fit sentir à cette princesse, plus que les infractions des droits du roi, que le trône était ébranlé." *Observations sur les Ministres des Finances*, 1812, p. 216.

† Sallier, *Annales Françaises*, 1813, p. 199.

‡ Montgaillard, i. 424.

§ *Ibid.* p. 428.

Malesherbes said to the king, in September 1787: "It is not a question of appeasing a momentary crisis, but of extinguishing a spark which may produce a great conflagration."* About the same time, Lamoignon said: "The parliament, the nobles, and the clergy have dared to resist the king; in two years there will be neither parliament, nor nobles, nor clergy."† On the 22d December 1788, the first President of the Parliament, D'Ormesson, pronounced an address to the king, in which he spoke of the state of the nation. "Already the partisans of opposite ideas take umbrage at each other; they seem to fear and to avoid each other, and to prepare for open discord; they throw themselves inconsiderately into the commencement of associations more dangerous than they imagine; they think that they are conducting the State towards reform, and they are only leading it to its ruin. . . . What they are determined to destroy they can no longer respect. . . . Where can be found the obedience which your majesty has a right to expect? A fatal shock makes it totter on all sides. The consequences make themselves felt from the foundations to the summit of the State. This general commotion is increased by ideas of equality, which men endeavour to erect into a system, as if it were possible for equality really to subsist. These speculations, however vain they may be, sow amongst the citizens the germs of anarchy; they are the destruction of the royal authority, and at the same time the destruction of the civil and monarchical order. It is this, sire, that alarms your Parliament." These representations, we are told, were received with an indifference which filled the Parliament with consternation.

As the plot thickened, the alarm became more general, and foresight ceased to be the dismal privilege of far-seeing men. At the assembly of the Notables, the Prince de Conti spoke in these terms to the Count of Provence: "The monarchy is attacked; men desire its destruction, and the fatal moment is at hand. . . . Whatever happens, I shall not have to reproach myself with having left you in ignorance of the excessive evils with which we are overwhelmed, and the still greater evils with which we are threatened." In December 1788, he joined D'Artois, Condé, and Bourbon, in signing a memoir, in which the king was told, "Sire, the State is in danger; your person is respected, the virtues of the monarch secure to him the homage of the nation; but a revolution is preparing in the principles of government." From the Travels of Arthur Young we know that the same sort of

* Montgaillard, p. 373.

† Sallier, p. 186.

language was common in French society. "One opinion pervaded the whole company, that they are on the eve of some great revolution in the government; that every thing points to it; . . . a great ferment among all ranks of men, who are eager for some change, without knowing what to look to or what to hope for."*

Soon after his dismissal, Calonne wrote to his brother: "I look upon France as a body festering in almost every part, on which it is feared to operate, because too many amputations are required; the disease increases, and the body dies while the remedy is discussed. Be sure that this will be the result of the States-General. . . . The State, without obtaining a useful change, will only be convulsed."†

Marmontel relates a conversation with Chamfort, some time before the meeting of the States-General, from which it is clear that what happened was not only foreseen, but prepared, by the popular party. "Repairs," said Chamfort, "often cause ruins: if we strike an old wall, we cannot be certain that it will not crumble beneath the hammer; and assuredly here the edifice is so decayed that I should not wonder if it became necessary to demolish it altogether. . . . And why not rebuild it on another plan, less Gothic and more regular? Would it be, for instance, so great a misfortune if there were not so many stories, and every thing were on the ground floor? . . . The nation is a great herd, that thinks only of feeding, and which, with good dogs, the shepherds drive as they please. . . . All this is a shame and a pity in an age like our own; and in order to trace a new plan, it is quite right to clear the place. . . . And the throne and the altar will fall together; they are two buttresses supporting each other; and when one is broken, the other will give way. . . . There are in the clergy some virtues without talents, and some talents degraded and dishonoured by vice. . . . The advantage on the side of the people in revolution is, that it has no morality. How can you resist men to whom all means are good?"‡ Marmontel repeated this remarkable speech the same evening to Maury: "It is but too true," he replied, "that in their speculations they are not far wrong, and that the faction has chosen its time well to meet with few obstacles. . . . I am resolved to perish in the breach; but I have at the same time the melancholy conviction that they will take the place by assault, and that it will be pillaged." The most significant saying of all is that of a Bishop to whom Maury

* Travels in France in 1787, p. 66.

† Montgaillard, i. p. 358.

‡ Marmontel, Mémoires, iv. p. 77 sqq.

communicated what he had heard: "We are not so far gone as is supposed; and, with the sword in one hand and the crucifix in the other, the clergy will defend its rights." Marmontel himself went to the minister Montmorin, spoke of the danger, and urged him to put the king in safety in one of the fortresses. Montmorin objected that there was no money, that the State was bankrupt, and could not incur the chance of civil war. "You think," he said, "that the danger is very pressing, to go at once to extremities?" "So pressing," was the answer, "that in a month's time from now I would not answer for the liberty of the king, nor for his head, nor for yours." The writer remarks very justly, that although the state of affairs and the general excitement had long threatened an approaching crisis, it is nevertheless true that it occurred only through the imprudence of those who were obstinately determined to think it impossible. Pitt wrote on the 6th September 1788: "The state of France, whatever else it may produce, seems to promise us more than ever a considerable respite from any dangerous projects."

Omens had cast their shadow on the unfortunate king from his birth. He was born at Versailles while the court was at Choisy, and none of the princes of the blood were present. This did not look well, in the ideas which then prevailed; but, worse than this, the courier who was sent to carry the news to court fell from his horse and was killed on the way. The great disaster which occurred at the festivities of his accession was still more ominous." "I saw," said a contemporary, "this sinister event disturb all the imaginations of men with the notion of an awful future."* In a remarkable military work, written early in his reign, there are some very impressive reflections on the state of the country. "The discomfort and anxiety of the nations under most governments are such that they live with disgust and mechanically; and that, if they had the power to break the

* Fantin Desodoards, *Histoire de France*, xxiii. 224. In the same year, 1775, Delille circulated a rhyming prophecy of the good times that were coming. We will quote a few verses:

"Des biens on fera des lots
Qui rendront les gens égaux. . . .
Du même pas marcheront
Noblesse et roture;
Les Français retourneront
Au droit de nature.
Adieu parlemens et lois,
Ducs et princes et rois!

Les Français auront des dieux à leur fantaisie."

bonds that hold them, they would give themselves other laws and other men to administer them. . . . Suppose there were to arise in Europe a vigorous people, with genius, resources, and a government,—a people combining with austere virtues and a national militia a fixed plan of aggrandisement, which should not lose sight of that system, and knowing how to make war at little cost, and how to subsist by its victories, should not be compelled to lay down its arms by calculations of finance,—we should see it subjugate its neighbours, and overturn our feeble governments, as the north wind bends the reed. . . . France is now the country that is most rapidly declining. The government does not sustain it; and the vices which every where else are spread only by imitation are born there, are more inveterate, more destructive, and must destroy her first. . . . The monstrous and complicated system of our laws, our finances, and our military power, will fall to pieces.”*

No writer of that age seems to have possessed greater foresight, or to have formed his opinions on a larger induction than Linguet, a pamphleteer of great activity, but of no great authority while he lived. In the first volume of his *Annales Politiques*, published in the year 1777, he writes as follows: “It is a tendency common to all, from the princes to the lowest of their subjects, to consider success as a right, and to deem oneself innocent when one has not failed.† . . . Unjust conquests had been seen before, but hitherto usurpers had been scrupulous to conceal their sword behind manifestoes. . . . But now it is in the lifetime of the owner, in the midst of peace, without a grievance, with a pretext even in appearance, the crown of Sarmatia has been shattered to pieces by the hands of friends. The weakness of the one, the power of the others, have been the only reasons invoked or recognised. The terrible principle that force is the best argument of kings, so often put in practice, but always so sedulously disguised, has been for the first time produced, and practised openly and without concealment. . . . It cannot be but that something should filter imperceptibly from this into general habits. . . . Never perhaps, in the midst of an apparent prosperity, has Europe been so near a total subversion, the more terrible because despair will be its cause. . . . We have arrived by a directly contrary road precisely to the point where Italy stood when the servile

* Guibert, *Essai général de Tactique*, tom. i., Discours préliminaire, pp. ix. xiii. xix. xlv.

† The elder Mirabeau says, in the *Ami des Hommes* (iii. 33), “La loi des plus forts fait de la révolte le droit des gens.”

war inundated her with blood, and carried carnage and conflagration to the gates of the mistress of the world.”*

In the importance which this able writer attributes to the partition of Poland he is supported by Burke, who called it “the very first great breach in the modern political system of Europe.” It did more than any other event, except the suppression of the Jesuits, to obscure the political conscience of mankind, and to prepare men to despise the obligations of right, in obedience to the example set them by their kings. The consequences were inevitable, and they were foretold, and the Revolution was heralded and announced at each step of its approach by all the most competent observers. The feeling of its approaching end was strong in the old society, and both the party of those who were the authors of the great catastrophe, and of those who were to be its victims, agreed in those expectations which were the hopes of the first and the fears of the other. “Revolutions,” says Bonald, “have immediate material causes which strike the least attentive eye. These are in reality only the occasions. The real causes, the deep and efficient causes, are moral causes, which small minds and corrupt men do not understand. . . . You think that a financial deficit was the cause of the Revolution: seek deeper, and you will find a deficit in the very principles of the social order.” One of the ablest of those who saw the Revolution mingles perhaps some vanity with much truth when he says: “I know nothing of importance that has happened in Church or State since I grew up which I did not foresee. God does not permit that men should allow a principle, and restrain that which flows naturally from it.”

RELIGION AND CIVILISATION.†

THE problem of the connection of religion with civilisation is one that at the present day must occupy the attention of every student of social science. However he may wish to shirk the question, the movements of the day force it upon him; even Proudhon, a man who thinks all religions, positive or negative, equally bad, who opposes pantheism, or even atheism, so far as it is a dogma, almost as violently as he opposes Christianity, is carried away by the vortex of thought; and while he would avert his eyes from religion, and never allow its name to escape his lips; while he thinks

* pp. 76, 78, 80, 85.

† *History of Civilisation in England.* By H. T. Buckle. Vol. II. Parker, Son, and Bourn. 1861.

that the only way to treat it is to affect and feel utterly ignorant of its existence,—he cannot help writing about it and about it, as if it had a serpentine fascination for him. The man who would fain think religion to be nothing writes about nothing else than the relations of religion and society. For this is the problem of the age, and the most unwilling thinker is obliged to give it some attention.

There are three well-defined divisions of thought upon this subject: the first maintains the necessary union of religion and civilisation, the other two deny it; but one of them does so in the interests of religion, the other in the interests, real or supposed, of civilisation. Each of these divisions contains many subdivisions; the first, though it is forced to admit those lukewarm persons who practically reduce religion to little more than a diffuse social benevolence, typified in a Supreme Being, is better represented by those enthusiastic religionists who consider Christianity to be the present as well as the future redemption of our race, and the great model and ideal towards which all social efforts are to be directed; who consider religion to be the soul of civilisation, and each of its dogmas and laws to possess a civil as well as an ecclesiastical development, to which the social action of the Church necessarily gives birth. "Civilisation is inchoate religion, religion is perfected civilisation; civilisation is a transitory and mediate perfection, religion is the final and eternal perfection." This is their creed.

The difficulty of adjusting this idea to commonly received views of facts, the suspicion that is attached to the names of some of its supporters, and a wholesome dislike of the ill company in which they are found, have somewhat frightened well-meaning men, and prevented them from giving due weight to the truth which it expresses. The "world" for them has no possible relations, except those of hostility, with the Church. And in this group we find men of all grades, from the common run of pious and stupid Protestants, up to those great men who, in former days, traced the beginnings of civil government to the corruption of our nature, to merely human right, to the cursed race of Cain, to the usurpations of atheists, thieves, perjurers, and murderers, or finally to the devil. Between these extremes all degrees are to be found; amongst us one of the most common expressions of the idea is that which bids us look at the civil and social work of the Church only as an accidental growth that crops out on her surface, overshadowing her instead of illustrating her, and making her stand in her own light, by doing more than she need do, more than belongs to her. If she has created civili-

sations, fostered sciences, and revived the arts, this we are told has been but an overflow of her gifts, not strictly included in her mission, and therefore not to be relied on as a pledge that she will ever bestow such gifts again, or that her future influence will not be quite contrary to that which she has exercised in the past.

To separate civilisation from religion in the interests of the latter, is only to prompt the advocates of civilisation to do the same in the interests of their favourite, and to justify their doing so. This school of thought emerges in the policy of the Revolution, and in the philosophy of positivism. In England Mr. Buckle is its most learned advocate, and he defines civilisation in a manner that is intended to shut out any acknowledgment of the additions which it might receive from moral forces. The moral condition of mankind he holds to be nearly stationary, and only to provide as it were the atmosphere in which the real work of civilisation is carried on; the flux and reflux of religious opinions he holds to neutralise each other in the long-run, and to eliminate all their effects from human society, when sufficiently long periods are considered. His civilisation, or progress, is confined to material improvements,—to those additions to the stock of human wealth and power over nature, which, with an unconscious perversion of St. Bernard's maxim, *Non tibi sint curæ res ad nihilum redituræ*, he thinks alone worth having, because they alone are "essentially cumulative," and do not cease to exist with the death of their discoverer or possessor, like the control of the statesman and the presence of the saint. The accumulations must be ponderable, tangible; they are new methods of discovery, like Bacon's philosophy or Newton's fluxions; powers of nature newly tamed and harnessed, like steam or electricity; newly-discovered territories, metals, mines, articles of use and commerce. In things like these Mr. Buckle makes civilisation exclusively to consist; for him the mental activity that has only mind for its object, and which does not react upon nature, and enlarge the material domain of our race, is as nugatory as the activity of a pig's tail, which, as the Chinese proverb says, is going all day, but has done nothing at night. After thus restricting the sense of civilisation, Mr. Buckle has no difficulty in establishing four leading propositions, which, according to his view, must be deemed the basis of its history.

"They are: 1st. That the progress of mankind depends on the success with which the laws of phenomena are investigated, and on the extent to which a knowledge of those laws is diffused. 2d. That before such investigation can begin, a spirit of scepticism must arise,

which, at first aiding the investigation, is afterwards aided by it. 3d. That the discoveries thus made increase the influence of intellectual truths, and diminish relatively, not absolutely, the influence of moral truths; moral truths being more stationary than intellectual truths, and receiving fewer additions. 4th. That the great enemy of this movement, and therefore the great enemy of civilisation, is the protective spirit; by which I mean the notion that society cannot prosper, unless the affairs of life are watched over and protected at nearly every turn by the State and the Church; the State teaching men what they are to do, and the Church teaching them what they are to believe."

That is to say, in Mr. Buckle's view, the great enemy of civilisation is the principle of authority, which is fatal to physical science, and therefore to physical civilisation. And note that it is not only the vagaries and the despotic acts and errors of authority which he abjures, but the principle itself.

Here, then, are the three schools; one whose central principle is to maintain intact the harmony and union of all truths of every order, and thus to imitate the Divine example; for "in all cases where evil is not the fundamental principle, God excludes nothing, sacrifices nothing; not the most insignificant virtue to the most sublime, not the minutest truth to the greatest." Its endeavour is ever, in practice as in theory, to show religion to be not only compatible with, but to be the active and energetic supporter of, all that is useful, beautiful, reasonable, honourable, good, and true; in a word, with the most perfect civilisation.

Both the other schools make the exclusion and the sacrifice which the first refuses to make; one sacrifices all minor interests to the real or supposed interests of religion, the other sacrifices all religious considerations at the shrine of science and progress. One school is Tory, and strives to preserve its rights of primogeniture by throttling all its younger brothers, like the Grand Turk. The other is Radical, and strives to equalise all ranks by the destruction of all classes that have hitherto been privileged. It is only the school first described that takes the true conservative line,—that preserves principles by permitting variations in their application,—that is faithful to the idea by acknowledging every one of its many-sided developments. Both the Radicals and Tories of the union between civilisation and religion are violent and coercive in their tactics; and as they are both in possession of many real truths in their different orders, each of which is sufficient to be the ground of practical conviction and of enthusiasm, no true peace seems possible between them until they compromise their differences by merging in the school

which alone possesses the truths for which both parties were fighting without sharing in the prejudices or enmities of either.

The Tory party, though it is loth to confess that any past social changes have had a fatal effect upon religion, but rather is disposed to make the best of them, and even, in some sense, to accept them, is by no means inclined to accept their logical consequences, to own that past changes must develop into future changes, or that any such changes can take place hereafter without the fatal effects that former changes would have had, if they had not been overruled by Providence. Whatever those men profess, they do not exhibit much practical faith in the vitality of principles apart from the forms in which they happen at present to be embodied. For them the pulling down of a house is the destruction of a family, and the loss of a guarantee involves the oblivion of the thing guaranteed. Such persons wish to petrify all forms in their present condition ; and the older a form is, the greater is their wish to preserve it, and the less is their conception of the possibility of its being worn out, and of the need of the idea it typifies to house itself under another roof. Any thing which has grown into the semblance of a privilege commands their special sympathies ; they are not contented with the acknowledgment of the rights of persons over things by the law of property, and the rights of rulers over subjects by the law of authority, without the further acknowledgment of the rights of persons over persons by a divine right of despotic power, involving the denial of any correlative rights in the subjects. For the preservation of this power they are willing to go all lengths ; esteeming it their last citadel, they are willing for its sake to give up one after another all other forms, and to violate all other principles, in the idea that they are mere outworks of the castle, and that when the siege is at last raised, they may be reoccupied and repaired. Hence such persons will sometimes risk every thing for that which appears to those who do not understand the rules of their conduct to be a position of only secondary importance, a mere form or guarantee of a principle that might be dressed up and guaranteed in several other ways without prejudice to itself, and with much advantage to other interests. Sometimes this devotion to time-honoured privilege takes strange shapes. Through the very limited extension of education and of intercourse in the middle ages, and the consequent narrowness of the groove in which each person ran, the fixedness of his position, and his entire want of versatility and range, it had become an axiom that the study of wisdom

was confined to the philosopher, of theology to the divine, and of State to the politician. Besides the terrors of the Star-Chamber, natural reason seemed to forbid the mere layman to meddle in politics; and the popular ballad declaimed against tongues "that will prattle and prate *against reason* about that which doth not concern them, which thing is no better than treason," and concluded with the advice to all auditors, without distinction, "not to meddle with matters of State." So, when the possession of education sufficient to read a verse of the Psalms gave "benefit of clergy," that is, gave a man the status of a clergyman in the eyes of the law, the principle that the clergy alone might meddle with theological discussions was very different in its bearings upon society from the same principle, expressed in the same way, now, when the educational distinction between clergy and laity is effaced. Indeed, the effacing of that distinction, and the attempts to preserve the religious elements of education by denominational colleges and schools, logically result in the admission that the persons educated there have a right to take part in religious discussions. For if education is maimed where religion is banished; if it is not enough to teach the catechism as an appendix to knowledge, by different masters, and during intercalary hours; if it is necessary to treat religion both as an integral part of universal knowledge, and as a light, a warmth, a soul leavening and animating the whole of it,—then it will be impossible to divorce in after-life that which has been married in the period of pupillage, to insist that the grown man, who has received religion and knowledge as an integral whole, an amalgam never to be separated, should in fact separate them, and cease to take any leading part in discussions where religion or its interests may be concerned. Yet there are some theological Eldons who are mediæval enough to wish this to be done, and who therefore incur the suspicion that their enthusiasm for religious education is not so much due to their friendship for religion as to their enmity to education, and to their wish to keep the ignorant still ignorant, in order that they may be more easily led; or, at best, that their enthusiasm is not founded on any wish to improve education in itself, but to give it a certain twist and bias which they hope the scholar may retain in after-years, even though he may be thrown into the arms of a society educated on quite different principles. Quite beside their intentions, their system is found always to develop into a distinction of classes; divinity is made a separate profession, like law, medicine, or navigation, in the hands of a defined body or faculty, which

tends to become a caste apart, with a separate professional education, and habits of thought entirely foreign from the intellectual progress of society, which always tends to view such monopolies with jealousy and suspicion. The next step is, either that this caste loses its influence over those whom it was meant to control, or, if it still retains that influence, it is only in the same way as the bureaucratic despotisms of the Continent retain their political power,—by keeping the people partly ignorant of, partly indifferent to, the deep “questions of state,” and by preventing their bearing their part in the controversies of the day, in order that they may be willing to yield unquestioning obedience to a body of directors officially charged with the management of their minds ;—by turning religion into administration, the clergy into doctrinal police, and the body of educated Christians into a mass of *suspects*, supposed to be always at the boiling-point of revolution, only kept within the bounds of orthodoxy and law by the terrors of the courts, and the external pressure of an organised network of functionaries ;—by reviving, but in an odious form, the ancient *disciplina arcani*, not now against the enemies, but against the friends and partakers, of the *arcanum*, who are shut out from discussing it ;—by the *cache-cache* policy of “hushing up” all disputes, as if the “decay of religious controversy was the increase of religion,” and its most lively state one of “sweet sleep,” as Lord North said, or, as Fox said, that “religion was best understood when least talked of ;” as if brain and tongue could live divorced for ever, and as if the repression of expression would not end in the death of thought. On the whole, then, this school separates religion from civilisation, not by trying to destroy civilisation,—it has far too much respect for right to attempt any such deed ; but it tries to prevent social changes, to fetter the legs and arms of society, to prevent the freedom of its movements ; it tries to preserve all that is just as it is, not considering that such preservation is really destruction, and that a living creature is killed by preventing its growth as surely as by lopping off its members, by preserving it in sugar or in spirits as by throwing it into the fire or the water.

The third or Radical school proceeds somewhat as follows. It began by questioning the truth of particular dogmas, and the lawfulness of particular practices of Christians ; then, having by these means established doctrinal differences and schisms in matters of discipline, it began to argue that there was no certain science of religion, no possibility of reducing it to universally acknowledged principles, like those of ma-

thematics and the physical sciences. Then this contrast was gradually extended to all metaphysical or mental sciences, in distinction to the inductive sciences, which deal with visible or ponderable results, and are summed up in numerical laws and averages. These sciences were contrasted not only in their certainty, but also in their utility and in their cumulative character.

Metaphysical sciences, these people say, and religious science among them, accumulate words only, and multiply books; the physical sciences accumulate powers and materials, and continually open new domains of nature to our knowledge or to our use. Hence, they say, there can be no question of their superiority, and of the side which any sensible man should take in all contests between the two parties. And such contests cannot be avoided. At least, metaphysical and religious thought fascinates the intellect and wastes the time which ought to be devoted to the progress of the species; generally, also, the advocates of metaphysical and religious ideas have been intolerant to the devotees of physical science, have in times past even gone so far as to hang them or burn them, and even yet, where society is still religious, are often inclined to make their social position intolerable, or at least uncomfortable. There cannot fail, then, to be a contest between religion and progress; and the only question for the men of progress is, what shall be their tactics in opposing religion?—that upas-tree which has killed the world's promise of progress for two thousand years, has stunted man's intellect and perverted it, has turned those whom Nature meant to be great discoverers—like Newton, or Watt, or Faraday—into barren speculators—like Aquinas, or Scotus, or Suarez. There are only two policies to be followed; that of persecution, and that of a negative opposition, which destroys the weaker crop by sowing taller and stronger plants in the field. Opposition and persecution involve controversy, open or implied. Those who saw our priests hanged for their religion were necessitated to inquire what the points were for which a man would consent to suffer death, and to deliberate with themselves upon those points; but religious controversy just concedes the whole point against which the Radical school erects itself. When a man argues, he implies that the subject on which he is arguing is a rational one, and that reason may get to know something about it. But this is just that which the Radical school will not concede to any metaphysical or religious speculations. Positive controversy, and its concrete form of penalties for opinions, are therefore by all means to

be avoided, not only for fear of affording a verbal triumph to the versatile and practised religious disputant, but also because they really concede the point in dispute in treating religion as a thing that can be usefully argued about. Negative opposition, then, is the only device left, and this takes two forms: its practical form is the attempt to supplant theology by more lively and fascinating studies,—to keep the student of science out of the theological lecture-room, by offering him more interesting information elsewhere, or information more necessary for his future career; and thus to keep the professors and students of theology as a class apart, cut off from all the progress of the world, and shut up in their own circle of intelligence and thought,—a conclusion which, as we have seen, harmonises strikingly with the practical result of the Tory discipline. And the literary form of this negative opposition is either to write books on subjects which require such allusions without a single passing allusion to the existence of the metaphysical world, or else, if this passes the powers of human nature, while carefully eschewing any discussion of dogmas on their own merits, as carefully to seize every opportunity of showing the baneful influence of priestcraft and religion upon intelligence, civilisation, and progress; to let each chapter suggest to the reader the thought “*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*,” and the consequent aspiration *écraser l'infame*, and thus to combine the intensest hatred to religion with the profession of the widest toleration and fairness.

In his second volume Mr. Buckle has shown a more thorough appreciation of this system than in his first, where he committed himself to arguments partly theological, partly metaphysical, partly physical, upon necessity and free-will, and upon the origin of religion, thereby exposing himself to very cogent replies. But in this volume we have no direct discussion of any religious topic, but an impartial consignment of all of them to the limbo of exploded fancies and degrading superstitions. He is not even one of those moderate men who consider that, though religion is now useless for progress, as she once aided civilisation by stemming the irruptions of barbarism, she may still be tolerated as a dyke against the wild savagery of the lower strata of society; he thinks that the good she does in this way is no equivalent to the evil which her resistance to progress does to society. He is a fanatic of Radicalism, and delights to trace all the evils of society, all the relapses, all the barbarism, not to the abuse, but to the necessary result of religion. In his sketch of Spanish history, he holds up the national decadence,

which he truly traces to the union between religion and the inquisitorial despotism of the monarchy, not as a warning to all those who would, in spite of the lessons of history, applaud anew any similar alliances which promised any present advantage to the interests of the Church, but as a warning to the friends of civilisation not to have dealings with religion at all; and he then turns to Scotland to show with what perfect impartiality he detests and abjures alike the "priestcraft" of Presbyterianism and that of Popery. If he maintains that the despotism of the Scotch Puritan clergy was less noxious to the progress of the nation than that of the priesthood of Spain,—because, while the latter was in alliance with the government, and was often merely its political tool, the former was always in opposition to the government, which wished to prescribe opinions as well as actions,—it is not that he has any greater liking for Presbyterianism than for Popery, but that, with his dislike of all government, he considers State interference and ecclesiastical superintendence the twin enemies of progress, and rejoices to show how, when in alliance, they have double power to crush all civilisation out of a nation, and how, when in opposition, they tend to neutralise each other.

In comparing the Radical with the Tory school of civilisation and progress, it will be seen that both agree in the fact, though not in the principle, of the entire separation of religion from secular thought. One forces on the separation by clinging too fondly to the fragments of secular life which past ages have embodied with religion, and whose violent separation is feared, as threatening the destruction of religious also. Accordingly they are held fast, even when they have become dead shells from which the living spirit has long ago departed, and religion is still condemned to the unnatural embrace, while living society, loosened from religion, goes reeling on its way unrecognised and unconverted. The other school intends to consummate the divorce, and does it, and besides takes measures to prevent any future alliance. And in practice the advantage is all with the party that knows what it is doing, and keeps its eyes open over its blind and blundering antagonist. If Radicalism kills theology, it keeps secular science energetically alive. But the Eldon school not only smothers secular science, but also puts theology to sleep; it binds its votaries only to reply to each new controversy that arises with the stereotyped formula, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*,—only to say that which all the world has said a hundred thousand times before; and in consequence, like the Bourbons, who in twenty years of ad-

versity had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, it cannot stand against the movement of thought. But its discomfiture does not prove that its antagonist must win. If the present success of the revolution on the Continent is fatal to the hopes of Tories; there are scenes being enacted across the Atlantic that ought to be as fatal to those of the Radicals; and the two failures together ought to give fresh energy and fresh hopes of success to that school which alone can find room for the true principles of both parties, while avoiding the fatal errors of each. The Conservatives, who seek to reconcile new forms with old principles, will remark the depression and the misgivings under which Mr. Buckle laboured in writing his second volume, and will feel satisfaction in comparing his present humility with the contemptuous and overbearing dogmatism of his first.

"Once," he says, "when I first caught sight of the whole field of knowledge, and seemed, however dimly, to discern its various parts, and the relation they bore to each other, I was so entranced with its surpassing beauty that the judgment was beguiled, and I deemed myself able, not only to cover the surface, but also to master the details. Little did I know how the horizon enlarges as well as recedes, and how vainly we grasp at the fleeting forms, which melt away and elude us in the distance. Of all that I had hoped to do, I now find but too surely how small a part I shall accomplish. In those early aspirations there was much that was fanciful; perhaps there was much that was foolish. Perhaps too they contained a moral defect, and savoured of an arrogance which belongs to a strength that refuses to recognise its own weakness. Still, even now that they are defeated and brought to naught, I cannot repent having indulged in them, but, on the contrary, I would willingly recall them if I could. For such hopes belong to that joyous and sanguine period of life when alone we are really happy; when the emotions are more active than the judgment, when experience has not yet hardened our nature, when the affections are not yet blighted and nipped to the core; and when the bitterness of disappointment not having yet been felt, difficulties are unheeded, obstacles are unseen, ambition is a pleasure instead of a pang, and the blood coursing swiftly through the veins, the pulse beats high, while the heart throbs at the prospect of the future. Those are glorious days; but they go from us, and nothing can compensate for their absence. To me they now seem more like the visions of a disordered fancy than the sober realities of things that were, and are not."

To us these accents of blank despair seem quite too deep for the disappointment of not being able to write fifty out of the hundred volumes or so which he first designed; neither are they in place, if they are transferred from the family affliction indicated in the dedication to the merely literary

disappointment. There is surely a more adequate reason for this wintry discontent. The cause cannot be owned by the author; for it would be reason enough not only to curtail, but to suppress, the coming volumes. Mr. Buckle's pen is paralysed by the same misfortune which, on one subject, has stilled Mr. Bright's tongue. Buckle was the philosopher of the system of which Bright was the prophet; one had to prove that the American civilisation, the go-ahead system, which only looks to the accumulation of material goods, without a thought for morals or religion, was the true way of human progress, while the other was to devote his extraordinary eloquence to persuading his countrymen to adopt it. Alas, how has the ground been cut from beneath the feet both of Philosopher and of Orator! What a task is left! When the first volume appeared, there was across the Atlantic a tinsel civilisation gleaming in the Western sun, where, under the fostering influence of a scepticism that believed neither in virtue nor its rewards, the "laws of phenomena" were the only objects of study, and accumulation was the only ambition;—where by this study intellectual truths were exalted above moral ones; where to be 'cute was better than to be virtuous; and where there was neither a State, with its omnipresent administration to teach men what they were to do, nor an inquisitorial Church to dictate to them what they were to believe. Like the Spanish Don on Blackheath, moralising on the view of London, Mr. Buckle had looked across the ocean to the young republic:

“ ‘And here,’ he cried, ‘is freedom’s chosen station,
 Here peals the people’s voice, nor can entomb it
 Racks, prisons, inquisitions—
 Here laws are all inviolate; none lay
 Traps for the traveller; every highway’s clear:
 Here’—he was interrupted by a knife,
 With —”

But our readers must supply the rest of the quotation for themselves. At any rate, the highwayman did not more ridiculously stultify the Spaniard's panegyric than did the secession and civil war of the American States disturb Mr. Buckle's design, as it robbed Mr. Bright of his most telling topic. Our philosopher is now driven to the conclusion that the introduction which he had projected as a solid foundation for his history of England must be greatly curtailed, and consequently shorn of its force, or there will hardly be a chance of his being able to narrate, with the amplitude and fulness of detail which they richly deserve, the deeds of that great and splendid nation with which he is best acquainted,

and of which it is his pride to count himself a member. "It is," he continues, "with the free, the noble, and the high-minded English people that my sympathies are most closely connected; on them my affections naturally centre; from their literature and from their example my best lessons have been learned; and it is now the most cherished and the most sacred desire of my heart, that I may succeed in writing their history, and in unfolding the successive phases of their mighty career." Not America, but England, must now be the historical ideal; and the task of the historian will be to show how its progress has depended directly on the success with which the laws of phenomena were investigated, and on the extent to which a knowledge of those laws was diffused. He will have to show how the spirit of scepticism arose here, and furnished the atmosphere in which alone that investigation could come into being and could live, and how that spirit was strengthened and extended by the investigations to which it gave birth. He must show how the discoveries in which this investigation resulted increased in England the influence of intellectual truths, and diminished relatively the influence of moral truths; how it gradually raised the merchant above the missionary, the speculator above the statesman, the economist above the general. He will have to show how in England civilisation overcame its great enemy the protective spirit; how it overthrew the notion that no society can prosper without the supervision of government, and the careful training of the clergy, teaching men what to believe, what to eat, drink, and avoid. He has engaged to prove how England has become great, not by the force of ideas, not by a national deference to law, not by a hierarchical organisation of society, preserved by the mutual respect of class for class, and by a natural equity and fairness which are sought in vain among the holders of power in other countries;—he has to show that England has not become great by these means, but in spite of them; that her real greatness is due to her scepticism, religious and political, and her devotion to "the laws of phenomena," and to material interests. He has to show that whatever religion she ever professed, and whatever religious traditions still linger in her heart, have never aided, but have always checked and retarded her progress; and all this in spite of the flaming beacon which is blazing in America to warn us of the real results of a civilisation which is only "accumulative," and which takes no thought for passing acts, that, as being only moral or religious, are therefore insignificant; which thinks only of interests, not of principles; whose

highest law is convenience, expediency, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as determined by the present impulse and determination of the omnipotent, if not infallible, majority; which is devoted to "phenomena," but never grasps an idea.

Hence these tears. In spite of his praises of scepticism, Mr. Buckle's faith in his own theory is proof against all demonstrations of its inanity; but not so his hope. His hope is shaken, and though his faith remains unassailable, it has lost its wings. It has yet to learn Catullus's lesson,—a lesson, indeed, which many besides Mr. Buckle should con :

"Desinas ineptire

Et quod vides perisse, perditum ducas !"

But there are men who are proof against all refutation; who, because they have once been wrong, will be so still; to whom consistency is more to be prized than reason; and who, if they have once committed themselves, will persevere in putting their trust in the shadow of a bramble, and in stroking the prickly grievance, and in hanging its thorns with the streamers of their continual praise. There are those who never know how to cease lamenting over that which they cannot help, or to turn themselves to studying the cure for that which they lament,—to whom failure is only a sign of strength, death a sign of life, and mortification a pleasant state, which it is desirable to prolong by every medical appliance.

Unfortunately, the positive philosophy on which Mr. Buckle's theory is built has too many roots in man's nature to be in the least discouraged by one political failure, however disgraceful: positive politicians will find relief in their doctrine of progress; they will have better luck next time. The American catastrophe does not undermine the influence of those creative geniuses of our age who have enabled us to escape from spirit, and to use matter instead; who have substituted lines and numbers for forces and essences and qualities, and the intangible generalisations of metaphysical science. But if this failure will not convert those who are already committed to positivism, it may stay those who were tottering on its brink. It may lead them to think twice before they resign themselves absolutely to the democratic absolutism of the day, before they finally renounce all faith in principles and ideas, and give in their adhesion to a utilitarian materialism. Finally, the lamentable consequences that have manifestly resulted from the separation of science from religion in the interests of science, may have a beneficial effect on the minds of those who have separated religion from science for the interests of religion, and who discourage men

who profess religion from entering with any enthusiasm upon the domains of secular knowledge. To conciliate all that is good and true in inferior orders with all that is good and true in the order of religion, is the supreme problem of the present day,—to conciliate religion with good government, with political progress and liberty, with scientific development, and with social activity.

Communicated Articles.

RELIGIOUS NOVELS.

THERE can be no doubt that for many years past religious novels have held a prominent place in the light literature of the day, and have been both widely read and highly recommended. It is a trite observation, that many will read a tale who will not look at a sermon ; and this is especially, of course, true of the young, for whom such works are primarily intended, and by whom they are principally read. On the other hand, a correspondent of the *Rambler*, not long ago, went so far as to designate this class of publications “odious,” and seemed very anxious to debar the young from their perusal. Now it is too obvious to require proof, that fiction has a peculiar charm for youth, and the merest common sense would suggest that here, as in other cases, we should use for good the most effective instruments we possess. At the same time, I can quite appreciate the feeling of aversion, and even disgust, with which many most excellent persons regard religious novels, and, what is still more serious, the contempt for religion itself which they often engender in the minds of the scoffer or the worldling. Nor is such an admission at all necessarily inconsistent with a full recognition of the uses and importance of fiction in the training of youth. The question will bear examination ; and I propose, accordingly, to draw out some of the reasons for at least viewing with grave suspicion that particular kind of literature which I have undertaken to discuss.

It was the desire of Plato to banish *all* fiction (and, if I remember rightly, all poetry too) from his ideal republic, as tending to corrupt the mind of youth by its falsehood. Nothing should be taught and nothing should be read which was not strictly and literally true. It would not be difficult to show that such a view is, *pace tanti viri*, most unphilosophical, and that poetry and fiction are often among the most effectual ways of conveying, not error, but truth, to the

mind. Indeed I much doubt whether the great teacher himself would have had the heart to enforce his ruthless edict on the *infantum animæ flentes* of a state for which he was called upon to legislate, not to theorise. But there is assuredly weight in his *reason* for excluding fiction, and so far forth as it really has the tendency he fears,—of undermining perfect truthfulness of mind in the young,—it can scarcely be too jealously watched, or too pointedly condemned. Xenophon tells us, that the education of a Persian boy was “to ride, to shoot with a bow and arrows, and to speak the truth.” The most “muscular” Christian will hardly consider such a discipline sufficient; but an education which omitted the last element would hardly be Christian at all. There is no habit of mind, perhaps, more important to guard and foster from the earliest years than a strict and scrupulous candour. It is the special glory of childhood. And here, I believe, we do really touch on a very fundamental objection to what ordinarily pass current under the name of religious novels. But it will be well, before going further, to explain a little more clearly what I mean to include under the term.

First, then, I do not include allegories and other stories for children, such as Mr. Monro and other High-Church writers among the Anglicans have made popular. Neither, on the other hand, do I include such works of ethical fiction as Lady Georgiana Fullerton’s or Miss Yonge’s, which are broadly marked off, both in character and ability, from the run of mere religious novels, and have little or no *controversial* element in them; though even here the least attractive novel of the first-named authoress is that written before she became a Catholic, *Ellen Middleton*, precisely for this reason, that the incidents of an exciting story are ingeniously twisted into an argument for sacramental confession; while Miss Yonge is never less pleasing or persuasive than when delineating the deceitfulness of Catholic converts, or the spiritual shortcomings of Unitarian governesses. It is not, in a word, of ethical fiction, of novels written in a high moral and religious tone, that I complain,—far from it,—but of those which have a special controversial purpose to serve, whether good or bad, and which are, even more than other works of controversy, very specially open to the worst faults of disingenuous partisanship. There are exceptions, no doubt, such as, *e. g.*, the wonderful tale of *Loss and Gain*; but that is not so much a religious novel as the record of an important local phase of religious thought, which has already become matter of history, described as none but the author could have described it; not to add that no warning would be needed against re-

ligious novelism were it always intrusted to such hands as his, only in that case we might reckon ourselves fortunate if we got one novel in a century.

It is now, I hope, pretty obvious to what class of works I am referring under the name of religious novels; and innumerable examples of every kind, Catholic and Protestant, High-Church and Low-Church, will at once occur to the memory of every reader. My first charge against them, then, is, as has already been implied, their essential untruthfulness. In saying this, I do not allude chiefly, if at all, to the character of the driest arguments brought forward in defence of the writer's view, whatever it may be, though these not unfrequently supply abundant illustrations of every conceivable form of logical fallacy. Still, this is unfortunately a weakness by no means confined to controversial *novels*, nor would it alone be a valid objection to them as a class; but their speciality lies in the fact that the author has, and must have, absolute control over the arguments and characters both of friend and foe, and this of itself—putting aside some aggravating circumstances to be mentioned presently—would be quite sufficient to discredit their veracity. At the very best, their argumentative value may be exhaustively summed up in the terse but scarcely conclusive aphorism of the illustrious Mrs. Gamp, "Them's my sentiments;" a statement which has its weight according to the estimate we may have formed of the speaker, but which is expressed in three words with at least as much force as in three volumes. The case would be bad enough if this were all,—if it were only that the advocate of one side has to state unchallenged the arguments of both; for not one man in a thousand has the gift, either intellectual or moral, which can enable him to do full justice to a cause he sincerely and earnestly condemns. And the matter becomes far worse when all this is done in books read mainly by the young, who are always swayed rather by feeling than by reason, and are pretty sure to hold any opinions they do hold, whether learnt in the nursery or picked up elsewhere, with a tenacity not so much of conviction as of prejudice, which makes it well-nigh impossible for them to imagine any good person thinking differently from themselves. I am not, of course, in the least blaming them for this,—at their age it is perfectly natural and right; but I do severely blame those who would take advantage of their open and confiding nature to warp their minds into a one-sided and uncandid temper, even though, to put the strongest and very uncommon case, it be done in the interests of unmixed truth. Here, as elsewhere, honesty is the best policy, and such a method of advocacy is

most fatal to the cause it is designed to serve. Catholicism, *e.g.*, has little to fear from the childish inanities which a Low-Church novelist puts into the mouth of his ideal Jesuit, and still less to gain from a literary defender of the faith who makes every Protestant talk like an idiot or a knave.

It would be bad enough, as I said just now, if this were all; but it is not all, or any thing like it. A religious novelist has not only the arguments, but also the *characters* of his opponents completely at his mercy; and, therefore, untruthfulness is too often darkened into calumny. It is not long since a "High-Church" novel was rejected by Mr. Mudie on the professed ground, not only of its literary weakness, but of its controversial injustice in representing an evangelical person as raised to a bishopric with the sole recommendations of a feeble intellect and vinous *morale*. As I know nothing of the tale in question, I can form no judgment of the value of the criticism; but that such a *kind* of criticism is applicable to some nine out of every ten religious novels scarcely admits of question. If I venture to instance a story published not many years ago by the late Mr. Conybeare, under the enigmatical title of *Perversion*, it is not from any disrespect for the memory of its estimable author, who has shown that he could write abler and better things, and whose treatment of this species of composition is therefore but a more correct proof how the best and highest natures are insensibly lowered when they set themselves to the ungracious task of caricaturing the opinions and persons of their theological adversaries. We are introduced to a pattern Rationalist, who ends by committing suicide; a pattern High-Church rector, who contrives, under a disgusting affectation of pastoral solicitude, to secure the hand of a wealthy heiress, and insists on being married during the festival of Easter, *in a surplice* (!), attended by six chorister boys, "clad in the same sacred vestments;" and to some typical models of the earlier school of Oxford "Romanisers" (sketched transparently, I regret to say, though most unfairly, from real life), who are made to speak and act with a ludicrous disregard of common good feeling and common sense. Yet I doubt if *Perversion* be at all an unfavourable specimen of its class. In ability it is very decidedly above the average of controversial novels; and it is worth noting, that it is precisely in this, their most objectionable feature, that the main strength of such works consists—I mean, in the delineation of character more than in the force of the arguments. The Horatian principle, *Segnius initant animum*, &c., comes into play here. The moral sense rather than the judgment is enlisted against the opinions

the writer wishes to discredit ; and just in proportion as this is *not* done, the work fails of its end. Thus, in the popular anti-Catholic tale *Father Clement*, the force of argument, such as it is, tells, of course, entirely on the Protestant side ; yet an impression exactly the reverse of what the author desires is produced on the mind, because she makes the chief interest of the story centre in the character of a very saintly and attractive Jesuit priest, for which she tries to compensate at the end by a clumsy attempt to convert him to Protestantism on his death-bed. On the other hand, the Catholic reply, *Father Oswald*, leads the hero through such an astounding *embarras de richesse* of universal perfection, "all-holy every body," as Prequi expressed it, that we wonder not at his ultimate conversion, but at his holding out so long against a weight of moral evidence which would turn Dr. Cumming into a zealous Ultramontanist, and Exeter Hall into a loyal dependency of the Vatican. To take a different instance : Miss Sewell is anxious to warn her readers against the Romanising tendencies of the day, and she writes a story in which the heroine is on the verge of becoming a Catholic, for no better reason than because she is passionately attached to a fascinating Italian countess, and finally decides to remain where she is, because it is the religion of her parents. But further illustration is needless to show on what such writers have principally to rely for producing the desired effect.

Now here two questions at once suggest themselves. In the first place, assuming the truth and importance of the opinions to be advocated, is it the best way of advocating them to insinuate the moral worthlessness of those who are differently minded ? Or is not this indeed to add to the want of candour already noticed, the still graver defect of want of charity ? To take the extremest case, *odit errores, amat errantes* is St. Augustine's account of the Church's attitude towards heretics. But, whatever becomes of the errors, hatred or contempt for the erring is the direst lesson and most telling result contemplated by a controversial novel ; and this, be it ever remembered, in works addressed primarily to the young, whose sympathies are strong, while their power of discrimination is small, and who, from the very generosity and vehemence of their nature, are certain rather to outrun their teachers in such points than to correct them. A second question is this : to take the lowest and narrowest view, is the particular cause which the writer desires to recommend promoted or injured in the longrun by this kind of championship ? For the moment, a strong impression may be made ; but the experience of life will almost infallibly re-

verse it, and the disciple who has been taught to see all moral good on one side, and all moral evil on the other, when he finds how far otherwise is the actual fact, will perhaps be tempted to ask if there is any truth at all, and to accept the sentiment of Pope's famous couplet :

“ For forms of faith let graceless zealots fight ;
He can't go wrong whose life is in the right.”

There is an amusing story of an old Cambridge beadle, who pathetically remarked, “ Well, sir, I've been regularly to university sermon for thirty years, and, thank God, I'm a Christian still !” A youth educated on religious novels might have cause to be equally thankful could he boast of a similar result.

It will perhaps be answered that the characters in religious novels are only intended as typical instances, and extreme instances, of the class from which they are drawn, and that on this view they are not unfair. For argument's sake, let us admit it. I reply that it is neither wise nor just to fix our attention mainly on extreme typical instances of a class whose opinions we dislike, and which then come to mould, consciously or unconsciously, our habitual estimate of the general body. No sensible man, of whatever views, would seriously maintain that all High-Churchmen were worldly, or all Evangelicals hypocrites, even supposing these are the faults to which either class is specially liable ; nor, again, that all Protestants are destitute of piety, and all Catholics are saints. Yet this is the sort of impression which a religious novel suggests, and I conceive it to be equally false and mischievous. More than this, it is a very difficult thing, and requires very high mental gifts, to describe character really well, even in the absence of any particular disturbing bias, and a George Eliot does not turn up every day. But where there is a strong party-bias, religious or political, what was difficult becomes almost impossible. If it be true, as I said just now, that not one man in a thousand can be safely trusted to state the arguments of an opponent, it is even more certain that not one man in a million can be expected to do full justice to his character, and still more not one *woman*, and the great mass of religious novels are written by women. It is no discourtesy, I trust, to the fair sex to say, that the very warmth and generosity of disposition which are their peculiar grace disqualify them from fulfilling the office of impartial critics. Where their objections are all engaged on one side, they are not likely to be quick in appreciating the merits of the other. To take a familiar instance : I have not the slightest doubt that Miss Strickland always *intends* to be fair ; but the most enthusiastic Tory would

hardly say that she always succeeds in being so. William III. may not have been "the blameless king and self-less gentleman" which Macaulay would represent him, but neither was he the revolting compound of blustering bully and contemptible "mannikin" which he appears in Miss Strickland's pages. And if this is so in history, how much more in works of fiction, where the writer is perfectly independent in the manipulation of character, without being bound even professedly to found it upon fact!

It may be as well, however, to guard against a possible misconception of my meaning. There are some who condemn unreservedly any use of sarcasm for moral or religious ends. I do not share that opinion; but all would agree that great caution is requisite in the employment of so dangerous a weapon, and one safe rule, which eliminates the ordinary run of religious novels at once, is this,—that it should be directed against what is stupid, or crotchety, or unreal, or affected, or pedantic, not against what is erroneous in belief. The reason is obvious: ridicule loses its point where its objects are incapable of recognising it as other than unjust. You can never laugh a man out of a serious conviction, though you may succeed in laughing him out of consistently acting upon it; and so much the worse for both parties if you do. But there are many follies and foibles, as Horace has observed, which are impervious to argument, but not proof against ridicule. Thus it is often said that Mr. Paget's clever tale, *Milford Malvoisin*, did much to inaugurate the crusade against the absurd "pew-system," which was then as universal as it now is rare in the churches of the Establishment. This is just a case in point: there was a standing absurdity, strong in the power of prejudice and prestige, in defence of which little could be urged in the way of argument, and therefore little could be urged against it. Pews were ugly, inconvenient, and expensive; but if people would not see it, argument would do little to persuade them of it. Nobody, however, could help laughing over the admirable story of the fat and querulous old lady who sat down on her cowl, nor were any deep convictions shocked, or parodied, or libelled by the tale. To revert to the general question: it has, I hope, been made sufficiently clear that religious novels are open to the most fatal objections on the score both of candour and charity, and this alone would be enough to condemn them as a class. But, in fact, the only defence that can be put forward, that they help to create an interest in religious subjects among the thoughtless and the young, strengthens the case against them. I have already

acknowledged the importance and uses of ethical fiction, and am not saying a word against it now. Many boys will read a story who take little interest in a sermon, and will gain far more good from the former than they would from the latter. Stories written for them by those who have the necessary gifts (which are far from being very common), in which high principles are uniformly but unobtrusively put forward, cannot be too warmly commended; only it must of course be understood that there shall be no *preachments* introduced, which are under such circumstances doubly irritating, and will probably be missed in the perusal. Of such books I might have much to say, did they fall within the scope of my present article.

But the kind of interest in religious subjects created by the species of literature to which my criticisms apply, is of that unhealthy and morbid kind which we should be anxious not to encourage, but to avert. It has no tendency to make its readers bitter, but it has a most direct tendency to make them shallow, flippant, uncandid, opinionated, and censorious. It ministers expressly to that evil temper of *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, of which Scripture speaks. Those who are called to deal with religious controversy, which the young seldom or never are, may consult works which make at least some profession of doing justice to both sides of a question, not the ephemeral *brochures* of one-sided and ignorant partisans, who will certainly misrepresent their adversaries, and not improbably their friends. And we have a right to claim that those who take up a story-book for amusement or instruction, or both, shall get what they bargain for, and not a *réchauffé* of pious scandal instead.

A further objection to religious novels may be found in their inevitable tendency to degrade and vulgarise religion; and this is no light matter. In an age when every body is expected to be prepared with a view, at a moment's notice, on every conceivable subject, from the highest mysteries of Christianity to the merits of horseflesh, most people are of course obliged to get their views secondhand, from some favourite preacher, or writer, or select coterie which is invested with a provisional infallibility for the purpose. And it is a cheap way of getting one's theology "done" for one to take it, cut and dried, from the pages of a fashionable novel. Like the famous murderer who was asked on the morning of his execution how he felt, and replied, "Mr. So-and-so (naming a popular Calvinistic minister) tells me I am very comfortable," such readers can readily give as their own the last new version of faith and morality propounded by

their chosen oracle. But all this is the fruitful source of endless unreality in themselves, besides bringing religion itself into contempt with the indifferent or the profane. What Lantern Yard was to poor Silas Marner, their pet novelist is to them, and if perchance, like his, their idol be rudely broken, more than itself may fall. They too may be tempted to doubt whether "there's dealings," when they perceive how little those dealings are conformed to the coarse and materialistic standard which had been proposed for their belief. A shallow sciolism on any subject is a positive injury to the mind, and the sacredness of the subject makes the mischief tenfold worse.

The upshot of what has been urged may be stated in a few words. If candour, kindness, justice, and delicate sense of honour be virtues; if to be scrupulously honest in our judgments about others, and scrupulously real in our profession about ourselves, be a duty; if plausibility is no substitute for depth, nor a supercilious intolerance the measure of orthodox belief,—then the study of religious novels is unlikely to make us wiser or better men.

H. A.

EDMUND CAMPION.—No. IV.

THE unchequered life of Campion at Brünn and Prague has been chronicled with greater minuteness by his Bohemian brethren than his short agony in England by his own countrymen. The historians of the Society in Bohemia reckon the one great glory of the novitiate of Prague and Brünn to have been the preparation of Edmund Campion for his martyrdom. They tell us, that before he left Brünn he was warned of the death he was to die. This fact, unmentioned by his English biographers, is partly confirmed by his own letters, which show that he went to England fully impressed with the certainty of his fate. This presentiment was unreasonable, if Campion only considered what had taken place in England, where, among the bishops and priests and laymen who had died in prison or beneath the gallows, not more than one or two had as yet suffered for religion alone. The murder of Dr. Storey was to satisfy an old grudge; Felton was hanged for pasting up Pius the Fifth's Bull on the Bishop of London's gates; Thomas Woodhouse, hanged in 1573, was so forward in anathematising the Queen's supremacy that Burghley considered him mad, and only had him hanged to be rid of his importunity; Cuthbert Maine, Campion's pupil

at Douai, was murdered, ostensibly for being in possession of a document which the English judges chose to call a Bull, but really in order to enable them to convict in a *præmunire* certain gentlemen who had harboured him, and to enrich one of the Queen's cousins with the estates of Mr. Tregian. Nelson was hanged in 1578 for saying that the Queen was a heretic and schismatic—expressions which had a terrible meaning to princes with insecure titles in days when it was almost of faith that no schismatic or heretic had any civil rights at all, much less the right to rule over Catholics. The case of Sherwood was similar; and though these executions evinced a firm determination in the English government to treat as a traitor any one who used of the usurping head of the Anglican Church terms which implied that she had no right to the place she claimed, yet they could not have given solid grounds for anticipating the persecution which was to follow in the teeth of the repeated declarations of the government, that freedom of conscience in all purely spiritual matters was and ever would be respected. Schmidl, however, tells us that Campion's presentiment of martyrdom was grounded upon a vision he saw in the garden at Brünn, where the Blessed Virgin, in likeness as she is painted in the picture at Santa Maria Maggiore at Rome, attributed to St. Luke,—copies of which had been distributed by St. Francis Borgia to the various novitiates,—appeared to him in an old mulberry-tree, and exhibited to him a purple cloth, which he understood to be a sign that he was to shed his blood for religion.

Sept. 7, 1574, John Paul Campanus, the novice-master of Brünn, was appointed Rector of the House at Prague; after waiting a month to complete his year, he carried off with him Campion and two other novices, "in the coach of Chancellor Pernstein;" for these progresses of the humble fathers in the trappings of civil state are dwelt upon with a complacency which reminds one of the Jewish chronicles of the royal procession of Mordecai through the streets of Suza.

October 18, the studies were solemnly commenced at Prague. Campion was made Professor of Rhetoric, and opened the schools with a "glorious panegyric," which Schmidl, in 1747, was able to read at Prague. And now began a series of routine labours, which are rather tedious even to describe. He was loaded with offices; besides being Professor of Rhetoric, he was *matutinus excitator*, and *nocturnus visitator*, and worked in the kitchen for recreation. He went to bed half an hour before the other fathers; but he had to rise and ring for the nightly examination of con-

science, and after the lapse of a quarter of an hour to ring again for the lights to be put out. After another quarter of an hour, he looked into each cell to see that all were in bed, and all candles extinguished. In the morning he rose half an hour before the rest; he rang the bell to rouse them, and went to each cell to awaken the inmate and light his candle. After fifteen minutes he repeated his visits, to see that all were dressing; then he rang for prayers, and again for ending them. It was his place to see that all were decently covered in bed, and to report all habitual defaulters. After his prayers, meditation, mass, and private study, he went down to the class-room to teach rhetoric, and to form the minds of the rising aristocracy of Bohemia. His method was rigidly prescribed to him: the object of his lessons was to teach the use of language, and to cultivate the faculty of expression in prose and verse; the art of speaking, the style of writing, and the store of rhetorical materials and commonplaces were to be his care. In speaking and style, Cicero was to be almost the only model; for matter, his storehouses were to be history, the manners and customs of various nations, the Scriptures, and a moderate stock of illustrations from arts and sciences.

In class, he first made his scholars repeat a passage they had learned out of school-hours; then the monitors collected the written exercises, which he looked over and corrected. While he was thus occupied, the boys were trying to imitate a passage of a poet or an orator which he had set them, or to write a brief account of a garden, a church, a storm, or any other visible object; to vary a sentence in all possible ways; to translate it from one language into another; to write Greek or Latin verses; to convert verses from one metre into another; to write epigrams, inscriptions, epitaphs; to collect phrases from good authors; to apply the figures of rhetoric to a given subject; or to collect all the topics or commonplaces that are applicable to it. After this came a summary of the former day's lesson, and then the lecture of the day, on one of Cicero's speeches, was read, and the boys were examined upon it. The composition of the lecture was to be on a given pattern. First, he was to explain his text, and to qualify the various interpretations of it. Next, he was to elucidate the writer's art, and to display his tricks of composition, invention, disposition, and style; the reasons of his dignity, his persuasiveness, or his power, and the rules of verisimilitude and illustration which he follows. Thirdly, the professor had to produce parallel or illustrative passages from other authors. Fourthly, he was to confirm the author's facts or sentiments

by other testimony, or by the saws of the wise. Fifthly, he was to illustrate the passage in any other way he could think of. Each lecture did not necessarily include all these points; but such was the range and the order prescribed for the points that were adopted.

After two hours thus spent in school, the scholars retired to play, and the professor to the kitchen to wash the dishes. Then came his dinner, followed by his hour of recreation—that innocent hour of guileless wit and harmless fun, which always leaves so pleasing an impression on the remembrance of the visitor to any convent who has been privileged to witness the inner life of its inmates. After this, the professor spent two more hours with his class. First his scholars repeated the heads of the morning lecture; then he gave them a lesson on one of Cicero's rules of rhetoric. The rule was first explained; then the similar rules of other authors were discussed and compared; then the reason of the rule was investigated; next it was illustrated by passages from the best authors in prose or verse; then any passages or curious facts that served to illustrate it were adduced; and lastly, the professor explained how the rule was to be applied in the various circumstances of modern life and society. All this was to be done in the choicest language and most picked phrases, so that the master's example might profit, as well as his precepts.

According to the rule, the second afternoon-hour was occupied with Greek. Campion was not Greek Professor, not because he was unacquainted with the language, but perhaps because he knew less of it than the Ruthenians and other Eastern Europeans who were to be found in the college. The familiar way in which he quotes it in his letters, and the easy fluency of his Greek calligraphy, are sufficient evidence of his scholarship. It was, perhaps, fortunate that in this language no one had obtained a Ciceronian monopoly. Demosthenes, Thucydides, Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Nazianzen, Basil, and Chrysostom occupied the throne in common.

On holidays, the exercises were more exciting: they were either historical lectures, disputes on questions of scholarship, or brief dramatic scenes. Every Saturday there was a repetition of the week's lectures. The chief aim was to give facility of speech and eloquence of style. All great days were celebrated with epigrams, inscriptions, or copies of verses; every month an oration was pronounced, and a play acted, in the chapel and hall. The boys' minds were always on the alert; and the life and soul of the whole method was the Professor of Rhetoric, who was at once the rule, the model,

and the moderator of the exercises, and who had to keep the hall, the refectory, and the chapel alive with daily, weekly, and monthly exhibitions of his pupils.

I suppose that the three great levers of the Jesuit education were, excitement of interest, concentration of attention, and application of principles to present controversies. They saw that they had to do battle for the intellectual and moral supremacy of the world with the new spirit of inquiry, which had its roots in the religious innovations of Luther and Calvin, the assertion of political liberties, the literary enthusiasm of the Humanists, and the scientific school, which culminated in Bacon. The science and boldness of the leaders in this fight extorted the admiration of their most determined opponents. "Behold also the Jesuits," writes Sir Edwin Sandys in 1599, after a tour through Europe, "the great clerks, politicians, and orators of the world, who vaunt that the Church is the soul of the world, the clergy of the Church, and they of the clergy; do stoop also to this burden (of education), and require it to be charged wholly upon their necks and shoulders. In all places wherever they can plant their nests, they open free schools for all studies of humanity. To these flock the best wits and principal men's sons in so great abundance, that wherever they settle other colleges become desolate, or frequented only by the baser sort, and of heavier metal; and in truth, such is their diligence and dexterity in instructing, that even the Protestants in some places send their sons unto their schools, upon desire to have them prove excellent in those arts they teach." But this, he continues, is only a bait; their real object is "to plant in their scholars with great exactness and skill the roots of their religion, and nourish them with an extreme hatred and detestation of the adverse party." "Presuming, perhaps, of the truth beforehand, and labouring for no other thing than the advancing of their party, they endeavour by all means to imbreed such fierceness and obstinacy in their scholars as to make them hot prosecutors of their own opinions, impatient and intractable of any contrary considerations, as having their eyes fixed upon nothing save only victory in arguing. For which cause, to strengthen in them those passions by exercise, I have seen them in their bare grammatical disputations inflame their scholars with such earnestness and fierceness, as to seem to be at the point of flying each in the other's faces, to the amazement of those strangers which had never seen the like before, but to their own great content and glory, as it appeared."*

* To this graphic account of Edwin Sandys I may add the testimonial of the greatest English philosopher to the worth of the education of the Jesuits:

It was Campion's business to excite and direct this literary enthusiasm. For the first he was well fitted by his own sanguine and disputatious temperament, and for the second by his extensive knowledge, his exquisite taste, and his rare oratorical power. A portion of his rhetorical course has been preserved, and from it I will collect a few of his remarks. The two first parts of rhetoric, he says, the invention of arguments, and their arrangements, may be learned from any good writer—indeed the more authorities we have the better; but for style we must follow one man only. It must be learned by imitation, for it does not come by nature; but we cannot imitate all good writers at once. He is nowhere who is every where; if you chase two hares at once, you catch neither. Cicero, then, is not to be our chief, but our only model; not that we are to copy him unreasonably, like some would-be Ciceronians who mimic him like monkeys, but do not take after him like children—who quote whole pages, and lug in his words where they are least wanted; the proper way is, if we like his sentiment, to clothe it in our own words; if we like his words, to use them naturally, not as if the words were every thing and the meaning nothing, and as if all we had to say could only be expressed in a certain circle of pretty and plausible phrases. On the contrary, we should first think about the thing, then about the words. Beginners may write letters in direct imitation of one of Cicero's, or a speech like one of his; to continue the practice betrays either poverty of invention, or slavish imitation. It is foolish also to suppose that we may use no words but those authorised by Cicero, as if he had written on every conceivable subject, or as if we had all that he had written. Even now every fresh fragment of his that we discover adds to the list of his words. We must not copy his works, but himself; we must try to enter into his taste, to hear with his ear, and to speak as he spoke. It is

“The noblest part of the ancient discipline has been restored in the Jesuit colleges. When I consider their industry and skill both in cultivating learning and in forming character, I cannot help saying, ‘*Talis cum sis, utinam noster esses.*’ Partly by their own predilection, partly in consequence of the emulation of their foes, they devote their energies to literature; and as for education, the shortest advice I can give is, Copy their schools; nothing better has yet been brought into use.” The testimony of Selden, one of the greatest scholars and statesmen of his day, is equally flattering to the results of their education: “The Jesuits, and the lawyers of France, and the Low-Country men, have engrossed all learning. The rest of the world make nothing but homilies.” Bacon selects for his chief praise the dramatic exercises of the pupils: “There is a thing which, done for a livelihood, is infamous, done to discipline the mind, is capital; I mean the drama. It strengthens the memory; it tempers the tone of voice, and the clearness of pronunciation; it gives grace to the countenance, and to the action of the limbs; it gives no small confidence, and it accustoms boys to the eyes of men.”

absurd to reject all words that have not his authority. If he uses *perpassio* and not *passio*, and *resipiscentia* instead of *pœnitentia*, we need not innovate on our theological terms, nor need we restore the words *sacrament* and *testament* to their classical meanings. Campion's Ciceronian propensities were under the sway of common sense.

Among the other employments of Campion were those of the president and legislator of the "Confraternity of the Immaculate Conception," which he founded in January 1575. These confraternities, which were established in every college of the Jesuits, served many purposes. They were the means of introducing a more thorough conformity to Roman customs: thus at Prague, one of Campion's rules was that every member of his society should forego the Bohemian liberty of communicating in both kinds. They also gave the opportunity of a more thorough supervision of the best scholars, to whom it was a special honour and privilege to be admitted into these select associations. Campion's foundation flourished wonderfully, and afterwards branched into three great sodalities. Its name, however, was changed when it was incorporated into the Archconfraternity of the Salutation at the Roman College.

Besides these various duties, Campion had to compose a Latin oration or a play for almost every important occasion. It may be supposed that with this he was *literarum parcissimus*, most stingy in his correspondence; but what letters he wrote he composed with some care, as is proved by the foul copies of several that are preserved amongst the Stonyhurst Manuscripts. "In these most godly and Christian exercises," says Parsons, "he passed his time, doing good to as many as he could, and omitting no occasion or labour to increase his merit for life everlasting. He preached publicly, made exhortations in private, read in the schools, taught the Christian doctrine unto children, heard confessions, visited prisons and hospitals of sick men, and at the death of sundry great persons made such excellent funeral orations as astonished the hearers." "Whatever had to be done," says Balbinus, "was laid upon him. His companions thought it a miracle that one man could bear so many loads; but whenever a new task was laid upon him, he used to go to the superior, and ask whether he really thought him strong enough to bear it. If the answer was affirmative, Campion made no delay or excuses, but immediately did what he was told, because, even when the question was about his own physical strength, he had more confidence in the rector's judgment than in his own." And his labours did him no harm; he was never better in health. "Why

should I not be well, dearest Parsons?" he wrote; "I have no time to be ill." "The greatest and only difficulty that the fathers at Prague had with him for a time," says the same friend, "was to appease his conscience about the scruple of the Protestant diaconate, the memory of which profane degree and schismatical order tormented him every time he thought of it, and bred an affliction which could not be cured by telling him (what he also knew right well himself) that it was no order, degree, nor character at all, seeing that the man who laid his hands upon him was no true bishop, and consequently had no authority to give any such order more than a mere layman, but acted only in apish imitation of the Catholic Church, for a show to the people as though they had holy orders among them. But indeed themselves do not so esteem thereof that any character was given, as in Catholic ordination, by imposition of hands; for amongst them a man may be a priest or minister for a time, and then a soldier or craftsman again; whilst the Puritans flatly deny all spiritual authority of bishops. Therefore, though the sin was great for a Catholic man, especially such as Campion then was, to receive any ordination at the hands of any such heretical, schismatical, or excommunicate persons, yet he must believe that this sin was now fully forgiven, so that he should trouble himself no more with the memory of it, but put it wholly out of his mind, and proceed cheerfully in God's service." These arguments would cheer him for a time, yet ever and anon the "mark of the English beast" would sadden him again; nor was he wholly cured till the absolute command of the General came from Rome to trouble himself no more about the scruple, and until he was made both deacon and priest by the Archbishop of Prague, for by receiving this true character the imaginary one was blotted out from his memory.

After this general summary of Campion's life at Prague, I will give a chronicle of his chief actions there. In October 1574, he opened the School of Rhetoric; in January 1575, he founded the Confraternity of our Lady; in 1575 and 1576, he heard of several of his old Oxford friends entering the Society at Rome—Robert Parsons of Balliol, William Weston of All Souls', Lane of Corpus Christi, Henry Garnet and Giles Wallop of New College, and Thomas Stephens. "Of all these our being in Rome," says Parsons, "and entering together into the Society, when I written to good Father Campion, he wrote to me again of his wonderful joy, and hope that God would one day use mercy towards our country, and restore the Catholic faith again, as also vouchsafe to serve Himself of some of our labours to that happy end, seeing He had so wonder-

fully drawn so many together in one purpose and place for His holy service. And withal he insinuated again his own desire to be employed that way when God pleased; though in the mean time he were contented where he was; and not unprofitable altogether for England, for that now and then there passed that way, by reason of the Emperor's court, certain English gentlemen, who, finding him there, were content to deal with him in matters of religion, and departed commonly far better instructed and persuaded than when they came thither."

In 1576 Campion was transferred to the Convictor's College, where he added the duties of *Præfectus morum* and *Præfectus cubiculi* to his former functions. At the opening of the autumn scholastic term he made a panegyric of St. Wenceslaus, the patron of Bohemia, whose feast it was. The oration, which was much admired, may be found among his opuscula. This year also brought him into contact with the celebrated Sir Philip Sidney, who had been sent by Elizabeth to Prague to congratulate the new Emperor Rudolph on his accession. Sir Philip, who was only one-and-twenty, had been in Venice during the year 1574, and his familiarity with Catholics there, especially with his cousin Shelly, the English prior of Malta, had excited the misgivings of his friends to such an extent that his tutor, Hubert Languet, then agent for the Duke of Saxony at the imperial court, wrote to warn him about it,—“I see that your friends have begun to suspect you on the score of religion, because at Venice you were so intimate with those who profess a different creed from your own. I will write to Master Walsingham on the subject, and if he has entertained such a thought about you, I will do what I can to remove it; and I hope that my letter will have sufficient weight with him not only to make him believe what I shall say of you, but also endeavour to convince others of the same. Meanwhile, I advise you to make acquaintance where you now are (Vienna) with the French ministers, who are learned and sensible men; invite them to visit you, and hear their sermons, and do the same at Heidelberg and Strasburg.” This was written from Prague, March 10, 1575. At that time Maximilian, who was very lukewarm in his Catholicism, was hesitating whether to grant the Bohemians the religious liberties they required. As long as he demurred, his subjects were earnest in the cause; but when they triumphed, in September, they thought they had gained enough, and the new Emperor Rudolph found them easily contented. “The Bohemians,” Sidney wrote to Walsingham from Heidelberg, on his way to Prague,

March 22, 1576, "which were earnest in Maximilian's time to have churches of the true religion granted them, do now grow cold, only being content to have the freedom in their houses." When Sidney reached Prague, he wished much to see Campion, whom he had known at Oxford, and whom his father had protected in Ireland. Their meeting, says Parsons, was difficult, for Sir Philip was afraid of so many spies set and sent about him by the English Council; but he managed to have divers large and secret conferences with his old friend. After much argument, he professed himself convinced, but said that it was necessary for him to hold on the course which he had hitherto followed; yet he promised never to hurt or injure any Catholic, which for the most part he performed; and for Father Campion himself he assured him that where-insoever he could stand him in stead, he should find him a trusty friend, which he performed not, for afterwards, Campion being condemned to death, and the other in most high favour, when he might have done him favour he denied to do it, for fear not to offend. Politically, Sidney always took the side contrary to what were then supposed to be Catholic interests. He hated the Spaniards, whom he considered "born slaves," and took a very strong national line in preventing Elizabeth's marriage with the Duke of Anjou in 1581; he was even on the Parliamentary Committee of that year for framing the penal laws against Catholics. One thing, however, is clear, that after his embassy to Prague, in spite of his marriage with Walsingham's daughter, he made no advance in his public career for several years, and held no trust or office except the nominal one of royal cupbearer. According to a letter of Father Thomas Fitzherbert, of Feb. 1, 1628, Sidney had the courage to confess in England that one of the most memorable things he had witnessed abroad was a sermon by Campion, at which he had assisted with the Emperor in Prague. Probably the reports sent home by the spies caused him to be looked upon as wavering in religion. He ever afterwards had a strong party in the Council against him. Campion's own account of his conversations with Sidney will be found farther on, at the end of a letter to Bavand. On Sidney's part, one curious memorial of their meeting may be discovered by a critical eye in the ambassador's official letter to Walsingham from Prague. After describing his reception by the Emperor, he says, "the rest of the days that I lay there, I informed myself as well as I could of such particularities as I received in my instructions." He promises a *viva voce* report upon most of the questions, and only sets down the following brief character of Rudolph, which is evidently

from the hand of the author of the History of Ireland. "The Emperor is wholly by his inclination given to the wars, few of words, sullen of disposition, very secret and resolute, nothing the manners his father had in winning men in his behaviour, but yet constant in keeping them; and such a one as, though he promise not much outwardly, but, as the Latins say, *aliquid in recessu*." I cannot find much further trace of Campion's influence. Sidney complains that the Emperor and his brother Ernest are "extremely spaniolated," and that the former is most governed by a professed supporter of the Spanish "inquisitor's government;" and on his way from Prague he persuaded the Elector of the Rhine at Heidelberg to tolerate the Calvinists, and not to force them to become Lutherans. But his letters to Languet from Venice show that his alienation from Rome was not dogmatical, but political, founded on national hatred of Spaniard and Italian, and fear of the overwhelming power of Philip II. His religious allusions and banter savour of Catholic, not of Protestant, sentiment; he refers to Saints, Sacraments, and Purgatory, not like a man who hates them and spurns them, but like one who believes in them, yet without trembling. The habit of mind most affected by him was "that seemly play of humour," which would not let "our own More" lose his jest even in the hour of death.

The next year, 1577, Campion wrote a tragedy on the subject of King Saul, which was exhibited at the expense of the town, with great magnificence, during Prague fair, in honour of Elizabeth, the widow of Charles IX. of France, who had then returned to her family at Prague. The play lasted six hours, and was repeated the next day, by command of the Emperor.

Several letters written by Campion this year have been preserved; one, written to the novices at Brunn, I inserted in the last chapter; another, to Gregory Martin, is published among his opuscula; and the rough copies of six more, in Campion's own hand, are preserved in the archives at Stonyhurst. I subjoin translations of all of them; for the man is best known by his familiar correspondence. The two first relate to the manuscripts of his History of Ireland; his library had been left in England, and Gregory Martin wrote to him Feb. 8, 1575, about the books "which Holland had in custody being transferred by Stock to the library of Cox, his sister's husband, in Gloucester," where they were afterwards burnt.

Edmund Campion to Francis Coster, at Cologne.

"I was troubled about a parcel of manuscripts which is due to me from France, when F. Anthony Possevin, who passed through this

place on his way from Rome into Sweden, told me that it was possible that you, as having the charge of the next province, could lend me your aid in the business. I was glad to hear the name of Coster, whose friendship I had cultivated at Douai; and I confidently undertook to ask you for any favour, as your former scholar and spiritual child. Gregory Martin, who is living with Allen at Rheims, writes to me that he wishes to send me a volume which I had intrusted to him, but he has no one to give it to, and does not know how so large a packet can be sent so long a distance. I have ventured to ask you, relying on our old acquaintance, and on the relationship in Christ which we have contracted in the Society, to do what you can for me in this matter, as I am far away, and know nothing about either places or persons. If Martin manages to convey the book to you, do you, my father, manage to have it sent to me at Prague, not by the shortest, but by the safest way. I will say no more, for I am sure that you will do whatever you conveniently can. In anticipation, I profess myself much in your debt; for the book is a production of mine, not wholesome because prematurely born; and if I am to lose it, I would rather it were altogether destroyed than fall into other hands. So I am trying to get it to you soon, and then it may creep to me as slowly as you please. Farewell.

Prague, January 1577."

Edmund Campion to Francis Coster, Provincial of the Rhine.

"Although, Reverend Father, I fully expected the assistance which you promised me in your kind letter,—for I knew by what spirit you were led,—yet it was in truth great pleasure to me to renew the taste of your goodness and charity from their impressions in your writing. I am bound to you, not now for the first time, but by old kindnesses, which I never forget, for they are eternal. This kind office of yours gives me a double pleasure, both because you are going to do something for me, and because you love me so well as to do it willingly. And see what impudence your kindness has inspired into me. I enclose you a letter for Martin; if you can send to him into France I hope that he will do his part. I beg of you also, as Martin tells me that he knows no way of conveying the papers to me, that if you know any trusty person to employ, you will take the whole business upon your own shoulders, and manage to have them sent from Rheims to Cologne, and from Cologne to Prague. But if this cannot be done, let me know, and I will try some other plan, and give you no further trouble. The place where I sojourn compels me not to be too modest in my requests. Farewell.

July 12, 1577."

The third letter is to Father Parsons; in the first part he enters heartily into the "conspiracy" to catch Gregory Martin and make him a Jesuit: the share that he took in this partially successful attempt will be seen from another letter further on; in the second part he congratulates Parsons and the

rest who had entered into the Society, and vaguely refers to some old Oxford events which Parsons had recalled to his mind, and at the same time professes his agreement with Parsons' "philosophical reflections" upon the state of England. These clearly were, that a good wind, or rather storm of persecution, was the best way to reduce England to the faith, when the instability of mind, mundane attachment, cowardice, and want of logic that had allowed Elizabeth's government to deprive England of its religion, would be the best guarantee for the success of a forcible reaction under such masters as Philip II. or the Duke of Alva.

Edmund Campion to Robert Parsons, at Rome, greeting.

"I have received your letter, my brother, teeming not only with discretion and weight, but also, what is the chief thing, with love and piety. I readily take your advice, and consent to do my duty, in which I confess I have been for some time rather lax, somewhat more lengthily and liberally than you ; but I had written in that time to Martin, and my letter, I suppose, is still in Flanders, where it must have arrived after his departure. Do let us conspire to deliver that good soul ; it is good fishing. I love him on many accounts ; I can say nothing ἐμφοτικώτερον, I love him ; I congratulate him with all my heart upon making the acquaintance of so many of you ; my part shall not be wanting. At the end of his last letter to me there was something that showed that this miserable and slippery world was not altogether to his taste—'I am in peril in the world ; let your prayers preserve me.' Let us pray God ; if he is needed, he will be granted to us. About myself I would only have you know that from the day I arrived here, I have been extremely well,—in a perpetual bloom of health, and that I was never at any age less upset by literary work than now, when I work hardest. We know the reason. But, indeed, I have no time to be sick, if any illness wanted to take me. So you may unhesitatingly contradict those reports.

About yourself and Lane, whom you must greet heartily from me, I feel proud and happy ; I can more reasonably rejoice in this than in the memory of my proctorship. You are seven : I congratulate you ; I wish you were seventy times seven. Considering the goodness of the cause, the number is small ; but considering the iniquity of the times it is not little, especially since you have all come within two years. If my memory is good, I remember all the names, and your somewhat tall person.

Your reflections on the tears of our orthodox countrymen are quite true ; wavering minds, mischievous attachments, cowardly tempers, illogical intellects. But these things will carry them into port when our Lord gives a good wind. I have used up my paper, so I will end. But I will give you a commission, since you have offered yourself to me. When I was at Rome, I owed every thing

to the Rev. Father Ursnar. Tell him I have not forgotten him, and greet him most heartily in my name. Farewell.

Prague, St. John Baptist's day (June 25), 1577."

In the fourth letter, to Robert Arden of Warwickshire, another father of the Society, he speaks of none of these violent measures, to which his gentle spirit was only excited by contact with the fiery temper of Parsons, but only of reducing England by prayers and tears.

Edmund Campion to Robert Arden, Priest S. J., greeting.

"Father Francis, our common and dear friend, has told me the gratifying intelligence contained in your letter from Lucerne of May 3d. He asked me to write to you in reply, and I am doing so; for it seemed to me an excellent opportunity of greeting a fellow-countryman and—nobler bond!—a brother in the Society. If you are the Arden I fancy, this is not our first acquaintance; for we were members of neighbouring colleges in Oxford, I of St. John's, you of Trinity. If you are not the man, you need no more be ashamed of being taken for him than of being yourself. But if you had been not only my familiar friend but mine own brother to boot, even then our relationship could not have been dearer, or firmer, or nearer than the union by which we are now united in Christ. For this at least we are indebted to those by whose heresy and persecution we have been driven forth and cast gently on a pleasant and blessed shore. [A sentence follows, illegible through most of the words having been destroyed by worms.] One thing remains; we must rejoice at our deliverance from the hands of the Egyptians, and we must strive to save them, and to catch them by the prayers and tears at which they laugh. We will do them this favour against their wills, and so return them the benefit that they have unwillingly done to us. But to return to you, my father, and to finish my letter. You must know that I have had no greater pleasure for many a day than the perusal of your letter, which gives us good hope of restoring and tilling that vineyard. If you go on so, you shall gather a most abundant harvest.

We here, by God's mercy, can only do penance and pray, dignified by the honour of the college, the numbers of our scholars, the favour of the people, and the gain of souls. That these things may become more abundant, help us by your prayers and sacrifices. Farewell.

Prague, the morrow of Our Lady *ad Nives* (i.e. Aug. 6), 1577."

The fifth letter, to John Bavand, his old tutor, contains some pleasant recollections of his youth, and his account of his dealings with Sir Philip Sidney.

Edmund Campion to John Bavand, his master, greeting.

"Thanks to our good Martin, who in his last letter to me enlarged upon your goodness and kindness to him, I am reminded, not by his

precept, but his example, not to shirk my duty, or to loosen any of those old links by which your undying care of both of us has bound us to you. I must own that, if I had thought frequent letter-writing the sum of fidelity and gratitude, I had been too neglectful of what my respect for you, and your fatherly care and provision for me, required. But there are other tokens of love and friendship beside letters, and my sentiments from my earliest childhood have been so well known to you that they can never be clouded over either by my epistolary neglect, or by our separation in place. I should be a mere knave, and unworthy of the liberal education which you gave me, if, while I have any memory at all, I forget you, instead of bearing witness, by all sorts of observance, to the care, the prudence, the sympathy, and the purity which you displayed in teaching and educating me. To these I must add the clear proofs of your favour and affection since bestowed upon me,—and they the more pleasant, because they so plainly manifested an uncommon benevolence. For though in my youth I was but an indifferent subject, yet, since I was intrusted to you and clung to your side, hung upon your looks and lived in your society, I do not much wonder that a good man like you, so diligent in your duties, took such care of me. But that in after years, you undertook to feed me and to polish me, as it was all from your free choice, so does it more redound to the credit of your virtue and kindness. And what is your last favour? When I was in Rome, did you not altogether spend yourself upon me? Did you not give me introductions, help, and money? And that to one who, as you knew, not only would never repay you, but who was on the point of leaving the world, and, so to speak, of death. One of the greatest works of mercy is to bury the dead, for they help those towards whom neither flesh, blood, nor goods, nor hope, nor favour, nor any thought of earthly convenience attracts them. You were munificent to me when I was going to enter the sepulchral rest of religion. Add one further kindness, my dear father; pray for me, that in this seclusion, far from the noise of all vanity, I may be buried really and meritoriously. For it was the Apostle's declaration, 'You are dead, and your life is hidden with Christ in God.' I remember how, on the eve of your leaving England, you bade me farewell with the words, 'I go to die.' For you had determined to let death overtake you any where rather than in Egypt. We must seek to die once for all, and happily, but we must seek it also daily and faithfully. But whither have I wandered?

Now listen to my news. The Emperor Rudolph, a prudent, brave, and good youth, and a sincere son of the Church, has fixed upon himself the eyes and the hearts of the Germans and Bohemians. If he lives, great things are expected of him. The Empress Dowager, Maximilian's widow, and sister of Philip of Spain, is living at Prague. A few months ago Philip Sidney came from England to Prague as ambassador, magnificently provided. He had much conversation with me,—I hope not in vain, for to all appearance he was most eager. I commend him to your sacrifices, for he asked

the prayers of all good men, and at the same time put into my hands some alms to be distributed to the poor for him, which I have done. Tell this to Dr. Nicholas Sanders, because if any one of the labourers sent into the vineyard from the Douai seminary has an opportunity of watering this plant, he may watch the occasion for helping a poor wavering soul. If this young man, so wonderfully beloved and admired by his countrymen, chances to be converted, he will astonish his noble father, the Deputy of Ireland, his uncles the Dudleys, and all the young courtiers, and Cecil himself. Let it be kept secret.

Do you want to know about Bohemia? *σύμμιζις καὶ κοινωμία τῶν αἰρεσέων*, a mixen and hotch-pot of heresies. But all the chief people are Catholics. The lower orders promiscuous. A pleasant and diversified harvest. For my part, I labour in it with more pleasure since an Englishman, Wicliffe, infected the people.

In conclusion, I must ask you to excuse me if I have been remiss in writing. Greet in my name Sanders, Cope, Stoneley, and the priests and fellows of your Hospice. Finally, be merry, and mind your health; love me, and write to me. Farewell. When you have opportunity, reverently kiss the hand of the Bishop of St. Asaph for me."

The next letter, to one of his Bohemian pupils, is a specimen of the affectionate terms on which he and his scholars stood.

Edmund Campion to Sebastian Pastler, at Passau, greeting.

"Your letter was grateful to me, because I saw by it how grateful you were. For if while you were here we hoped much of you from your rare advance in learning and piety, what must we think of you now you are gone for persevering so constantly in the course which you pursued here! I wish that my services to you had been worth as much as you value them at; any how, whatever they were worth, they were given with a real good-will, which I will take care to preserve, so as not to let a young man so good and so devoted to us slip from my memory. I read some paragraphs of your letter to the Confraternity at our meeting yesterday, and exhorted them to remember you; I have no doubt they will. This is written in the evening twilight, and the failing light forces me to finish. Farewell.

Prague, July 14, 1577."

The last letter belonging to this year is that written to Gregory Martin, to try and induce him to become a Jesuit; the adroitness which insinuates and implies without indicating, and which stirs up desires without too plainly showing how they may be gratified, is a model of subtle rhetoric. Martin was at this time in circumstances that facilitated his capture. His position with Allen was uncertain; the English seminary was on the point of being driven from Douai by

popular tumults, which Allen attributed to the intrigues of Elizabeth, and by which he partly justified his perpetual intrigues against her. The Cardinal of Guise had not yet offered him a retreat at Rheims, and Martin had been sent to Rome to see what could be obtained there. For at this time Allen probably thought with Sanders, who wrote to him a few months later (November 1577), "We shall have no steady comfort but from God, in the Pope, not in the King of Spain. Therefore I beseech you to take hold of the Pope, for the King is as fearful of war as a child of fire, and all his endeavour is to avoid all such occasions. The Pope will give two thousand [men] when you shall be content with them. If they do not serve to go to England, at the least they will serve to go into Ireland. The state of Christendom dependeth upon the stout assailing of England." Martin had gone to Rome in 1566, and had written to Campion in Feb. 1577,— "After the first letter which you wrote from Brunn, you received two of mine together, a long while after date. In answer you at once wrote most kindly, in every way corresponding to my hopes, except in your brevity. You called your letter only a precursor; this expression of yours authorised me to look for another and a longer letter, as I have done and still do. I am not at Douai, but at Rome." And then he proceeded (but the letter is lost) to describe the popular risings at Douai against the English. To these "accusations" Campion replied :

Edmund Campion to Gregory Martin.

"Such accusations as those wherewith you accuse me trouble me not ; for they coax you out of a letter full of endearing complaints, and let me see, to my joy, how lovingly you look for my reply. It may perhaps be stale to excuse myself on the plea of business, but I do, and ever will, steal time enough for the religious rites of our friendship, which is always in my heart. I lately sent a parcel to you at Douai ; in it there was a long letter to you ; and because you did not receive it, you wrangle with me about the postmen. But don't irritate me, though you are tall, and I short. The next sentence in your letter gives me sad news, which nips my jokes in the bud. Are there indeed such troubles in Flanders ? Has the peril reached to the English College ? How far ? Are they to be driven out ? Let them be driven any where but into their own country. What is it to us, to whom England is imprisonment, the rest of the world transportation ! Be of good cheer ; this storm will drive you into smooth water. Make the most of Rome. Do you see the dead corpse of that Imperial City ? What in this life can be glorious, if such wealth, such beauty, has come to nothing ? But what men have stood firm in these miserable changes,—what things ? The

relics of the Saints, and the chair of the Fisherman. O prudence ! Why is heaven neglected for worldly glory, when we see with our own eyes that even in this world the kings of this world could not preserve these monuments of their vanity, these trophies of their folly ! What will this smoke seem in the ether of heaven, when it so soon blows away in the atmosphere of earth ? How will angels laugh, when even men mock ? But *γλαυκὰς εἰς Ἀθήνας*, what is this to you ? For your whole letter breathes a noble spirit. Your story, your hopes, and your requests set me in a blaze at all points. Nor is this the first time ; all your letters show with what prudence, with what a Christian spirit you love me, when you so heartily congratulate me on the state of life which I have embraced, though it places so strong a barrier to our union. This is real friendship. I remember too how earnestly you called me from Ireland to Douai, how you admonished me, and how effective were your words. Before that, I remember how from the Duke of Norfolk's house you dealt with me to keep me from the ecclesiastical dignity, which, as a friend, you feared might betray me into serving these wretched times. In these words, as I consider, you were even prompted by the Holy Ghost,—‘ If we two can live together, we can live for nothing ; if this is too little, I have money ; but if this also fails, one thing remains, they that sow in tears shall reap in joy.’ What you foretold is fulfilled. I live in affluence, and yet I have nothing ; and I would not exchange the sorrows of my Institute for the realm of England. If our tears are worth all this, what are our consolations worth ? And they are quite numberless, and above all measure. So as you rejoice with me, you may always go on rejoicing, for what I have found is indeed most joyful. As for your praises, I pray you, my dear father, to commend my soul to God in your sacrifices, that it may become less unworthy of your praise. This is the sum—since for so many years we had in common our college, our meals, our studies, our opinions, our fortune, our degrees, our tutors, our friends, and our enemies, let us for the rest of our lives make a more close and binding union, that we may have the fruit of our friendship in heaven. There also I will, if I can, sit at your feet. Though I have many greetings for John Bavand, our old tutor, of whom it would be too long to write all I might and ought to say, yet, as I am writing to him, I will send him a very brief message. If he receives this letter, he will have three on his conscience (supposing the others have come to hand), and yet not a word from him. There was some reason, which, though I know it not, I fully admit and approve, in entire confidence of his kindness and friendship. Farewell.

Prague, from the College of the Society of Jesus, July 3, 1577.”

The next year Campion returned from the Convictors' College to that of the Society, and was ordained deacon and priest by Anthony, Archbishop of Prague, who told him on the occasion that “ as from one Englishman, Wicliffe, all the

evils of Bohemia had sprung, so God had provided another Englishman to heal those wounds." The new priest said his first Mass on the feast of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin, September 8. This year he also exhibited a drama, which was celebrated among his contemporaries, on St. Ambrose and the Emperor Theodosius. It was repeated by command of the empress and the French queen. In after times some German admirer of the author prefixed a title to it: "*Ambrosiana Tragædia, authore Beato Edmundo Campiano, Græco, Latino, Poeta, Oratore, Philosopho, Theologo, Virgine et Martyre.*" Epigrams were written, complimenting the author on his mellifluous mouth, and on the nectar and ambrosia which distilled from it. It is a pity that no trace of it can now be found among the Mss. at Prague. This year he was appointed Latin preacher, and in that office made an "admirable sermon" before the Archbishop during the feet-washing on Holy Thursday; August 14, he preached at the funeral of the Nuncio; he also wrote orations for his scholars to deliver; one of these, "*De laudibus B. Mariæ Virginis,*" is printed among his opuscula. Among his other productions of this year, Schmidl enumerates a Latin poem in honour of the Archbishop. This year, too, he obtained an evil reputation amongst Protestants as a proselyte-maker. A Protestant youth, Martin Schultes, of Frankfort, who had been sent to the college because of its superiority, had been converted by Campion. In the vacation the lad's parents became aware of the fact, and were furious; but he ran away from them, and returned to the college.

In October this year, having finished his course of rhetoric, Campion was made Professor of Philosophy; here he was bound down by the same minute rules. Philosophy was to be the vestibule of theology; Aristotle was to be the professor's great authority, in every point in which the philosopher was not contradicted by the schoolmen or the creed. The infidel commentators, like Averrhoes, were not to be used in such a way as to give the pupils a taste for them. St. Thomas was always to be mentioned with honour, and when not followed to be reverently and respectfully treated. Logic, physics, and metaphysics were each to occupy one year; the chief object was to be a right understanding of Aristotle's text, particularly of the trite passages. As in rhetoric, there were to be monthly and quarterly disputations in public, in which the scholars were to be made ashamed of all faults in formal arguing, to be taught to adhere rigidly to rules, and never to speak but in their turn.

Nothing is more notable in most of Campion's letters than

the entire want of any political allusions; religion and literature were the only spheres which he recognised, except with one passing exception, in a letter to Parsons. Parsons, however, observed no such reticence, but gave to Campion intelligence about Elizabeth's enemies, to know which, without discovering it, by the laws of those days, rendered a man a traitor.

"PAX CH.

Having read this letter, almost a month ago, from Mr. Marten, I deferred to send it until this time, to th'end I might accompany it with some news touching our English matters. You shall understand, therefore, that Sir Thos. Stewkly, who was made here Marquis before his departure, is now dead in Africa with the K. of Portugal; the particulars of his death I have not received. He took here away with him at midnight out of their beds all the Irishmen in Rome, and one English gentleman named Mr. Minors, nephew to Cardinal Pole, who had good entertainment here of the Pope before,—that is to say, xx crowns in gold a month. This Mynhurst, with one Sedgrave, an Irishman, which once had been of our company, Sir Thomas, being on the sea, upon what cause I know not, would have hanged them, and being prohibited to do it, by the earnest request of certain Italian captains that went with him, he deferred the work until he came to Portugal; and there arriving, condemned both of them to the galleys for term of life, and so led them slaves with him into Africa: but since his death they are delivered by the new King of Portugal, which is the Cardinal: and this much Minors hath written hither himself. And other provision that went with Sir Thomas, all is dispersed; and so this enterprise is come to nothing. Here, in Rome, the English seminary goeth forth well; for there be almost 40 persons under the government of iij of our Society. We are here at Rome now 24 Englishmen of the Society, whereof five hath entered within this month. One named Mr. Holt, which was once of Oriel College, Master of Arts, and the other four came hither from Paris; all excellent towardly youths, and all have ended the courses of philosophy: ij of them are your countrymen, born in Paternoster Row; one named Harwood and the other Smith, little Dr. Smith the physician's nephew. One Inglis, of good learning, is presently now herehence sent towards Japponia. I hope, e'er it be long, we shall [find] a vent another way. Father Darbishire is come hither from Paris, and it may be that I shall go, e'er it be long, in his place thither. Mr. Lane, as I wrote to you before, is gone to Alcalá in Spain, and arrived thither, hath wrote your commendations in a letter to me. And this is as much [as] I have to write to you at this time. Mr. Marten was called away herehence by Mr. Dr. Allen his letters. I think they were half afraid of him, what might become of him; but Mr. Horltus, entering of late, hath much amazed them. I pray you, good Mr. Campian, pray for me; for I

have great need of it. All our countrymen here doth commend themselves heartily to you.

Your servant in Christ,

ROB. PERSONS.

From Rome, this xxviii of November 1578."

As early as 1571, the English government had known of the design of this Stukely (who had been at the head of a rebellion in Ireland in 1569) to land in Ireland with a large Spanish force; and the enterprise described in Parsons's letter, though diverted for a time to Africa, was ultimately meant for Ireland. Castelnau, the French ambassador, was well informed when he wrote from London, July 4, 1578: "Stukely, who had given here so hot an alarm of a descent on Ireland, cannot do any thing this year, because he has gone with the King of Portugal into Africa. But people still think that when the king disbands his army Stukely will be able to have more men and more ships, if only the people favour his designs upon Ireland." Ships had been in commission to oppose him, and the queen intended to increase her navy for the next year. Any communication with such a man, any knowledge of his doings without detecting them, was sufficient to constitute treason. Campion was of much too sweet a temper to rebuke Parsons for intruding upon his notice things of which he wished to hold himself quite clear. Probably, too, he had then no idea of ever being sent on the English mission; otherwise he must have felt what Donne describes, when listening to compromising conversation—

"I felt myself
Becoming traitor, and methought I saw
One of our giant statutes ope his jaw
To suck me in for hearing him."

Of the year 1579, we have a letter of Campion to Gregory Martin, still on the subject of his books and the troubles of the seminary, and upon the martyrdom of Cuthbert Maine, November 29, 1577, which Campion seems to have heard of for the first time a year after the event.

Edmund Campion to Gregory Martin.

"Father Parsons has sent me your letter from Rome; I see the devil is furious with your seminary, and will not allow banished men a place of banishment. Well, he may burst with envy; but these blasts of his will never blow away the Spirit of Christ. Do you daily torture our envious foe with your good deeds. I am indeed angry sometimes when I remember what Allen—himself a little angry, I think—wrote in the beginning of Bristow's book, that so good a cause was dashed by men so evil, so ignorant, so few, and

so much at variance with each other. We all thank you much for your account of Cuthbert's [Maine] martyrdom; it gave many of us a real religious joy. Wretch that I am, how has that novice distanced me! May he be favourable to his old friend and tutor! I shall now boast of these titles more than ever. I have answered your two letters, the latter first. I have left something for the end, that you may know how much I have it at heart. I had written to F. Francis Coster, our provincial of the Rhenish province, asking him if you sent him those writings of mine about Irish history which you have, to find some way of sending them to Prague in perfect safety. He promised. So now I ask you to get them to Cologne; our people will manage the rest. Tell me or them what you can do,—what you would do I already know; write either to Father Coster, the Provincial of the Rhine, or to your namesake, who is Rector at Cologne; for he is called F. Martin. You shall be either Father Martin or Father Gregory, as you choose. Is there aught else? I had well-nigh forgotten. About the burning of the books I congratulate both of us, and thank Holland. I wish he had not spared Erasmus and the Scholiasts, whose prefaces, corrections, antidotes, and triflings have deformed the works of the fathers. I am truly glad that the bill has been honoured, and I acknowledge Sheldon's kindness, whose family we have reason to love. I remember them when I say Mass; to your sacrifices also I commend the patrons, companions, entertainers, and scholars that we have almost always had in common. You ask what I am doing: I have finished the *Organon* of Aristotle; now I go to the *Physics*. I shall soon confer the Bachelors' degrees, and after finishing this course the Masters' of Prague. Six days we quarrel with the philosophers, the seventh we are friends. I am foolishly supposed to be an accomplished Sophist. What does it signify? Salute my honoured friend Allen, and Bristow, and the whole seminary.

Prague, August 1579."

Two other letters, concerning Melchior Newhyre, a pupil and convert of his, show with what affectionate care he watched over the fortunes and progress of his scholars.

Edmund Campion to George Ware, at Olmutz, greeting.

"Melchior Newhyre, my pupil, an honest and well-instructed youth, and very dear to me, is migrating to you for the sake of his studies. There are many and weighty reasons why I wish his progress and fortune to be well cared for. Wherefore, I beseech you, let me lighten my anxiety by your friendship, and by the certainty that you will spend all your love for me in care, favour, help, and any thing else that the youth may require. Whatever kind office you do him, you may put to my account; and as I am already your debtor to an amount which I cannot repay, I have determined to increase the debt daily. Farewell.

Prague, January 22, 1579."

Edmund Campion to Melchior Newhyre, at Olmutz, greeting.

"I recognise in your letter the old polish and the old affection, and I return praise for the one and affection for the other. In giving me such abundant thanks, you kindly and dutifully preserve the memory of my love towards you; while in speaking so piously about the light of faith, which God's mercy called you out of darkness to behold, you faithfully and religiously offer to God the soul which you owe Him. So I sincerely hope that our divine Redeemer may reward your recollection of His favours by a daily increase of grace. You have me not only as a friend, whom you reckon far above his value, but also as a debtor, because you proceed in such a way as not only to increase but to honour the flock of my Master. For the rest, I earnestly exhort and beseech you to temper your good disposition with all liberal learning, to endure whatever comes upon you in this short span, till you can reap with honour and profit that which you now sow with labour and cost. Farewell.

Prague, May 6, 1579."

This year also he preached a celebrated funeral sermon at the burial of Mary Requesens, the wife of Antonio Cardona, Viceroy of Sardinia, published amongst his opuscula.

This was the last year of Campion's quiet life at Prague. In the autumn, Doctor Allen went to Rome to organise the English College, and to obtain the assistance of the Jesuits in the English mission; after mature deliberation, the chief points of which I will give in my next chapter, it was determined that two fathers, Parsons and Campion, should be sent. As soon as Allen had secured his object, he wrote to Campion in an exulting strain to announce the fact—

"My father, brother, son, Edmund Campion, for to you I must use every expression of the tenderest ties of love,—Since the General of your Order, who to you is Christ Himself, calls you from Prague to Rome, and thence to our own England; since your brethren after the flesh call upon you (for though you hear not their words, God has heard their prayers),—I, who am so closely connected with them, with you, and with our common country both in the world and in the Lord, must not be the only one to keep silence, when I should be first to desire you, to call you, to cry to you. Make all haste and come, my dearest Campion; you have done enough at Prague towards remedying the evils that our countrymen inflicted upon Bohemia. It will be dutiful, religious, and Christian in you to devote the rest of your life and some part of your extraordinary gifts to our beloved country, which has the greatest need of your labours in Christ. I do not stay to inquire what your own wish and inclination may be, since it is your happiness to live, not by your own will, but by others; and you would not shrink from the greatest perils or the furthest Indies if your superiors bade you go. Our harvest is already great in England: ordinary labourers are not enough; more practised men

are wanted, but chiefly you and others of your order. The General has yielded to all our prayers; the Pope, the true father of our country, has consented; and God, in whose hands are the issues, has at last granted that our own Campion, with his extraordinary gifts of wisdom and grace, should be restored to us. Prepare yourself then for a journey, for a work, for a trial. You will have an excellent colleague, and though they still live who sought the Child's life, yet for some time past a door has been open for you in the Lord. It is not I that am preparing for you and your order the place in England that your soul presaged, but it is you, I hope, who will procure for me and mine the power of returning. We will talk over the rest, my dear Edmund; and I hope you will be here as soon as may be, for I know not how long I can stay in Rome; and as soon as the winter is past I mean to go to Rheims or Douai, where our common friends Bristow and Martin now live. You will be astonished to see our Belgian and Roman Colleges, and will easily understand why we have at last such hopes of our country. In the mean time let us pray the Lord of the harvest to make us worthy of His mercy and visitation, and do you, by your prayers and sacrifices, wash away my sins before Jesus Christ. May He send you to us as soon as may be.

Entirely thine,

WILLIAM ALLEN.

Rome, the English College, 9th Dec. 1579."

Campion, though surprised at this intelligence, was on the whole glad; if there had been any fears—and he confesses to a lack of constitutional courage—he had conquered them. He wrote to Allen that he was ready to go when the order should arrive; the honour of the cause made him willing, but the command of his superiors made him anxious to go. At their bidding he was willing to fight to the death for his country. In March 1580, two letters from the General came to Prague, one to Campanus the rector, the other to Campion, who was to go to Rome as soon as might be. The rector immediately communicated the command to Campion, who heard it in silence, blushed, and said, "Indeed the fathers seem to suspect something about me. I hope their suspicions may be true. God's will be done, not mine." The suspicions to which Campion alluded had already found vent; the night before, a simple father, James Gall, a Silesian, reputed to have ecstasies, wrote over Campion's cell, "P. Edmundus Campianus, Martyr." The writer, when discovered, was punished for his infringement of discipline; but he declared that he felt obliged to do it. Another father had previously painted a garland of roses and lilies on the wall of Campion's room, just above where his head usually rested. When he left Prague, Campanus the rector changed habits with him,—a common mode in those days of leaving a keepsake with a friend.

Campion left Prague March 25, 1580; he went as far as Munich with Ferdinand, second son of Albert, Duke of Bavaria, lately dead. On the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas he was induced to give the students a specimen of his eloquence. He preached in their hall on the text, *vos estis sal terræ*, and explained the office of a Christian doctor; intending to describe St. Thomas, his hearers said that he described himself. The duke and his brother were so pleased, that they insisted on conveying the preacher to Innsbruck, from which place he set out on foot for Padua, where he was commanded to take horse; and so he arrived in Rome on Holy Saturday, April 5, 1580.

R. S.

Correspondence.

THE ROMAN QUESTION.

SIR,—The following correspondence has been placed in my hands, with permission to publish it; and I send it to you, not because I have any right to suppose that you will agree with the arguments used on either side, but because I believe you are anxious that the question of the temporal power should be discussed freely. If I am right in that belief, these letters will recommend themselves by the spirit in which they are written, no less than as being the authentic copies of what passed between a priest of Romagna and an ecclesiastic, whose name, if it were published, would give great authority to his opinions in this country. The problem defined in the first letter has presented itself to the consciences of thousands; it may be well that the solution actually given by an experienced master of religious direction should be made accessible to many.*

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

J. R.

* Our correspondent is right in thinking that the political arguments and authorities used in the second of the following letters have very little weight with us. We insert his communication for the sake of those with whom the spiritual knowledge and judgment of a venerable priest will have a real value; but we must express our entire disagreement with the views of politics on which his judgment is founded. In an absolute State *silent leges*; authority and obedience become mainly questions of force and of interest. But in an organised State authority does not proceed from the people, and does not lapse to the people until it is forfeited by the sovereign. The violation of obedience is only justified by the violation of authority, and revolution is legitimate only when it is caused by revolutionary conduct in the government, that is, only when it seeks the restoration of injured rights. In order to be just, it must have a definite occasion; where it appeals to abstract propositions it is a crime, and threatens the existence of society. The Italian movement is essentially

“ * * * April 26, 1861.

VERY REVEREND SIR,— It is really rash in me to put my thoughts about these subjects on paper, meagre as is my knowledge of theology and of law. But you have asked my opinion, and I have promised to give it; so I write to you as well as I can. With regard to the fact of the destruction of the Pope's temporal power, which power is a sublime and most ancient reality, it cannot be discussed as a simply theoretical question; treated only in that way, however brilliant and ingenious the argument might be, it will never fully convince one who, besides knowledge, wants a rule to sustain his conduct in the circumstances of the present developments, or restorations, or revolutions, or whatever they are called. The propositions defended by the *Conciliatore*, in the articles I have read, appear to me to elude the true, the chief, the important question, which is this, ‘Is it lawful, for the sake of securing national unity, to coöperate in anyway in the destruction of the temporal power of the Holy Father?’ It is an old desire of mine, which I scarcely hope to see accomplished, to see this question treated by a Catholic writer, not of the school of the *Civiltà Cattolica* or the *Armonia*, and yet in a manner different from that of the *Conciliatore* and the *Amico*:—‘In presence of the political events of the last two years in Italy, and of the acts of the Supreme Pontiff in regard to these same events, what is the rule, the practical conduct, that a Roman Catholic ought to follow?’

My general impression of the articles in the *Conciliatore* is, that it maintains that at least a relative incompatibility between the two powers must spring up in time, owing to the unchangeable character of the the Roman court. The Pope has several times answered revolutionary, for it seeks, not the redress of grievances, but the realisation of speculative ideas, and it has been ready at any moment to sacrifice the first cause to the latter—good government to national independence and unity. The papers of Lord Lyons, which were published last year, distinctly proved that there was nothing the Liberals desired less than reforms which might strengthen the government and weaken their opposition. Some years ago, when Lord John Russell said that he hoped that Austria would govern Italy with liberality and mildness, Manin expressed the deepest feelings of the Italians in a reply which was one of his latest productions. “We do not ask of Austria that she should be humane and liberal in Italy; we demand that she should depart. . . . The object we have before us, and which we all desire without exception, is this: complete independence of all Italian territory, union of all parts of Italy in a single political body. As to independence and union, we can make no concession, we can consent to no compromise.” This is the revolutionary principle as naked and undisguised as it ever exhibited itself in the Reign of Terror, and this is the principle on which the deliverance of Italy has been pursued. In Lombardy and in Tuscany there was no other argument. But Naples and Sicily were governed in such a way that a revolution there cannot be deplored. It was accomplished for no better ends than that of Tuscauy, but it was justified by very different reasons. In the Roman States the question of misgovernment is not the first to be considered. It is not for that that the temporal power has succumbed, but because great part of the Catholic world had ceased to believe that the advantages derived from it outweighed the perils in which it involved the Church. It is a question of conscience more than of politics, and for this reason we are glad to admit our correspondent's letters, in spite of the political opinions, which we do not share. [ED.]

this, arguing from the present condition of the age and of states, that the temporal power is an actual necessity as a guarantee of the spiritual. He says that it is more than ever necessary in these times, when religion nowhere remains a fundamental law of the State, when the separation between Church and State is accomplished;* and when the Church is only more or less confessed, as being the religion of the majority; not as being a truth admitted by the law, the temporal power is more than ever necessary in these times to secure the independence of the Pope for the common good in the exercise of his spiritual ministry. And the argument is founded on the principle, that the maximum of authority ought to possess the maximum of independence.

If people will only reply to this, that it is not a truth of the theological order,—not a dogma, but an opinion,—not a principle of faith, but a human theory that does not oblige us to assent,—I say, that this is not a categorical answer to the question. But if it is meant by this answer to imply that it is allowable to oppose the temporal dominion, and even to destroy it, and that for the good of the Church, as the *Conciliatore* openly professes, then it is clear that the argument is a mere sophism, that truth is trampled upon, and used for deception. The reasoning is as follows: ‘We are not bound to believe that the temporal power is necessary for the independence and free exercise of the spiritual; therefore, whoever says it ought to be abolished, can say so, and wish so, without committing a sin against *faith*.’

Still the question comes back to the fact of the civil kingdom possessed by the Pope: can this be taken from him without *injustice*? If people plead nationality, political utility, or the like, I answer, there is no utility, there is no imaginable greatness, that can be purchased with the sacrifice of justice; for justice is for the true interests of the Church, and of mankind, of nations as of individuals. It is eternal, unchangeable, and rigorous in exacting respect from all, be they individuals, peoples, or governments.

If the right of peoples is pleaded, it will still be necessary to concede that *historical* right is opposed.† If abstract right is pleaded, I answer that the abstract always becomes concrete, and when concrete cannot be violated. The right of the people cannot give it, nor a majority, with its demonstrations and its votes, even when free, which legalise nothing. If there is not right, neither a minority nor a majority can create it or give it. But I should like to hear the question of pure right discussed on the principles of a sound school.

A Catholic, educated or not, knows about the Councils, by means of their true Interpreter, that whoever takes part in the destruction of the civil power of the Pope incurs the censures which those coun-

* So far as they are separable; for no State can declare itself altogether atheistical. We must not take *distinction for separation*; yet these two notions are often confounded.

† I suppose that few will maintain Rousseau's doctrine of popular sovereignty.

cils have enacted. In this knowledge a Catholic is secure, and knows how to keep himself right. But I say that those morally and formally take part in the consummation of the deed, and in encouraging others to do so, who write or speak to that effect, although they take no active part in doing it. Then there would be much to say on the morality of the means adopted for the end. Then the direct or indirect attack upon the Catholic religion on the part of its more or less open foes. It is striking, and at the same time sad and suspicious, to see the care that the two liberal Catholic journals take not to mention the ecclesiastical censures, as if they were non-existent, and not pronounced by the Pope, or not worth speaking about. For my part, I know for certain, and I strive not to forget, that the Catholic religion is an historical fact, and that it is the right and duty of all mankind to maintain it, to preserve it, to defend it; that the power of excommunication belongs by divine right to the Church, and that the excommunicated person is banished from her pale; and in a doubtful case I had rather have a quiet conscience, and stand well with the Church, and be safe, than possess outside of her all possible human advantages, nationality, liberty, independence, and the like. Up to this time I have sought for light and instruction on this matter; but I have not found it; some had none to give me, others would give me none. If the liberal Catholic writers were endued with that pure love of truth which was evident, for example, in all the works, and in the whole life, of Rosmini, we should soon see daylight in their writings, and they would doubtless be masters of the situation. Once more I beg your pardon for this trouble; remember me, as I do you, in your prayers; and let us beseech Almighty God to put a speedy stop to the present scourge, so grievous and doleful in its excitement of men's minds and disturbance of their consciences.

Your most humble servant,

* * *."

" June 3, 1861.

MY VERY DEAR DOCTOR,—I thank you very sincerely for the letter you have written me, which, as was to be expected from a man of your religious feelings and truthful mind, incapable of being imposed upon by the sophisms or fettered by the clamour of journalists, bears witness to the hesitations of your intellect and your heart with regard to the truth and justice that lurk behind the controversies and the quarrels involving the weighty question of the temporal power of the Holy See. Still I cannot fairly conceal from you my wonder and my disappointment at finding your letter full of questions that require answers, instead of expressing your own opinion on these matters. You have, however, already seen how difficult it would be to furnish a triumphant solution of all your doubts, and you would justly put me down as a rash fool if I arrogated to myself such a power. Moreover, the matter of a volume cannot be compressed into a letter; yet, since the interchange of ideas on a given

subject may minister to the discovery of truth ; since the first step towards this holy consummation consists in separating the real point of the questions in dispute from all party spirit, and from all predetermined purposes and prejudices, except the pure search after truth, —in this case, I will not refuse to avow candidly what are my ideas on the subject ; indeed, I rejoice at the opportunity of helping one step forwards the discovery of the truth in a question of such vital interest for all Catholics, and specially for the Italians, by attempting no less arduous a task than to harmonise the independence of the Catholic Church with the independence and unity of the land on which its central authority is planted, and that in a manner conformable to truth and justice.

I think that you have put the question excellently when you ask, ‘ Is it lawful, for the sake of obtaining national unity, to co-operate in any way towards the destruction of the temporal power of the Holy Father ? ’

In this proposition there are several elements which must be considered apart before we combine them, and weigh their relative importance. The first element is the temporal power of the Pope ; the second, national unity in itself, apart from the destruction of the other ; the third, the lawfulness of destroying the one in order to obtain the other.

To begin with the first and most important question : What is the temporal power of the Holy Father ?

It is an elective royalty over a part of Italy, attached to the person of the head of the Catholic Church. The union of the two powers in one person is a fact, not a necessity. We can, then, easily conceive them separated, and vested in two different persons, without the slightest alteration or practical difficulty. Indeed, this is so true, that in the early ages of Christianity, even when Rome and Italy were already Christian, the two powers were actually distinct, and yet the Church was not deprived of any one of the means ordained by God to enable her to attain her end. That the Patrimony of St. Peter, as the temporal dominions are called, is entirely distinct from that which would constitute the ecclesiastical benefice or episcopal *mensa* of Rome seems to be clearly proved by the Abate Passaglia. In fact, the Pope, independently of his temporal power, would have his endowment as Bishop of Rome, and has always received taxes, or regalia, or Peter’s pence, as they were variously called, from the whole Catholic world, as head of the Universal Church. On the other hand, the Papal States gradually grew up, after the Church was already extended over most of Europe, by means of donations such as those of Pepin and Matilda, of voluntary self-dedication to the Papal Government, of military occupations for security against the incursions of Saracens, of alliances and treaties with other princes, &c.; in sum, by the same means as those by which other kingdoms exist, and under the same conditions of political existence. Hence, unless his government is a theocracy, the Pope rules over his subjects, by the grace of God, through the con-

sent of the people. On this element of popular consent, which is of vital importance to the question in hand, you should consult the two Jesuits, Cardinal Bellarmine and Father Suarez, and the commentaries of Balmés upon the Catholic view of the nature of government.

The prescriptive right which is invoked to eliminate the right originally derived from the people is a mere begging the question, for it is reducible to this—That the people, by continuing a given time under a government, of whatever origin,—even only of conquest, even though odious from the first, and only tolerated through want of power to throw it off,—has given in its adhesion to this government, even though only implicitly, indirectly, passively, or in some similar way. But this implicit submission only gives the right to govern so long as it survives in the great majority. If the people has a right to choose, it has also the right to modify or change laws or rulers, when induced thereto by the motives and in the manner specified by St. Thomas. To reason otherwise would be to suppose the people a mere herd in the fields that is sold or exchanged with the meadow on which it feeds, or, at most, serfs attached to the soil which they cultivate, and on which they live.

I think that what I have said shows the way at least to a proof (1) that the Papal States contain no element that makes them different from other States, except that single one of being governed by the person who is also head of the Catholic Church ; (2) that in consequence the Pope receives his right, like every other prince, from the general agreement of his subjects to be governed by him.

The second element of your thesis is the attainment of Italian unity. Considered in itself, this is neither a Utopia, as the enemies of Italy say, nor a crime against justice, as the clerical party says. The unity of France, of England, and of Spain were themselves also thought to be Utopias when each of those States was divided into different kingdoms ; but it has been in each case a reality for centuries, in spite of the diverse origin, the hostile municipal feelings not yet entirely overcome, and even the difference of language. But Italy, it is said, was always divided ;—how will it remain united now ? Ten years of peaceful union will suffice to show the incredulous how she will remain united, if they will only let her unite. Certainly since the fall of the Roman empire she has been broken up, pounded into a hundred fragments ; she has passed under every possible government ; and I believe that she was least broken up in the division imposed by the *Holy Alliance* of 1814, an alliance of kings, not of peoples, imposed by foreign bayonets, incapable of ever attaining prescriptive right, because the peoples always protested by revolution against that arrangement. Latterly Italy had seven lords, of whom only two were Italians, the Pope and the King of Sardinia, and the two together had not a third of the country ; moreover, they all reigned by grace of the two-headed eagle, which held the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom in its talons, and extended its wings from Savoy to Sicily. Was it Italy's fault that she was always divided ?

If she could have been united in former times, the temporal dominion of the Holy See would have been absorbed ages ago ; and it was precisely the Papacy which, by calling in one foreigner to defend it against the aggressions of another, gave Italy into the hands of the three great States which surround her, sometimes to be under the rule of one, sometimes to be partitioned amongst them all. But the beautiful land, 'which the Apennines divide, and the sea and the Alps surround,' was formed by God to be as much one as the faith she professes and the language which she speaks. And if the Italians can seize the opportunity of securing unity of government by ridding themselves of all the satellites of Austria, and by giving themselves to that one king who for so many years has withdrawn himself from German influence, and has displayed the banner of Italian independence, shall this be called a crime against the rights of princes ? It can only be maintained by the man who knows nothing of the rights of the people, who thinks that the people is the dynastic property of a few divinely-privileged persons.

Then, to turn to the question whether the unity of Italy can be wished for and aimed at, even when it cannot be obtained without displacing the temporal sovereignty of the Pope,—I say, that for my part I would most willingly, if I could, give the Pope the whole of Italy, if I thought that an elective ecclesiastical sovereignty could be harmonised with the necessities of the time. But since the Italians have chosen a king, and since the Pope's subjects will no longer live under an exceptional government, because all their aspirations are for unity ; since, on the other hand, the Church has been provided by her Divine Founder with all means necessary for her perpetual existence and mission, among which means we find no trace of this power, but, on the contrary, open renunciations of all power of the world and over the world as such, except the power of converting it,—I do not see why the temporal power of the Pope is not to be subordinated to the express wish of the great majority of Italians to unite themselves in one family.

Whilst I am endeavouring to reason *à priori* from principles universally admitted, all the arguments brought to defend the temporal dominion of the Church are *à posteriori*. People say, the Pope is bound by oath to preserve his States. If the question was about a benefice, the argument would stand ; all holders of benefices swear to preserve the property in which they have only a life interest ; but with respect to royal power such an oath would imply this : 'I swear to be king as long as I live, even though my subjects will not have me, and though they choose another ; and to do all in my power to preserve the crown, so as, if I am strong enough, to crush my people rather than yield.' A man cannot yield, you will say, what is not his. True. If the king reigns by the will of the people, the kingdom is the people's, who, in certain circumstances, may change its head. But the great argument brought forward in all the pastorals is the interests of the liberty and independence of the Church. To this objection Döllinger has lately replied ;

and I add another argument, familiar to both of us, which was given thirty years ago by Rosmini, in the sixth of his *Maxims of Perfection* : ‘No one is necessary to our Divine Redeemer for the glorification of His Church’ (still less for its preservation), ‘which consists in redemption from the slavery of sin, in which all men are equally involved ; and simply through His gratuitous mercy He takes from amongst the redeemed those whom He pleases to exalt to such honour’ (Pope and Bishops), ‘ordinarily making use of that which is weakest and most contemptible in the eyes of the world’ (as would be the Church deprived of its earthly sovereignty) ‘to perform the greatest works.’

And that Jesus Christ has assigned to Pope and Bishops far other means for the glorification of His Church than earthly sovereignty is clearly shown us in the first chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. ‘The Apostles then being assembled to witness the ascension of our Lord into heaven, asked Him, saying, Lord, wilt Thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?’ (The throne of David, which they, like others, believed was to be restored by the Messiah.) ‘But He said to them : It is not for you to know the times and moments which the Father has put into His own power ; but you shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost, who shall come upon you ; and you shall be witnesses of Me in Jerusalem, and in all Galilee, and in Samaria, and to the end of the earth.’ It seems clear to me that in these words our Lord admonished the Apostles not to think of a temporal kingdom, but to preach the Gospel, in which the glorification of the Church consists, by enlarging the number of the faithful by their witness.

A few words more upon the third element of your proposition, viz. how can it be lawful to destroy the temporal power of the Pope to obtain the unity of Italy? The reply seems to me easy. Every way is not lawful, as you say in your thesis. For example, the way in which Napoleon I. took possession of the Papal States, to make part of them French departments, and to unite the rest of them to a state which he called the kingdom of Italy, though it did not contain a third of the country, and that in spite of the subjects of the Pope, who at that period did not like the change. That was a mere act of conquest, disgraceful to the conqueror who used violence against an unarmed prince. But if, on the other hand, by the force of events, not through the fault of the Pope, those people, who in former ages were happy under a paternal government in comparison of those who groaned under the capricious tyranny of kings, are unhappy, perhaps unreasonably, at being under a government they no longer love, and that has not the means of keeping them in their allegiance ;—if these people, with their old complaints of compacts broken, and privileges annulled without compensation (especially in the Legations), through an unintelligent attempt to centralise the government at Rome without sufficient power, find themselves, in comparison with the other States of Italy, in a state even of degradation, through the annihilation of commerce, agriculture paralysed by

the mortmains, tedious, involved, and expensive processes of law, dependent moreover on privileges which may suspend or modify their action;—if they find themselves also cut off from all participation in the high administration of the State because it is intrusted to the clergy, and besides, envious of that which they think better in other states,—then it is a miracle if they preserve their fidelity to their prince, in obedience to a principle which, though so good and sublime in itself as the preservation of the independence of the Holy Church by means of the temporal sovereignty of its head, is too high for the intelligence of the multitude, and too holy for the common run of souls. I do not appeal to the Plebiscite to prove the will of the Pope's subjects to unite themselves with the rest of Italy, but to the German and French bayonets which have been so long more or less necessary to keep the subjects of the Pope in obedience to their sovereign.

This letter is already too long, and I find myself obliged to jump to the conclusion that if some ways are not lawful, yet, in that way which more or less explicitly represents the will of the nation, national unification may be attained even with the destruction of the separate governments of the several States. It is said that the principle of a popular vote is entirely new; let the man who thinks so turn to the account of the election of Saul, the first king of Israel.

I know not what impression the arguments hitherto discussed may make on your mind, but you will certainly own that, admitting these principles, all your observations about the rights of kings, which cannot be created or destroyed by majorities, lose all their force, and may, in fact, be turned against kings in favour of the rights of the people. In fact, rights and duties of government are complementary, and I sincerely confess my amazement and my inability to comprehend how the Church, whose mission is exclusively spiritual, and which for ages has recognised accomplished facts, and has made concordats with all kinds of governments, revolutionary and usurping, should now be asked by her ministers to meddle with the sphere of politics, with such trouble to consciences, and with such damage to purely religious interests. Pope and Bishops in France recognised and blessed the two Napoleons, Louis Philippe, and the Republic, all the time that the legitimate Bourbon was alive and claiming his crown; whereas, now in Italy the very same principle of change, appealed to for a much higher purpose, no longer for the mere change of dynasty, or form of government, but for Italian unity, is opposed with sword and excommunication. And since I have mentioned excommunication, I will wind up with a few words on this important matter, which justly presses upon your conscience. I should be no Catholic if I combated the Pope's power to excommunicate. But you know well that man, even in the highest dignity, is still man; and though he may be, through God's assistance, infallible in deciding on faith and morals, he is not secured from the possibility of error in the subjective application of his incontestable authority. Certainly this authority is such that any one censured by

it would commit a sin if he refused to submit himself on the plea of injustice ; otherwise every subject would be judge in his own case, and the authority would be illusive. But it is no less true that man, invested with a legitimate authority, may sometimes err, were it only intellectually, in the application of the penalty. So much for the principle ; but in practice it is extremely difficult and dangerous to set oneself up as judge of the convenience and prudence of the proximate use of this supreme authority. Still, before I finish, I will explain to you an opinion regarding the excommunication with which the Legations were threatened, to frighten them from the Plebiscite, which is the same as that fulminated by the Council of Trent against the usurpers of the goods of the Church. You can easily see that, as soon as a distinction is made between royal power and ecclesiastical benefices, or property applied to the maintenance of both branches of the clergy, this excommunication would only apply to the secularisers of the goods of convents and of benefices,—of whom there is, indeed, plenty,—but not to those who vote for the government ; because, the cause being wanting (and the temporal sovereignty was not even named by the Council), the effect ceases.

And here I will finish my too long letter, but not without a protest, that I, in common with all good men, detest and abjure all the evil deeds and ribald words which have disgraced these years of struggle. The world has always fought against the Church, and if God, who alone knows what is necessary for His own glory, through the Church of Jesus Christ, wills to seek greater glory through the greater moral dignity which the Church, stripped of all earthly encumbrances, and raised high above human passions, in the sublime nakedness of her heavenly Spouse, may obtain in compensation for the temporal greatness which she has lost, we, instead of sorrowing, ought to praise God, to rejoice, and to be silent.

If this letter displeases you, burn it.

Believe me ever, with the greatest consideration,

Your most affectionate servant,

P."

ECCLESIASTICAL DECISIONS.

SIR,—As there has been a great deal said lately about the disloyalty of distinguishing between those ecclesiastical decisions which we are bound to accept and those which we are not bound to accept, because in reality, whatever their form, they are not ecclesiastical decisions at all, it may help to clear men's ideas on the subject to print the following paragraphs from Zallinger, whose work was the text-book of canon-law while I was in Rome.

Isagoge, cap. vi. § 95. "Not only reverence and simple subjection are due to the constitutions of Popes, but also right interpretation, and an attention to their matter, and to the method and manner in which they treat it. For the Papal Constitutions are only authoritative in that sense and within those limits within which

they are confined by the intention of the Popes themselves. Peter Ballerinus, in his excellent work on the power and theory of the primacy of the Popes, truly says, 'Among no few persons the prejudice prevails, that all sayings or writings of Popes are to be considered as definitions of faith; nor do they consider that by this means, while they intend to be too favourable to the Popes, they do them the greatest injury, and give occasion of numerous objections to the adversaries of papal infallibility.' "

Ib. c. xv. § 10. "In order that the Pope be considered to utter a definition of faith, it is necessary, *first*, that the thing defined should be dealt with as one belonging to faith or the divine law; *secondly*, that something should be imposed upon our belief or obedience as belonging to faith or divine law, or on our reprobation as an error repugnant to faith or divine law. This command is usually thus expressed: that they who think differently are aliens from the Catholic or Roman faith; or that they are declared separated from the communion and unity of the Roman Church; or are anathematised; or that the propositions should be branded with the censure of a condemned heresy, or other equivalent censures."

These rules are clear, and may be adopted as safe guides in the present confusion, when feeling seems to have obscured law.

Your obedient servant,

B.

DR. WARD'S PHILOSOPHY.

SIR,—Will you allow me to offer some explanation of a portion of an Article of mine which you published in your last Number, and which, I understand, has been much misapprehended? The passages in question are two paragraphs of a review of Dr. Ward's Philosophy, pp. 78, 79.

If the former of these paragraphs is compared with the one preceding it, in which I give Dr. Ward's list of the temptations to which intellectual exercise exposes a man, and of the beneficial results which spring from the use of intellect, it will be seen that the paragraph which has been criticised is merely a completion of Dr. Ward's list. He first assaults the intellect, and then apologises for it. I first declare apology to be needless, and then point out certain omissions in his list of the temptations which intellectual men feel. I say that Dr. Ward ought to have told us that one of the chief difficulties which scandalise scientific men results from "the hatred, terror, and affected contempt which some believers feel for intellectual superiority, the suspicion with which they regard the free discussion of objections, and the galling regulations with which they would fetter the exercise of the mind." That scientific men do feel this objection, and that it is one which requires a proper explanation and defence, is, I suppose, a fact; and I surely may state the fact without being supposed to consider the objection unanswerable.

It is most unfair to consider me responsible for an objection which I only bring forward to show Dr. Ward how imperfectly he has treated the subject, and how entirely he has evaded the edge of the difficulty. Next, I say that Dr. Ward's claim for an indirect power of the Church peremptorily to interfere, whenever she sees reason, in all questions of metaphysics, geology, and astronomy, is not more likely to be submitted to by men of science than Bellarmine's claim for her indirect right of peremptory interference with civil governments has been dutifully accepted by politicians. Surely there is no harm in stating this most unquestionable fact. The indirect power of the Church to pronounce with regard to scientific propositions, concerning the exact truth of which she has no means of judging, has been for three centuries, and will be till sufficiently explained and guarded, a most serious temptation to men of intellect to disregard the voice of the Church. By stating this fact I do not create it, nor has any one a right to assume that I succumb to the temptation, which I only say that Dr. Ward has failed to notice.

Next, I glance at the defence which Dr. Ward sets up for this indirect power. His first argument is, that the decisions of the Roman Congregations upon the Copernican system,—which have had so deep an influence on scientific training, that, in consequence of them, even up to 1788, if not later, the University of Salamanca still taught the Ptolemaic system, “because Newton, Gassendi, and Descartes did not so well harmonise with revealed truth as Aristotle did,”* and which thus “for generations fettered or perverted the course of science in several parts of Europe,”—that these decisions never were such as to claim internal assent, only external obedience, that is, that they obliged professors either to teach the false Ptolemaic system, or if they taught the Copernican theory, to declare at the same time that it was a mere unfounded speculation, a mere hypothesis. No doubt this answer saves the infallibility of the Church; but does it conciliate men of science to the claims which Dr. Ward defends? As a matter of fact, I say that it does not.

Next, I say that Dr. Ward's second argument, namely, that all scientific truth must be tested by an external standard, does not apply because the external standard by which alleged laws of nature are to be tested is nature, and not the intuitions of theologians, or their opinions about nature gathered from tradition and the interpretation of Scripture.

Then I adduce a third difficulty which men of intellect have always felt. They feel aggrieved when they find themselves silenced

* Sempere, *Monarchie Espagnole*. vol. ii. p. 152. There is a well-known passage about this in Palgrave's *Merchant and Friar*, pp 304-308. He says, “Before 1818, though the heliocentric system was taught in all Catholic universities except Salamanca, it was always required of the professors, in deference to the decrees of the Church, to use the term *hypothesis* instead of *theory*,” and editions of Newton's *Principia* printed in Catholic countries often bore a protest that the propositions were only hypothetical, not proved “according to the decrees of the Church.”

on the plea that they scandalise the weak; whereas the ignorant persons who profess to be scandalised are allowed with impunity to blazon abroad the most ridiculous theories without rebuke. This was Galileo's complaint,* and I refer to an important passage of St. Augustine which I may as well quote at length here. "It often happens that a person, not Christian, has a certain and profound knowledge of the earth and heaven, and their movements; now it is most disgraceful and pernicious and intolerable that such a person should be exposed to hear a Christian dogmatising on what he pretends to be the Christian tradition on these subjects, while in reality he is talking such nonsense that his hearers cannot contain their laughter. Not that we lament the ridicule which the foolish fellow gets; but the misery is, that infidels will suppose our Scripture to contain these opinions, and will reject it as untrue. For when they hear a Christian misrepresenting natural truths, and asserting that he finds his opinions in his books, how will they be brought to believe in what those books teach about the resurrection of the dead, and the hope of eternal life, when they find them fallible in those subjects of which the infidels themselves have a scientific knowledge?" Dr. Ward shows that intellectual men are subject to sore trials; I remind him, after St. Augustine, that he has omitted the consideration of one of the sorest. Non-intellectual persons feel none of the intellectual temptations which Dr. Ward describes, whereas those rich in intellect will find it as difficult to enter heaven as those who are rich in lands and goods; yet Dr. Ward would organise his intellectual police entirely in favour of those who are in very little intellectual danger, utterly careless of multiplying tenfold the temptations and perils which already threaten the intellectual man. There is no equity here.

The paragraph on p. 79 so clearly only means that the ordinary duties of life are the high-roads to sanctity, that there is no other way of perfection for the great mass of Christians than the performance of the common duties of life with an eye to God,—it so clearly means this and this only, that I should not have referred to it unless I had heard that persons were shocked at it because it asserted that intellectual exercise is good *per se*, without reference to the object to which it is directed. I assert nothing of the kind; I merely draw attention to an inconsistency of Dr. Ward, who reckons intellectual power to be worthless as the sea-weed, except so far as it contributes to the advance of sanctity, though he had before owned that, without reference to devotion, intellectual exercise had procured "the greatest advantages to society." How can *advantages* be *worthless*? I did not know before that because a man reckoned good of an inferior order to be a real good in its own order, he was therefore to be considered a traitor to the highest good. I should have thought that to deny the goodness of every existing thing in its own

* See his Tract *Nova antiqua SS. Patrum et probatorum Theologorum Doctrina de Sacra Scriptura testimoniis in rebus mere naturalibus etc. temere non usurpandis*. Augustæ Treboe. 1636. p. 3.

order, is to deny the first principles of Christian philosophy, and to reject the Christian doctrine of creation. As I was criticising Dr. Ward's treatment of intellect, I was obliged to assume for the moment the person of a scientific man, but I do not necessarily occupy that position permanently. Still I will confess that between Dr. Ward and intellect my private sympathies are all on the side of the latter; for it seems to me that to accumulate difficulties in the way of a mind which naturally has difficulties enough to contend with is simply "to persecute him whom God hath smitten, and to add to the grief of his wounds." If intellect is in the miserable plight that Dr. Ward describes, surely it was quite as necessary to implore stupidity for charity's sake not to add the scandal of persecution to the inherent failings of intellect, as it was to chastise intellect for its own moral weakness. We often hear of the duty of intellect not to scandalise the unlearned; we seldom hear of the correlative duty of ignorance to abstain from scandalising intellect by denouncing natural truths, as if they were contradictions to the Word of God. Charity commands that no one should cast a stumbling-block in the way of the faith of the weak. But persons seem to forget that the really weak in faith are the learned, not the ignorant. Yet the ignorant have all the protection, the learned all the censure.

I am, sir, yours obediently,

THE REVIEWER OF DR. WARD'S PHILOSOPHY.

Literary Notices.

Egyptian Chronicles; with a Harmony of Sacred and Egyptian Chronology, and an Appendix on Babylonian and Assyrian Antiquities. By William Palmer, M.A. Two vols. (London: Longmans.) There are two poles in Mr. Palmer's mind, each of which has had its share in the production of these volumes. On one side is a poetical power of allegory not unworthy of Origen himself, and of the greatest masters of the art; on the other is an industrious ingenuity, that can patiently fit together the most complicated puzzle, or set itself to unravel the most hopeless tangle.

Mr. Palmer's power of allegory is well exemplified in his account of Egypt's place in the prophetic and typical history of the Church contained in the introduction to these volumes. Egypt, Mr. Palmer thinks, is a kind of apish imitation of the Church, its land an image of Paradise, its religion a perverted type of Christianity, and all its institutions a diabolical parody of those of Christian life. To show with what closeness he follows the parallel, we will quote his account of the dogmas of the Egyptians:

"In their theology they named first three deities which answer, in some sense, to the three Divine Persons in the doctrine of the

Trinity : an unoriginated father (*Phtha*), a son of that father (*Ra*), of whom the visible sun was a symbol, and a divine spirit (*Cneph*). Then, with a certain correspondence to the doctrine of the Incarnation, there was a deified humanity, from which all mankind was derived, which was slain by its enemy, and in which all the scattered members were to be collected together, and renewed through a son, —a son of the woman,—who was no other than the original humanity itself, and in whom it was to triumph eventually over its adversary. The mysteries of the death and *passion* of Osiris, and the lamentation of Isis, were celebrated annually in Egypt with images, ritual ceremonies, readings and singings, lights, processions, and a representative embalming and burial, much as the ceremonies of Holy Week are now celebrated by Christians. Isis, the deified woman, the ‘great mother,’ and the ‘queen of heaven,’ answered to her who obtains similar titles and worship in the Christian Church. Then there was a multitude of lesser deities—deified ancestors—to whom worship was paid, anticipating the Saints, and other spirits and powers, which may be compared to the Angels. All these had their peculiar names and associations, and their supposed spheres of influence and patronage. They had their images, too, like the images and sacred pictures of the Christians. Nor did the parallel stop here ; but a special influence or inhabitation of the image, and special preferences of particular images, were recognised, like what is heard of miraculous images and pictures now.”

Mr. Palmer goes on to show the fundamental discordance of all this external similarity with the realities of Christianity, and he turns that which to Mahometans and Jews has ever been the great argument against Christianity into a powerful argument in its favour. But we are not at present concerned with this ; we only wish to exhibit Mr. Palmer’s power of picking out and rearranging the details of an old superstition, so as to make it look exactly like what he says it is, a diabolical anticipation of Christianity ; a thought, by the way, that also struck M. Huc with regard to the Buddhism of Thibet.

Mr. Palmer’s details are all historical ; but his picture is one which no ancient Egyptian would recognise. All allegorists have in themselves one great source of error : the state of things which they wish to illustrate so predominates in their imagination that it colours all the materials with which they illustrate it ; their eye is so powerfully affected that it not only colours, but also dissolves and reconstructs the past periods of history which it would use for describing the present. Hence it is that history of the past, written with an eye to the present, is generally so untrustworthy. Of course the past will generally contain lessons applicable to the present, and the same causes always tend to produce the same effects ; but the temptation is too great for most men to confine themselves to the honest parallel ; they will enlarge here and diminish there, add here and suppress there, to make their comparisons more symmetrical, and to continue them further than truth would warrant. We can

scarcely recognise Mr. Palmer's account of the Egyptian religion ; his triad of Phtha, Ra, and Cneph is certainly to be found nowhere as a triad on the monuments, where the triads almost universally consist of a father, mother, and child, differently arranged in different places : indeed, the monuments point to a series of seven or eight gods as having been the original datum and ground-line of Egyptian mythology. Mr. Palmer looks back at this mythology through the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and the whole system dissolves, and takes a new and unhistorical form under his hands. So too does he look back upon the almost purely cosmogonical myth of Osiris and Isis through the telescope of the Incarnation, and under that powerful lens it rearranges itself, and gives itself a new colouring, a new signification, and a new form, under which it would probably never be recognised by an ancient Egyptian.

The second element of Mr. Palmer's book is a triumph of industrious ingenuity. By a thousand pages of the most refined calculations he seems to have demonstrated that the six different chronological schemes of the Egyptians, which have hitherto appeared hopelessly antagonistic to every historian, are in reality but one, and that when properly interpreted they agree marvellously in one chronological series of dynasties, which again harmonises excellently with one scheme of Biblical chronology. We cannot presume to offer any judgment on this part of Mr. Palmer's work ; but we may express an opinion that he has advanced some way in proving that the most ancient computations of time that we have, Hebrew and Egyptian, were more or less drawn from the same original source, and that the Egyptian learning of Moses was sanctioned by his inspired knowledge. This, of course, is a great step in settling chronological difficulties, and half a century ago would have appeared a final settlement of the controversy ; but in the continual flux of science a new set of difficulties has emerged with geological and ethnological science, and a scheme which maps out the stream of time since Menes, monuments of whose near successors are still found above the surface in Egypt, throws no light on the races of men whose art-relics lie buried fathoms below the foundations of the city of Menes, or of those whose stone hatchets and knives are found in the gravel-pits of Abbeville, or amongst the remains of extinct animals in the bone-caves of England and Germany. Neither does it explain the steps, or measure the period that was requisite for the single human family to branch out into such fixed and such distinct races, or to bend their primitive speech into such a variety of languages, almost all of which preserve in their layers the fossils of many a former tongue, and the traces of a gradual and long-continued transformation.

These considerations are enough to show us the need of patience, and the futility of expecting that all objections to historical religion will ever be answered at once. The difficulties of ten years ago may be solved to-day ; but in the mean time a new crop has grown up to occupy the patience of the apologists of the future. Enough

is done to show us how hasty men were ten years ago in declaring the then ruling objections to religion unanswerable, and to give us just ground for declaring that the men of to-day would be equally hasty and unreasonable if they gave way to a premature despair, lost patience, and declared their cause defeated. It is in the nature of things that objections should always be in advance of replies. In a controversy that is destined to last while the world lasts, we cannot expect the steps to be rapid ; a lifetime may witness the advance of one or two steps, but it would be unreasonable to ask for more, or to fear that the steps never will be taken because they are not made now.

Notice sur la Collection des Documents relatifs à la Définition du Dogme de l'Immaculée Conception de la Très-sainte Vierge qui sont conservés dans la Cathédrale de Notre-Dame du Puy. (Le Puy : Marchesson, 1860.) The Bishop of Puy, whose personal devotion has communicated itself to such multitudes, that he has been enabled to erect in his episcopal city a gigantic monument of bronze to commemorate the definition of the Immaculate Conception, has been inspired by that success to prepare to erect another monument of no less importance, and of a more spiritual kind. It is to comprise two things ; first a complete collection of all the documents in any way connected with the origin, progress, and end of the movement, and secondly, a history founded on these documents. It is for the purpose of communicating to Catholics all over the world a knowledge of this design, and of showing the opportuneness of the occasion, and the co-operation which the work requires, that the present Notice is written. It tells us what is already done, and what still remains to do. The Bishop has collected all the documents which regard the remote preparations for the definition,—the petitions of Bishops to Gregory XVI. for the addition of the title “immaculate” in the litanies, the encyclical of Pius IX. from Gaeta in 1849, and the episcopal replies,—together with the various treatises that appeared on the definability (if we may use the word) of the dogma, and on the fitting time for its definition. Then he has the documents regarding the “proximate preparation” and the definition itself, containing the *procès verbal* of the various sessions of congregations, and of the solemn act of definition in December 1854. Then he has the documents which appeared subsequently to that great act, the publication of the dogmatic bull and its reception, the celebrations made in honour of the event, the writings published to elucidate it or to defend it, and the works of art and poetical effusions with which it was welcomed.

It appears that all countries have responded better than our own to the request made by the devout Bishop. “In England,” he is forced to own, “I regret to have to say that all my questions have remained hitherto without answer. Luckily there was a Frenchman in the country who supplied every thing ; this was the Abbé Guelle, chaplain to Queen Amelie at Clermont.” Certainly the three volumes on the subject, mentioned at pp. 75, 76, and the pamphlets

and articles mentioned at p. 85, cannot be a fourth part of what was written on the subject in England. We have no wish to renew a controversy that was opened in our pages, but some letters which appeared in the *Rambler* in 1856 on original sin in connection with the doctrine received marked but not very flattering attentions from theologians. One who wishes to collect even all the copies of verses on the subject will perhaps find it worth while to place the series of articles to which we refer in his collection.

The task of writing the history of the movement has been confided by the Bishop to the Rev. Dr. Dominic Sire, Professor and Director at the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris, from whose learning and penetration his friends expect a very able historical and critical compilation. Some of our readers will doubtless be able to furnish him with new documents.

The Castle and the Cottage in Spain. From the Spanish of Fernan Caballero. Two vols. (Saunders, Otley, and Co.) We wish to call the attention of our readers to these stories of Spanish life. Those who take the *Correspondant* will recognise the Alvaredo family, which is perhaps the best of the series of tales in Lady Maxwell Wallace's translation. If we may trust our impressions of Spain, the author is to be preferred in "the Cottage" rather than in "the Castle;" and this is fortunate, for it is there that the characteristics of a nation can be best studied. The imagery may strike an English taste as being somewhat florid, and the natural refinement of the ideas appear overdrawn; but this is not a criticism which any body will make who knows the people. The national taciturnity is nowhere so remarkable as in the peasantry of England, and the covert suspicion of ridicule which is probably at the root of much of what we call shyness, and which leads to a disinclination to talk except to a not only friendly but acquiescent audience, is one of the English working-man's most marked peculiarities. A country public-house partakes in some degree of the character of a *club*, or *caucus*, and is as different as possible from the open-air conversations which are free to all in continental villages. Even Germany in this respect contrasts strongly with England, as might be seen by a comparison of George Eliot's novels with Berthold Auerbach's *Baar-füssele*, the most perfect and charming picture of German peasant-life. In these stories, the legends, nicknames, proverbs, and riddles give life to the conversations, and are bandied backwards and forwards in a sort of intellectual game of battledore and shuttlecock. Here is an example or two taken at random :

"Tomasillo," said Mateo, "he who wishes to be rich in a year is sure to be hanged in six months." "Father Molasco," returned Tomasillo, "three things form a man : knowledge, the sea, and the king's court." "What would you have?" said the bailiff; "self-respect and profit don't always lie in the same sacks." The touches of pathos, too, are equally natural and refined. What could be better and more gracefully put than the following : "Dolores was fourteen years old,—an age at which childhood and youth unite so closely,

that often years as they pass must call in the aid of tears in order to separate them"? Or this, of a man in grief: "The priest and some of his friends went daily, not to console Pedro, but to converse with him on his troubles, like those who lighten a boat of the bitter waters of the sea without being able to stop the leak, but only to prevent its sinking." It is true that the plots are somewhat inartificial, and the hatred of "progress" a little indiscriminating; but the former fault is so intimately connected with the *naïveté* which is their prominent charm, that one can hardly blame it, and the latter is so evidently aimed at those who may be called the *Tartuffes of Liberty*, whose liberality is solely exercised towards those whose opinions agree with their own, that even when disagreeing one can scarcely be surprised. Lady Wallace in her translation has wisely adhered to the unpretending simplicity of the original, and we think many will be obliged to her for their first introduction to Fernan Caballero, and anxious, from the grace, poetry, and fascinating unaffectedness of these specimens, to improve the acquaintance at some future period. They will hardly guess that stories so profoundly Spanish are the work of a lady of German origin.

Current Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

The House of Commons.

THE discussion on the Budget occupied Parliament this year from the middle of April to the end of May, and though the plan of the Government was exceedingly simple, the debates were in many ways remarkable. The financial statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was made April 15th. The Estimates of Expenditure and of Revenue were as follows: The interest on the funded and unfunded debt, 26,180,000*l.*; charges on the Consolidated Fund, 1,930,000*l.*; army and militia, 15,256,000*l.*; navy, 12,029,000*l.*; miscellaneous civil charges, 7,737,000*l.*; charge of revenue department, 4,780,000*l.*; packet service, 995,000*l.*; total estimate, 69,900,000*l.*; in round numbers, 70,000,000*l.* The estimate for the revenue is—the customs, 23,585,000*l.*; excise, 19,463,000*l.*; stamps, 8,460,000*l.*; taxes, 3,150,000*l.*; income-tax, 11,200,000*l.*; Crown lands, 295,000*l.*; miscellaneous, 1,400,000*l.*; China indemnity, 750,000*l.*; post-

office, 3,500,000*l.*; giving a total of 71,823,000*l.*, and a surplus of 1,923,000*l.* Although this result was obtained by including in the estimated revenue the Chinese indemnity, an extraordinary and somewhat uncertain item, and by reckoning on the continuation of all taxes, and on some minor additions, it is impossible for Government to retain so large a balance. Mr. Gladstone moreover deems the State already too wealthy, and he endeavoured to show that its demands on the resources of the nation were already excessive. The tenor of a large portion of his speech was to protest against our inordinate expenditure and our increased taxation, and he gave point to his remarks on this topic by a panegyric of the Emperor Napoleon. The following passage is the most remarkable:

"I will ask the House, if they will allow me, to compare very briefly the year which we have just brought to a close with the latest preceding year which seems to resemble it in

its main features—I mean 1853. In both these years there were large remissions of taxations. In both, the harvest was a very bad one. No doubt the course of 1860 was considerably worse than that of 1853. It was also preceded by an unfavourable spring, which raised the price of animal food to an unprecedented rate, and was followed by a most severe and ungenial winter, which for several weeks deprived one-half, or a considerable proportion, of the labouring population of their employment. Notwithstanding all this, I cannot help feeling it my duty to ask the Committee to note, as I have said, the resemblances, and at the same time to note in one important respect the marked contrast, between 1853 and 1860—I mean as to the immediate and palpable effect of the remissions of duty made in those two years respectively. In 1853-4 we remitted 1,500,000*l.* of customs' duty, and every shilling of that 1,500,000*l.* was made up in customs' revenue within the year, with 23,000*l.* to spare. That has not been the case this year. As I have said, there was upon the customs' revenue of 1853 a gain or recovery of 1,523,000*l.* This year we took off 2,376,000*l.*, after allowing 400,000*l.* of additional spirit-duty which we laid on. Instead of recovering the sum of 2,376,000*l.*, however, we only recovered 580,000*l.* In 1853-4 the estimate of excise revenue was 14,640,000*l.* After deducting taxes imposed, we gave a balance of relief of 350,000*l.*, and the excise revenue of 1853 showed an increase of 623,000*l.*, so that at the end of the year the revenue gained to the extent of 973,000*l.* In 1860 that was far from being the case. The excise revenue was originally estimated at 19,170,000*l.* We imposed upon it, in the shape of malt credit, additional spirit-duties, and hop credit, an increase of 1,945,000*l.*, besides the 19,170,000*l.* But instead of such a recovery as we had in 1853, we obtained out of this 1,945,000*l.* only a sum of 265,000*l.* This is a very serious and important fact, which I am sure must attract the attention of the Committee. I do not undertake to give any complete, or full, or demonstrative explanation of this fact. But I cannot help calling the attention of the Committee to one circumstance

which I have not yet mentioned, of difference between 1853 and 1860—I mean the difference in the expenditure of the country at the two periods. In 1853-4 the Imperial expenditure of the country—I mean that not local—was under 56,000,000*l.* The local expenditure was under 16,000,000*l.*; and the total expenditure was under 72,000,000*l.* But in 1860-1 the Imperial expenditure amounted to what the local and Imperial expenditure together were in 1860. It amounted in round numbers to 73,000,000*l.*, including the small sum which was due in respect of the fortifications. The local expenditure, as nearly as I can make it, was about 18,000,000*l.* The total expenditure had grown from 71,500,000*l.* to 91,000,000*l.*, or nearly 20,000,000*l.* in the space of seven years. Now, sir, I do trust that this will be remembered and considered. Let us think what is the meaning of it. We have nothing to do but to reflect in order to take a wise and becoming course, and all I am anxious for is that we should reflect, and should reflect in time. What are the annual savings of this country? May we take them at 50,000,000*l.*? Enormous as that sum is, I believe it may be taken as the amount which the skill, and the capital, and the industry of England lays by every year. If it be so, and if we take this 50,000,000*l.* for a period of eight years, we get a total capital of 400,000,000*l.* Now, if we put upon that sum of 400,000,000*l.*—taking all kinds of investments together—an interest of 5 per cent, the result is that it gives us the 20,000,000*l.*, as the aggregate result of the whole savings of the nation for eight years, completely absorbed and swallowed up in the grave of this expenditure. I cannot help thinking that there is some degree of relation between the enormous and inordinate growth of expenditure and the diminished elasticity of the revenue."

Mr. Gladstone accordingly proposed to remit a million and a half of taxes, and to divide the remission between direct and indirect taxes, by reducing the income-tax to ninepence, and repealing the paper-duty. The remission of income-tax would diminish the revenue of the year by 850,000*l.*, the repeal of the paper-duty by 665,000*l.*, leaving a surplus

of 408,000*l*. Nothing could be more obvious, politic, or moderate than this measure. It involved no question of principle, it held an even balance between direct and indirect taxation, and it removed the cause of dispute between the two Houses of Parliament. Under these circumstances the unpopularity of the man made up for the inoffensiveness of the measure, and a pertinacious and vehement personal attack was directed against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which on two great occasions threatened to destroy the ministry; for Mr. Gladstone, although his eloquence gives him greater power than is possessed by any other member, stands alone and without a following in the House. Hated by the Tories, disliked by the Liberals, trusted only in part by the deluded Radicals, an object of peculiar animosity to the Catholics, and of extreme suspicion to the City, he cannot obtain a permanent position, and is for ever threatened by combinations of his enemies.

The reason of this extraordinary proscription of the statesman whose genius raises him above his contemporaries, as Burke was raised above the men of his time, lies quite as much in his great qualities as in his defects. He has to suffer as much from his greatness as from his weakness. The character of his mind is essentially antagonistic to the prevailing system of party policy. Without taking into account the inconsistencies of his political creed, and the discrepancy between his foreign and his home policy, it is easy for those who follow him closely to see that he belongs to no party, and that it would not be extraordinary if he were from time to time to place himself in the front rank of each of the three great parties. But it would be extraordinary, indeed, if he were to continue in alliance with any body of public men as they are at present grouped. Three years ago nothing but a question of personal arrangement prevented him from becoming the leader of the Tories, as the representative of the University of Oxford should be. Now he is the prop and leader of the Liberal ministry, more beloved by the Radicals at home than Lord John Russell, and more admired among foreign revolutionists than Lord Palmerston. And, at the

same time, the most powerful democratic constituency in the empire wishes to take him from the home of Conservatism and to place him at the head of the party of progress. Mr. Gladstone may, with perfect consistency, and with equal ease, occupy, for a time, either of these contrary positions. We are not sure that he would not be just as much at home in the defence of Catholic interests and as the champion of a Catholic cause. For there are points in which he sympathises with each of these opinions, and in which they deserve sympathy. As each party considers only the points of agreement or antagonism, it will adopt or repudiate him; and no party can apply any test more subtle than that of comparison with its own tenets. They must respectively feel themselves attracted or repelled by him as the questions predominate on which he agrees or opposes them. If the Established Church is in danger, where will she find a more zealous advocate, or her party a more efficient leader, than in Mr. Gladstone? When toleration and religious freedom are at stake, is there any Whig who can defend them on higher ground? And in that great scheme of financial reform with which the democratic party have been identified, who has done so much to carry out the work of Peel? There is nothing strange in this; for it is not a new discovery that parties are exclusive, or that men of large mind and high character cannot permanently submit to their discipline. But what is strange is, that the Tories should see so distinctly their remoteness from the man whom they once were ready to obey, while the Radicals seem blind to the wide difference between their own principles and those of their hero. The link between them is not political, but merely scientific. In the doctrines of political economy the Radicals have had the benefit of all the errors of the Tories, and their revolutionary politics have derived strength from the righteousness of their economic agitation. Direct taxation is hateful to the wealthier classes and popular with demagogues, and the classes are divided in their interests as affected by it. But financial science, whose teachings are definite, and do not embrace considerations of the political interests of a class, requires

inexorably a just proportion of direct and indirect taxation. In early periods of society classes predominate over the State, and use their power for their own advantage by means of slavery, privileges, exemption from taxation, &c. All these mediæval institutions must fall away before the advance of economical science and of political development. Until this occurs, political economy is at war with the existing interests, and this is the broad material basis of the Revolution of 1789 in France, and of 1848 in Germany. Where there is one set of class-interests to assail, it can be done only by protecting another. The economist becomes so far a political partisan, and his doctrines are, for a time, identified with the interests and rights of a class. Behind political economy appears democracy, which fights in its name, and uses its power. At that moment, in the progress of society therefore, the democrats are true economists; and it is natural to suppose that the economists are friends of democracy; and that because Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bright are followers of Adam Smith, Mr. Gladstone must be of the party of Mr. Bright. This is the delusion which creates so strong a resentment against him on one side, and so strong an attachment on the other. No living statesman is so averse to the principles of democracy as Mr. Gladstone, or more free from the taint of class Conservatism. He has gone against the Tories so far as financial science led him; beyond that point his antagonism is not with the enemy he has defeated, but with the ally with whom he has triumphed. The day has now arrived when he has reached the term of his career of financial reform, and the spell by which he has held the Radicals is broken at last. For the first time Mr. Gladstone has expressed this in significant language.

March 5th. In the debate on the hop-duties, Lord Holmesdale had asked for their repeal on the principle of free trade for the benefit of the producer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in his reply, "We are now happily all agreed in being free-traders, but there is a very serious controversy remaining unsettled. The original free-traders always held that the essence of free

trade consisted in the abolition of preference and protection; but there is another school of politicians who give a further development to the principle of free trade, and say that you have no free trade in any article which is subject to a tax. With them free trade is the abolition of all individual taxes. . . . I must confess that I have been very glad to see, within proper measure, the abolition of indirect taxes which were not protective. . . . But if the noble lord will go on to insist on that free trade which means relief from all taxation, I must reluctantly part company with him, and leave him to perform the ulterior stages of that consummation of free trade without my having the honour to accompany him." It is pretty clear in whose company Mr. Gladstone considered that he was leaving the noble lord. In his opening speech on the Budget he defined more clearly his position towards the advocates of direct taxation.

"And here we are faced by the old question between direct and indirect taxation. I take some credit to myself that I have never entered into the debates upon that subject. I have always thought it idle for a person holding the position of Finance Minister to trouble himself with what to him is necessarily an abstract question—viz. the question between direct and indirect taxation, each considered upon its own merits. To many people both appear sufficiently repulsive. As for myself, I confess that I entertain quite a different opinion. I never can think of direct and indirect taxation except as I should think of two fair sisters who have been introduced into the gay world of London, each with an ample fortune, both having the same parentage,—for the parents of both I believe to be necessity and invention,—having somewhat different manners, one being more free and open, and the other more retiring and insinuating. I cannot conceive any reason why there should be any unfriendly rivalry between the admirers of these two damsels; and I frankly own, whether it be due to a lax sense of morals or not, that, as a Chancellor of the Exchequer or a member of this House, I have always thought it not only allowable but even an act of duty to pay one's addresses to them both. I am therefore perfectly impartial as between direct

and indirect taxation; but this I must say, that with regard to the remission of indirect taxes, I hope that the memorable history of the last twenty years will never be forgotten; for I do not scruple to state that if you look to its economical, and then to its political, social, and moral results, it is difficult to know which to prefer. If we had not gained a shilling by the remission of indirect taxation, it would have been worth having for the sake of the manner in which it has knit together the interests and feelings of all classes from one end of the nation to the other. If, on the one hand, it had had nothing to do with any question of moral and social results, still the merely economical results in promoting the material well-being of the people have been so signal and extraordinary, that we may well rejoice to have lived in a period during which it has been our happy lot to take part in bringing about such changes. But, sir, there cannot be a grosser delusion than the supposition that the work of Parliament has been to destroy indirect taxation. The business in which Parliament has been employed has been the business of pruning the tree,—not to destroy it, but in order to strengthen it, and give it greater size and vigour; and the consequence is, that at this moment, when indirect taxation has been destroyed and undermined in the public mind, as the phrase is, not once but four or five times over, indirect taxation is larger and more productive,—I do not mean in this particular year, but upon the average of the last two or three years,—than at any former period of our history. . . . I believe that Parliament has done much of what is to be accomplished in that matter, but yet something may remain; and I trust that the House of Commons will not hold its hand when favourable circumstances shall offer, but will from time to time carry on so good a work within the limits of prudence and justice. But, sir, in speaking thus of indirect taxation, I cannot deny that remissions of direct taxation are as just and as desirable, and I as fully feel as gentlemen opposite may feel that our direct taxation has reached a point at which it is most desirable that we should, if we can, begin at least to apply to it the process of reduction.”

Six weeks later, on the last night of the discussions on the Budget, Mr. Gladstone described still more explicitly his views with regard to the political party who support his financial schemes, in replying to Mr. Ker Seymour.

“My hon. friend the member for Dorsetshire, who made this motion, has thought fit to repeat imputations on me which I have never noticed in this House. As long as the most sordid motives or the most questionable proceedings are imputed only by anonymous writers of the press, or at any rate by those from whom one has no right to expect favour or indulgence, I think by far the best course for a member of this House to take is to pass them by in utter silence, and to trust to the candour of his countrymen, which, I believe, will never fail him, and, I must add, to their appreciation of his character and his services, be those what they may. But my hon. friend, whom I have had the pleasure of knowing from boyhood, and my respect and regard for whom no political circumstances can ever in the slightest degree affect, has imputed to me that the proposals which I have made in this House are brought forward for some mysterious purpose of conciliating the hon. gentleman the member for Birmingham. With regard to any supposed sympathies of mine with the hon. member for Birmingham, I must say, that if I did sympathise with him, I should not have the slightest hesitation in avowing it, because I know of nothing in the character or in the conduct of the hon. gentleman which need make any man who agrees with him afraid to state it. His character has, in my opinion, always been marked with strict integrity, and his conduct has been uniformly straightforward. But when a statement of that kind is made against a person like myself, who am not at all aware of holding the same opinions in politics as the hon. member for Birmingham, I must observe that neither my hon. friend who made it last, nor any gentleman who made it before, has ever attempted to support or sustain it by any language I have used, or by any sentiments I have expressed. I certainly do sympathise with the hon. gentleman the member for Birmingham in regard to the whole

course of that commercial legislation which has conferred such immense boons and blessings on the country, and of which he has been one of the most distinguished champions. And I regret to find that that policy still has many opponents in this House, who, though unable to prevent it from taking effect in the main, are apparently glad to find any opportunity of crippling it, or of covering it with discredit. I should not be doing justice to my hon. friend the member for Birmingham if I attempted to describe my own opinions with respect to matters of finance by mixing them up with his, of which I have no knowledge other than that which every member in this House possesses in common with myself. But if my hon. friend the member for Dorsetshire wishes to make any imputation on my opinions such as I can explain, I am willing to give him an explanation. I have no doubt that he has a meaning, which I am obliged to conjecture, as he has been content to make use of vague and shadowy language. He means, perhaps, that I am one of those who entertain the concealed and covert intention of changing the system of taxation, shifting the burden from commodities to property, and affecting thereby a considerable alteration in the relative position of classes. If such be the belief of hon. gentlemen opposite, I have no doubt that the proposal we now make for the repeal of the paper-duty is regarded as the insidious beginning of a serious innovation, fraught with danger to the country. It might, perhaps, be enough for me to say that not one syllable has been adduced from any speech of mine to sustain that belief. Whether such be the desire of the hon. member for Birmingham I know not, but it is not mine. I am sure that hon. gentlemen opposite will permit me to state in a few words the view I take of the proposal of her Majesty's Government. We are not now at the beginning, but at the accomplishment and consummation, of a great series of legislative changes. We are not introducing novel principles, but working up the residue of great and beneficent operations introduced by great men, whose names will ever live in the grateful memory of the country, and who advanced them up to a certain point, and then handed them over

to us simply and in all humility, out likewise in all fidelity, to complete. I confess that, in my opinion, the days of what are called by their friends comprehensive, and by their enemies ambitious, Budgets are gone by. They began in 1842 and 1845 with Sir R. Peel, who had a great work to do, and who set about it like a workman equal to his business. Then came, in 1852, the Budget of the right hon. member for Buckinghamshire, who, quite justifiably in his own point of view, though I did not concur with him, produced an extensive and comprehensive new financial plan. In 1853 I was myself responsible for a plan of the same kind, and again last year, taking the opportunity presented by the treaty with France, we introduced a measure which in our view went to complete the whole of that series of changes which had been initiated, though not entirely, in modern times by Sir R. Peel. Therefore, it is not the commencement, but the conclusion, of our commercial legislation that we are now proposing, and, viewed as the conclusion, I put fearlessly to the House the proposal for the repeal of the paper-duty as being one as well and as firmly founded in all the sound principles of finance and of industrial economy as any proposal that, during the course of the last twenty years, was ever submitted to, and met the approval of, Parliament."

The Opposition began by denying that there was a surplus. It was led by Mr. Baring, a great authority on commercial questions, but not so great in questions of finance. For the point of view from which capitalists judge financial schemes is that of the City, not of the State. The interests are not identical between the Bank and the Exchequer; for the former gains by a quiescent surplus, while the administration of the latter is best when receipts and expenditure accurately tally. Personal opposition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which was relieved at later periods of the debates by invidious contrasts with his more popular colleagues, exhibited itself at the outset.

April 22d. Mr. Baring said, "I am happy that we live at a time when experience has shown that a Budget may be modified or rejected without any change in the position of the Ministry. I am glad that we have seen

Budgets withdrawn and fresh ones introduced. We have seen taxes remitted, or taxes the remission of which, when proposed, has been refused, without having any effect upon the Cabinet. In fact, a change of the Budget does not involve a change of Ministry; and I rejoice that it is so, because I think it would be most unpardonable obstinacy on the part of public men to adhere to the terms of a Budget which was opposed to the wishes and feelings of Parliament. It would be unfortunate for the free exercise of the judgment of this House if the rejection of any portion of a Budget were to be construed into a vote of want of confidence. I beg sincerely to disclaim any intention to convey such a censure in the course I am now taking. . . . I confess, sir, I have a strong opinion that the course proposed by her Majesty's Government for the abolition of the paper-duties is neither wise nor safe, and I beg the Ministry to reconsider the matter; I beg them to ascertain whether their future position is so secure that they can afford to wipe off at once and completely this source of revenue. I say this from no wish to disturb their position on the bench, for there is no calamity which at present I should more deeply deplore than a succession of weak Governments. I desire a strong Government; but I am convinced that neither this present Ministry,—strong as they may be in talent and in the majority at their command in this House,—nor any other, can be strong unless they possess a strong financial position. I am convinced that, unless you give evidence to the world as well as to this country that your finances cannot be embarrassed, you cannot exercise that influence and that power which it is desirable you should possess abroad, nor can you with safety carry on the government at home. While the country is in a state of comparative prosperity, direct taxation may be assented to; but in a moment of reverse and of trial, public opinion may pronounce against the income-tax." Mr. Baring maintained that the tea-duties ought to be first reduced, if the existence of the surplus could be proved. Sir Stafford Northcote argued that instead of a surplus there was a large deficit, and Mr. Moffat affirmed that we had not

at the present time a surplus out of which to remit taxation. The nine-penny income-tax was carried without a division, April 29th.

May 2d. Mr. Gladstone moved the renewal of the tea and sugar duties, and Mr. Horsfall moved an amendment, reducing the duties on tea, which was supported by Sir Stafford Northcote in a speech which established his claim to be the future finance minister of his party. They had shifted their ground, and, after denying the existence of a surplus, now proposed a new way of disposing of it. In the speech in which he announced the course he meant to pursue against the Budget, Mr. Disraeli drew, in a glaring way, the distinction which his party make between Mr. Gladstone and Lord Palmerston, and did not disguise that the attack aimed at the expulsion of the first from office. "Who is it, then? It is not difficult to point out the author of the expenditure, and I believe that in acting as he has done he has been governed by a high sense of duty, and that he does not shrink from the responsibility of the course he has pursued. No doubt it is the Prime Minister of England. In repeated speeches in this House, and in addresses to his countrymen out of doors, he has never concealed his opinion that the present position of public affairs was such that it was the duty of the Chief Minister of the Crown to call on the country to make those exertions and endure those sacrifices. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer, indulging in one of those unwise taunts which he sometimes conveys, talked about the gossip in the speech of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Horsman) on the subject of Cabinet divisions. Lord, sir, we need not maunder about in the antechamber to discover differences in the Cabinet, when we have a patriotic Minister appealing to the spirit of the country, telling it that it must be prepared to defend itself against aggressive ambition, and to show Europe that we are determined to maintain our rights; and when, at the same time, we find the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose duty it is to supply the Ways and Means by which those exertions are to be supported, proposing votes with innuendo, and recommending expenditure

in a whispered invective. Don't tell me that there are not misunderstandings in the Cabinet,—that the right hon. gentlemen and noble lords who compose it are all of the same opinion,—when on that most important subject, the expenditure of the country, which affects every branch of policy, there is between two of the most eminent Ministers of the Crown—one the Prime Minister and the other the Chancellor of the Exchequer—such difference and discordancy.” He would touch on one other question, the influence on the Government of a hostile vote in Committee of Ways and Means. Here he showed with great detail how the Minister's foreign policy had not been challenged or criticised by the Opposition; how that Minister has been cordially supported, saved more than once from defeat, and not once opposed by the Opposition. Mr. Disraeli had even offended his friends by enabling the Government to retain the hop-duty. It is one of the privileges of the House to advise with impunity upon the distribution of a surplus; and it would be highly unconstitutional for a Minister to desert his Sovereign because on a point involving the distribution of a surplus the House differed from him. There is no reason for rash conduct on the part of the noble lord. “From this House, and from those who, because they sit opposite to him, bear the constitutional and formal name of Opposition, the noble lord, since he has accepted office, has received upon the whole a sincere and cordial support. Sir, no one grudges the noble lord the position which he occupies. He has for many long years served his country and his Sovereign, often with great advantage, though we may sometimes have questioned the prudence or propriety of some particular course that he has taken. The noble lord has on all occasions expressed himself in a manner upon the important subject of the defence of the country which has obtained from this side of the House an echo sincere and steadfast. The general policy of the noble lord has been well received and countenanced on this side of the House; and on this very question of finance, on this question of the paper-duties, if it is possible to understand language aright, no one who sat in this House last year can suppose that

there is any serious difference between the gentlemen on this side and the noble lord. Then is this Minister, who in difficult circumstances has been so supported—is this Minister whose policy in these eventful times has not been challenged by the Opposition—is this Minister, who has come forward to make unprecedented demands on the finances of the country, to ask an amount of taxation for which he has never applied in vain—is this Minister, who never has brought forward one great measure that has been defeated by the Opposition (for I maintain that the measure of Parliamentary Reform was mainly defeated by his own friends)—is this the Minister who, after a career so long and experience so great, after having lived so long in the House of Commons and loved it so well, who will grudge to the House the enjoyment and exercise of its dearest privilege—the privilege of considering how a remission of taxes may be effected most advantageously for the interests of the country?”

The amendment was lost by a majority of 299 to 281.

The second reading was moved May 13th. The Bill reimposed the income-tax and the tea and sugar duties, and also repealed the paper-duty. In this way Mr. Gladstone redeemed his pledge of last year, to take active steps against the encroachment of the House of Lords, and this supplied the third ground of attack, and the third phase in the opposition to his Budget. He was defended in a very impressive speech by Sir James Graham, and, after a division on the adjournment, in which the Government had a majority of 247 to 164, the Bill was read a second time May 16th.

The discussion in committee began May 27th, and was adjourned to the 30th. On this occasion a division occurred, which led to a general expectation that the Government would be defeated, and which is characteristic of our parliamentary system. On the 18th the Government declared its contract with the Galway Company at an end, because the stipulations had not been fulfilled; and a storm arose in Ireland, not because of injustice to the company, but because of the hardship to the Irish, to whom the contract had been so great a boon. Financially, the Government were

quite justified, but politically they were in the wrong, and the excitement of the Irish was natural. For a moment it was believed that the Irish members, voting under the influence of the national grievance, and irrespective of the merits of the paper-duty, would convert the Government majority of eighteen into a victory of the Opposition. There is little doubt that in foreign countries, in the infancy of constitutional government, where public morality is as backward as political wisdom, men would hardly be sensible of the ignominy of such a course. This preference of interest to conscience, and of expediency to right, common, we are told, in the time of Sir Robert Walpole, might, if it had been consistent with the notions of honour and duty that now govern the conduct of our public men, have exhibited itself on other occasions even more important than this. If the Irish members had been capable of judging the merits of the Budget by the light supplied by the withdrawal of the Galway subsidy, the Catholic members, being nearly all Irish, might have introduced into the same question the consideration of foreign affairs. They might have thought the Tories more conservative than Lord John Russell in their foreign policy, and have sacrificed paper to the Pope, at least as soon and as reasonably as to Father Daly. But the imputation was indignantly denied by the Irish members, and acknowledged as a calumny by the Government. But for this explanation, those who represent in Parliament the cause of Ireland and of the Catholic religion would have fallen from the sphere of party government into the degradation of faction. The public good is equally betrayed by the man whose vote on public questions is determined by private interests as by the man who takes a bribe. Personal honour and integrity suffer whether a man sacrifices his conscientious opinion of a measure to any external consideration, or whether he acts with a view to his own advantage. The distinction between party and faction consists in this. A party pursues public objects according to its interpretation of the constitution; a faction pursues its own private ends irrespective of constitutional regulations. It does not stand on the ground of the con-

stitution, or else it does not act within the conditions of the public good. Hence, in moments of great national emergency, party opposition is silent. Faction deems such moments its best opportunity. Party desires strong government, but desires to exercise it. Faction desires weak government, and tries not to obtain, but to profit by it. One is a political body, the other belongs not to the State but to the social order. It carries into public affairs interests and influences which have no representation in the State, and no foundation in any political principle. Therefore it is the ruin of party, and consequently of constitutional freedom. Perhaps it would have been no great calamity if the Government had been defeated; but it would have been a great calamity if, having had a majority of eighteen on May 2d, they had been defeated in committee by the defection of those who were influenced by the withdrawal of the subsidy. In the division, May 30, the numbers were 296 to 281, so that the Opposition had not gained a single vote in consequence of the discontent in Ireland. The House of Lords offered no opposition to the passing of the Bill. But at the Mansion House, on the 1st of May, Lord Derby delivered a speech against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, reiterating against him in the strongest manner the prejudices and commonplaces of his party, and defining with honourable candour their foreign policy.

"My Lord Mayor, I cannot say that I look with entire satisfaction on the state of parties in this country. I look, above all, with deep regret and concern on the position of the remnants of that great Whig party that was honoured by the names of Grey, and Brougham, and Mackintosh, and to which I deemed it an honour to belong. I see with great regret and concern men of distinguished character, of talent, and of eminence, perhaps from an honourable, but, I think, misguided, fidelity to names, overlooking entirely the difference of principle their names conceal and cover, allying themselves with men from whose principles and politics they wholly dissent, and dragged into a reluctant support of measures and of men of which and of whom in private they would not hesitate to speak in the most depre-

ciating terms, and who, in return, I am bound to say, reciprocate, without stint or hesitation, that particular amount of personal affection and friendship which is known to subsist between the extremes of the great Liberal party. My Lord, I say I regret the position of honourable and distinguished members of the Whig party, between whom and the great Conservative party at the present time there is really little or no difference of principle, if they were allowed to act on their own principles and opinions. I regret, I must say, that a gentleman—a man adorned with every qualification which can charm or delight an audience, a man of the highest powers of oratory of any in England, once a distinguished member of the Conservative party, the representative still of one of the most distinguished and Conservative constituencies in the kingdom, is lending himself, his great abilities, his great powers, his seductive eloquence, and making himself the corypheus and mouthpiece of that party whose politics and opinions are the most repugnant to all the sound lovers of their country,—of a party which, dissatisfied with that wide and extensive liberty of speech and action which we enjoy in this country, would desire us to take pattern for our institutions from that great republic the stability of whose institutions is undergoing at this moment a melancholy proof, suggesting by its approaching dissolution to the minds of its greatest admirers that we have the happiness to possess an institution worthy of the affections of a loyal people in a constitutional monarchy. If I may be

permitted to allude but shortly to the state of political affairs, I must say there never was at any time a moment when it was more important that those who have to deal with political affairs in England should exercise the greatest amount of moderation of temper, of judgment, and of forbearance. With regard to foreign policy, I believe that as to the foreign policy that ought to be pursued in this country there is little if any difference of opinion among any class of Englishmen. We all of us have a national sympathy for countries desirous of extending their own liberties and rights; we all sympathise with their efforts to obtain and maintain the constitutional liberties which we have long enjoyed and know how to value; but, on the other hand, every Englishman desires that those rights should be won by those countries themselves,—that they should not be obtained by the intrigues of other Powers,—that other countries should not be stimulating and exciting secret intrigues and fomenting discontent among the population of countries with which they are in alliance. We have no object to pursue, no ambition to gratify; all our desire is,—and I believe it is the desire universally of every Englishman with regard to our foreign policy,—that the influence of this great country should be used for the purpose of maintaining the peace of the world,—for the purpose of conciliating differences,—for the purpose of securing to all that amount of peace which is the surest herald of prosperity, and which we ourselves know how to enjoy."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Russia and Poland.

The Polish nation greeted with sanguine expectations the accession of the Emperor Alexander II. During the latter period of his father's reign, and especially since the defeat of the Polish generals in Hungary, in 1849, the idea of entire separation from Russia has been generally abandoned, and is kept alive almost exclusively by the Poles of the Diaspora. The aristocracy of the country thronged

the court of the viceroy, sought high offices, and distributed government situations among the lower order of nobility. Their ambition aimed not at national independence, but at the supremacy in a great Pan Slavist empire. These aspirations were met in a remarkable manner by corresponding tendencies among the Russian Pan Slavists, whose leader, Pogodin, has constantly insisted on the necessity and advantage of reconciling the Poles by administrative separation,

and every possible concession. Soon after the death of Nicholas he wrote: "Now we can bring the Poles on our side and surprise them with unlooked-for happiness, so that they may join our ranks with gratitude, and be ready to aid us against the common enemies of Russia, and of the Slavonic Union." Poland, he rightly calculated, ought to be a model of Russian government, if the other Slavonic races were to be attracted towards it. The concessions of Alexander II. and the longanimity of Gortschakoff were the price offered by Russia for the coöperation of the Polish *noblesse* in her designs upon the Slavonic dominions of Prussia, Austria, and Turkey. The moment of the general awakening of national feeling in Europe, and of the rising of the Slavonic races from the Carpathians to the Adriatic, was the one in which the largest harvest could be expected from the conciliation of Poland. The Sarmatian nobles, on the other hand, were willing to combine with Russia, but exacted heavy conditions. This is the first point of view from which the recent crisis is to be judged.

It has also a very serious religious aspect. The long conflict between Catholic Poland and schismatic Russia, and especially the insurrection of 1831, raised the hostility to the Catholic Church in Russia to the highest pitch. Roman Catholicism came to be regarded as a national danger, as it formerly was in England, and the protectorate of the Greek Church in the East was a useful appendage of schism in Russia. But of late years there has been a remarkable reaction. In the school-books used in the Western provinces the difference between the two Churches has been toned down as much as possible, in order to remove the barrier between Poland and the empire. Already a considerable literature has arisen on the subject of reunion. In many quarters the imperial family have obtained from eminent Catholics reports and opinions upon the theological, the historical, and the political bearings of the question. The friends of the French alliance at Petersburg have adopted the idea, and it is for corresponding reasons in favour with those who are specially hostile to Austria. Another party have been reckoning for years on the downfall of the tempo-

ral power of the Pope, in order to facilitate measures for reconciliation with him. At the accession of Alexander II., the severity of the penal enactments against Catholics was relaxed; hundreds of priests returned from exile, and at Petersburg the Catholics obtained concessions which had been long withheld. An idea arose that union with Rome might be politically more advantageous than the protectorate of the Greek Church. In Turkey the Greek Church seemed to be losing ground, and signs appeared of a movement more extensive than that of the Bulgarians. In Austria the national sympathies of the Slavonic population for the great Slavonic empire are neutralised by the religious separation; for out of fifteen millions of Slavonians in Austria only 2,800,000 are schismatics. Both in Prussia and in Galicia the Polish nationality might be turned to great account but for the same reason. Two millions of Prussian Poles are all Catholic, and their clergy are for the most part hostile to the German Government.

Nevertheless the counsels of the Grand Duke Constantine and of the ardent Russians have prevailed. In 1859 the Emperor refused to receive addresses from the nobles in support of the churches and clergy. The old laws have been once more severely carried out; Polish Catholics are again sent to Siberia for conscience-sake; it has been decreed that no priest shall administer any Sacrament to any one who has not a certificate from his own parish priest that he is a Catholic and of Catholic descent; and the knout is once more, as in the days of Nicholas, the instrument of conversion. The resistance which the Czar encountered in many quarters to his scheme of emancipation naturally disinclined him to tolerate resistance of another kind.

But if those considerations of ambition and aggrandisement failed to bias the Russian Government in favour of the Church, they have kept alive among the Catholic nobles of Poland hopes connected with the extension of the Russian dominion over Eastern Europe; and while this is one reason of the demonstrations in Austrian and Prussian Poland, it is the explanation of the sympathy shown for the Poles in Russia her-

self. The antagonism between the two races is not to be compared to that between the Poles and the Germans. The war of 1855 pressed with extraordinary severity upon Poland, and yet the wishes of the country were all in favour of Russia. Since the late outbreak, the feeling is gaining ground in Russia that she would gain by total separation from Poland. The calculation is, that the tenure of Poland is precarious and costly; that national feelings, as well as gratitude, would bind it for ever to Russia, and that it would quickly expand over the territories which fell to the share of the German powers. Meantime the animosity of the Poles is turned, not against their oppressors, but against the German population. The alarm amongst the Germans was so great that they have kept watch upon their houses at night, and in some places have fled from their homes. The sentiment of nationality is the strongest agent in the whole affair, and it is therefore headed by the nobles; whilst a reaction is feared on the part of the country people, such as occurred in Galicia in 1846. But inasmuch as the movement far exceeds the bounds of legitimate resistance to definite wrongs, and aims at a great revolution, the more advanced element must gradually assert itself, and the power will pass, in the nature of things, from the aristocratic to the democratic party. The government reckons upon two things to prevent this,—on the opposition of the conservative peasantry, and on the influence of the party of Prince Czartoryski, who act under the influence of the Emperor Napoleon, and wish, by means of his alliance with Russia, to obtain terms, not to hasten a catastrophe. France seeks in the Polish movement a handle against Russia, but fears, at the same time, lest it should become the occasion of an alliance between the Northern Powers. It is in the French interest, therefore, to keep it within limits, at least until it can combine with the general rising against Austria.

The earliest symptoms of disturbance made their appearance in Poland after the interview of the Czar with the Emperor of Austria and the Regent of Prussia. This apparent renewal of alliance between the powers who had divided Poland among them

quicken the national feeling; and the intense hatred of the Gortschakoffs for Austria, the chief object and enemy of all projects of a Pan-slavist empire, secured for the first demonstrations the assumption of the national costume, and aversion to the Russian language, an extraordinary toleration. The anniversary of the Revolution of 1830 was celebrated, November 29, by a Mass, and on leaving the church national hymns were sung by the congregation. A similar demonstration was organised, February 25, for the anniversary of the battle of Grochow. This was prevented by the troops. A national procession was then substituted, the Polish banner of the White Eagle was carried by torchlight through the streets; a collision took place with the police, and some lives were lost.

February 27. The funeral procession of the victims was attacked by the Cossacks, and the bodies were then carried to the French Consulate, with appeals to France for vengeance and protection; but the Consul refused to speak or to interfere. The crowd moved on to the palace of the Agricultural Society, which was the centre of the movement, and there the troops fired, and several of the people fell. The government then negotiated with the leaders of the Society, with whom it was their interest to continue on good terms, and consented to permit a national demonstration, the nobles undertaking that order should be preserved, and forming a committee for the purpose. "If," said Liprandi, "they have got so much with the loss of only five lives, it will only cost them ten to drive us from the citadel, and 500 to drive us out of the country." The bodies of the slain were therefore carried to their graves with an immense procession. The Protestant clergy and the Rabbis walked with the Catholic priests; the troops presented arms as they passed, and order was scrupulously observed. The nobles were masters of the kingdom. The Agricultural Committee, founded in 1857, is the instrument by which this success has been obtained. It now declared itself *en permanence*. It had organised local committees all over the country; it was the centre of union for the aristocracy, and the means by which they acquired the

command of the people. A petition was then presented by them, with the Emperor's permission. Prince Gortschakoff imprudently remarked that it had few signatures, upon which the Poles replied, that it was no time for writing when blood flowed, and 20,000 names were at once appended. The substance of the petition was the full admission and realisation of their separate nationality, a demand consonant with certain tendencies of the Russian Government, and conveniently susceptible of indefinite extension. At the same time, to add force to the petition, great numbers of Poles in the Russian service resigned their offices and their commissions.

The reply of the Emperor, dictated by the desire of preserving the powerful principle of nationality, and influenced by the feeble state of the Russian army, the necessity of keeping troops in the interior during the progress of emancipation, and the time that was required to fill Poland with soldiers, came March 13. The demands of the Poles were conceded. Poland was to be again a distinct kingdom; a Polish Council of State was promised, presided over by Count Zamoyski, the leader of the national movement; municipal rights were given to the towns; and education was to be remodeled on a national basis. Meantime Muchanoff, minister of the interior and of education in Poland, issued a threatening circular, in which the dislike of the peasants for the nobility was significantly dwelt upon as the security of the Russian power. He was very naturally accused of treachery, and the general indignation compelled the Emperor to dismiss him. This success led to many attacks upon unpopular official men.

March 27, the new system was inaugurated, and the Marquis Wielopolski, a Pole and a Catholic, was appointed minister of public instruction. In him the Russian Government found a man able to cope with the progress of the revolution, and with the skilful organisation of the patriotic party. The struggle lay between him and Zamoyski. The limits of Russian concession had been reached, and General Chruleff, an officer of great energy and decision, arrived at Warsaw.

The terms in which the imperial

ukase was communicated by the Viceroy to the people caused great discontent, and destroyed the effect of the concession; for the government, in order not to sacrifice its *prestige*, treated the movement as treasonable, and the concessions as the free gift of the Emperor. The Poles could have confidence only in what they obtained and secured for themselves.

April 1st. A despatch of Prince Gortschakoff, the minister of foreign affairs, announced to the world the changes which had been granted to the Poles. At the same time the government proceeded to recover the authority it had lost, in order to carry out the reforms as its own work. "The reforms," said Count Zamoyski to the Viceroy, "satisfy us; but they are still on paper, and we have no security." The security lay in the power of the committee of nobles, and in the municipal guard that had been established to keep the peace, and had succeeded during four weeks. The guard were dissolved, and, April 6, the dissolution of the Agricultural Society followed. The decree was known the next day, and excited great discontent. The people assembled before the palace of the Association, and Zamoyski recommended peace and order. They then went to the palace of the Viceroy, which they found surrounded with troops. After a parley with Gortschakoff, the troops were withdrawn, and the crowd retired. The government had ceased to inspire awe, and found itself in a false position, between the wish to cherish the national principle and the fear of losing its power. The people were encouraged by the sympathy with which their success was received in Russia; and they had not yet learnt that with Wielopolski and Chruleff a new policy reigned at headquarters. They had defied and provoked the troops with jeers to fire upon them, and the Russian officers declared that they wished the Poles had arms; that they could soon suppress them in open fight, but that there was no dealing with their passive resistance. On the 8th of March the demonstrations were renewed, and a sanguinary conflict took place between the soldiers and the people. Poland was filled with troops, and disturbances in several places were

at once put down. The Poles reckoned on French assistance ; but the *Moniteur* dissipated the expectation :

"The late events at Warsaw have been unanimously commented upon by the French press, with the sentiments of traditional sympathy which the cause of Poland has always excited in the West of Europe. But these expressions of interest would ill serve the Polish cause if they had the effect of misleading public opinion by allowing it to be supposed that the Emperor of the French encourages hopes which he could not satisfy. The generous ideas displayed by the Emperor Alexander since his accession to the throne, especially in the great measure of the emancipation of the peasants, are a certain token of his desire to likewise effect the improvements admitted by the state of things in Poland. It is only wished that he may not be prevented from so doing by manifestations of such a nature as to place the dignity of the political interests of the Russian empire in antagonism with the tendencies of its sovereign."

The Russian Government published the following explanation of the events at Warsaw :

"The Italian War, the good fortune of a successful soldier, the contagious example of Hungary, and the continued declamations of the foreign press,—these are the causes which have exercised a great influence upon Poland, and could not but ultimately result in an over-excitement, differently interpreted by different parties.

"One of these parties, which may be called the revolutionary, and which obeys the *mot d'ordre* of Mieroslavski, has endeavoured to bring about a sanguinary conflict, with a view to prepare the immediate triumph of democracy in the midst of unfettered passions. The other party, which can be hardly said to have had a distinct object in view, or which, at all events, concealed any definite purpose, merely endeavoured to keep up the move-

ment by the manifestations of an unarmed multitude. It was in this way that they perhaps intended to bring the Polish question before Europe, and make it one of urgency. After this description of the actors, it is easy to arrive at an explanation of what has taken place. The manifestations of the 25th and 27th February were the work of the revolutionary party ; while the peaceful demonstrations which preceded it were originated by the other party, and could not but result in a sanguinary conflict, the partisans of the more turbulent section being always upon the alert, and trying to avail themselves of every opportunity as it occurred for their own purposes."

The Poles, with the best cause in the world, have compromised it by their revolutionary propensities, and the Catholic clergy, which has so much to suffer in Poland, have placed themselves in the false and dangerous position of approvers of disorder. But the most remarkable circumstance is the hesitation of the Russian Government before the conflict, and their moderation afterwards. The disturbances of the peasant-war, in almost every province, is one cause of this. The other is the hope of using Poland against other Slavonic lands. With that bait, and certain concessions, it is probable that Poland might, with the exception of the Catholic clergy, be entirely conciliated. We cannot yet know whether the reforms which have been given since the death of Gortschakoff will be sufficient for that purpose. The attitude of the Archbishop of Warsaw towards Count Wielopolski is hostile and almost defiant. It is hard to conceive any thing more difficult than the part he is required to play between a despotic monarchy, an oppressive aristocracy, and a revolutionary democracy, all three partisans of those national theories of which the Pope himself has been a victim.

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PART XV.

THE CATHOLIC ACADEMY.*

THE appearance of this polished and eloquent discourse claims our attention on account both of the distinguished personage whose views on a very important question are expressed in it, and of the occasion and the purpose for which it has been written. From the beginning of the century a Society has existed in Rome, to which for more than thirty years the Cardinal has belonged, and whose labours are dedicated to the illustration and defence of the Catholic and Christian faith. Founded at a period which witnessed the almost unexampled combination of persecution with the prostration of religion, and in which weakness and coldness of faith united with the most bitter animosity to afflict the Church, the Catholic Academy has been one of the instruments of the revival of a better spirit, and has enjoyed the countenance and support of many of the most eminent persons in Rome. The object of its members has been to promote the reconciliation of religion with the advancement of learning, and at the same time to initiate in these studies the educated youth of the city. If we may draw an inference from what we hear and from what we do not hear, it would appear that the last of these objects has been more successfully attained than the former. The good that has been done seems to be principally confined to the society of the capital, and the printed acts of the Academy have not become

* *Inaugural Discourse pronounced at the First Meeting of the Academy of the Christian Religion, June 29, 1861, by His Eminence Cardinal Wiseman, Burns and Lambert.*

widely known. So many reasons for this are at once suggested by the circumstances of place and time that have surrounded its institution, that it by no means follows either that the plan is radically defective, or that it would not achieve greater success and wider utility in another sphere.

Dwellers on the outer frontier of Catholicity, surrounded by an atmosphere of unbelief and hatred, and exposed to dangers both of attack and temptation against which the Church has always endeavoured to protect those who live in the centre of the fold, we might be justified in envying our brethren in the Eternal City an institution which, as a safeguard, we require more than they do, and which we have, in some respects, greater means of using as a weapon for the intellectual support of religion. In no country would there be a better field for its action, or more ample conditions of success, than in England. The object of the Academy is not controversy; it does not address itself to those who are out of the Church, but seeks to digest and to assimilate the results of scientific inquiry, and to maintain the harmony of sacred and secular science. The Catholic body amongst us has especial need of a work of this kind, and possesses the materials for it; and it is one of its greatest misfortunes that no such combination for a definite purpose subsists among its members. It is a consequence of the very advantages of our position, though it detracts from them, that the elements which are united in the Catholic Church in England are of such various derivation that we do not possess even common prejudices, the very lowest symbol of unity; and the bonds of faith and of charity are not always powerful enough to secure either the necessary agreement, or the freedom of discussion, or the tolerance of differences enjoined by the well-known Protestant maxim which Catholics have consecrated by attributing it to St. Augustine. The cultivation of literature in a spirit inseparable from Catholicism, and on a basis which no Catholic refuses to acknowledge, is perhaps at the present time the only way that could be devised of reconciling, in a higher harmony, divergencies which proceed partly from the contrast of early education and partly from an imperfect and unequal conception of the present position of the world and its works in relation to the Church. It is an enterprise which, in the beginning, contradicts no opinions, and in the end must reconcile them. When, therefore, Cardinal Wiseman undertook to establish in England a branch of the Roman Academia, he planted it in a soil prepared to receive it, where it has a vast opportunity

of doing good, and in which, if it is only understood, it ought surely to thrive.

The Inaugural Address consists of two parts. The topic of the first portion is the idea that the Church has encouraged and adopted all that was most admirable in the secular movements of different ages, and has enriched herself with the best treasures of the outer world. Unchanged herself, she received and retained the impression of all that touched her. "Such has been the Church in every age. Whatever is good, whatever virtuous, whatever useful in the world, at every time, she has allowed to leave its seal upon her outward form" (p. 20). There are some considerations suggested by this passage which it is important that the Society to whom it was addressed should not overlook.

In speaking of the temporal action of the Church, or of her successes in spiritual things, it behoves us to define and to distinguish, and to eschew generalities which disguise a truism or conceal a fallacy. The divine purpose, which is her essential mission, she can never fail to fulfil; and in pursuing it, she has accomplished innumerable secondary and collateral ends, and, while teaching the transitoriness of all earthly things, has conferred immeasurable temporal benefits on mankind. But it is not this that constitutes her proper vocation, and it is not just to dwell on this in supporting her claims to the reverence and gratitude of those who do not believe in her. In comparison with the higher duty she discharges for the world, the encouragement at one time or another of literature or of agriculture, of art or of commerce—merits which are a primary subject of consideration in discussing polytheism or Islamism—are altogether insignificant and imperceptible. Nor, if this human point of view is put prominently forward, would it be fair to say that men are under obligations to her for all the things which constitute terrestrial advantages, or that in every thing in which religion can affect civilisation, Christianity surpasses every other system in a degree at all proportionate to her intrinsic superiority. In these matters her influence has not been always alike, nor her policy consistent or always in harmony with her nature. It belongs both to her character and her interest to require the development of literature and science for the performance of her own great intellectual work, and to promote political liberty because it is the condition of her social action. There were times when she did both these things, and then a time came when that part of her influence was abandoned to those who were not of her. Then the two great forces, freedom and know-

ledge, were converted into weapons of assault ; they seemed to justify while they avenged the neglect, and, in spite of Protestantism, they prospered better among Protestants than among Catholics. In England the spirit of political liberty, in Germany the spirit of scientific research, overcame the barriers of religious antagonism, and as it were spontaneously did homage to the Church, and protested against their estrangement from her. Human learning has often been an instrument, but not a source, of hostility to religious truth. It has served it in spite of great outward difficulties, of a long separation, and of a heavy bribe, and it has acted as a corrosive to all false religions ever since the time when the gods of Greece began to wane before the rising brightness of her philosophy. And this is a character of the present age which we are hardly accustomed to consider, and which we have not used as we might for the advantage of our cause, that learning has acquired an authority before which even religious rancour must give way, and is an ally to the Church that would be more powerful if it was more trusted. So long as its alliance is not claimed by the truth, it is certain to be used against it.

“ *Cain.* I never
As yet have bowed unto my father’s God ; . . .
Why should I bow to thee ? . . .
Lucifer. He who bows not to Him has bow’d to me.
Cain. But I will bend to neither.
Lucifer. Ne’ertheless,
Thou art my worshipper : not worshipping
Him makes thee mine the same.”

The great error of the day, in reference to the position of the Church between science and policy, is that Catholics, men of science, and politicians are inclined to recognise only one authority. In the domain of learning, as well as in civil society, there is an authority distinct from that of the Church, and not derived from it, and we are bound in each sphere to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s. There can be no conflict of duties or of allegiance between them, except inasmuch as one of them abandons its true purpose, the realisation of right in the civil order, and the discovery of truth in the intellectual. Political wrong and scientific error are the only sources of hostility in either department to the Church, and this is met by the restoration of right or of truth, that is, by the advancement of politics or of learning. If we neglect this, we are ourselves responsible for disputes and conflicts in which the right may not be on our side, and we shall have no criterion to apply but that which we

believe to be the interest of religion ; forgetful that a true principle is more sacred than the most precious interest, and that the consideration of interests is suspended where the obligation of principles is acknowledged. The danger comes from those who consider only one thing, and take their stand exclusively either on the secular or on the ecclesiastical ground. All that we demand is that science should be true to its own method, and the state to its own principle, and beyond this the interests of religion require no protection.

From the second part of the discourse we learn that this and no other is the spirit in which the English branch of the Academy has been instituted. The Cardinal exhorts its members to follow, "without anxiety, but with an unflinching eye, the progress of science." The perversion of learning alone must be resisted and exposed, but the spirit of investigation is to be humbly, joyfully, and gratefully accepted ; and the day will hereafter come when men will look with admiration upon its works, and upon the important part it has had in promoting the progress of religion. The rise of this new and mighty power, due in great measure to the lull of religious controversy at a time when Protestantism had lost its vigour, and the Church seemed to be absorbed in her internal troubles, is justly compared to the revival of ancient learning in the fifteenth century. That, too, was a new and powerful element in civilisation which might and did accomplish both great evil and great good, and which was viewed by some with confidence, by others with alarm, and by many with satisfaction as a welcome auxiliary against the Church. Then as now, in presence of a somewhat similar phenomenon, the Catholic world resolved itself into three sections. There was a large party, who knew that all the resources of criticism and learning belong to the armoury of the Church, and who greeted in the new discoveries a valuable accession to her strength. This was the feeling that for a hundred years uniformly prevailed in Rome ; it was shared by the most illustrious prelates of that age, by Ximenes, by Lindanus, by John Dalberg, by Giberti, and by the two great cardinals of the House of Borromeo ; and the author of this discourse, whose name is in the foremost rank of those who have combined elegant literature with severer learning, naturally ranges himself on their side. Then there was a party in which it would be unjust to place Erasmus, because his satire of the clergy that so readily accepted the doctrines and precepts of the Reformation was at least redeemed by his dogmatical opposition to Luther,

who, seeing nothing but paganism in antiquity, followed it instead of Christianity, and beheld in the clergy a set of ignorant and selfish conspirators against knowledge. Such were the authors of the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*, who, although the publication of the first volume preceded by two years the outbreak at Wittenberg, became Protestants for the most part, and whose ridicule of the priesthood was in intention and in reality an insult to the Church. Lastly, there were those whose conduct justified the attacks it drew down on them, who feared and deprecated the introduction of the new studies. But few men of note in the Church shared these views, and it is not probable that they will find favour in the Academy, if the traditions of its inauguration and the spirit of its founder survive in it. Much may be expected from the pursuit of literature by a body of earnest Catholics, who are impressed with the conviction that the harmony of religion with profane learning cannot be made, but may be found; who regard scientific investigation as a suspension rather than an occasion of controversy; and who understand that an important preliminary towards encountering with success the anti-Catholic prejudices of scientific men is, the suppression of an unscientific tendency among Catholics. For knowledge, says Thomas à Kempis, has no enemy but the ignorant. "Truth," says John of Salisbury, "becomes obscured as often by the negligence of those who profess it as by the assaults of error."

When Frederic Schlegel concludes his *Philosophy of History* with a chapter on the general restoration as the predominant sign of the age, he touches upon the great point of resemblance between the present time and the period of the Renaissance. For the development of the scientific spirit has proceeded from a revival of forgotten knowledge as comprehensive as that of the fifteenth century, and by the resurrection of a buried world whose influence is as profound and as important for civilisation as that of the ancients. The antiquity that was brought to light was partly Christian and partly pagan, but it was a period of civilisation deformed by corruption, and of Christianity beset with heresy. The influence of the revival corresponded to this character. It was in the first place æsthetical rather than practical. We still associate with the word *Renaissance* above all the notion of art. The Humanism of Italy was a study of beauty, of enjoyment, of refinement; what was beautiful was placed before what was true. The bearing of these pursuits on actual life was generally injurious. We need not point for proofs of this to the erotic

literature of the fifteenth century, or to the demoralisation of the courts ; they are most visible in the ideas of politics and of government which were derived from the ancients. The example which the history of their state supplies is only a lesson of false republicanism, generating in its corruption an unlimited despotism. Even the increased insight into the early period of the Church, though it modified and enriched the scholastic teaching, promoted only an archæological and fragmentary, not a complete, historical study of Christianity. The connection with the immediate past was interrupted, and the continuity of institutions, the genesis and succession of ideas, were completely lost sight of. A time came when the ancients were the only authorities, antiquity the only study, and when the thousand years that separated its restoration from its fall were as little understood as the classic world had been during the supremacy of the barbarians who destroyed it.

The spirit of investigation was rapidly absorbed by the passion of formal elegance. At one moment it appeared as though it would be otherwise, but the first efforts of criticism, eminently characteristic of the times, were not followed up. In the middle of the fifteenth century, Valla wrote a treatise to prove that the Donation of Constantine could not be genuine, and in this he easily succeeded, though it was reserved for our time to ascertain the origin of the forgery which gave Ireland to England, and the Indies to Spain. The result of Valla's skill was merely negative. Finding in the period whose records he had studied no authority for the existence of the pontifical state, and certain of the spuriousness of its most famous title-deed, he conceived that the whole fabric of the temporal power was a usurpation, and insisted that it ought to be surrendered. "Men say," he writes, "that the Church is at war with Bologna or Perugia. It is not the Church but the Pope, of his own ambition, that is at war with the towns." But the Pope was not alarmed by the Humanists, and Valla obtained promotion at Rome ; but here a serious charge was brought against him, and he was denounced to the ecclesiastical authorities for that, puffed up with pride, and abandoning himself to an unseemly and hazardous temerity of statement, he taught that Tarquin the Proud was not the son of Tarquin the First. This was in the early period of the movement. It was not by criticism, but by frivolity and free-thinking, that the classical scholars did harm to religion ; their researches were dangerous neither to faith nor to credulity. It was in anticipation of such a change, which did not, however, actually ensue for centuries,

that Pius II. uttered a cautious saying, which is not in the tone of mediæval Catholicism, "*Christianam fidem, si miraculis non esset approbata, honestate sua recipi debuisse.*"

That anticipated innovation, which the classic revival failed to introduce, constitutes the essence of the corresponding revival of the 19th century. The most comprehensive and penetrating influence, which marks our age, as the Renaissance the age of Medici, and which is the strongest current that counteracts that which set in before the Revolution, is the restoration of mediæval learning. Its tendency is in almost every respect exactly contrary to the other revival. The ignorance of the middle ages, during the period between the Reformation and the Revolution, amounted to physical blindness. The remains of mediæval art were not even curiosities. An intelligent traveller could visit Cologne, describe several of the smaller churches, and declare that there was nothing else worth seeing in the place, though the cathedral towered above the city with that irregular and striking outline which all remember who saw it before the works were commenced for its completion. The great Gothic churches, it has been truly said, had to be discovered again like Pompeii, after lying hid for ages. The mediæval world was a palimpsest that had yet to be deciphered. Its history formed no part of education, and it was the great business of governments to obliterate all the traces it had left upon the state. Even in theology those who most faithfully preserved its forms were not likely to study its history. Its languages were extinct among the learned, and no man knew that they possessed a vast treasure of poetry, epic poets who could compare with Dante, and ballads such as in the hands of Percy and of Scott introduced a new era in the literature of England. The poetry of the romantic school, the art of the foreign pre-Raphaelites and of the Goths, are the most familiar outward tokens of a revolution immeasurably more profound and more extensive. The mediæval revival involves a return to continuity in social institutions, to tradition in ideas, and to history in science. The presiding impulse in this pursuit is the opposite of that which guided the Humanists. It is not the charm of beauty or of eloquence, for that is the privilege of antiquity, nor a delight in idle enjoyment, or even the cultivation of the mind; for in these things the middle ages have incomparably less to offer. We go back to the middle ages in order to know the realities of the past. The poverty of forms, the repulsiveness of style, restrict the inquiry to that which is alone of actual value, the facts of mediæval life. For the civilisation of that

age, its ideas, habits, and institutions, possess a direct importance for us who are its descendants and its heirs. Our society is the development of that of the mediæval chivalry ; our civilisation is founded on theirs. Our national instincts and character were moulded by them. Our modern history has been occupied in destroying or modifying what they have left us ; it is filled with the contest between mediæval facts which were no longer understood, and ancient ideas which had no basis in real life. The classical revival was the conquest of an unknown world. The mediæval revival is a pilgrimage to the homes of our fathers, to the graves of

“The dead but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns.”

The heroes of the revival of letters went forth in the spirit of adventure, and are of the same type as the men who discovered a new world in the age that had revived the old. Ours is a spirit of reverence and piety, as of men returning after a long migration to places hallowed by the recollections and the traditions of their race.

The aim, then, of these studies is not beauty or pleasure, but truth and instruction. Their method therefore is critical, and their form is historical : for it is less the works of individuals that attract us than the general ideas and deeds of those days. A classical scholar has such a rich literary world before him that he may be any thing but a historian. But it is only for the historian that the bulk of mediæval literature has any attractions. Not only, therefore, does the study of the middle ages promote the historical art, and a stricter critical method than the classics, but it has given rise to a totally new feature in the moral sciences, the supremacy of the means over the end. Many problems about which men have disputed and fought naturally resolve themselves when considered as history. Numberless systems and opinions lose their absolute character, and appear in their conditional, relative truth, when the mode of their formation and the modifying influences of time and place are understood. Ecclesiastical history is filled with conflicts which a knowledge of the history of development would have made superfluous, and in all other branches of learning history is a peacemaker and a destroyer of idols. Until the middle ages were reinstated in their proper position, the scientific study of history was in its infancy ; for the omission of a large and essential portion of the subject gave the rest a merely antiquarian interest, as a curiosity, not as part of a single and consecutive process to which the present belongs.

Religion has been served by this phase of literature in two ways. The least important is the rehabilitation of the ages of faith by its enthusiastic admirers, like Count de Montalembert and Mr. Digby. What is of far greater consequence is the establishment of those fixed rules, and of that disinterested spirit of investigation, which rigidly exclude the influence of prejudice, interest, or passion, pursue not the application of truth so much as its discovery, and apply to moral science something of the patient self-denial and closeness of observation which belongs to natural philosophy. If these qualities have been rare till lately in modern times, they were not unknown to an earlier age. Bishop Adelbold of Utrecht begins his life of St. Henry with the following definition of the duties of a historian: "*Scriptor veritatem tenere nequit nisi hæc quatuor aut potenter devitaverit, aut aliquatenus a mente deposuerit: odium et carnalem dilectionem, invidiam et infernalem adulationem. Odium enim et invidia bene gesta aut omnino tacent, aut dicendo transcurrunt, aut calumniose transmutant. E contra male gesta dicunt, dilatant et amplificunt. Carnalis autem affectio et infernalis adulatio, quæ male gesta sunt, scientes ignorant et ignorantiam simulantes, veritatem occultant; bene gesta autem, placere quærentes, spaciose dicunt, et plus justo magnificant. Sic per hæc quatuor, aut in bene gestis aut in male gestis veritas evanescit, falsitas superducto colore nitescit. Spiritualis autem dilectio veritatis amica, nec male gesta celat, nec bene gesta pompose dilatat; sciens quia et male gesta sæpe prosunt ad correctionem, et bene gesta frequenter obsunt, dum ducuntur in elationem.*"

We gather from the names that have reached us of the members of the Academy that the moral sciences will be chiefly cultivated, for in the others few of course are really competent, and the interference of amateurs can only lead to a demoralising shallowness. It will be well if this is so, for those branches of learning are of more vital importance than physical science. They touch religion and morals more directly, and influence more powerfully men of cultivated minds, whilst illiterate persons are more easily struck with the facts and influences of the material world. It is, we presume, only for the facility of illustration, and perhaps from old reminiscences, that so many of the Cardinal's instances are drawn from geology and the physical creation. These sciences are of a subordinate utility to religion, even when cultivated in a religious spirit; and when directed against religion, have not the same force as the sciences which are connected with her origin, her history, and her doctrine.

Much will depend on the regulations which are to guide the Academy, and on the changes which will become necessary in order to adapt the original rule to new wants. As learning does not flourish even with protection so well as with freedom, no institution without some degree of self-government can retain an enduring vitality. The less it resembles a manufacture, and the more it obtains the character of an organism, the better it will fare. In the constitution of the French Consulate, the majority of the senate was originally appointed by the government, and it then completed its numbers by election. We know not whether this is the plan adopted by the Academy, but we have no doubt that the original list has been drawn up in conformity with the rule which was followed on that occasion. "We put aside," said the Third Consul, "all personal affection in our choice, and considered nothing but the merit, the reputation, and the services of the candidates."

The Academy of the *Lincei*, which is alluded to in the discourse, may supply some useful hints to the new association. Their historian, the Duke of Cezi, tells us that they were very different from the philosophers of our day; for they considered religion not only as the first of all sciences, but as the only safe basis, the principle, and true source of all knowledge,—an idea which is better expressed by a writer already quoted: "Quia tam sensus quam ratio humana frequenter errat ad intelligentiam veritatis primum fundamentum locavit in fide" (Metalog. iv. 41). Amongst their rules we applaud the following: "Non minus sedulo et hoc observent ne Lynceorum quemquam aut voce aut calamo perstringant, quorum tamen opiniones, ut amplectantur, non ob id adstringantur, cum cuilibet proprii genii, et ingenii modulo in hujusmodi disciplinis philosophari, et ad veritatem quam proxime collimare libere linquatur." It is easy to see that the *Lyncei* were not of the party who were disposed to give up religion and theology for the sake of an elegant Latinity.

The purpose of an academy has been defined to be to advance learning, whilst the mission of a university is to communicate it. This distinction, founded on the necessity of a fixed and finished matter for the instruction of youth, and of a direct religious control which the growth of science will not bear, did not originally subsist. The first academy was also the first university, and the name of the spot where Plato lectured on the banks of Cephissus has survived in both. We should think little of a university which did nothing for the enrichment of literature, and produced

men, and not books. But it has been usual for academies to addict themselves more exclusively to their own special function of acquiring, not of distributing knowledge; and it is not one of the least meritorious points in the Society of which we are speaking, that it returns in some manner to the old plan, and proposes to extend to younger men the advantage of witnessing its proceedings, and gathering something of its spirit. The majority of the academies which sprung up in every part of Italy, in consequence of the number of universities and the deficiency of public employment, can supply no useful example for the serious and practical design which the Cardinal is endeavouring to realise amongst us. The scheme of Leibnitz for the Academy of Berlin, the purpose of which was to advance at the same time the public good, learning, and religion ("un point des plus importants serait aussi la propagation de la foi par les sciences"), is the only one with which we are acquainted that combines such exalted ends.

THE LIFE OF DR. DOYLE.*

THIS work, unquestionably one of the most valuable contributions recently added to our stores of Catholic biography, illustrates a period at once so near to our own, that its events largely influence that in which we live, and also so remote that it is rapidly passing out of the recollection of the existing generation. We will endeavour to indicate the importance of these memoirs to all who are interested in the recent condition or the future prospects of Catholicity among us. Dr. Doyle was well known in England as well as in Ireland. With many of the liberal statesmen who assisted in carrying Catholic Emancipation he was intimate; and from his conversation, as well as his writings, they derived many of the arguments by which they replied to the political bigots of those days. He preached the sermon at the consecration of Dr. Baines, and witnessed the beginning of that advance which Catholicity has made in England.

To his native land Dr. Doyle was attached by historical as well as religious ties; and patriotic aspirations were from the first intertwined with his devotion to the Church. He was the descendant of an ancient family, long settled in the

* *The Life, Times, and Correspondence of the Right Rev. Dr. Doyle, Bishop of Kildare and Leighlin.* By William John Fitz-Patrick. James Duffy, Dublin and London.

neighbourhood of Wexford, which had been outlawed for its fidelity to James II., and which, after the confiscation of its property, had, in spite of the penal laws, retained its faith and held its ground in a condition of honourable poverty. Times that we look on as remote were to him as the days that preceded Catholic Emancipation are to us.

"How often," wrote Dr. Doyle, in his letters on the state of Ireland, "have I perceived in a congregation of some thousand persons how the very mention of the penal code caused every eye to glisten ! The very trumpet of the Last Judgment, if sounded, would not produce a more perfect stillness in any assemblage of Irish peasantry than a strong allusion to the wrongs we suffer."*

This circumstance is the key without which we shall fail to understand the remarkable career of Dr. Doyle, or to conceive that state of society which provoked from an antagonist who early learned to fear him, Dr. Magee, the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, the flippant witticism, that "among the Roman Catholics of Ireland politics constituted a religion, and religion meant nothing beyond—politics."

Dr. Doyle was born in the year 1786, at New Ross. Close to that place, in 1798, he witnessed one of the fiercest battles that took place during the Rebellion. His companion on this occasion was a boy of about his own age.

"Dr. Doyle, many long years after, in a conversation with his stanch friend, Father Martin, referred to this incident of their young days. 'The only beating I ever got,' he said, 'was from you, while both of us lay concealed in the furze-bush.' 'You deserved it, my lord,' was the reply. 'Nothing would do for you but to be popping up your little black head after every volley, to see if the battle was over. I at last lost all patience, and belaboured you unmercifully with a hazel-switch. You lay pretty quiet afterwards,—*Deo gratias!*—for had our hiding-place been observed, we should in all human probability have been piked or bayoneted.' †

In 1800, he was sent to a seminary then recently established in New Ross by Father John Crane, a member of the Augustinian Order, where he was more noted for studiousness than for natural quickness. Here he resolved to enter that Order; his preference for a career among the regular clergy having been not a little produced by his dislike to that species of maintenance upon which the secular clergy were then as now forced exclusively to depend. Upon the latter subject his views, at a later time, underwent a great modification; and, in spite of his love for the cloister, Providence had destined him for the most active career

* Vol. i. p. 5.

† Vol. i. p. 9.

which a Catholic priest can know. In 1804, he lost his widowed mother.

"She was," remarks Mr. Fitz-Patrick, "in a great degree to him what Monica was to Augustine; and we may attribute to the early instruction which she caused to be imparted to his tender mind, the germ of that breadth of brain and strength of piety which in after-life surprised the world."*

In 1805, he entered on his novitiate in the Convent of Grantstown, a small thatched building, approached by a long avenue lined on either side by stately trees, and standing near the sea-shore, within some miles of Carnesore Point, which forms the junction between the eastern and southern coast of Ireland, and near the ruins of an ancient monastery belonging to the Eremites of St. Augustine. The next year he made his vows. The laws prohibiting Catholic education had been repealed in 1782; but, preferring a foreign education, which at a later time he speaks of as a thing calculated to enlarge the mind, and increase, not diminish, the student's love for his own country, he placed himself in the then celebrated university of Coimbra.

Here he found memorials in abundance equally apt to excite his devotion and his patriotism. Here Archbishop Talbot, of Dublin, and Father Luke Wadding had studied; and here an Irish college had been founded by Dominick O'Daly, of Kerry, the historian of Catholic persecution in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. In this beautiful retreat the future Bishop laid the foundation of that extensive knowledge which afterwards distinguished him. That retreat was not, however, exempt from its dangers. The Voltairian philosophy even here had found entrance. The youthful stranger from Ireland breathed for the first time an atmosphere tainted with that poison of infidelity which, issuing out of France, had infected so large a part of Europe. But he did not fall. His studies convinced him that the philosophy then so fashionable was as superficial as it was brilliant. At a later time he said:

"I recollect, and always with fear and trembling, the danger to which I exposed the gifts of faith and Christian morality which I had received from a bounteous God."

A short time afterwards we find him, with a fellow-student, serving in the English army, with sword for book, against the French invader, and acting as an interpreter. Such were the vicissitudes of that time, and such the rough training, by

which he was prepared for a stormy career made peaceful only through that religion which consecrated it. The Portuguese government soon discovered the abilities of their young recruit, and made him magnificent offers, on condition of his placing his services finally at their disposal. But he remembered his vows, recorded in the little chapel at Grantstown, and forsook the caresses of a court for spiritual labours, not among the feudal and royal splendours of Alcobaco, with its 800 rooms, its library of 50,000 volumes, its statues and courts, towers and gardens, but among the desolate hovels of his native land. He returned to Ireland in 1808. It is thus that he describes his country at that period :

“I have read of the persecutions by Nero, Domitian, Genseric, and Attila, as well as of the barbarities of the 16th century. I have compared them with those inflicted on my own country ; and I protest to God that the latter, in my opinion, have exceeded in duration, extent, and intensity all that has ever been endured by mankind for justice’s sake. These Catholics are now emerging from this persecution, and—like the Trojans who had escaped, with their household gods, to the shores of the Adriatic, or the Jews after returning from the captivity—they are employed with one hand in defending themselves against the aggressions of their implacable enemies, and, with the other, in cleansing the holy places, rebuilding the sanctuary, making new vessels for the sacrifice, and worshiping at their half-raised altars. The recollection of their past sufferings is far from being effaced. The comparative freedom which they enjoy is a relaxation of pressure rather than a rightful possession. As religionists they are suffered to exist ; and the law restrains the persecutor, but persecutes them of itself. They are obliged to sweat and toil for those very ministers of another religion who contributed to forge their chains.”*

The tithe-grievance, here alluded to, was one of the scandals which Dr. Doyle denounced in his writings with the sternest hostility. The tithe-commutation has removed from the peasant its *direct* pressure, and saves him from many incidental cruelties with which the injustice was formerly embittered to his feelings. It is needless to observe that the substantial wrong continues to exist. That charge upon the land which belonged neither to the proprietor nor to the occupier, but was set apart as a religious, educational, and charitable endowment for the benefit of those living on the land, is still diverted from its proper objects, and paid over, though by another hand, for the purpose of maintaining the clergy of a small, comparatively wealthy, minority, and of a novel creed. Yet the strength with which Dr. Doyle felt

the wrongs done to his country and Church never prompted him to any uncharitable course. As far as mutual coöperation (not to speak of mutual good-will) was possible between Catholics and Protestants, he ever wished to promote it. At New Ross, he became a member of a committee composed of persons belonging to different religious denominations, and instituted for charitable ends. He remarked at a later time, "Great harmony prevailed among the different religionists in that town, and I think this was mainly owing to the Protestants and Catholics meeting every week, and acting together for a charitable purpose." When establishing schools in his diocese, he especially provided that Protestant children should, if they pleased, share in the instruction there given, without, however, the slightest interference with their religion.

From his Augustinian Convent at Ross, Dr. Doyle was removed, in the year 1813, to the College of Carlow, which had suddenly been reduced to great difficulties, very humorously described by Mr. Fitz-Patrick, by the abrupt departure of a divinity professor. There he remained, every year increasing in reputation, until March 1819. One day, as he was walking in the College Park, saying his office, some of the priests belonging to that institution advanced to meet him, and, to his great astonishment, saluted him as Bishop elect, informing him that he had been recommended to the Pope by the clergy of Kildare and Leighlin, who had discarded all local claims and interests in favour of one known to them only by fame. Their choice was gladly confirmed by Pius VII.; and then began that episcopate which, till death terminated it in 1834, diffused over the whole Irish Church a splendour long unknown to it; which had strengthened the brave, and changed some who had previously occupied the contradictory and almost ludicrous position of *timid Catholics* into men proud of their Church, and to her no cause of shame.

We have made these references to the earlier part of Dr. Doyle's career because it is less known than that portion of it which followed, and because we who live in comparatively easy times cannot but be the better for remembering upon what basis rested the greatness, and out of what trials rose the eminence, of those who now, indeed, are spoken of with reverence by all,—nay, who are often invidiously contrasted with the very men, of those now living, perhaps their nearest counterparts,—but who in their own day had to sustain, in abundant measure, not only the hostility of avowed enemies, but, what is more difficult to bear, misconception among friends. In his subsequent career he was mixed up in all

the great questions which bore directly or indirectly on the interests and honour of his country. To but a few of these we can at present refer. His conduct with respect to several of them has been misapprehended by some, who seem to find it equally difficult to understand, on the one hand, that truth is one and doctrine immutable, and to perceive, on the other, that what belongs to the lower sphere of expediency varies with times and seasons. In these latter cases a man's principles, being subject to modifications in practice, can only be understood so far as he has definitely asserted them as *principles*.

One of the great questions of Dr. Doyle's day, as of ours, was education. The Catholics were then far less able than they have since become either to provide schools for themselves, or to demand assistance upon just terms from the government. It was also in a large measure through the schools of the Kildare-Street Society that proselytism was then carried on. These were the circumstances under which somewhat of a compromising spirit might have been expected. How little the principles of Dr. Doyle permitted of such compromise may be inferred from such passages as the following:

“ ‘I have always considered the education of the poor as an essential means of bettering their condition, and of promoting the peace of society and the security of the state. . . . Literature might become in some measure here what it is in Scotland, the staple manufacture of the country, and add, not only to her fame, as hitherto, but even to her improvement and wealth. . . . The only education not an *evil in itself*, and which can promote the advantages I have stated, appears to me to be that which regards the mind and the heart, by uniting the *religious with the literary* improvement of the people.’ ”

Dr. Doyle proceeded to observe, that ‘the first and most essential stipulation to make was, that the priest should be allowed to visit these schools, as often as he should deem necessary, in order to ascertain that the religious education of the children is attended to.’ Next, that the master must be a Roman Catholic; and ‘with regard to the books of instruction to be used, you will adhere strictly to the established usage of our Church. Therefore, declare explicitly to the gentlemen concerned, that no books shall be introduced for the use of the Catholic children which are not approved by their pastors.’ ”*

Here and elsewhere is the same distinct assertion of pastoral authority which was made in Mr. Stanley's celebrated letter, announcing the system of national education,

* Vol. i. pp. 110, 111.

before it had become the fashion to assume that parental authority and pastoral authority were likely to be at variance, and that parents and children were to find at the hand of patrons and masters of a different creed a protection from the undue religious interference of their own clergy. These quotations are taken from a letter of Dr. Doyle's, published in the *Carlow Post*, January 1820.

It was because these principles were violated by the Kildare-Street Society that Dr. Doyle denounced it. In 1823, we find him writing thus to Sir Henry Parnell :

"The present Parliamentary grants for the education of the poor are fully sufficient for their object, if well administered and made available for the purposes intended by the legislature ; but as they are now employed, they serve to generate discord, heart-burnings, and almost a civil war in every village. God knows what sacrifices I have made, and almost every Catholic prelate in the kingdom, to allay passions excited by persons who, with probably the best intentions, are labouring to educate the poor according to a system opposed to their conscience. *We even overlook what we can never approve*, rather than offend or cause irritation, hoping that the Government would adopt a wiser course, and not through any want of ability to defeat the Kildare-Street System ; for by an address not longer than this letter, I could induce the Catholic poor of the Dioceses of Kildare and Leighlin to withdraw all their children. . . . It is to me unaccountable why a government, which ought to look only to the peace and happiness of the people, should not seek to educate the poor without interfering with their faith."*

With what a cry of "Ultramontane" would not the Bishop, claimed by some as a "Gallican," be received, if now living and making statements like these ! "But," it will be answered, "though he disapproved of the Kildare-Street System, he approved that which succeeded it." Just so ; and let us assume that he would have approved of it no less when the same Liberal party, which had advocated the "Appropriation Clause," introduced the "Ecclesiastical Titles Bill." What then ? The new system was distinctly founded on the *three principles* he had so pertinaciously asserted. Education was to be religious in every case, not secular only. The Catholic priest was to have access to his children in all the schools. No child was to be dependent, *for his religious instruction*, on persons of a faith opposed to that of his parents and pastors. Does it follow that Dr. Doyle would have equally approved of changed rules, through which in many cases the pastor may not visit the school, and the Catholic child must receive his religious instruction from masters of

a different faith, or in which, if he objects to this, he must content himself with that exclusively secular education which the Bishop pronounced to be the greatest of all evils?

In the autumn of 1824, Dr. Doyle published his *Letters on the State of Education in Ireland, and on the Bible Societies*.

"He complained," Mr. Fitz-Patrick says, "that foundations for education had been turned into sinecures; that the very few diocesan and parochial schools which existed were accessible only to those who could pay; that charter schools aimed notoriously at the religious proselytism of the people; that Catholics were excluded from every endowed school, or exposed in them to the mental training of a master professing a different religion, or perhaps no religion at all, 'whilst their own creed might be spit upon and buffeted by every zealot who believed that, in so doing, he rendered a service to God and the State.'"*

To the cry of "priestcraft" then raised against Dr. Doyle, as now against those who, in a changed time, have not swerved from the three great essential principles he then contended for, Dr. Doyle thus replies:

"Do we wish or require to be intrusted with the public instruction? No; we seek only that the portion of it which regards ourselves be intrusted to us; we do not desire to put our sickle into another man's harvest; all we require is, that you observe the commandment of Christ: 'Whatever you wish that men do to you, do you to them in like manner.' You would not confide the instruction of your children to us; do not oblige us to intrust ours to you. As to the State bestowing aid, we feel indebted for it: we shall not even think, if you will, that the State exists only for the good of the people; that we are its subjects; that we pay its taxes; supply its luxuries; bear all its burdens; fight and die for its aggrandisement or glory. We will waive all right to the public money, and sit, like Lazarus, expecting the crumbs. All this we will do; only do not afflict us by interposing your authority between us and our children; do not estrange from us the mind or affection of our little ones, or teach them from their infancy to regard the stranger as entitled to their confidence; do not intimate to them that their parent and pastor are unfit to train their mind, and form their heart, or introduce them to the world. If your object be to seduce them from the faith for which they have suffered, and into which they have been baptised, tell us so, and we will retire with them into the desert, and tell our misfortunes to the rocks; or we will cease to beget children in our bondage, and let our name be forgotten, and our race extinguished."†

In his great Pastoral for 1826, the Bishop sounded a yet

* Vol. i. p. 353.

† Vol. i. p. 356.

bolder note. He traces historically the long series of attempts, now by violence, now by fraud, to seduce Catholics from their faith. Coming down to later times, he says :

"This policy has yielded somewhat to the force of time and events ; it has assumed a meeker tone ; but in deceit, in craft, in injustice, as well as in hostility to the faith of the 'Island of Saints,' it has undergone no change. . . . Shall Ireland no more be Catholic and orthodox ? Yes, brethren, it shall ; and rather than desert the faith once delivered to the Saints, let our right hand be withered, and our flesh given a prey to the beasts of the earth or the fowls of the air.'"

Whether the author of these passages, and many others far stronger, would have been contented to compromise what he had clearly shown to be *vital* and *essential principles* of education, we need not here raise a discussion. We know that he is sometimes spoken of in our day as a very lamb ; but in his own he was frequently denounced as a revolutionist, notwithstanding the notorious fact that in times of disturbance his Pastorals did far more to tranquillise the country than soldiers or police could do, and that on one occasion 300,000 copies of a Pastoral by him were published and circulated at the expense of the Government. Notwithstanding such tributes, the Rev. Sir Harcourt Lees had early denounced him as guilty of "malignancy, of blasphemy, and of treason ;" and affirmed that his purpose was "to irritate the lower orders in this superstitious country into acts of outrage against the Government ;" pronouncing the "Titular Bishop" an "impostor and a fool." His offence was this : Archbishop Magee, a prelate of great vivacity, and violently addicted to antithesis, had, in a Pastoral published in 1822, drawn a sublime and pathetic picture of that branch of the "United Church of England and Ireland" which is located in the latter country, affirming it to be the true descendant and representative of apostolic times, but lamenting that it was "hemmed in by two opposite descriptions of professing Christians,—*the one possessing a Church without what we can call a religion, and the other possessing a religion without what we can call a Church.*" Dr. Magee was a High-Churchman, and had expressed himself as wholly opposed to the principle of "the Bible without note or comment." Dr. Doyle replied to him under the well-known signature of "J. K. L.;" and after refuting some of his calumnies against that Church upon the spoils of which he was living, and against which he was preaching a crusade, propounded to him the following unceremonious questions, at that time unusual :

"As an Archbishop of the Established Church, I would beg leave to ask you, my lord, who are you, and where did you come from? From what heaven have you fallen? What earth produced you? Turn over the records of your Church; tell us the names of the Bishops who preceded you; show us how they were connected with the Apostles, or with those who received the faith from them; produce your claim to that title of apostolic which you so ostentatiously put forth."

On one occasion Dr. Doyle used in a pamphlet language so strong, that some in his own community took alarm. He said,

"The minister of England cannot look to the exertions of the Catholic priesthood: they have been ill-treated, and they may yield for a moment to the influence of nature, though it be opposed to grace. This clergy, with few exceptions, are from the ranks of the people; they inherit their feelings; they are not, as formerly, brought up under despotic governments; they have imbibed the doctrines of Locke and Paley more deeply than those of Bellarmin, or even of Bossuet, on the divine right of kings; and they know much more of the principles of the constitution than they do of passive obedience. Such is the view which this country must present to the eye of British statesmen," &c.

Dr. Doyle was warned that such strength of language would produce a storm. He replied,

"The man who first stirs up these truths will be decried by all. The Government will fold itself in its strength and dignity, and make a show of severity and vengeance. But he is a fool who does not see that the truth works secretly, and, like a grain which must corrupt before it gives fruit, will, after it has suffered obloquy, produce advantage. I have exposed myself knowingly and willingly to danger," &c.

Part of Dr. Doyle's pamphlet was read aloud at Maynooth.

"The Irish professors present listened in silence; but the French theologians, Delahogue and Anglade, who had belonged in their own country to the *ancien régime*, at once pricked up their ears, and assumed a mingled expression of disgust and alarm. 'Mon Dieu,' exclaimed Delahogue, 'est ce possible qu'il prêche la Revolution!' 'La Revolution!' echoed Anglade, 'c'est horrible!'"*

This was not the prelate whom statesmen most delight to honour, except at peculiar times, or after his death.

A disposition to subject the Church more or less to State interference has been attributed to Dr. Doyle by some as a merit, and by others as an error, only excused by the cir-

cumstances of his time. Neither the praise nor the censure will find much confirmation in these volumes. That such tendencies existed in the early part of this century is proved by the veto question. The royal veto having been finally refused by the Irish Church, even when emancipation was the inducement offered, Mr. Plunket, in the year 1821, in his ardent desire to carry emancipation, proposed to append to his Relief Bill another bill intended to give to Government what were then called "securities." This bill provided that before any one was appointed to be a Bishop or Dean in the Irish Church, his loyalty, &c. was to be decided upon by a board consisting of Catholic Bishops, two Privy Councillors, and the Secretary of State as president. Dr. Doyle was one of those who saw most quickly the danger sure to result from allowing the Government thus to introduce the end of the wedge, though he was willing to make every sacrifice not inconsistent with safety. He proceeded to Dublin, and submitted the documents in question to Archbishops Troy and Murray, the Bishop of Ferns, and several others of the assembled clergy. In accordance with his views, the meeting adopted resolutions condemning the proposed bill. Similar resolutions were soon after adopted at Limerick, by Bishop Tuoley and his clergy, and elsewhere, and the plan came to nothing. The concession party in the Irish Church was still strong; and had its counsels prevailed, the mischief thus done would hardly have been compensated for by any measure of political relief. It was indeed a time of danger, though the danger has been forgotten.

Another measure with which Dr. Doyle's name has been connected was the plan for endowing the Catholic clergy by means of a *regium donum*. On this subject considerable error seems to have at one time prevailed respecting his opinions. From many passages in the volumes before us it is made plain that his real sentiments were as follows, viz. that it is best that the clergy should continue to be maintained without any legal endowment whatever; that, if endowed at all, that endowment should consist in a rate or charge derived from the *land*, as does the present endowment of the Establishment; and that in any case a pension paid by the treasury, or in any manner connecting the clergy with the crown, is absolutely inadmissible. On this subject his opinion was given when examined before the Parliamentary Committees in 1825:

"The payment of the Catholic clergy by a *regium donum*, and the exercise of a veto by the crown in the appointment of Catholic Bishops, Dr. Doyle reprobated and rejected with the zeal of a true

churchman. He added, that he would be hostile to such an influence even if the sovereign of this realm were a Catholic.”*

During the same year, the Catholic Relief Bill was provided with two “wings,” as they were called, in order to help in carrying the measure through the adverse atmosphere of prejudice. These wings were the disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders, and the endowment of the Catholic clergy by means of a *regium donum*. It is thus that Dr. Doyle writes on the latter subject to Mr. Blake :

“With respect to the provision itself, it is perhaps superfluous to repeat that, let it be of *whatever kind or amount it may*, I would accept of it with great reluctance ; so much so, that I would certainly reject it if emancipation could be obtained on any other terms. . . . I have made this reflection in order to record, at least with you, that the mode of providing for the Catholic clergy in Ireland, which I have seen detailed on paper, was not devised by us, and though it may be submitted to, will never be approved of by, me. In the event of a provision being made, it should proceed on the principle of connecting the Catholic clergy, *not with the crown, but with the state*, and of preserving inviolate the mutual dependence and connection of the *priesthood and the people* with and upon each other. For this purpose an Act of Parliament might provide that the parishes now existing, or to exist hereafter in each diocese, should be classed by the Bishop, and that a vestry of each parish, composed of *Catholic freeholders*, should be enabled to vote, and levy by assessment from off the parish, an annual sum not exceeding £— for the maintenance of a parish-priest of the first class, and so on in proportion for those of the other classes.”†

Dr. Doyle then stated objections against the principle of paying the priesthood out of the treasury, and added, “the Catholic clergy should be paid by those amongst whom their duties are performed.” He next proceeds to show that the Protestants would not suffer any wrong in consequence of not being present and voting in the proposed vestries, although the rate would fall upon them no less than on Catholics.

O’Connell had given at one time his support to a certain proposition relative to the payment of the clergy, and defended his course by a reference to what he supposed to be the opinions of Dr. Doyle and Archbishop Murray. His statement was made at a public meeting in Carlow. The following eminently graphic account of what took place is given by Mr. Fitz-Patrick :

“The Rev. Martin Doyle had no sooner heard the allegation

* Vol. i. p. 394.

† Vol. i. pp. 405, 406.

made, than he repaired to the college adjacent, and requested Dr. Doyle to come forward and deny it. 'I have already done so,' said the Bishop. The priest returned to the meeting. O'Connell was still speaking, and giving, as it would appear, implicit credence to some incorrect information which had reached him. He declared that, as the prelates did not disapprove of the 'wings,' the laity might well subscribe to them. A resolution was proposed in favour of the 'wings,' and a portion of the meeting, hungry for emancipation, seemed anxious to adopt them. The priest again sought his Bishop. . . . Dr. Doyle closed the Breviary which he had been reading, and, with a lofty severity of deportment almost ominous in its expression, unexpectedly entered the room. O'Connell abruptly ceased speaking as the Bishop approached. . . . 'As I was informed,' observed Dr. Doyle, 'before I entered this room that frequent mention had been made of my name, and of the assent which I was supposed to have given to the measure now under your consideration, I feel myself called upon to give such explanation with regard to that measure as may serve to remove from the minds of the gentlemen present any misconception under which they may labour. . . . What my opinion was I declared in London to my right reverend brethren. I repeated it since then in Dublin. I may have sometimes mentioned it in private conversation; and it was this,—that if the prelates were led to approve of a provision emanating from the treasury,—if the ministers of Christ were to be paid by the Minister of State for dispensing the mysteries of God,—then in that case I would not create dissension among them; but sooner than that my hand should be soiled by it, I would lay down my office at the feet of him who conferred it. For if my hand were to be stained by Government money, it should never grasp a crosier, nor should a mitre ever afterwards be fitted to my brow. This was and is my fixed determination.' . . . O'Connell atoned for the mistake into which he had been led by a respectful apology, while Dr. Doyle made his exit amid peals of applause. The resolution in favour of the clerical 'wing' fell to the ground."*

The sequel respecting the coolness between the great Bishop and the great Tribune, together with their subsequent reconciliation, is not less interesting.

Taking into account the eminently practical character of Dr. Doyle's mind, there is some difficulty in understanding how such an idea as the "reconciliation of the Churches" can have seriously presented itself to him. That the proposed union was not to be attained by the aid of the slightest doctrinal compromise on the part of the Catholic Church need hardly be stated. Again and again Dr. Doyle had come forward as the triumphant champion of that Church which in doctrine knows no change. Many passages in Mr. Fitz-Pa-

trick's valuable memoir prove that the *doctrinal* concessions looked for were all to come from the other side.

"It was next observed, that some Catholics were exceedingly anxious lest he contemplated a compromise of their faith in his project of a union. Here the Bishop smiled, and said, 'I am too good a *Papist* to compromise any thing ; and if I sought to do so, there is not an old woman or a young child in the diocese who would not see my error and abandon it. No good can ever be effected by compromise ; and the nature of truth is to be unchangeable, and not to ally itself with error. . . . The doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent could be received by the English Church without any considerable violence being done to articles of faith.' "*

His mode of viewing the *theological part* of the matter would seem to have been this : he took the definitions of the Established Church and its Liturgy (the latter deduced chiefly from ancient sources, and the former very equivocally drawn up, for the purpose of including as many of the half-Catholics of the 16th century as could be induced to conform to the new order of things),—these he took, apart from the interpretation which time has placed upon them, and apart from that actual condition of religious belief which belongs to those who, unconsciously to themselves, find their theological guide neither in Prayer-Book nor Articles, Bible nor Concordance, but in that great prophet of modern times,—Public Opinion. This was taking the most favourable view of the Established Church. But with this view of its theological documents, Dr. Doyle seems to have combined another and less favourable one, respecting the Establishment itself as an actual institution. The latter he regarded, not as the real exponent of any theological system, but simply as a great and influential state instrument, which must find the best excuse it can for taking whatever course the state prescribes from time to time. When asked how the proposed religious change in the Established Church was to be effected, the Bishop simply replied by pointing to—Law !

"I could *frame a bill*, not so long as the Declaration of Rights, which, if *passed by Parliament*, would effect a union, and a union which would be more *useful to England than were* her unions with Scotland and Ireland."†

The benefit to Ireland which Dr. Doyle anticipated was the union of classes. Political materialists see only what is on the surface of society. Dr. Doyle well knew that injustice, as regards religious institutions, was, as it still is, though in a less degree, the hidden but living root of almost all the

* Vol. i. p. 336.

† Ibid.

animosities that internally distract Ireland, and that separate her from the empire at large.

"A person well acquainted with Ireland," he went on to say (this was in 1824), "would not find it difficult to show why the efforts made to better her condition have been fruitless, and why every benefit conferred on her by the legislature, or through the bounty of the English people, has had no corresponding effect. The whole frame of society among us is disorganised. . . . This state of the public mind and feeling is unquestionably produced by the inequality of the laws, and still more immediately by the incessant collision and conflict of religious opinions. . . . In Ireland, I am confident that, notwithstanding the ferment which now prevails, a proposition such as you have made, if *adopted by the government*, would be heartily embraced. The clergy of the Establishment are unpopular, and they feel it; they are without flocks, and every professional man wishes for employment; their property is attacked, and even endangered, for the State has touched it, and the people have no respect for it. The Dissenters have encroached on them; and the Catholic clergy have despoiled them, in many places, of their flocks. The proprietors and capitalists in Ireland are affected at the prospect which lies before them, and are anxious to establish peace and security amongst us."*

The Bishop seems to have overlooked the fact that, if public interests be stronger than the theological definitions made by "private judgment," in its attempts to "cut a coat for the moon," yet animosities are often stronger than interests. Some such conviction seems, however, ere long to have forced itself on him, and chilled an aspiration which had probably recommended itself to him rather as a statesman than as a churchman; for Dr. Doyle was pre-eminently both. Soon afterwards we find him writing to a friend: "As to the union of the Churches, I told you I looked upon it as not attainable, unless by a miracle of grace." To Mr. Newenham, a Protestant, who had written to him from England with a friendly enthusiasm, the Bishop replies in a manner that indicates that it was not from theological discussion, but from diplomatic arrangement that he looked for aid in dealing with an establishment, the *theology* of which he regarded but as a sort of heraldic device and decoration: "If I could perceive a likelihood of the matter being taken into consideration by *Government*, I should not fail to labour for its advancement whenever I could find a moment's leisure."† The mere discussion of such a proposition, whether or not it be a practicable one, has of course abiding religious influences which at one period may be healthful and at another the reverse. The danger consists

* Vol. i. pp. 321, 322.

† Vol. i. p. 331.

in the degree in which it may favour the notion that the Church and the sects, whether established or non-established, can be "high contracting parties," standing on a common ground, and that the former can make concessions besides those relating to discipline. On the other hand, Catholic doctrines can hardly fail ever afterwards to look very differently to a Protestant controversialist who has been induced, but for a few days, to divest himself of traditional prejudice, and to ask himself how nearly he can agree with them when he has come to understand them.

We lament being obliged to pass by many passages of Dr. Doyle's life recorded in these volumes, to which we can but refer the reader. Among these passages are the reforms which the young Bishop early made in his diocese, and some of which were carried out with the rigour of the apostolic times, though his clergy, so far from being alienated from him by this occasional severity, evinced, at a later period, their attachment by presenting him with a house and park which they had purchased at a cost of several thousand pounds. These reforms are treated of in pp. 98, 99, 117, 118, 120, 129, 277. They relate chiefly to clerical assiduity, costume, the majesty of divine worship, spiritual retreats, the priests' farms, and clerical bequests. On these subjects the depressed state of things left by the penal laws bequeathed a task to the reformer from which he did not shrink. Not less interesting are the passages that illustrate the personal devotion and manly piety of the Bishop. Those who have fancied he was a "liberalised" Catholic will find edification in the fervour with which he flung himself on his knees before the shrine of St. Bridget, on finding it still remaining in the ancient church, long since appropriated to Protestant use at Kildare. To the great patroness of his diocese his devotion was at all times ardent.* Those who think that miracles which did not "happen a long time ago," with a promise not to recur, are improbable, superstitious, or not in good taste, will be surprised to find two of the miracles effected through the prayers of Prince Hohenlohe, solemnly attested by the two prelates they commonly regard as especially enlightened, viz. Bishop Doyle and Archbishop Murray, as having occurred in their respective dioceses, and as being especially worthy of the gratitude and veneration of the faithful.† His views as to foreign politics are always striking, as are his preference of free institutions with regard to the interests of religion, and his belief that the suppression of convents in Portugal would

* Vol. i. pp. 134, 232.

† Vol. i. pp. 241-246.

but lead in time to the creation, as in France, of more numerous and more efficient convents.* In the whole biography, perhaps, there is nothing more touching than the narrative given by the Bishop in a letter of his visitation in the year 1823.† It presents an extraordinary picture both of the present and of the past in Ireland. In the most remote part of his diocese he finds a people still as primitive in their ways, as pure in their morals, and as ardent in their piety as the early Christians themselves were; a people the elder among whom pointed out the haunts in which his predecessors had so often taken refuge from persecution, and where they themselves had heard Mass in a cave while their scout had kept watch on the hill.

His sermons preached in other dioceses upon occasions of great solemnity attest the esteem in which his eloquence was held; amongst others was one at the opening of the new Augustinian Church in Limerick, where he discharged, in 1823, the same part which another illustrious prelate discharged in the same city, when, after the lapse of centuries, a new Cathedral was opened there in 1861.‡

But the two prominent positions in which Dr. Doyle is presented to us in these volumes, are those of the vindicator of his Church and the defender of the people. Over the people he extends a double shield: he defends them from their foes, whether spiritual or temporal, and he defends them from themselves. Again and again his solemn and majestic Pastorals condemn and subdue, with the authority of a father, those insurrectionary movements which invariably aggravated the evil they endeavoured to resist; movements which were produced by misery, and met by the bayonet, in an age of chronic famine and a suspended *Habeas Corpus* Act. But no less searchingly does he point out to statesmen the source of the evil, and its only permanent cure; demanding a cessation of laws undeserving of respect, if respect for law is desired, and the introduction at once of a wisely-considered provision for the poor, of enactments calculated to stimulate and protect industry, and of that education which alone can direct it. To him justice was, as to Edmund Burke, an ever-present divinity, not a fable or a name.

"When I consider," he writes in 1820, "this great principle, emanating from Him who is the fountain of all justice, existing before the Gospel, and to last to eternity; when I view it thus, and compare it with what is called by its name in Ireland, a thrill of horror pervades my blood, because we are all hastening to Him who

* Vol. i. p. 188.

† Vol. i. p. 231.

‡ Vol. i. p. 249.

will judge us in justice, and weigh all our actions in the scales of the sanctuary.”*

In 1823 he writes in his fifth letter on the “State of Ireland” as follows :

“Without adopting the opinions of Mr. Owen, on the capability of this country to support eighteen or twenty millions of inhabitants, I am inclined to the opinion that its present population (then about 7,000,000) is not at all excessive; and that the Legislature might in a single session pass such laws as would, in the course of a few years, render the poor of Ireland, who now create so much anxiety and alarm, if not as comfortable as those of the same class in England, at least placed beyond the reach of want.”†

Alas! such laws as he desired were not passed, or not passed in time. It is but last year that one of them, intended to protect the fruits of the farmers’ industry, and thus develop the resources of the land, was sanctioned by Parliament. He foretold the consequence if successive governments persisted in the substitution of a cruel and blind empiricism for statesmanship, justice, and mercy. Mr. Poulett Scrope, in the famine of 1847, lamented that Dr. Doyle was not then alive. If he had been alive, he would but have witnessed the fulfilment of the following prophecy :

“If the policy of governing by division be pursued longer, then the people will perish by *famine, or emigrate to Great Britain, or be cut off by the sword*. If strong measures be resorted to, and some of the Irish gentry and absentees proceed as they have been doing, these results, or some one of them, will be accelerated. Captain Rock will resume his sway; the poor will instinctively confederate; the Insurrection Act will be in constant operation; and if a foreign war should occur, and circumstances favour it, there may be a general rebellion. What the result would be, God knows. I know that my office as a minister of religion, and my duty as a loyal subject, require that I should state my opinions at a time when effectual remedies may be safely applied; and I do so totally regardless of the slave and the bigot, nay, though I were doomed, like the prophetess mentioned by the poet, never to be believed. Or let it be supposed that the law, by the agency of the musket, the transport, or the gibbet, may still sustain the uneasy tranquillity of the country, and that the population should be pressed on, as heretofore, then they will congregate in towns and villages, finding no habitation or employment in the country; and should a dearth of provision occur, *famine and pestilence will set in together, and rid us probably of a million*. Happily we have missionaries in abundance to attend the dying; but if there be a chosen curse, some hidden thunder in the stores of heaven, it must be reserved to blast those men who shall have brought such a ruin upon their country.”‡

* Vol. i. p. 128.

† Vol. i. p. 252

‡ Vol. i. pp. 219, 420.

But the faith of his fellow-countrymen, and the honour of that faith, lay yet nearer to Dr. Doyle's heart than their material interests. In 1823 he addressed to Lord Wellesley his letter entitled *A Vindication of the Religious and Civil Principles of the Irish Catholics*. This work appeared at one of those periods of temporary depression in Ireland which have so often tempted those who do not know that permanent tranquillity must rest upon justice, to cry out "Peace, peace, where there is no peace." In 1829 Mr. Sheil thus contrasted the apathy of that time with the restored energy of later years, an energy which gave to Ireland her freedom, and removed from England her chief danger and her chief opprobrium.

"In 1823 an entire cessation of Catholic meetings had taken place. There was a total stagnation of public feeling, and I do not exaggerate when I say that the Catholic question was nearly forgotten. . . . The country was then in a state of comparative repose; but it was a degrading and an unwholesome tranquillity. We sat down, like galley-slaves in a calm."

Mr. Fitz-Patrick tells us that this new pamphlet "gave the first mortal stab to the tithe-system," of which Dr. Doyle, the most effectual enemy of sedition, and the most eloquent preacher of charity, has said, "May our hatred of tithes be as lasting as our love of justice." This theme he had previously touched in his reply to Archbishop Magee, and touched in a tone which speedily convinced that dignitary that the spiritual tournament he had intended to institute, when heading the proselytism movement then called the "New Light," was likely to expose the aggressor to the fatigues of real war. Dr. Doyle had then said,

"It must have been a painful avowal to your grace, the acknowledgment that in this country, so famed for its love of justice, 'there should be found many who deem it no violation of that cardinal virtue to infringe or evade the laws which are designed to protect the property of the Church.' The reason is, my lord, that in this country the nature of your Church property is understood by all, and is considered as different from every other in it. Your property is not held by deed nor conveyance, for it was transferred by law from those who held it by these titles. It is not held by prescription from time immemorial, for all know when and how you became possessed of it, what your title was, what the good faith by which you held it, and what the term of your possession. . . . You hold, my lord, by the law, and the law alone,—not by the Divine law, for that ceased, as regards tithes, with the Commonwealth of the Jews,—not by the law of the Church, for you have no connection whatever with the Church which once possessed them in this

country. You satisfy none of the obligations which she incurred on receiving them; you discharge none of the duties which her ministers were bound in justice to perform *for them and with them*. You possess your property only by virtue of the civil law, and that law is penal, and highly penal.”*

The Catholic Church was, at the time of that letter, DISINHERITED. That later law, passed in 1851, by which it is PROSCRIBED also, had not then been passed; for such men as Dr. Doyle and Mr. O’Connell were still alive, and the famine prophesied by the Bishop had not as yet prostrated the people of Ireland, and reduced them to a state of weakness far exceeding that of 1823. Whether Dr. Doyle would have been contented with an additional “penal law” because it cannot be, or has not been as yet, enforced, and is only held in contumely over our heads by an enemy at once frightened and insolent; whether he would have deemed that a law, insulting and assailing, ceases to be hateful merely because it is contemptible also; whether he would have thought that a law, though not enforced, is really without a practical effect, when to the ascendant minority it imparts a more minatory superiority, while on the Church of the nation it brands the stigma, not of isolated illegal acts, but of a total existence against law,—all this, alas, is left to conjecture since no pamphlet on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill can be expected signed with those well-known initials, J. K. L., *James Kildare and Leighlin*. We return, therefore to what stands recorded, not doubting that the great prelate, whose nature, with all its gentleness, was

“Based on a surging subterranean fire,”

and to whom the cry of wrong was ever as the trumpet-blast summoning the strong man to battle, would, had his life been spared, have used language not less strong, on the occasion referred to, than that used by his friend, Archbishop Murray, when he wrote that he had trusted and been deceived, and that the men whom he had trusted were the men who had made a mockery of his gray hairs.

In every age it is convenient to traduce the faith in order to find a pretext for oppressing it. The following language, addressed to Lord Wellesley, is Dr. Doyle’s reply to such attempts:

“It was the creed, my lord, of a Charlemagne and of a St. Louis, of an Alfred and an Edward, of the monarchs of the feudal times as well as of the emperors of Greece and Rome; it was be-

lieved at Venice and in Genoa, in Lucca and the Helvetic nations, in the days of their freedom and greatness; all the barons of the middle ages, all the free cities of later times, professed the religion we now profess. You well know, my lord, that the charter of British freedom, and the common law of England, have their origin and source in Catholic times. Who framed the free constitutions of the Spanish Goths? Who preserved science and literature during the long night of the middle ages? Who imported literature from Constantinople, and opened for her an asylum at Rome, Florence, Padua, Paris, and Oxford? Who polished Europe by art, and refined her by legislation? Who discovered the New World, and opened a passage to another? Who were the masters of architecture, of painting, and of music? Who invented the compass, and the art of printing? Who were the poets, the historians, the jurists, the men of deep research and profound literature? Who have exalted human nature, and made man appear little less than the angels?—Were they not, almost exclusively, the professors of our creed? Were they who created and possessed freedom under every shape and form unfit for her enjoyment?!”*

In 1824, Dr. Doyle replied to some strictures made by Mr. North. That eminent man boasted in parliament of what he considered the great services of the Kildare-Street Society in dispelling the “thick and palpable darkness” in which the Irish people had long grovelled, and substituting a wholesome teaching for the “immoral and seditious books generally used in the Catholic schools with the tacit sanction or connivance of the Catholic priesthood.” After showing that where books of a disedifying character had been introduced into the hedge-schools, it was by the Catholic clergy that they were removed, the Bishop pointed out, with a trenchant pen, by what laws, and to what men, the low condition of Irish education was occasioned, illustrating his statement with appeals to recent facts.† Much that Dr. Doyle wrote on such topics, however valuable for the time in which it was published, would have seemed superfluous some twelve years ago. It is at once sad and strange to observe how applicable these parts of his works have again become to the times in which we live, when to the learned and impartial writings of a Maitland have succeeded elaborate vindications of Henry VIII.; when calumnies against the Church as stupid and false as Fox’s *Book of Martyrs* are again provided for the appetite of the public; and when, in place of the ready concessions of a Hallam respecting the persecutions carried out by Protestant monarchs, whether with or without a political pretext, we are again

* Vol. i. p. 269.

† Vol. i. pp. 313-315.

assured by men whose unhappy task is that of sustaining, let us hope unconsciously, the "false tradition" in history, that it was always for high treason, not for religion, that recusants were punished in Queen Elizabeth's reign,—that the Catholics were prompted only by romance to provide sliding panels for the concealment of their priests,—that the sufferings of the Irish were in part exaggerated, and in part self-provoked,—and that persecution was hardly ever practised against that religion which, from the day when Elizabeth struck down the Catholic hierarchy to the passing of Catholic Emancipation, had never ceased to be persecuted by law!

To the zeal of primitive times in defence of his flock, Dr. Doyle united the vigour of primitive times in ruling it. We have alluded to the solemn Pastorals with which he put down Ribbon conspiracies, while he also threw his whole weight into the constitutional efforts made for the redress of wrongs. Against other local abuses he was not less powerfully armed.

"On the occasion of his visit to Mountrath, in 1825, faction-fighting had prevailed to a frightful extent. Having ascertained the leaders to be men who had frequently been checked for similar tendencies, he summoned them before him. Hardened as they were in other respects, they trembled to disobey their Bishop, and proceeded to the chapel. The congregation knew that a storm was brewing. . . . After the Confirmation-Mass, Dr. Doyle (the wave of whose hand acted like the loadstone upon iron) motioned the ringleaders of the faction to advance within the altar-rails. They were colossal men, of iron nerve and almost savage countenance; but they obeyed the Bishop's summons with the alacrity of children, and knelt down humbly before him. Dr. Doyle uttered a touching exhortation; but this had several times been addressed to them, and he felt that something more was necessary to smother the growing abuse for ever. The candles were extinguished, and other preparations were made for the awful ceremony of excommunication. I was too frightened to remember more; but I knew that faction-fighting received its death-blow on this occasion. The leaders, having shown true repentance, were soon afterwards tenderly received back again by their Bishop."*

In 1826, the proselytisers of that day, following in the steps of a famine then prevailing in his diocese (for Ireland's "difficulty" is always their "opportunity"), met with some success in their joint distribution of tracts and bread. At Staplestown, a few of the refuse of the parish began to "have doubts." Dr. Doyle heard, and went.

* Vol. i. p. 389.

“‘Go,’ said he, ‘go to your new master. No one can serve two. . . . I excommunicate you!’ A long deep groan of wildness and despair swept through the chapel. Some fled panic-stricken : others fell prostrate before the altar, sobbing and imploring forgiveness of God, and of his faithful vicar. ‘Pardon them, my lord,’ interposed the parish-priest ; ‘they repent.’ ‘No,’ said Dr. Doyle, ‘the crime is too great to be immediately forgiven.’”*

His tenderness for his flock was equal to his severity, as it was the cause of it. The following passage seems to carry us back to the age of St. Cyprian and the martyr-deacon, the St. Stephen of the West. In 1824 there was a famine at Carlow.

“It was by his own singular and personal efforts that 2000 persons were fed every day at the college, at the convent, and at the soup-kitchen. . . . ‘Poor Peter is ashamed of me,’ said the Bishop, ‘and has given me 25*l.* to keep the life in me (as he said) by warm clothing ; but the poor fellow has done more than he fancied, as I shall, of course, give it to the poor this day, and keep the life in hundreds of persons for many years to come. . . . I shall sell some silver tankards which I have received as presents. I shall dispose also of my gold watch, and I have already made arrangements to sell to the Bishop of — some chalices which we do not want.’ ‘Oh, my lord,’ said one of the party, ‘surely you do not mean to sell the chalices!’ ‘Be assured, friend,’ he answered, ‘I will sell them, and all I have in the world beside, in the present necessity. Surely, sir, you would not have me to preserve the mere metal within which our Lord temporarily resides in His sacramental form, and let perish the living tabernacle, the faithful hearts of my own poor suffering people, where He and the Holy Ghost cherishingly dwell, as their dearly-loved habitation in this world of sin.’”†

The last sentence might perhaps suggest deep thoughts (better things than *bravura* phrases and declamatory brain-tricks) to those who persuade themselves that “sacerdotal claims” flourish at the expense of the “*Pauperes Christi*,” and that Catholicity slights the “INDIVIDUAL,” with all his awful prerogatives and trials, for the sake of the body at large.

The skill with which Dr. Doyle varied his method, both of thought and expression, according to the intellectual character of the person he addressed, was remarkable. The following extract from his *Essay on the Catholic Claims*, addressed to Lord Liverpool in 1826, is in singular contrast with the sharper but less philosophic tone in which he addressed Archbishop Magee. Writing to a statesman, he points out that the Church, though a universal and super-

* Vol. i. p. 500.

† Vol. i. p. 310.

natural institute, not (like a state) a local one, has yet something in common with a state. This is the circumstance which the sects never see. In habitual servitude, they boast that they do not overstrain their authority; and, wholly without ecclesiastical government, they exult that they are never charged with governmental abuses, which is much as if an oyster were to be proud that he had never gout in his toes.

“From this sketch of our doctrinal and legal economy, if I may so style it, two things must be quite obvious to your lordship: first, that it would be as unreasonable to expect the same simplicity in our laws as might be found in those of a Church of one or two centuries, and confined to some one nation, as it would be to look for the same number of statutes in the new State of Columbia as are to be found in the code of Great Britain; and that it would be equally unwise, a similar proof of presumption and ignorance, for a man to charge the whole system of the British laws and constitution with inconsistency or absurdity, because their nature and meaning were unknown to him, as it would be to pronounce the creed and discipline of the Catholic Church monstrous because it happened not to be understood by him. The harmony, the beauty, the excellence of the constitution and laws of England are always appreciated and prized in proportion as they are known and understood, whilst their antiquity contributes to render them venerable and secure: so, my lord, the order, the harmony, the consistency of our doctrine, and of our ecclesiastical government, have been, for similar reasons, approved and appreciated at all times by the wise and learned of all sects and countries. To these qualities, so eminently conspicuous in our Church, her continuance and preservation, amidst the wreck of states and nations, have been attributed by the most learned of her adversaries, whilst *we* assign them to that all-ruling Providence which, in virtue of the Redeemer’s promise, watches over her with a peculiar and unceasing care. The second thing which appears from what I have noticed is, that if any one wishes to learn our doctrine and discipline, the laws and usages which prevail universally amongst us, or those which are confined to any one nation or province, he must have recourse for such information to the authentic records of our faith, and to the code of our existing laws; and should he be unable to satisfy himself by the inspection or perusal of these, he must, as in all analogous cases, apply to men who by their profession and station in the Church are competent, and even obliged, to furnish it.”*

Mr. Fitz-Patrick tells us that Dr. Doyle knew Blackstone nearly by heart.

“Dr. Doyle was a prelate of an entirely new type,” remarks Mr. Fitz-Patrick; “fear, doubt, or diffidence were unknown to him. With

one glance he could make the wielder of an insult wither. 'His face,' says a celebrated and acute observer (Mr. Sheil), 'has a very peculiar expression; intelligence throughout, strength, and an honest scorn about the mouth and lips. . . . The remark may be fanciful, but it struck me that I could discover in his controlled and measured gait the same secret consciousness of strength, and the same reluctance to display it.' 'I never,' said Canon Pope, 'knew a man whose demeanour inspired a stronger or wider feeling of awe and veneration. I have met all the Cardinals and Princes of the Church, at Rome and elsewhere, but not one of them ever impressed me with that singularly intense feeling of respect and admiration which Dr. Doyle's presence never failed to enkindle.'"*

Our quotations have been restricted to the first volume of Mr. Fitz-Patrick's excellent work. For the present we must leave a subject which would exhaust a space far greater than we can afford on this occasion.

REASON AND FAITH.

IN a paper on Reason and Faith in our last Number, we treated rather of the relations of the religious or faithful mind with the scientific mind, than the relations between the truths that Christians believe and the truths which science seeks to know. We considered the contest between science and faith in their characters of qualities of mind and principles of action; now we have to look at the relations between the objects and results of science and the things proposed to our belief,—between the accumulations of science and the records of faith, the creeds, the Church, and the Scripture.

The creeds are summaries of Christian faith, comprising not all that is revealed, not all that should be known, but all that need be known by the adult of average intellect as the condition of his joining the Church, and as the indispensable foundation of his Christian life. There can be no question of a contest between the articles of the creed and science, because it is confessed both by philosophers and divines that natural science and the dogmas of faith stand on different platforms, and have nothing to do with each other. "The articles of faith," says St. Thomas,† "cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things which appear not. . . . This must be minded, for fear that under pretence of demon-

* Vol. i. p. 494.

† Sum. i. 9, 46, art. 2.

strating the faith, we should employ only probable arguments, and so give unbelievers ground for mocking us when they think that our faith rests on such insufficient grounds." Thus "he who attempts to prove the dogma of the Trinity by natural reasons injures the faith both in its dignity, for it has to do with invisible things which transcend our reason; and in its interests, for he destroys the chance of the conversion of those who laugh at the flimsiness of the base on which they suppose our faith is founded. We must always rest our proofs upon authorities which our opponents admit; and in default, we must be contented with showing that the facts which faith affirms are not impossible."* The distinction is clearly drawn; reason cannot go farther than to show that the dogmas are not impossible, not self-contradictory, not inconsistent with the fundamental data of reason, or with other orders of known truth. It requires the authority of revelation to prove that they are true. "*Abscondita Deo nostro: mundum tradidit disputationi hominum.*" The invisible world is God's; we know no more of it than He reveals. The visible world is handed over to the investigation of men.

A detailed review of the contents of the creeds and definitions would show that their subject matter is all outside the sphere of phenomena, which is the realm of science. The Trinity, the Incarnation, the Fall and the Redemption, Grace, the Sacraments, the authority of the Church, the inspiration of Scripture, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, heaven and hell, offer no hold for scientific experiments. The philosopher may theorise upon them in a way that offends faith; but it will be only theory, not science. He will have once more proved the venerable truism, that without revelation we have no demonstration of any Christian doctrine, that each dogma becomes a mere guess, and therefore as susceptible of denial as of affirmation.

But, it may be said, "The creed talks of the world, which is handed over to men's disputes, of physiology in the virgin conception and birth and the death and resurrection of our Lord, touches on history in the date *sub Pontio Pilato*, and adds no man knows what to the heap of credenda by introducing the Church, which may teach what it likes, and the Scripture, which does teach many things at variance with modern discoveries, and which it takes care we should not interpret in conformity with these discoveries by binding us down to the exploded interpretations of the Fathers. Is not this a contest between faith and science?"

* Sum. i. 9, 32, 1.

The most extended notice of the world in any creed is in that of the fourth Council of Lateran. The faith teaches that the world is not eternal, but was created out of nothing, not of necessity but freely, by God, "the one sole Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal; who by His almighty power at once in the beginning of time formed out of nothing the two systems of matter and spirit, the world and the angels; and then made man as a mean between the two, composed of spirit and body." Not one of these points is capable of scientific proof or refutation. The creation of the material and spiritual worlds is an article of faith; not so the time or manner of their creation, in which questions we may take any side, or adopt any theory about the progressive or sudden formation of the universe, the celestial mechanism, the world's chronology, or the meaning of the "days" of Genesis. These questions do not enter into the faith as summed up in the creeds, and, so far, are still left to the disputes of men.

The physiological facts in the creed are there, not because they are natural, but because they are miraculous; now all that science can do, is to prove that they are not natural; but this was known before. Again, from the presence of one small fact of civil history in the creed, it does not follow that faith interferes with general historical investigations, or with the philosophy of history. The name of Pontius Pilate is immaterial to the act of faith, and if it was essential, his existence is a fact beyond a doubt; the most sceptical would be ashamed to call it in question if it were not for the object of insulting Christianity.

The objections concerning the Church and Scripture are weightier. The creed binds us to accept Scripture, with all its statements about nature and man, such as science has a right to dispute upon. And though Protestants may pass over them on pretence of their unascertained and unascertainable meaning, the Catholic cannot do so, as he is bound to the sense imposed by the Church and her doctors. He professes that he "admits the holy Scripture in that sense which is held and has been held by our holy mother the Church, to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the holy Scriptures," and that he never "will receive or interpret them except according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." But, for example, cannot Church and Fathers be cited in support of a cosmogony which, however well grounded in Scripture and tradition, is quite disproved by modern discoveries? Are we bound to such a theory? And has not the Church condemned as false and

unscriptural the theory of the mechanism of the universe, which is now a demonstrated truth? Are we bound by such a condemnation?

Here is the focus of the difficulty. The articles of the faith are not in contradiction with science; but they come to us so involved in Scripture and the tradition of the Church, that any material error in these *media* would invalidate the authority on which we accept the faith, and would thus involve it in uncertainty, and render real faith impossible. Hence the relations of Church and Scripture with science involve the very existence of Christianity. The Church enters into these relations in two characters; first, as teacher of the Catholic faith, or creeds; secondly, as guardian and mother of the theological habit of faith.

The Catholic faith is the body of doctrine proposed to all the faithful as necessary to be believed in order to salvation. It consists of articles of faith, laws of morals, and certain dogmatic facts in which some of the doctrines are enveloped. The revealed dogmas are outside the sphere of science, and afford no ground for a collision between science and faith. The dogmatic facts are either miraculous, and so beyond the realm of science, as the article, "born of the Virgin Mary;" or such individual events as the commonest testimony is sufficient to prove, as the article, "crucified and buried." But it is to be noted that these external facts are not in themselves the objects of faith, but only so far as they are the outward expressions of an inward truth. "Of the phenomenon," says Suarez,* "there is not faith, but experience; it is not revealed, but seen; it is not proposed as the object of faith, but to lead to faith. The inner truth and substance is something distinct from the outward seeming, and faith has to do with the substance, not with the shape." St. Thomas puts his finger into his Master's side, and makes his act of faith, not in what he sees, but in what he infers. He saw the living flesh that had been dead; he believed in the incarnate God.

The Catholic faith, then, being limited to the invisible substance, and the few individual facts in which this substance was manifested, it is clear that the authority of the Teacher of this faith is by the force of the term comprised within the same limits; the Church, as the infallible teacher of religion, only claims infallible authority in questions wholly and directly religious, and in the religious element of mixed questions.

But whatever limits there are to the Catholic faith, we

* De Fid. disp. 2, § ix.

can put none to God's revelation. God might reveal an answer to any question that man's curiosity could put. Are there men in the moon, or in Jupiter? And it is a fact that in the revealed Word there is much which is directly within the provinces of the historian and philosopher, and which is delivered over to the disputation of men. And yet if men conclude against it, they throw a slur upon Scripture, cast a doubt on the authority of the records of faith, and so make faith impossible. We are in a dilemma. If the Church is the infallible teacher of faith, she should have power to interpret in her own way the texts which, otherwise interpreted, contradict her infallible teaching by making the Scripture false which she teaches to be true. And yet she has no power over the facts to which those texts refer. It becomes, therefore, an anxious duty for the Catholic to determine the precise relation of the Church to those parts of revelation which do not directly refer to religion. (1) Has she infallible authority to interpret them? or (2) has she only a limited right of practical interference in controversies about them? or (3) has she no right to speak on Scriptural questions that do not directly belong to faith, morals, or discipline? The affirmation of the first question allows faith to crush science; of the second, leaves it undetermined whether or not science is contrary to faith; of the third, subordinates faith to science.

1. Has the Church an infallible authority over the interpretation of these texts? It belongs to her "to judge of the true sense and interpretation of Scripture;" but in performing this function she does not, says Möhler, proceed by the rules of verbal criticism, nor by the interpretation of particular texts; indeed when she quotes a text to prove a doctrine, we are bound to believe the doctrine, but not bound to believe that the text proves it. But if she be an infallible guide, then no doctrine which she rejects can be contained in Scripture: hence, though she cannot search the Scripture to *discover* what to teach (because she knew what to teach before the New Testament was written, and therefore she cannot accept Scripture as the original well-spring of her doctrine), yet she may reprove the man who affirms that a text contains a doctrine which she rejects, or that a text which expresses in terms any of her doctrines *must* be interpreted metaphorically. For both propositions suppose that the Church contradicts Scripture by her doctrines. But she has no infallible key for texts not thus connected with her dogmas. "Her interpretation does not descend to the details which claim the attention of the scientific exegetist. It is *not her duty*, nor has

she the right to determine when, by whom, and why the book of Job was written. She does not explain particular words or verses, their bearings on each other, or the connection between the sections of a sacred book. Antiquities are not in her domain; her interpretation extends only to doctrines of faith and morals." "It is one thing," says St. Augustine, "not to know the primary meaning of the sacred writer, and another to err from the rule of faith." "The ancient consent of the Fathers," says Vincent of Lerins, "is not to be looked for in every little question that arises on the divine law, but only, or at any rate chiefly, in the rule of faith."

There are, however, those who claim for the Church an infallible authority over all things that "pertain to faith and morals, and to the support of Christian doctrine," but as the overthrow of any single text would overthrow the Christian doctrine concerning the Scriptures, therefore the vindication of every text pertains to the support of that doctrine, and therefore it belongs to the Church to interpret infallibly every sentence of the Bible.

A crucial test of the validity of this reasoning may perhaps be found in the prophetic passages of Scripture. As these passages are the proofs of the inspiration of her first teachers, it is of the last consequence to her that they should be true. But the Church cannot make them come true, unless she can dictate the course of events. God, in denying her this power, has reserved to Himself the office of fulfilling that which the prophets have foretold. And as she is unable to fulfil the prophecies, so is she unable to write history beforehand, and predict how they will be fulfilled. To interpret rightly a prophecy before its accomplishment is to choose out of many possible interpretations that which shall be the true one. This is a prophetic gift, requiring a prophetic inspiration, and certainly is not among the ordinary gifts or graces bestowed on the Church.

And even if the Church had this prophetic gift, it would not prove that she could interpret all her prophecies. The inspired prophets and apostles did not always know the meaning of the predictions they were commissioned to pronounce. For there is an inspiration which impels a man to announce something which he understands imperfectly, or not at all. We have instances of such inspiration in Caiaphas, and in those who had the gift of tongues or prophecy without the gift of interpretation. The Apostles themselves misunderstood our Lord, as when He said that St. John should tarry till He came, or when they and the whole Church lived in daily expectation of the second advent. Indeed, with respect

to one prediction, that of the restoration of Israel, our Lord plainly told them, "It is not for you to know the times and moments which the Father hath put in His own power." If it was not for the Apostles to know these particulars, neither was it for the Church. Another instance. In Job xxxviii. and xxxix. the creation of the world is described in a series of questions which the patriarch is challenged to answer: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" and so on, till Job is constrained to own that he knows nothing but his own ignorance. "I have spoken unwisely, and things *that above measure exceeded my knowledge.*" That which exceeds the knowledge of the prophet and the apostle, exceeds the knowledge of the Church, which is built upon them, and knows no more than they communicated to her; but they could not communicate more than they had, and perhaps they did not communicate all they had. For as St. Augustine says, "even if they knew, their commission was to tell only what was profitable to salvation," therefore, he continues, they did not tell us what is the form of the heavens, because it does not signify to religion what form they have. On the whole, then, they probably did not know the meaning of all they were commissioned to utter; and even if they had known it all, it by no means follows that they should have communicated it all to the Church. And hence we may conclude that the Church has no authority to interpret the prophecies of Scripture, except so far as they involve faith or morals.

This conclusion, so far from being derogatory to the Church, seems to exhibit her as a spouse in her husband's arms, not every moment asking with fear and suspicion what he is going to do, but full of trust, confident that the perils she is being borne through, are more apparent than real, and will all be triumphantly surmounted. If she had been launched into the world, and left to her own resources, she might well have demanded a control over events; she might then well view all progress with suspicion, and fear lest discovery might at last discredit her claims, or politics destroy her independence. But she is a spouse, not a widow, and her Lord, who is with her all days, has reserved for Himself the task of avenging her honour, and of justifying her faithfulness. It is His business, not hers. She has only to teach that which she has the commission to teach with infallible authority. On questions of history, politics, science, interpretation of prophecy, and subjects outside the faith, which serve only to recommend her faithfulness or vindicate her character, she must resign herself to the jealous care of "her Maker and

her Husband," and her rulers must remember that he that is too anxious to "bear witness to himself," loses both dignity and credit.

When the Church, the teacher of the faith, tells us to interpret Scripture according to her teaching, and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, she must be considered as giving us with one hand her tradition and dogmas, and with the other the Scriptures, bidding us expatiate at will in this ample field, so long as we do not directly or indirectly contradict the faith. "In things which do not pertain to faith or morals," says a great Canonist, "a man may affirm what he pleases, if the matter is indifferent." "To mistake," says St. Augustine, "in matters which make no difference to salvation, whether they are believed or not, whether they are thought true or false, is no sin." But the Church does not give us the Bible to seek therein new doctrines of faith. Her faith is her life; a new faith is a new life, and a new life implies a negation and condemnation of the former living. To preach a new faith is to proclaim that the Church was dead, till the preacher restored her to life, as her new founder and apostle. While we keep clear of this absurdity, in all the rest we have perfect freedom. Neither her authority nor that of the Fathers determines questions of chronology or natural history. "Except in the interpretation of a very few classical passages," says Möhler, "we know not where we shall meet with a general uniformity of Scriptural interpretation among the Fathers, further than that they deduce from the sacred writings the same doctrines, yet each in his own peculiar manner." The "unanimous consent of the Fathers" is only a phrase equivalent to "common ecclesiastical tradition," the faith in which all agree, excluding opinions on which they differ; and the authority belongs not to their reason or research, but to the tradition of which they were the channels. In matters not of faith or morals, however closely connected with Scriptural history, we are not bound by any decision of the Church, nor by any array of Patristic authority. "In matters of philosophy," says St. Thomas, "which do not relate to the faith, the decisions of the holy Fathers are of no more authority than those of the philosophers whom they follow." So much for the first question.

2. Has, then, the Church only a *limited right of practical interference* in controversies about those parts of revelation which do not directly affect religion? And when we say *practical* instead of *theoretical* interference, we consider the Church no longer as the teacher of dogma, but as the nurse of the habit of faith, the legislator and ruler of the faithful.

We have already considered her powers with regard to the dogmas ; it remains to speak of that authority in behoof of the moral habit of faith, which belongs to her in her character of guardian and governor of men in matters pertaining to the faith.

If the Church had not this limited right, the affirmative of the third question would be true, and she would be condemned to a perpetual silence on all questions not directly concerning faith, morals, or discipline ; and philosophers would have an unquestioned power of sapping the approaches and outworks of faith. But the Church cannot, and does not, admit this ; since she does interfere in such controversies without claiming infallible authority to determine them, she acts on, and therefore affirms, the general law that she has the right to interfere, even where her judgment is not infallible.

Such an interference, however expressed, cannot constitute a definition of faith. To call it so is to damage the Church's cause. If the Church had only a right to interfere where her judgment was infallible, she would have gone beyond her rights in half the books she has placed on the Index ; she would have shown herself ignorant of the limits of her authority, and would have proved by her acts that she did not know on what subjects she was infallible. And if this had been so, it would follow that all her decrees must be subject to the revision of a higher court, which would decide whether or no she had gone beyond the bounds of her infallible authority. Thus, even in her infallibility, she would be subject to a higher tribunal, which might set up a rival and contradictory infallibility.

All this difficulty vanishes when we think of the Church not simply as dogmatic teacher, but as guardian and nurse of the virtue or habit of faith. We have already pointed out the chief rivalries between the habit of faith and the habit of science: their interference as rival occupants of the attention ; their mutual depreciation of each other's ends ; the conservatism of the one, and the changeableness of the other. We cannot deny that the conservative dislike of change has been often manifested by the faithful with equal weakness and obstinacy. For we are a mixed multitude ; most of us are poor and ignorant ; and men, even when most refined and educated, are often full of prejudices. Out of this mixed multitude our leaders and spokesmen are chosen, and their sympathies, as well as their interests generally, lie with the many against the few. If our leaders were angels from heaven, they would be forced to take us as we are ; being only men,

they have often no higher ideal, but try also to keep us what we are. Their object is to help us to our supernatural end, and to keep us faithful to the teaching and discipline of the Church. They know the reality of what the Church aims at, and its unrivalled importance; they care for nothing else, and take no interest in our political or philosophical views, except when they react upon our faith and morals. They tolerate all that proves to be compatible with faith, and try to suppress all that they think detrimental to it; in doing so they inevitably interfere in controversies which they cannot infallibly settle. Natural science is not within the domain of faith, yet from the beginning faith has followed one rule in regard to it. Whenever natural science has been mixed up with heresy, or has been an occasion of unbelief, or has excited the passions and caused moral disturbances, faith has discouraged and opposed it. The first religious command was the prohibition of the tree of knowledge. Then came the laws against magic and the occult sciences; and if the modern magnetism and table-turning, in spite of their adepts identifying them with the old magic and witchcraft, are not formally condemned, it is because these new impostures are not necessarily connected with the idea of a compact with invisible powers, but pretend to go by natural laws. If they are only "natural magic," they are lawful till they endanger morals. Many other tenets connected with the science of nature were formerly disallowed, but are now tolerated. In the beginning of the controversy on original sin, "the very root of Pelagianism was, that Adam did not become mortal by the Fall, but was created so."* Yet now every one holds that his immortality was not involved in his natural creation, but in his supernatural gift. To deny that the earth was a flat disk was reckoned heretical by St. Augustine; and St. Boniface and Pope Zacharias obliged St. Vigilius to recant the scandalous assertion of antipodes, supposed to involve the existence of men for whom Christ had not died. St. Augustine, probably for the same reason, calls it heresy to assert the plurality of worlds, though St. Clement of Rome had taught it. Galileo was vehemently suspected of heresy for his adherence to Copernicus. Aristotle's works were forbidden by the Councils of Tours (1163) and of Paris (1209). After the Germans and Celts had been converted from their nature-worship, intimate intercourse with nature became suspected of witchcraft, and the sinful reading of works on physical science was forbidden. Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and almost all the older Fathers, objected to the

* J. B. Morris, *Jesus, Son of Mary*, vol. i. p. 77.

plastic arts as handmaids of idolatry. These are examples of opinions and practices, indifferent in themselves, being reckoned heretical because of their accidental accompaniments. For when a truth of any order first strikes the imagination of a people, its effects are disorderly. One party considers it a dangerous innovation, the other exalts it above all hitherto known, and dates a new era from its discovery. Even truths which were destined to be afterwards admitted into the closest fellowship with Christian doctrine, on their first rise formed the basis of heretical opinions; Dr. Newman cites the examples of Montanism, Gnosticism, and Sabellianism.* Error is only the perversion of truth. Truths suddenly thrust upon ill-regulated or empty minds assume an exaggerated importance which blinds the intellect to all other truths, and so they become heresies. Even religious truth may be prematurely known, and its exaggerated and dislocated assertion may result in a lie. It is often the same with the religious effects of the sudden effulgence of a new physical truth. Hence the considerate master teaches with economy. "I have yet many things to say to you," said our Lord to the Apostles, "but ye cannot bear them now." A new principle of philosophy working on the ardent brains of young students generally begets a school which denies all principles but the new one. The Benthamites made utility and pleasure not only the corner-stones of their system, but its only stones. The revival of physiognomy begets phrenology, claiming to be all philosophy. The revival of the medical principle *similia similibus*, true in many cases, begets homœopathy, which affirms its exclusive truth. Most modern systems are chargeable with the quackery of extending a partial truth into all spheres of science. Now, all the ecclesiastical interferences with science are easily defensible so far as they are directed against this false application of scientific truths. Whenever the bent of philosophers or the prejudices of the faithful impress upon a new or revived theory, however true, the tendency to upset faith, the Church may proscribe the theory, and brand it as scandalous, rash, absurd, false, or heretical, without pretending to decide on its absolute truth or falsehood in its own sphere. It is called false if it seems to prove the true faith to be a lie, even although it owes its evil force only to the prejudices and ignorance of the faithful; it is called heretical if it is used to strengthen and illustrate the arguments of heretics; it is called absurd if, while only an uncertain hypothesis, it is used to undermine the certainty of faith.

* Essay on Development, p. 349.

The government of the Church may be considered in several aspects: in one it is the organ of the Holy Spirit, guarding the deposit of faith, teaching faith and morals with infallible precision, and claiming interior assent to its decisions. In another aspect the government of the Church is the organ of the multitude of Christians, reflecting faithfully their prejudices and fears, and repressing what they for the moment feel to be dangerous to their convictions or principles. For the rulers of the Church are personally only her children, though they are the leaders, the examples, and the flowers of the flock,—often sharing its prejudices, still more often loth to offend the prejudices which they do not share. In this aspect the Church nurses her children, as a mother presides in her nursery, lowering her intellect to the level of her babes, at the risk of gaining the contempt of her children who have outgrown the need of such condescension. When she feels too weak to receive new truths without scandalising masses of her children, she will prohibit them, at the risk of scandalising the few philosophers who may yet know them.

But such prohibitions make no claim to interior assent, as prohibitions of propositions against the faith do. Orthodox faith is necessary to every Christian. The prevention of scandal by the suppression of irritating controversies only requires a silent acquiescence. Hence we need not be surprised at Cardinal Bellarmine's certificate to Galileo, testifying that he had not retracted one of his opinions after the first condemnation of the Copernican theory. Nor need we wonder that the Church should compromise matters by allowing the condemned theory still to be taught as a mere hypothesis; as the organ of popular feeling, and the judge of those who give scandal, she is obliged to protect those who cry out that the faith is in danger. The philosophers themselves would do the same, if they were placed in a similar position; if a revolution were to make them rulers of a country, they would prohibit all writings against their government which they thought capable of disturbing public opinion. Whatever measures philosophic politicians would take for the salvation of society, they must allow the rulers of the Church to take for the salvation of souls; if life is to be sacrificed to save one soul, can science claim exemption? If Christians may be debarred from an indifferent pursuit when it becomes an occasion of sin, they may also be debarred from a certain course of study when it becomes dangerous to their own or their neighbour's salvation. And, in fact, ecclesiastical and civil governments have ever taken analogous measures to defend themselves from the dangers

which they apprehended from certain opinions, political, social, or religious. It is only when civilisation has differentiated society to such a vast extent that the inquiry into the endless modifications of opinions would be impossible, that the axiom has emerged, that it is better for government to let opinions take care of themselves, and to leave them to be dealt with by social agencies, to be merged in an average balance of forces, where society is large enough to admit of averages. We are persuaded that the ecclesiastical tendency is in the same direction; and ecclesiastical authorities would now find it difficult to interfere with matters foreign to faith, as they interfered in the 17th century.

It is not easy to apologise for those whose prejudices and weakness make such interventions necessary. Ordinary Christians seem to forget that philosophers and politicians are also men, with souls to be saved, and with minds liable to be scandalised, indeed beset with doubts and difficulties of which the ignorant and thoughtless never dream. Why is it forgotten that if charity sometimes requires the philosopher to suppress a truth of whose scientific value and fecundity he has a clear view, for fear of scandalising good souls, good souls also are bound, both in charity and in justice, to remove all obstacles from the philosopher's path as soon as possible? Ignorance is not prejudice; prejudice arises from half knowledge or false knowledge, which is usually acquired with as much labour as true knowledge. It saves neither time nor trouble to teach doubtful or false cosmogony, or history, or chronology, as part of a theological course; it is slovenly logic to argue that because Suarez, Petavius, or à Lapide were good divines, they were also competent authorities on physical science. If students in theology are forced to suck in the theories which ages of ignorance have foisted on Moses, when they have to work as clergymen they will experience in their own persons the way in which Church and Scripture have been exposed to the contempt of intelligent infidels, who, after hearing divines teaching physical falsehoods as Bible truths, have mocked at the same men when they claimed credence for biblical faith and morals; for most people have at least biblical knowledge enough to be aware that those who are found unfaithful in what men can see, are not to be believed when they speak of heavenly things that men cannot see.

Again, as this is not a matter in which the infallible teaching Church comes into action, but only the Church in her human and social character as the nursing-mother of faith, it is not disrespectful to remember, that here there is

greatest danger of the human weaknesses of the leaders of the Church cropping out, and overshadowing the divine character of the institution which they administer. There is danger in all cases of interference with secular science or progress on the ground of its supposed ill-effects upon faith, lest the interfering authorities should mistake their own irritation for a scandal growing up in the minds of the masses. There are pilots who take counsel only of their fears, exaggerate dangers, and create imaginary perils. It was in deference to the clamours, not of the ignorant laity, but of the instructed clergy, that the Congregation of the Index declared the Copernican system a false Pythagorean doctrine altogether adverse to Holy Scripture. The storm which these men dreaded was altogether of their own brewing, and the agitation was, for the most part, confined to their own minds; the illiterate classes, for whom they professed to fear, took no interest in either side of the controversy; far above their comprehension, the arguments of both parties passed by like the wind, and left no trace behind. The real object of fear, if the agitators would but have calmly examined their own consciences, was not the scandal of the simple, but the loss of their own personal authority; they suspected that the tenure of dogmatism in the field of induction was precarious, and they were angry with the new school which questioned its title; so without taking the precaution to sift the truth of facts, they pretended to judge of reality by convenience, boldly declared that to be true which they thought most conducive to their interest and their influence, and were reckless enough to attempt, not without an illusory show of success, to commit the Church to their views.

In intellectual encounters the Church and the world must always use the same weapons; they must argue upon the common principles of reason, and assume the same universally-accepted truths. In her battle with successive schools of philosophy, she has ever fought with their arms: they have passed away, and she remains; and the swords and bucklers she used are still hanging up in her museum. Happy if her children understood that the place where they hang was only a museum, not an arsenal! What engineer would trust to the picturesque walls of a mediæval castle to defend him against modern artillery? Yet some ecclesiastical engineers seem to do this; and their work reminds us of the vision of Hermas, who saw the Church like a beautiful tower, surrounded with unsightly heaps of rejected stones. The glorious creed of the Church is overshadowed with accretions which do not belong to it. False physiology, in-

herited from the dogmatists, disturbs moral theology. False astronomy and cosmology disfigure the popular interpretations of Scripture. To the man of science the high-road of Christian truth is blocked up with rubbish, the beautiful city is smothered with purlieus of mean houses, the impregnable rock is surrounded by lines of old fortifications built only against arrows and battering-rams. Though the real substance of the Church's truth is not affected, yet much of that brilliance has departed which dazzled the world when she first appeared, unencumbered with the superfluous spoils which have been accumulating for eighteen centuries. Each of her rusty suits of armour, each ruined outwork, was proper for the time when it was made; each protected the Church from some attack of the philosophy of the day by means of that philosophy. But for this very reason they are now crumbled into dust. They were not mere negations of the systems they opposed, but adaptations of them, founded on the admission of the truths on which they claimed to be built. And so whenever philosophy has denied its former self, and has removed to new ground, it has rendered the counter-works of religion useless, and has undermined them simply by withdrawing itself, leaving only ruins more or less picturesque or noble, but useless for present habitation or defence. The learning of the world, invited to dwell in them, answers by keeping outside the pale of Christianity.

There was not always reason to lament that the Christian ranks were so denuded, or so suspicious of great men that there was no one strong or influential enough to keep them up to the age, or to prevent them marching out in the armour of a crusader against the artillery of Armstrong and Whitworth. Of old the great schoolmen were the foremost men of their age; and no sooner did Aristotle threaten as fierce an opposition to the juridical theology of the Western Church as Kant or Mill threaten to its Aristotelised philosophy, than a St. Thomas was found to grapple with the rising heresy, to convert it, and to make it a buttress of the Church. Is there no truth in the modern systems that they are all to be treated so differently, that they are all suspected, and their friends treated as aliens from the Christian schools, and only Christians at all by a happy accident? The supernatural system of Christianity must be able to live at peace with any system of natural philosophy, true or false, which does not intrude into the supernatural realms that lie outside its sphere. Why should one such system only be favoured and the rest barely tolerated; especially when that system favours the intrusion of dogmatism into the field of induc-

tion, and is committed to astronomical and cosmogonical theories which modern science has demonstrated to be false? Why should Christians hug their chains, and even try to fasten them on the Church, instead of seeking to drop the log, and so to leave their limbs free for the intellectual contest to which they are challenged?

If the Aristotelic Christian schools have interfered with natural philosophy, natural philosophers have abundantly indemnified themselves by interfering with Christian science. Indeed, we fancy that philosophers first forced the Church to accept their systems, for which the successors of those philosophers laugh her to scorn. The earliest teachers of Christianity declared that such systems were outside the province of the Church. "It does not seem necessary to happiness," said St. Augustine, "to know the causes of the motions of the stars, which lie hid in the most secret recesses of nature. . . . If it were necessary to know the causes of material motion, none would have greater claims than the causes of health. But if our ignorance of these obliges us to go to the physicians, who does not see that we must bear with patience our ignorance of the secrets of heaven and earth?" Again: "We do not read in the Gospel that our Lord said, I send you the Paraclete to teach you the course of the sun and moon; for He wished to make us Christians, not astronomers." But this abstention of Christians did not satisfy the philosophers; they insisted upon hearing what the Christian schools had to say to their systems, and the fathers were reluctantly compelled, under protest, to speak their language. "The philosophers," says St. Ambrose, "wish us to own that the sphere of the heaven revolves rapidly, with all its brilliant stars, while the earth remains unmoved. . . . Now even granting what they ask, I may answer according to their own opinions," and so on; showing that St. Ambrose received the current astronomy, not as scriptural and Christian, but as that of the philosophers, on whom he throws the whole responsibility of it. In process of time, this astronomy had been so long taught in the Christian schools that its origin was forgotten, and it was supposed to be part of the tradition of the Church, instead of being a theory imposed upon her schools by the philosophers of the fifth century; and when the Copernican theory superseded it, both philosophers and divines, especially the latter, considered that the Church, and not the old astronomy, was the subject of attack. Galileo, indeed, thought that the new system was the more scriptural; and he demanded that the old system, forced upon the schools by his philosophical

predecessors of the fifth century, should be summarily evicted, and replaced by his new system. Bellarmine told him, that when the new theory was demonstrated it would be time enough to change the interpretation of Scripture. But the philosopher, we are told, "demanded that the Pope and Holy Office should declare it to be founded on the Bible, and wrote memorials on memorials."

We may conclude, then, upon the whole, that the infallible Church, the teacher of the faith, cannot be opposed to the march of science; because the faith is conversant solely with things about the reality of which science has not a word to say with any certainty. When science pretends to decide upon their truth, it goes beyond its limits, and ceases to be science; and the Church, in opposing this abuse, does not oppose science. But the Church has a more familiar and social aspect as guardian and nurse of the habit of faith; in this relation she has, like all other societies, a right of discouraging or repressing particular scientific theories *pro tempore* as long as she finds them dangerous to faith, and till they can be promulgated without mischief. The philosophers, however, will have reason to complain if she does not take strong and immediate measures for destroying those prejudices which impose upon her the lamentable and invidious necessity of interrupting, though only for a few years, the march of progress, and the discovery of the laws of nature.

Hence, in case of such a condemnation as that of Galileo for asserting the Copernican theory, the first thing to inquire is, whether the opinion is branded by the Church the teacher of the dogmas of faith, or by the Church the nurse of the habit of faith. Now the only organs of the Church, as infallible teacher of dogmas, are (1) the consentient teaching of all pastors in communion with the Pope, (2) a general council approved and confirmed by the Pope, and (3), according to the most approved school, the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*, and declaring that he is defining *de fide*: though, as long as persons are permitted to controvert the infallible authority of this last mode of ecclesiastical definition without ceasing to be Catholics, it cannot be put upon the same level as the two former modes. And none of these organs of ecclesiastical expression can delegate their infallible authority to any other institution or congregation; otherwise such organs might be indefinitely multiplied; nothing is *de fide* that is not defined by one or other of these three. And till such a definition can be produced, the condemnation of any scientific theory which has turned out to be true can

never fairly be used as a premiss to demonstrate the fallibility of the Church in teaching Christian doctrine.

But nothing can prevent men from bringing it forward as a proof of the jealousy that subsists in practice between the Church and science; and they will proceed to ask, "Is it not scandalous to allow Congregations like those of the Index and Holy Office to come forth with all the pomp of authority, and to condemn as false and heretical theories which the Church, as teacher of truth, has never so condemned?—as if the only object were to impose upon weak minds, and to force them to obedience by pretending an infallible authority which really has nothing to do with the matter in hand."

We need not be very careful to answer this objection; the Church as nurse of faith is only a generalisation of the social action of the Christian community; unquestionably, the whole Christian community may sometimes act in a scandalous manner, and compel its organs to do unjustifiable things. But the social action of the Church, being necessarily local, provincial, and national, can seldom be uniform. There is one Christian opinion in Italy, another in France, another in England. We cannot therefore argue from the intolerance, or impotence, or prejudice of one or more Christian provinces that the universal Church, if it acted together, would display the same weakness. Moreover it must be considered that besides the dogmas of faith, there exists in the Christian body a sentiment, an intelligence, that imbibes and assimilates the received beliefs and theories of the age, when these beliefs are not incompatible with faith. Christian knowledge thus embraces other things beside theology, and Christian philosophy is the organic whole of which theology is the head and the heart. This organic whole forms the basis of Christian education, and thus Christian faith becomes interwoven with, and partly dependent upon, many beliefs that are not of Christian origin. Thus in Galileo's day the physical philosophy of the peripatetics was incorporated with theology, and from this union there resulted a system partly true, partly false, which, as the ground of education, and the received mould and groove of Christian thought, could not be suddenly broken up without causing great distress and scandal, especially in a period of great religious disturbance. Interference with the philosopher who by means of a theory as yet undemonstrated was attempting to break up the received system was clearly not grounded on the truth or falsehood of his theory, but only on the scandal and harm he might cause,

or was supposed to have caused, in the Christian body. The guardians of the faith felt it to be their duty to guard the philosophy with which the faith was blended, to denounce those who attacked it, and to condemn their new opinions as contrary to philosophy and to faith. But at the same time, as if to take away all pretext for affirming that the condemnation was meant for a definition of faith, Bellarmine was commissioned to give Galileo a certificate of the falsehood of the calumnious report of his abjuration of any one of his doctrines or opinions. Now if the cardinals of the Congregation had really meant that the doctrine of the earth's motion was essentially contrary to Scripture and heretical, would they have permitted themselves to call the imputation of Galileo's having retracted it a "calumny"? These cardinals, then, never wished to "impose upon weak minds" with the pretence of authority, though less scrupulous ecclesiastics may have afterwards misused the sentence.

Now, though this is doubtless very galling to the philosopher, yet it is difficult to see how the divine can act on other principles. The very notion of social life is, that each individual gives up his wishes in some things in which he might please himself if he were living in a hermitage. Society is a compromise; and society cannot avail itself of the immense advantages of the social action of the Church without enduring some of the corresponding drawbacks. If society wants the Church to keep the uneducated masses quiet and virtuous through the influence of the faith, society must agree not to mar her work by offending the faith of these masses. And there is no great hardship here; the law of neighbourhood and nuisance applies to mind as well as body. I have no right to build either a factory or a school of opinion that shall be a source of danger and of grave annoyance to all my neighbours; for the stewardship of ideas is as much a trust as the stewardship of wealth. In neither has a man the unlimited right of doing what he will with his own.

We conclude, then, that in spite of occasional practical difficulties in the relations between bodies of Christians and philosophers, there never was and never can be any real opposition between scientific truth and the dogmas of faith taught by the infallible Church. The instances most relied on by objectors are only examples of the temporary social opposition of the Church to the tumultuous discussion of opinions that were at the time both undemonstrated and dangerous. She has never been opposed to their quiet investigation and demonstration; but she has opposed the

dishonest use sometimes made of them, when philosophers have pretended to submit them to the judgment of the ignorant mob, in order to gather a party, or to add fresh fuel to a movement already dangerous. Unlimited publicity is often only an appeal to popular prejudice. But in fact philosophers do not reckon the people to be the judges of their theories, and when they appeal to them it is generally for some unexpressed purpose that has nothing to do with science. If the Church suspects that this unexpressed purpose is opposition to herself, she may condemn the act without thereby meddling with the science.

Yet, after all, no Catholic can with honesty deny that the opposition of Christian society to the progress of thought has been carried on in a manner which has alienated much of the intelligence of Christian lands from the Church and from Christianity. The remedy, however, seems easy. If the Christian schools would escape from the consequences of their old-fashioned fidelity to philosophical systems which have no longer their old power in the world of thought, they must cultivate modern versatility, and not only leave to others, but assert for themselves, that freedom in doubtful matters which is quite compatible with unity in fundamental principles. Again, if their one-sidedness has led them into many a contest with the secular schools, they have only to acknowledge the many-sidedness of truth; they have only to own that there is some truth in almost all human systems, and that no human system monopolises all truth even in its own order; and therefore that no one such system should monopolise the favour of the Church, or occupy the Christian schools to the exclusion or depreciation of other systems.

Assuredly the remedy for the present intellectual eclipse of Catholic society is not to be found in assimilating the ecclesiastical government to the civil system, which is making such progress in Europe and America. The tendency of the principles of 1789 is to a democratic despotism, that is, to an absolute power, wielded in favour, not of privileged classes, but of the masses; the average level of society is the ideal which it strives to uphold. Such a system is possible in temporal matters, which are disposed of more or less by force; for the masses are the sphere of force, and if they can only be organised by a scientific administration, their power is irresistible. But the system fails when it comes to be applied to the world of ideas. Organisms whose forces are intellectual and moral cannot be ruled for the exclusive benefit of the existing average of intelligence, but they must always be

directed towards an ideal, which is much more nearly realised by the intellectual and moral few than by the average many. In such organisms, then, there must always be privileged classes, for there is no possible means of reducing all minds and hearts to the same level. To govern such a society on the levelling principle, on the principle of compelling all men to think in a uniform groove, to adopt the same political principles, the same theories of science, the same canons of taste, and to treat those who refuse the yoke as disloyal, disaffected, and treasonable subjects, necessarily alienates many intellectual persons, and forms them into a class apart, more or less hostile to the Christian society, continually reacting on the less intelligent classes, and, by spreading knowledge and education amongst them, continually winning them from the supremacy of those leaders whose yoke they have themselves cast off,—or, as they term it, emancipating them from ecclesiastical or clerical bondage. With such a system, the spread of education and the progress of knowledge would be a continual drain and loss to the Church ; whereas, if she extended her patronage and recognition equally to all truth, wherever found, the progress of knowledge would only enlarge her domain and increase her influence, instead of necessitating the cold withdrawal of all ecclesiastical patronage from every attempt to break through the charmed circle of custom, or to strike out a new path not already traced on the map, or to give an onward motion to the treadmill of ideas.

Communicated Articles.

ENGLISH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES IN CATHOLIC TIMES.

A QUESTION has arisen out of the recent educational controversy, which, as it is almost entirely of an antiquarian character, admits of being discussed without violation of the rule which has been made to insert no more letters in this Magazine on the subject of the controversy itself. The question is briefly this : Is the present practice of the English public schools as to discipline and the formation of character, or is that which is adopted in Catholic colleges, the truer counterpart of the system which prevailed in England before the Reformation?

For the sake of clearness, it is necessary to begin by stating the assumed view of the things to be compared. By the Catholic method, whether abroad or at home, so far as it partakes of a common character, is to be understood, for the present purpose, one under which discipline is maintained by incessant personal supervision. It is not a question of intercourse, merely, between masters and students; because such intercourse has often been carried out, on principle, in Protestant schools and colleges. The late Dr. Arnold was ever most anxious that his boys should regard him less as their master than as their friend. At the universities (certainly at Oxford), tutors and pupils have often been thrown together in the relations of the most intimate confidence. Yet in both cases, and especially in the former, which is most in point, the motive of this intercourse, on the part of the superior, was solely and simply the moral and religious good of the pupil. So far as *this* kind of personal intercourse exists in the Catholic colleges, whether of England or of the Continent, it is not a point of characteristic difference from the modern public-school system of England. Mr. Allies, in his account of Catholic France, speaks more than once of such intercourse as existing between the superiors and students at St. Sulpice and elsewhere. But *this* is not what is meant by "surveillance." Let any one read, for instance, St. Alphonsus Liguori on Seminaries, and he will rise from the perusal of that treatise with an idea of "surveillance" as different as possible from that just described. What St. Alphonsus supposes is strictly a system of "police," into which *espionage*, in the fullest sense of the term, enters as a recognised institution, the conduct of which is intrusted to a special officer,—an "esploratore," as he is called, or "speculator,"—whose duty it is to be habitually on the look-out in the interests of discipline, though secretly from the students. Between this system and that of our English public schools, the opposition is less complete even in machinery than it is in spirit. It is not, as has been more than once said of late, that the importance of "discipline" is undervalued in our public schools, or that the enforcement of it is not a main object with those who administer public-school education. Nor is it true that the principle of governing the great body of the students through certain of their number, who are especially in the master's confidence, is a feature of moral education altogether unknown among Protestants, for this, as we have been always told, was a main cause of Dr. Arnold's success at Rugby. The difference turns chiefly upon the mode in which the influence is gained, and upon the nature of the

influence itself. For the master to have his spies among the boys unknown to the boys themselves; to encourage the practice of tale-telling; to be even expected to listen to such information with avidity; to adopt underhand and unrecognised methods of getting at his knowledge of what is going on;—these, and similar modes of government, which are popularly supposed to be the effects of what has been called the continental system, are undoubtedly opposed, *toto cælo*, to the ideas of education which prevail among English Protestants.

Has there not been a good deal of exaggeration on both sides of the late discussion? In the Catholic theory of education, even under its greatest disadvantages, there is this inestimable value in comparison with all Protestant methods, as such, that it makes the *soul* of the educated party its first and great object. It may err to any extent as to means; but its motive and end admit of no dispute. It *aims* at training Christians for the next world, and not for this. I am far from denying (indeed I have just asserted) that there have been Protestant masters of public schools, and Protestant tutors of colleges, who have recognised the same end, according to their light, as the paramount object of all education, and that too in practice as well as theory. But to speak of the sanctification of the student as the *finis ultimus* of English public-school education, is surely a mere delusion. The general spirit of the institution, as distinguished from the accidents of time, place, or person, is in a wholly different direction. Manliness, gentlemanliness, “spirit,” self-possession, tact, the sense of honour, and such-like qualities,—some of them valuable indeed in their way, but all of them perfectly compatible with the absence of any supernatural principle, and some of them even unchristian, at least in tendency,—these it is which constitute the heroic virtues of Protestant public schools.

Yet surely, on the other hand, to depreciate many of these qualities in their proper place, and to deny that, although parts of mere natural morality, some of them are yet not only compatible with grace but capable of a high religious application, is as extreme an assertion the other way; and one does not see how less than this can be understood in the wholesale condemnation of our public schools as the “most detestable of educational establishments.” The most perfect system of education, whether for the clergy or the laity, would seem to be one under which the characteristic excellences of the two methods were united, and the best refutation thus given to the popular prejudice, which excludes plain dealing,

and the sense of honour, and other special features of our national character, from the catalogue of Catholic, or at least of priestly, virtues. Whether these great social qualities be or be not duly valued in our English Catholic schools is a question irrelevant to this argument, which deals rather with principles than facts. But if (as I am quite willing to believe) they be so valued, I cannot help thinking that it arises from the salutary operation of specially English influences upon a system which, not in itself, but in its exaggerated or perverted forms, is unfavourable to them.

It has seemed well to say thus much, in the way which presented itself as most natural, upon the leading differences of those two systems with which we are now to compare a certain third system, viz. that of the English colleges and public schools of most ancient foundation in their purely Catholic days. It has been positively affirmed, and as positively denied, in the course of the late discussion, that the present public schools of this country are the lineal successors, in the theory and practice of moral education, as well as in their history, of the same institutions in their pre-Reformation state of existence. It has been less positively stated, but still apparently implied, that the Catholic collegiate system—not in that modified form in which we know it in England, but as it exists in the seminaries of France or Italy—is the true counterpart and proper representative of the ancient English method.

The first of these statements, which supposes the present public schools of England to be “of Catholic origin,” in any other sense of the words than the purely historical and external one, is surely a dictum whose strongest claim upon acceptance is its extreme *prima facie* improbability. To those who know any thing of our academical statutes, and who remember that our two oldest public schools were founded by men who were also founders of colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, it was a startling assertion, that a state of things so essentially Protestant in its whole idea and complexion as that which has grown up in our public schools could be a development, or even a perversion, of any Catholic idea. As little likely did it seem that, if the present public-school system and spirit were those of the ancient Church of England, any thing so little akin to them as the present Catholic theory of education should have dropped from the clouds about the time of the Reformation, without so much as a type or adumbration in the preëxisting educational institutions of this Catholic land. Such researches into the

subject as I have been able to make are, on the whole, strongly confirmatory of these impressions.

There are but two of our greater public schools whose origin runs back into times of indisputable Catholicity, namely, Winchester and Eton. Other great English schools were either founded since the Reformation, or so near that great crisis as to have caught much of its spirit in entering upon their history. But Eton dates from the middle of the fifteenth century, and Winchester—its predecessor and pattern—from the latter end of the fourteenth. Wykeham's other great work, New College, Oxford, dates from nearly the same time as Winchester. The connection of these two foundations leads to the remark, that the present argument absolutely requires us to take the case of the universities into the account, as well as that of the public schools; and for this reason, if for no other, that such of the colleges as are of kindred origin with the public schools (namely, New College at Oxford, and King's at Cambridge) furnish evidence in their statutes of the common founder's spirit and intentions.

There is yet another obvious reason for including the universities among our witnesses to the character of ancient English education. Our Catholic colleges (those, at least, which are best known to most of us) contain students of various ages, ranging from ten or twelve to twenty-three or twenty-four. Boys come to them as young as they generally go to Protestant public schools, and remain in them two or three years later than the age at which they commonly leave the universities. I could never quite see, therefore, why the comparison instituted between the Catholic colleges and Protestant places of education was not made to embrace a wider range of evidence on the Protestant side. For a portion, at least, of the objection to "surveillance" in Catholic colleges is derived from its being applied to the older students; and had the ground selected for the comparison included the universities, I cannot think that even the strongest advocate of "surveillance" would have extended to *them* the objections felt against the public schools, from the fact of their leaving young people too much to themselves.

It is, then, to the ancient discipline of the colleges and public schools together, and not to that of either separately, that we are to look for the proper counterpart of our present Catholic seminary or collegiate practice. Let us begin with the colleges.

The description given by a discontented Cambridge scholar of his college-life, shortly before the time of the Reforma-

tion, furnishes a better idea of the actual state of things than can be gathered from the letter of statutes :

"The greater part of the scholars get out of bed," he says, "between four and five in the morning ; from five to six, they attend the reading of public prayers, and an exhortation from the Divine Word in their own chapels. They then either apply to separate study or attend lectures in common until ten, when they betake themselves to dinner, at which four scholars are content with a small portion of beef bought for one penny, and a sup of pottage, made of the gravy of the meat, salt, and oaten flour. From the time of this moderate meal to five in the evening, *they either learn or teach*, and then go to their supper, which is scarcely more plentiful than the dinner. Afterwards problems are discussed, or other studies pursued, until nine or ten ; and then about half an hour is spent in walking or running about (*for they have no hearth or stove*), in order to warm their feet before going to bed."*

This picture, after some allowance for exaggeration, is probably correct enough, and certainly does not give an idea of college-life which would find much favour in modern times. Chaucer, writing of the universities rather less than a century and a half earlier, gives us a very different view of a student's life. There is a well-known tale which begins—

"Whilom ther was dwellyng in Oxenford
A rich gnof, that gestes held to boorde,
And of his craft he was a carpenter ;
With him ther was dwellyng a poure scoler," &c.

Of this tale it is enough to say here, that it exhibits a very lax state of academical discipline. The "scoler" aforesaid is described as having a room to himself in the carpenter's house (this appears to have been an exception to general practice), as being addicted to astrology, and as following his vicious inclinations without let or hindrance. The picture given in the "Reves Tale" of the sister university presents no higher idea of the morality of some of the students, though it suggests certain notions of academical discipline which are wanting to the other. The two scholars whose exploits form the subject of the latter story are inmates of "Soler Hall" (said to be the old Clare Hall). They are represented as having to "crye besily uppon the wardeyn" for leave to go and visit the mill at "Trompyngtoun," where the corn was ground for the use of his college.

"And at the last the wardeyn gaf hem leve."

So, furnished with the "gere," and mounted "on an hors,"

"Forth goth Aleyn the clerk, and also Jon."

* Huber on English Universities (F. W. Newman's translation).

Arrived at the mill, they make inquiries of the miller which might have raised a suspicion in a less simple mind as to the motives of their visit. Their horse (it was the warden's) gets loose, and they waste so much time in recovering him that the night closes in. The miller houses them; and a great deal follows which brings home to the mind some of the worst features of Protestant academical life.*

The vast change which had taken place in the interval between one of these periods of academic history and the other, is due to that glorious work of educational reform which is associated with the names of such men as Wykeham and Waynflete. Chaucer's experience belongs to the latter half of the fourteenth century, about the time when Wykeham laid the foundation of the sister institutions of Winchester and New College, but before the effects of the change had come into play. During the whole of that century, the collegiate, as distinguished from the university, system, was in gradual course of formation. The "inns," or "halls," which furnished the basis, or at least the idea, of the colleges, were little more than lodging-houses. At first, the only condition imposed upon a student on entering one of the great English universities was, that, within a certain time after his arrival, he should enrol himself under some licensed teacher or regent-master. A house was taken by one of these teachers, who collected round him a body of pupils, and appears to have answered precisely to the character of a "tutor" at Eton or Rugby. Thus arose the halls, whose numbers, like that of the students, was at Oxford something absolutely fabulous. Oxford indeed appears to have been the great education-market of England, to which boys repaired for the article of learning as horsedealers resort to a fair. The collegiate was all but merged in the university character; and the constant gown and town riots, with the internal feuds of the different "nations," which embroiled the whole academical population at the period in question, are entirely inconsistent with any ideas of Catholic discipline, or indeed of any discipline at all.† Sometimes a certain number of students would club together and choose their own director, whether with or without the consent of superior authority. Some of these societies, as they received endowments, grew into colleges; others assumed the position now occupied by the halls at Oxford, as dependencies upon certain colleges, for the accom-

* Elsewhere Chaucer gives a favourable picture of an Oxford student, which, it may be hoped, represented the average specimen of the class. But the above pictures must have had a foundation in facts.

† Huber on English Universities, edited by F. W. Newman.

modation of supernumerary members; while the greater part of the original halls disappeared altogether as the colleges arose into importance.

New College, though far from being the earliest of the colleges at Oxford, was the first which was modelled upon the splendid type of our great Catholic foundations. It consisted, at its origin, of seventy fellows; of whom ten were chaplains, and three directors of music. There were also sixteen choir-boys. About the same time, Bishop Wykeham founded the noble College of Winchester, which was to form a kind of preparatory school to "St. Marie's of Winton, at Oxenford," afterwards known, by reason, as would appear, of its unprecedented splendour, as the "New College." These twin sisters, about half a century later, formed the models of Eton and King's.

The erection of Winchester and New Colleges was quite an era in education. Till that time, the chapel and the appurtenances of Divine worship appear to have formed no part of the original arrangement. But of Wykeham's plan, the chapel was the principal feature; it was adorned with an image "of the Holy Trinity, of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, and of many other Saints," besides a variety of ornamental works of "curious subtlety," and furnished with "chapel-organ," magnificent vestments, and a ceremonial equipage of the most elaborate and costly description.

With men like Wykeham and Waynflete, these external matters were evidences of the ecclesiastical spirit which manifested itself in far more important ways, as we shall find when we look at the interior regulations of their colleges. The following are some of Wykeham's regulations :

"The members of his college were to live together according to the statutes. They all dined together in the refectory, where strict silence was preserved while the Holy Scriptures were read aloud. Indeed Wykeham had a peculiar care that his scholars should cultivate good manners; he ordains that—even in times of recreation—they should address one another in a modest and courtly manner. Immediately after dinner, the juniors retired, and the seniors after them. In winter, a fire was lighted in the hall, that, after dinner and supper, the fellows might take honest recreation. Stringent laws were made against all excesses in dress, and penances in the way of fasting imposed upon offenders."*

This was at Oxford; at Winchester, similar arrange-

* *Lives of Wykeham and Waynflete*. (Burns and Lambert.) This learned and interesting little volume has supplied much of the information contained in this article.

ments were made to secure good discipline and good manners among the boys. Their dress was strictly regulated. Many monastic customs were introduced into the college; for instance, every boy was obliged to sweep his own room and make his own bed. When the Protestant Bishop of Winchester, Trelawny, held his visitation of the college, in 1708, this custom was strongly condemned by him as "servile and foul." The scholars rose at five, and, after performing these menial offices, were expected to say private prayers till half-past five, when the bell summoned them to chapel.

Although the founder expressly forbade "*ludos incautos et inordinatos*," he was very careful to provide the boys with innocent recreations. Whether all readers will consider the ceremony of the "boy-bishop" as included in this class, may be doubtful; but at any rate they will appreciate the wisdom and kindness of the great prelate in making provision for a supply of "divers singers and dancers," who came periodically from Hopley to amuse the boys, besides conjurors, minstrels, and the like. We hear also of a real "live lion" sent by his Majesty, one cold January morning, to entertain the young collegians. The college entries bear witness also to payment for a "cart" to take the boys into the New Forest, that they might witness the stag-hunt. They speak likewise of wine furnished out at a pic-nic, besides an extra supply of viands at supper when the boys got home.

Magdalen College arose almost a century later, but was modelled according to the same rule. Waynflete's motto was, "Let all sciences militate under the banner of theology." Hence he appointed frequent lectures on Scripture and theological disputations to take place in his chapel of St. Mary Magdalene's College. "The design of the founder was to cherish in the hearts of the students a deep spirit of piety and practical religion, so that his college should be a nursery at once of science and of faith." The rule of life was very much the same as in Wykeham's college. The society rose at an appointed hour, and repeated certain prayers while dressing, the versicle, response, and antiphon of the Blessed Trinity, and a prayer for the founder. Other suffrages for the dead were to be used by each student during the day at his own convenience. Every one was to hear Mass daily. There was to be silence at dinner, with spiritual reading, and every evening vespers and a procession. The dress of the students was minutely regulated. When walking out, they were always to go two and two, as in Catholic colleges of this time. The want of necessary comforts of which the

Cambridge student complained to the Royal Commissioners of Henry VIII., has no precedent in Waynflete's or Wykeham's rules, which make special provision for a fire in winter at recreation-time. Card-playing was forbidden, together with such games as might disturb study or devotion; also the keeping of dogs and birds; but elegant and literary amusements were encouraged, such as music and the recitation of poetry. Above all, the students were liberally treated and abundantly fed; so that things must have sadly degenerated before the Reformation, if our Cambridge friend is to be trusted.

Intermediate between Wykeham's and Waynflete's noble works, comes the foundation of Eton and King's. The young king Henry turned his attention to the sister university, and under his auspices arose, in 1440, the "Kynge's College of our Lady of Eton, besyde Wyndesore." It was natural that the young king should look to Winchester for the model upon which to form his proposed establishments, and to Winchester therefore he repaired. There he fell in with Waynflete, at that time Master of Winchester School, and a cordial intimacy sprang up between them. Before Henry left Winchester, it was arranged that Waynflete and thirty-five of his scholars should remove to Eton, and begin to work out the new foundation.

And now, what was the life of the Catholic Eton boy? At five, the "surgite" of the præpositors summons him to rise. He recites prayers alternately with a fellow-student while dressing; after which, as at Winchester, he sweeps his room, and makes his bed. Every boy was required to recite the whole rosary every day. This was to be done in the cemetery, or in the cloisters, before High Mass. The five decades were to be said in expiation of sins committed by each sense. Besides, they were to say the Psalter of our Lady, and many Paters and Aves during the day. We hear also of the Confessions at Shrove-tide, the Communions on Holy Thursday, the Conferences on Good-Friday, and the early risings and mutual gratulations on Easter Day.

The school-exercises were often upon religious themes. On All Souls' Day, for instance, the Latin verses were on the hope of immortality. On St. John the Baptist's Feast, the dormitories were hung with pictures of the Saint, and songs were sung in his praise. In the midst of these holy doings, study was not overlooked. Latin verses were cultivated, and Latin speaking encouraged.

But there was plenty of harmless and healthy recreation; May-day gambols, and autumnal nutting-parties into Wind-

sor Forest. On the 1st of May, the boys might rise at four, and go out to gather may, "*provided they did not wet their feet.*" Before maying and nutting, however, they were to write verses on the charms of spring, and the lessons of autumn. On Midsummer-day, and on the Feast of St. Peter, they had bonfires; and on St. Nicholas's day, they elected the boy-bishop with extraordinary solemnity. It is characteristic of the affectionate intercourse which subsisted between masters and boys, that the boys were always "to share their nuts with their masters."

Let us now come to the arrangements made for the protection and superintendence of the younger boys. The following is from the old Eton Statutes (xxxvi, De Dispositione Camerarum):

"In singulis cameris puerorum supradictis, sint ad minus tres scholares honesti, ac cæteris scholaribus maturitate, discretionem, ac scientia provectiores, qui aliis consociis cameralibus studentibus *superintendant*, et eosdem diligenter *supervideant*, et de ipsorum moribus et conversatione, studiique profectu, præpositum, vice-præpositum, et magistrum informatorem* de tempore in tempus, quotiens causa seu opus fuerit, sub ipsorum debito juramenti collegio præstiti supradicto, *cum requisiti fuerint*, veraciter certificent, et informant, ut hujusmodi scholares, defectum in moribus patientes, negligentes, seu in suis studiis desides, castigationem, correptionem, et punitionem percipiant juxta eorum merita debitas, ac etiam competentes."

The oath to which the foregoing extract refers was required of every scholar at the age of fourteen, and obliged him, if he knew of any "conventicula, conspirationes, vel confederationes" against the college or its master, "id præposito, vice-præposito, aut bursario, intimare, et eos expresse præmonere ore tenus, vel in scriptis."

In the statutes of Winchester College, from which those of Eton appear to have been taken almost *verbatim*, it is enjoined that boys shall give information to the authorities of grave offences among their companions; but under the same proviso, "*si requisiti fuerint.*"

Even at Cambridge, in very early times, the same rule existed as a safeguard against scandalous breaches of discipline or morality. "We enact, on pain of anathema, that, if any scholars know any one to go under the name of scholars, or have in their society any one who has no master, or who does not attend the ordinary lectures of his master, or who openly keeps his concubine, or is of bad repute in any way, either by manifest signs or by evidence of the fact, or a thief, or incontinent, or a disturber of the peace,—he shall de-

* *i. e.* "informatorem morum," prefect of discipline.

nounce him to his master, or to the chancellor, in order that, after being denounced, he may be forthwith expelled from the university."

The statutes of Peterhouse College, Cambridge, provided that the rooms were to be assigned by the master, taking care that "two old scholars or two young ones do not dwell together in each room, but one old and one young . . . in order that the young man may be more profitably excited to learning and good morality by his older companion." At Clare Hall, the scholars were to live in the same room with the fellows.* At Eton, again, choristers were chosen by the fellows, who lived in the same room with them, "ad serviendum eisdem." The same provision was made in the colleges at Oxford; as, for instance, at Magdalen, where the demies were to lodge in the same room with the fellows, "probably to perform service for them, and at all events to be under their control and superintendence."†

These materials will furnish an idea of the education of English youth in Catholic times, sufficient at all events for the present purpose. That education, it will have been seen, was not merely, as appears to have been thought, the present public-school education of Winchester or Eton, or the present academical education of Oxford or Cambridge, *plus* the sacraments of the Church, but a system every part of which was permeated by religion, and which, in structure at least, bears a strong resemblance to that in use among Catholics of this day. This conclusion might be made yet more evident, were there space to give fuller proof of the spirit and intentions of the founders.

To come now to the two points in which the present public-school discipline has lately been contrasted with that common, amid all local and circumstantial varieties, to all our Catholic colleges, namely, magisterial or vicarious supervision, and government through the agency of the students themselves. It is manifest that practices more or less answering to these descriptions existed in the theory, and entered into the actual conduct, of English education in old Catholic times. At Eton, for instance, older and younger boys were put together in the same rooms, in order that the older might "superintend" and "supervise" the younger.‡ At the two universities, also, something of a like arrangement was made for the mutual benefit of both parties. But

* Cambridge Statutes (Heywood, 1855), p. 32, xviii., &c.

† Vide the *British Critic* for April 1840, Art. V., "On the Statutes of Magdalen College;" a paper full of valuable information on the present subject.

‡ "Fagging" is probably the modern form of this practice.

we find no provision whatever in the statutes, minute as they are, for extending this personal supervision to play-hours, nor do we know how far the same rule was applied later to students not on the foundation.

Again, with respect to the obligation of students to denounce their comrades in the event of graver faults. This obligation, it seems, was confined to the case of evidence which they were bound to give "when asked for it;" or, if the evil were one which struck at the root of discipline by implying a combination for the overthrow of authority, they were at once to reveal it, as appears, without waiting for inquiries.

This, at any rate, is not *espionage*, the essence of which is *secrecy*. It is an open and recognised system of government, under which, as there is no pretence for the charge of treachery, there can be no reasonable complaint of unfairness. One boy is as liable to it as another; the informer of to-day may be the informed against of to-morrow. It is quite a different thing, surely, from having one's steps dogged by a detective, or one's words noted down and reported by a companion who mixes freely with us under the mask of friendship. When a novice enters the Society of Jesus, he knowingly and voluntarily submits to the rule by which his words and actions are made liable* to this kind of scrutiny; and the same was true of every boy who entered at Eton in Catholic times, or rather of every parent who allowed his son to become a subject of its discipline. All was above-board.

With the safeguards of discipline and morality required by the Eton statutes, let us for a moment compare those which are contemplated in the Treatise of St. Alphonsus on Seminaries.

"Il prefetto giri sempre per li corridori, i quali non debbono esser mai senza custodia, o senza occhi di alcuno. Usando i seminaristi fuori del seminario, egli attenderà ancora a vedere se n'è restato alcuno. Egli potrà entrare in tutte le camerate per visitare come si fa lo studio, come si osserva il silenzio, la recreazione, &c. Egli assisterà, quando vengono i barbieri, calzolai, sartori, acciò si eviti ogni disordine. E di tutte le inosservanze ne avviserà il rettore Tenga ancor (il prefetto) due, o almeno uno de i seminaristi per *esploratore*, che fedelmente e *in segreto* l'avisi di qualche *difetto* di cui egli non si è potuto accorgere Sia attento in riferire al rettore i difetti di chiascheduno, specialmente si sono abituali, e più specialmente si sono contra l'onestà. Perchiò tenga una nota di difetti che più facilmente posson

* Institutiones Soc. Jesu, vol. ii. cap. 15.

commettersi, per notarvi di sotto i nomi di coloro che le commettono.” He then gives a list of such defects, and specifies speaking out of time, going to the gate without leave, and omitting the weekly confession.

I have noted the expressions in the above passage which seem to distinguish the rule of St. Alphonsus from that of Wykeham or Waynflete.

On the whole, while freely admitting, or, rather, earnestly contending, that there is a characteristic and fundamental difference between the ancient Catholic and the modern Protestant education of England, both as regards principle and details, I fancy myself to discern differences hardly less material between the ancient English and the modern (especially the foreign) Catholic type; and they are precisely such differences as will always be sure to characterise our national, in contrast to foreign, education. With all that is strict in principle and minute in rule about the educational system sketched out in the preceding pages, there is a generosity, a largeness of spirit, a parental tenderness about it, which render it a model, with whatever circumstantial variations, for the Church of all times. In the personal supervision which it includes, there is nothing which indicates suspicion on the one side, or interferes to any excess with liberty on the other. It is a kind of control calculated rather to assist than to thwart the development of personal character. In the means used for bringing the moral condition of the Society *veluti in speculo*, under the governor's eye, however in the sight of many modern theorists objectionable, there is, at all events, nothing mean nor underhand; while in the evident tokens of a constant view to the comfort, the recreation, and the health of the students (even to such suggestions, of an almost maternal tenderness, as the danger of “wet feet”), there is surely a most accurate, as well as a most beautiful, appreciation of the duties of that office which, next to the priesthood (if, indeed, not rather a department of it), is the likeliest of all on earth to His, in whom all family relations are harmoniously blended and archetypally represented.

However, it is the object of this Paper rather to exhibit certain facts than to found conclusions on them. Those facts have been produced less with the view of settling a controversy than of furnishing a basis of argument, upon which impartial disputants may meet with a better chance of mutual understanding than is offered by a contest on first principles, which may be protracted to an indefinite length without the prospect of approximation, much less of contact. But they seem, at any rate, to show that the common principles of

Catholic education, which are of no particular age or country, are subjected to great modifications in practice from the influence of national character—a position which might be further illustrated by a review of the history of English Catholic colleges on the Continent. This question, however, and that of the origin of the more stringent and inquisitorial system which prevails abroad, though collateral to the present subject, are not directly involved in it.

A. M. D. G.

AUBREY DE VERE'S POEMS.*

LITERATURE influences patriotism in two ways, by national history and by ballad poetry. In all the catastrophes of a nation's life, when a mighty effort is required, or when extraordinary calamities rouse the deepest feelings of the people, they find comfort or encouragement either in the first and simplest, or in the latest and most complicated of the arts: one belongs more to the character of early times, when literature addresses itself to the ear; the other is most potent in a cultivated age. Poetry lives and flourishes under misfortune; history requires for its inspiration freedom and success, and owes its origin to the first great victory of freedom in the Persian war. A dominant race does not promote the study of the annals of the people or of the class it has subjugated, or does it with an elaborate purpose of falsehood and concealment; and for the same cause it was the policy of the Plantagenets to exterminate the bards in Wales, and in Ireland, from the time of Edward III. to the reign of Elizabeth, they are threatened with an increasing severity of punishment. Whilst Irish history is but slowly emerging from the obscurity and uncertainty, from the indifference and the neglect of ages, a poet—a Catholic and a patriot—has attempted to combine the influences of history and of song, and revives, with a distinct and open purpose which would have been fatal to him in less polished and less peaceful times, the memory of his country's many sorrows, and of that which has been for centuries her single consolation. "Inisfail, or Ireland in the olden time," is a series of poems, embodying a kind of chronicle of Ireland, and it is a suggestive indication of their spirit and tendency that they begin with the year 1170. There are two reasons

* The Sisters, Inisfail, and other Poems. By Aubrey de Vere. (Longman, 1861.)

which induce me to question the wisdom of this limitation. Poetically it would have been better to begin with the record of Ireland's brightest period, when, by the teaching of her schools and by the example of her saints, she was the mistress of Western Europe. The darkness of her later day would have been made more striking by a glimpse of the glorious dawn :

“Apostle, first, of worlds unseen !
For ages, then, deject and mean,—
Be sure, sad land, a concord lay
Between thy darkness and thy day” (p. 84).

Historically, too, we are not justified in attributing to the English conquest all the misery that has befallen the nation. The source of so much suffering was not wholly imported from England, but lay in the primitive circumstances of the country, in the very facts which led to the invasion, and which the invasion afterwards converted from deficiencies into gigantic evils. But it is not the province of a national poet to censure his country, and her woes are more interesting as well as more poetical than her defects.

The author himself says of his book : “Its aim is to record the past alone, and that chiefly as its chances might have been sung by those old bards, who, consciously or unconsciously, uttered the voice which comes from a people's heart.” Unconsciously, perhaps, he has here touched on the most strongly marked characteristic of his poems. I say unconsciously, because he hardly does them justice in another passage, where he compares them to the national ballads of other countries. Those of most other nations which are preserved, especially of the Greeks, the Spaniards, and the Germans, are essentially of an epic character. They are narratives of enterprise, adventure, and achievement, and relate things that have been done ; their heroes are men of action, and, whether they succeed or fail, have got something definite before them. Songs of this nature are warlike and vehement ; their value is in the event they record, and they are a sort of substitute for history. Tacitus says of the ancient war-songs of the Germans, that this is the only form in which they preserve their traditions,—“*unum apud illos memoriae et annalium genus* ;” and there was little care for musical effect, for he tells us, “*affectatur præcipue asperitas soni et fractum murmur*.” Exactly opposite in character is the song of the Irish Celt. It is vague, indefinite, purposeless ; a poem of feelings, not of actions, plaintive, subjective, reflective, lyrical. The Irish bards expressed rather, as our author says, the feelings of the people's heart than the memory of

its deeds; their language was extremely soft and flexible, and their musical power was the most wonderful of their faculties. The ballads of Scott, Macaulay, and Aytoun tell their own tale, and we have no difficulty in believing that Livy composed the first decade of his history with the assistance of the early lays of Rome. It would be altogether impossible to put together a history out of poems that have so little of the narrative character as those which Mr. De Vere justly says are in the spirit of the old minstrelsy of Ireland. We generally require the title in order to know what the poem is about, and the title, which, by the by, is sometimes wanting, is very often insufficient. The few notes that are given only make us wish for more. There are not many readers who know enough of Irish history to supply the circumstances and motives of each poem, and a fuller commentary would be extremely instructive, as our curiosity and interest are excited by the poetry itself. It would be the more desirable inasmuch as it is one of the author's purposes to promote the knowledge of Irish history, the want of which is, and has been, a great misfortune to the people of both countries. "It might well be worth while," he says, "to inquire how far this ignorance has stood in the way of a kindly feeling between classes, and of an enlightened patriotism." And in one of the poems he appeals to a wider audience than his own countrymen:

"Unstaunch'd is the wound while the insult remains.

The Tudor's black banner above us still flieth,
The faith of our fathers is scorn'd in their fanes!

Distrust the repentance that clings to its booty;

Give the people their Church, and the priesthood its right.

Till then to remember the past is a duty,

For the past is our cause, and our cause is our might" (p. 278).

Here is an instance of the want of an historical commentary. A reader must be better versed in Irish history than an author has any right to expect of him, in order to find the explanation of these lines in an allusion to the statute of 1612, in which the distinction between English and Irish was verbally abolished, "with the intent that they may grow into one nation, whereby there may be an utter oblivion and extinguishment of all former differences and discorde betwixt them."

There is abundant evidence that even during the wars with the Danes a high civilisation survived, and at the time of the conquest both of Ireland and of Wales the inhabitants were more advanced in material culture than their conquerors. But in those things on which a people's existence

depends, and which constitute the solid framework of society and the foundation of political life, in their notions of property, and in their notions of the state which is inseparable from these, they were separated from the whole of that movement of creative ideas which made the middle ages a period of progress. The nature of the ownership of land is a distinctive type of difference between states. In the lowest stages of civilisation there is no appropriation of land. Hunting tribes are disconnected with it altogether, and nomads have property only in their herds. Pastoral life first creates a collective ownership in the land; but as the land is not the real source of wealth or object of labour, there is no impulse to go farther, and pastoral life retains a natural hostility to private property. An instance of this was the *Mesta* in Spain. Landowners were forbidden to enclose their fields, in order that when the flocks came down from the mountains to winter in the plains of Estremadura, and when they returned in the spring, they might be able to browse on the way. Russia is another instance, where the roving habits of pastoral life were so deeply rooted in the people that they would not settle permanently on any fixed piece of land until they were bound by serfdom to it; and whilst serfdom survives on the one hand as a sign of their former restlessness, the ancient communism in the distribution of land preserves, under totally different circumstances, and in another order of civilisation, the ideas of nomadic life. When agriculture is introduced, the land necessarily becomes fixed property, though not necessarily private property. It may be vested either in the family or in the *commune*.

We can trace in the history of Rome the parallel progress of the rights of landowners with the growth of the state. At first the land belonged to the state; it was *ager publicus*. Then it was held in lots by the people (*possessiones*); and this was ultimately matured into real ownership (*dominium*), when no such thing as collective or impersonal property was admitted, and what did not belong to an individual became *res nullius*. This system, the foundation and security of Roman freedom, was subverted by the accumulation of capital and of debt, and attempts were made to restore it for the benefit of the poor, and thus to save the state at the expense of the rich, by those agrarian laws which are the critical revolutions in Roman history. As the class of small proprietors disappeared, the strength of the state departed with them, and the land ceased to be tilled. The Teutonic notion of real property is based on freedom, but recognises the right of the family by inheritance, and therefore limits the power of sale.

At the same time it recognises the property of corporations, and retains as common property to this day wood, waste, and water. By admitting the right of corporations, the claims of the community, and the interests of the family, this system combines stability with liberty, and prevents the disorganisation of property, which ruined Rome, and which, by the excess of subdivision, has produced in France a reaction against all liberty in favour of a Slavonic communism. Where the latter subsists, it is generally in consequence of the predominance of pasturage; it hinders cultivation and enterprise, because, as Aristotle says (*Pol. ii. 1. 10*), that is least cared for which is common to the greatest number: it deadens the love of freedom by making despotism less oppressive; and it excludes from property all corporations excepting that species of community on which the system rests.

In Ireland this species of communism subsisted, and the community was the sept. In no country had the feelings of kindred greater power, but it was a power of a peculiar kind. It was a sentimental attachment, not a well-regulated duty, forming in many cases an artificial obligation that superseded law and right. It is, perhaps, not a consequence, but a symptom of this, that an affection equal to that of blood-relationship bound foster-brothers together, which gives a poetical but most unpractical and disorderly character to many passages of Irish history. This is the theme of the play that maintained for so many months an unexampled popularity in London, and exhibited this sentiment in all its beauty and in its danger to society. This family attachment was the basis both of government and of property. "Even those arts," says Burke, "which we are apt to consider as depending principally on natural genius were confined in succession to certain races;" and the land belonged to the race. Each Irishman had his part allotted to him by the chieftain, not even for life, not because it belonged to his father, but because he belonged to the sept. The constant redistributions of land seem to prove that agriculture did not generally prevail. In later times, to speak English, sow corn, and build stone houses, went to the character of an alien. This system had the political effect of making the individual dependent on the community, and intercepting at the same time the action of the state. The chief was responsible for the crimes of every man of his sept, and the custom of tanistry gave him a successor in his lifetime, and an organised opposition. But the fundamental point is the impersonal tenure of property, and the imperfect notion of inheritance. It resulted in a constant disturbance of society, in the absence of a strict code

of law, and in the exclusion of the Church from her proper position, influence, and rights; it was impossible for her to disengage her lands from the system of succession in the septs. To such a system of polity the Church was necessarily in a position of absolute antagonism.

In the middle of the twelfth century St. Malachi led the way to a great reform: synods were held, and a Cardinal-legate arrived from Rome, with the pallium for the four Archbishops. But the evil was not to be met by ecclesiastical reforms, by the abolition of simony and usury, the reformation of morals, or the institution of tithes. It lay in a region to which the influence of the clergy and the decrees of councils could not directly extend, in the political and economic habits of the people. The necessary conditions for the fulfilment of the public mission of the Church were wanting; a voluntary internal reform was impossible; there was no resource but in an appeal to another country. Every European land, from Thule to the Pillars of Hercules, had already obtained from the various tribes of one common stock the elements of a similar political development, with the germs of ecclesiastical freedom. The Celts and the Iberians, the Hungarians and the Slaves, all owed their polity to the German race, and the Church throughout Europe rested on the Teutonic institutions. In Hungary and in Bohemia the empire had served as an instrument by which civil order was established together with religion; and in Poland the Church destroyed the absolutism of the old Sarmatian government by encouraging the immigration of German colonists, and sheltered her own influence and immunity behind the *jus teutonicum*. And while this was going on in the North and West, Byzantium and Muscovy held aloof from the salutary influence, lapsed into schism, and never attained a Christian system of government. It was only those portions of the Teutonic race that had developed under a higher civilisation the national principles of their public life, who fulfilled for the Church this office of pioneers. The Anglo-Saxons had degenerated after the time of Dunstan; and in Ireland the Danes had no well-organised political system, and lived separate from the native inhabitants. Thus it came to be found, when a great effort was made by the Irish clergy to introduce a better order of things, that the English supremacy was necessary to that end; and the Holy See resolved to introduce into Ireland that national element whose influence was coextensive with the *Respublica Christiana*, and without which the Church had in no instance succeeded in obtaining a full and secure authority.

It is remarkable that the Synod of Cashel, the first that was held after Henry's arrival, occupies itself quite as much with the question of tithes and with the regulation of property as with matters purely religious. Leland, whose words are quoted with approbation by Lanigan, speaks with contempt of the small result of so great an enterprise as the English invasion, "as if the same futile ordinances had not been repeatedly enacted in every synod, held almost annually by the Irish clergy," for twenty years before. It was precisely because the enactment of them had proved futile that the transfer of the sovereignty was accomplished; and the original bull of Adrian IV. was issued very shortly after the Synod of Kells, which was the first great step taken by Rome in the movement of reform.* Thenceforward the clergy were generally on the English side, which promised them fixity of tenure in land. For a long period, the king's writ ran only on the demesnes of the Church, and the Bishops supported the crown, not only against the Irish law, but even against the fusion of the races. But a prediction has been handed down from those early days, which a poet ought not to have overlooked. It was the boast of the Irish that Christianity had been established among them without violence and without martyrdom; and the absence of martyrs was cited by Giraldus as a reproach to the Irish Church. Maurice, Archbishop of Cashel, replied, that if that distinction was wanting to the clergy, it was an honour to the people. "But now a nation is come into this kingdom which knows how, and is accustomed, to make martyrs. Henceforth Ireland will, like other countries, have martyrs."

The mode in which the conquest commenced was decisive of the issue. The king held aloof for a time, and even recalled all his subjects from Ireland. Then he went over himself, but left the enterprise to the great nobles, who carried it on for their own advantage, not on behalf of the crown. The presiding motive was, therefore, not political, but selfish. Nothing in the state of England incited to migration, or contributed to keep up the supply of immigrants. The Spanish colonies in America exhibit the same defect; but the object of converting the natives secured to them the powerful protection of the Spanish crown. In Ireland the crown had neither sufficient power nor any very strong inducement to intervene between the conquerors and the peo-

* Mr. Kelly, in his excellent notes to Lynch's *Cambrensis Eversus*, ii. 546, denies the connection between the revival of discipline in the Irish Church and the bulls of Adrian and Alexander; but he does not support his opinion, and altogether overlooks the political character of the ecclesiastical reform.

ple. The conquest of England had been the work of the Norman ruler and of his whole people, and it was undertaken by one of the largest armies ever known in the middle ages. It was a great public and political concern, and the laws of the two nations were not so different that they could not gradually coalesce. The natives were not deprived of their nationality or of their laws; and nothing drove them, like the Celts, to shut themselves off from the invaders. But in Ireland all this was different. It was held, not by the English state, but by a class of great nobles. They wished to subjugate it to themselves, not to be with the inhabitants fellow-subjects of the king. Consequently every precaution was taken to prevent the amalgamation of the races, or their union under a common law. It was an attempt by one race to rule over another, whilst it governed itself by a different code. This was the problem of the period before the Reformation. The only people of that age that had never known the institution of servitude were reduced to a subject caste. In all countries where the dominion of race over race has taken this form, in Poland, Hungary, and New Spain, the rise of a settled order of government has been impossible. It was a privilege to be an Englishman; and the right to the enjoyment of English law was a favour eagerly demanded by the Irish within the pale. When the hero of the old Muscovite party in Russia, General Yermoloff received some decoration from the Emperor Alexander, he begged to be made a German at once; all other honours and advantages would then, he said, be his as a matter of course. But in Ireland the people were anxious to obtain English laws and rights; and in 1278 all the king's Irish subjects offered a large sum of money to obtain charters of denizenship at once. Edward was willing to grant them, but the English colonists would not consent to lose their privilege, and the evil was perpetuated.

Not only was the distinction of the two races carefully preserved, but a third race arose, distinct from both, and without the advantages of either. These were the degenerate English, like the Pullani of the kingdom of Jerusalem, a grievous annoyance to the rulers. The Statute of Kilkenny, in 1367, put them on a level with the Irish enemy, and visited with the penalties of treason the practice of fostering, which had created between the Anglo-Normans and the Irish peasants an attachment which seemed to render a future reconciliation possible between the two nations. This statute amounted to a declaration of war against the Irish people. In 1413 they were forbidden to come to England, even to

study at English universities. It was forbidden to admit Irish novices into the monasteries within the pale. The clergy supported these laws, and drew down on themselves the rebuke of Innocent IV.: "Quia in omni gente qui facit justitiam acceptus est coram Deo, nec sanctuarium Dei convenit jure hæreditario possideri." The league of the clergy with the English crown seems to have deprived them of influence until the Reformation; and O'Neill accuses them, in his Remonstrance, of being "cowardly, and basely silent." The Statute of Kilkenny has inspired some of Mr. De Vere's best verse:

"Of old ye warr'd on men: to-day
 On women and on babes ye war;
 The noble's child his head must lay
 Beneath the peasant's roof no more!
 I saw in sleep the infant's hand
 His foster-brother's fiercely grasp;
 His warm arm, lithe as willow-wand,
 Twines me each day with closer clasp
 Through thee the puissant love the poor;
 His conqueror's hope the vanquish'd shares.
 For thy sake by a lowly door
 The clan made vassal stops and stares;
 Thy foster-brothers twain for thee
 Would face the wolves on snowy fell:
 Smile on! The Irish enemy
 Will fence their Norman nursling well."

The Irish continued to look up to the Pope as their protector against the English, and their history does not exhibit either a grudge against the Holy See,* or a dread of absolute monarchy. Indeed, the small part which the crown of England played in their country was not the least of their misfortunes, and the revival of the royal authority under the Tudors might have proved a great blessing to them; but the change of religion occurring at the same time converted the crown into a new source of oppression, whilst it united once more the people with the priesthood, and gave to the latter

* In making Ireland a kingdom, Henry VIII. wished to repudiate the notion that the papal authority was the foundation of his title. Till then the Irish looked up to the Pope as their supreme lord and protector, and did not lay at his door the misery they endured, just as in Russia the oppression of the people by the boyars, instead of being a danger to the state, has confirmed the popularity and the power of the Czar. There is a singular view of these relations in a discourse on the mode of conquering Ireland, addressed to the Pope in the year 1590: "Li Rè d' Inghilterra contra d' ogni ragione et dovere si hanno intitolati Rè d' Irlanda, havendo l' ultimo Rè nostro come l' historie dicono, rissegnato il Regno al Papa, il qual ne diede poi il dominio al Rè d' Inghilterra, ch' era all' hora Henrico Secondo, come a vassallo di Santa Chiesa Romana, intitolandolo Signor d' Irlanda, riservando sempre il titolo di Rè alla Sede Apostolica; nè mai è stato Rè d' Inghilterra, che si chiamasse Rè d' Irlanda, finchè Henrico ottavo si fece poner inscriptione tale."

a popularity and an influence which had not been known since the English occupation. The passage of the supreme authority from the aristocracy to the crown inaugurated a new policy opposite to that which had been so disastrous. It had been the interest of the English nobles to keep the Irish a separate and remote class. It was the interest of the king to make them faithful and available subjects, like the English. The former had aimed at preventing civilisation; the new policy sought to destroy nationality. Henry ruled that no priest should be ordained who could not speak English; and this attempt to make the people English was a timely security to prevent them from being made Protestants.

But a new mode of oppression, altogether different from that which had been endured so long, came in before the Reformation as a fruit of the new policy by which the national differences were to be removed. During the prevalence of the policy of separation, the benefit of English law had been refused to the Irish; under the policy of absolutism and uniformity, the Irish laws and habits were ignored, and the harmony of their customs with the English ideas of law was assumed. It was not conceived that they could retain their national customs, and as it seemed hopeless that they could be reclaimed, a plan was proposed for repeopling the island altogether. Then the idea of putting away the Irish chiefs was suggested by the insurrection of the Geraldines, and it was supposed that their property and influence could be brought into English hands. In 1538, after the reduction of the Kavanaghs, the Council wrote to Henry that the insurgent chiefs had submitted, "offering to holde ther landes of your Highnes, and to paie your Grace a yerely rent for the same," but they advise the king "clerely to exile them." "Noither do we meane, when we speke or motion to conquest or exile theis men, that we wolde banishe all the inhabitantes ther, but the gentilmen, and men of warre; and, haveng garri-sones of men of warre in certen principall placis, to reteyne still the most of the poor erthe tillers ther, which be good inhabitauntes."* This was the system which recommended itself to the absolute monarchy, after the old oligarchical government had passed away in the Wars of the Roses. The rebellion of the O'Connors and O'Moores, in the centre of Ireland, soon furnished an opportunity of testing the new scheme. Under Mary Tudor their territories were confiscated and were made shire-land, by the names of King's and Queen's County,—the only shires made since the reign of

* State Papers, III. 100.

John. The chiefs themselves were detained in a splendid captivity in England. The purpose of the confiscation was less to punish their rebellion, than to destroy that system of septs and tanistry which had been allowed to flourish for 400 years, but which was an insurmountable obstacle to the design of assimilating Ireland to England. This policy, which struck at the root of Irish society, continued for a century and a half, and is the second great calamity that befel the country. The policy of the English oligarchy in the middle ages, of which the most pointed example is the Statute of Kilkenny, had stopped the growth of Ireland, and had shut it off from the advancement of the times. The policy of the monarchy, founded on the right of forfeiture, despoiled the people of their property, and reduced to poverty and dependence the true owners of the soil. For the ownership was not vested in the offending chief,—all the sept had a partnership in it; and the property as well as the authority of the chief was not his to dispose of. This theory of power is expressed in the poem “The True King.”

“Who were they, those princes that gave away
 What was theirs to keep, not theirs to give?
 A king holds sway for a passing day;
 The kingdoms for ever live.
 The tanist succeeds when the king is dust;
 The king rules all, yet the king hath naught.
 They were traitors, not kings, who sold their trust;
 They were traitors, not kings, who bought.”

The English could not understand that there was any alternative form of jurisdiction besides property and sovereignty. In earlier times, when the feudal system established a hierarchy of powers,—when a baron bore as much the character of a sovereign as of a subject, and the nature of sovereignty was imperfectly defined,—the position of a great feudal chief would not have been deemed incompatible either with the rights of the crown or with the rights of property of his men. In an age of absolutism, the territories of the chiefs could not be regarded as their dominions, and were therefore treated as estates. If their authority was not inseparable from their property, it was an anomaly highly dangerous to the prerogative of the crown. Any other relation between the chief and the sept but that of landlord and tenantry, would imply a revival in Ireland of that aristocratic might which it had cost the monarchy a long and terrible conflict to destroy. The Statutes of Liveries had been a powerful weapon against the nobles under Henry VII., and a rich mine of wealth in the hands of Empson and Dudley. “These handsome gentlemen,” said the king to the Earl of Oxford,

when he found him surrounded by a host of retainers, "are doubtless your menial servants." And the earl confessed that they were his retainers, and was mulcted, it is said, for the breach of law, in 15,000 marks. It was not possible that Ireland should long preserve so distasteful a privilege. But the tyranny of the system consisted in this, that it was not, as in England, a blow at the power of the aristocracy, but a revolution in the rights of property which fell most heavily on the poor. The English nation had not then, and they have not yet, that flexibility and tolerance which is necessary in order to bear with the peculiar habits and ideas of another race. This incapacity has followed them every where, and in every clime it has been the curse of their power. They are the best colonists that the world has ever seen, because they maintain with admirable tenacity, under all circumstances, the system of property and of government which has made them great at home. But they are the worst civilisers among colonising nations, because they exhibit the same tenacity in their intercourse with others. The troubles in Canada, in New Zealand, in Ionia, and even in India, where the dominion of the Company called forth an amount of administrative ability that has never been shown in the service of the state,—all these have been due to the same constitutional defect that has ruined Ireland.

The policy introduced by the Tudors was continued by the Stuarts. James abolished tanistry, and what was called Irish gavelkind, and commenced the scheme of plantations on the ruins of the sept. The power of the chiefs, we are told, "sodainly fell and vanished." And then, first by the inquiry into defective titles, and afterwards by ingenious provocation to rebellion, an immense part of the soil of Ireland was confiscated, and society utterly disorganised.

Evils such as these have not been suffered by any Christian nation in modern times, and they were aggravated by the rise of Protestantism. But the religious animosity which made the sufferings more bitter was not their cause. The Reformation was the third great calamity of Ireland; but the others were enough to make her history the most painful that men have recorded. They were first of all the policy of a foreign aristocracy, that refused to her the benefits of a higher form of government and of society; and then the policy of a foreign absolutism, that deprived her of her own. At the present time, these causes have spent their force and have done their havoc, and their consequences are concentrated in one thing,—the ascendancy of the religion of the minority. It inherits all the results and all the power for

evil of the policy of social degradation, and of the policy of indiscriminate confiscation. The spirit of both survives and triumphs in the Establishment; alone it is a sufficient substitute for all the other traditional modes of oppression, and an effective counterpoise for the things that have been conceded.

And this, if I understand the accomplished writer of whose book I have attempted to give a political summary, is the idea which Mr. Aubrey de Vere wishes to bring home to his readers. The spirit of his patriotism has, like his verse, its strength in religion; and his practical view tends to represent the Irish Protestant Church as perpetuating whatever has been most tyrannical in the dealings of England towards Ireland. He has not exhausted the poetical themes with which the history of his country abounds, and he has not given its just prominence and proportion in the catalogue of wrongs to the revolutionary treatment of the Irish system of property, which renders the confiscations more oppressive and more monstrous than any which in troubled periods have been inflicted elsewhere; but he has described in some of his most touching lines the great grievance of Ireland in the Middle Ages, and he shows a just and clear perception of the remedy which is needed in order to remove that which keeps alive in our time the sorrows and the anger of the past.

T. C.

EDMUND CAMPION.—No. V.

WHEN the English College at Rome was founded, in 1579, a Welshman, Maurice Clenock, was appointed president. His partiality to his countrymen excited factions which led to "mischief and almost murder," and maddened the students to that pitch that they were ready to forswear Allen and forsake "whom and what else soever," rather than continue under the Welsh rector. The tumults were not entirely calmed by the appointment of two Jesuits for the moral and literary superintendence of the scholars, for this only angered the Welsh faction against the society, which they accused of having stirred up these tumults underhand, in order that the fathers might gain possession of the college; not that they wished to send the English students to the mission, but rather to keep them at Rome and make them Jesuits. This party thought the fathers had "no skill nor experience" of the state of England, or of the nature of Englishmen, and that

their "trade of syllogising" was quite alien from the intellectual habits of this country. Allen wrote from Paris, May 12, 1579, that he feared, if these broils continued, "our nation would be forsaken both of the Jesuits and ourselves, and all superiors else;" and wished to God that he might go for a month to Rome, and either make up these extreme alienations of mind, or else end his life.

Allen accordingly went to Rome, and found that the best way of reconciling the factions was for the Jesuits to take part in the English mission. The cause was debated between him and Mercurianus, the general of the society, his four assistants, Claudius Acquaviva, the Roman Provincial, afterwards General, and Father Parsons. The arguments for the mission were founded upon several considerations,—the piety, the necessity, and the importance of the work; the desire of the English Catholics; the notable encouragement and help it would be to the seminary priests if they had Jesuits, not only to assist them abroad in their studies, but at home in their conflicts; the increasing intensity of the war, which now required more men; the comfort it would be to the English Catholics to see religious men begin to return thither again after so long an exile, and especially such religious as could not pretend to recover any of the alienated property of the orders; the propriety of the Jesuits engaging in the mission, since the object of their foundation was to oppose the heresies of the day. It was urged also that Englishmen were more neighbours than Indians, and had greater claims for spiritual help; for it was more obligatory to preserve than to gain; and a token that the Jesuits were called to accept the mission was to be found in the fact that there were more Englishmen in the society than in all the other orders together. Moreover, the Jesuits had been the professors and the directors of the seminary priests, and had exhorted them to undertake their perilous enterprise. It was not seemly for those who were sending men at the risk of their lives to bear the burden of the day and the heat, themselves to stand aloof. And how could the fathers expect to be acceptable to the English nation after the restoration of religion, if they refused to bear their share of the toil and the danger of restoring it? Lastly, as the Order of St. Benedict at first converted England, the society of Jesus might fairly hope for the glory of reconverting it.

In reply to these arguments, it was urged that so grave a matter must not be too hastily settled; that it was a hard thing to send men to so dangerous a place as England, where the adversaries, though Christians in name, were more hostile, more eager, more vigilant, and much more cruel than

the infidels of the Indies were then, or than the heathen Saxons formerly were when St. Augustine went over; that the superiors, who would have no difficulty in persuading the English Jesuits to face the risk of martyrdom, had great difficulty in deciding whether the loss of such men did not far outweigh the hope of gain by their labours. Again, the English Government would at once publish a proclamation declaring that the Jesuits had not come over for religious, but only for political purposes, and would thus make the missionaries odious, and their actions doubtful. It would require more wisdom than could be expected in the mass of men to unravel the web and detect the fallacy. The charge would either be believed, or men would remain in suspense till the event was seen. Again, the method of life which priests were obliged to practise in England was totally incompatible with the constitutions of the society. Whilst the external danger was a recommendation, the spiritual perils must give them pause. They would be obliged to go about in disguise, and hide their priesthood and their religious profession under the garb and swagger of soldiers; they must live apart from one another, and consort with men of doubtful character; they would be sent back to the world to escape from which they had sacrificed themselves. They would be overwhelmed with business, and there would be no facilities, as in India, for renewing their relaxing fervour by frequent retreats. They would have no rest, no silence; they would be in everlasting hurly-burly. And then they would be accused of treason, and hunted about as traitors. And on occasion of disputes with the other priests, there were no bishops in England to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and it seemed difficult to believe that so many priests and religious could live together in one realm without jars and discords.

It was long before any decision was made. Allen went to the Pope, who removed the last difficulty by sending Dr. Goldwell, who had been Bishop of St. Asaph in Mary's reign, to be the ordinary of all England. The other objections were overruled, chiefly through the arguments of Claudius Acquaviva, who asked to be sent on the mission, and of Oliverius Manareus, the assistant from Germany, who, as a Belgian, knew the state of England through the English exiles who swarmed in his country. It was determined that the society should take part in the English mission, and a paper of instructions was drawn up for the guidance of those who should be first sent. The missionaries were reminded of the virtue and piety, and of the prudence, required for dwelling safely in a nation of shrewd, experienced, and unscrupulous enemies:

to preserve the first, they were to keep the rules of the society as far as circumstances would allow ; for the second, they were to study with whom, when, how, and about what things they were to speak, and to be especially careful never to commit themselves, either amid the temptations of good fellowship, or by hasty and immoderate zeal and heat. Their dress, though secular, was to be grave, and the habit of the society was only to be worn when they were quite safe, and then only for sacred functions. If they could not live together, they were at least to visit one another frequently. With regard to their intercourse with strangers, they were to associate with men of the higher ranks, and rather with reconciled Catholics than with those who were still in schism. They were to have no personal dealings with heretics, but were to employ laymen to manage all the preliminaries of conversion, to which they were themselves only to put the finishing stroke. They were not to be over-ready to engage in controversy, and then were to abstain from all sarcasm, preferring solid answers to sharp repartees, and always putting first the very best and strongest arguments. They were to avoid familiar conversation with women and boys, to take especial care never to deserve the reputation of chatter-boxes, or of alms or legacy hunters ; “ they must so behave that all may see that the only gain they covet is that of souls.” They must not carry about any thing forbidden by the penal laws, or any thing that might compromise them, as letters ; except for the strongest reasons, they must never let it be publicly known that they were Jesuits, or even priests. “ They must not mix themselves up with affairs of state, nor write to Rome about political matters, nor speak, nor allow others to speak in their presence, against the queen,—except perhaps in the company of those whose fidelity has been long and steadfast, and even then not without strong reasons.”

It would have been too much to expect that the English Jesuits should have no political opinion at all, or that what they had should be favourable to Queen Elizabeth. But short of proscribing all political action whatever, the instructions given to the first Jesuits certainly shut up such action within the narrowest possible limits ; they were to do nothing, and only to speak out their opinions in the most select company. The only political action that was to be allowed them was one for which the government of Elizabeth ought to have been thankful to them. They were “ to ask the Pope for an explanation of the declaration of Pius V. against Elizabeth, which the Catholics desired to have thus explained : That it should always bind her and the heretics ; but that it should

in no way bind the Catholics, while things remain as they are ; but only then when public execution of the said bull shall be possible." My readers will remember that St. Pius V. excommunicated not only Elizabeth and her abettors, but also all who obeyed her and her laws. So that the unfortunate Catholics were placed between two fires, hanged if they did not obey, cursed if they did. Campion, on his first arrival at Rome, had been consulted about the practical effect of this bull, and had declared that it procured great evils to the Catholics ; Cardinal Gesualdi had told him that it might without doubt be so mitigated as to allow the Catholics to acknowledge the queen without censure ; and now, before going to England he asked for and obtained only this mitigation, not probably because it was all he thought useful, but because it was all he could hope to get. The proviso, "*rebus sic stantibus*," "whilst things remain as they are," was, I suppose, inserted by some one who knew what hopes the Roman court just then entertained of the subversion of the government of Elizabeth, and the substitution of a Catholic sovereign on the throne of England.

With regard to the use that was to be made of lay instructors for the preliminaries of conversion, to begin the building which the fathers were to finish, we have the following notice : "Since sundry persons, priests and others, in England have determined to imitate the life of the Apostles, and to devote themselves wholly to the salvation of souls and the conversion of heretics ; and the better to do this, have determined to be content with food and clothing, and the bare necessities of their state, bestowing all the rest of their goods for the common needs of the Catholics, to collect alms for this common fund, and to promote the conversion of England in other ways ;" the Pope was asked to approve and bless this association, and to give sundry indulgences to those members who promised to practise the rules as well as they could, whether in prison or out of prison. These, and sundry other indulgences and faculties, were granted by the Pope to Father Parsons and Father Campion, the two Jesuits first sent on the mission, April 14, 1580 ; and by a brief dated two days later they were enabled to communicate all their privileges to the secular priests employed on the missions of England, Ireland, and Scotland.

In spite, however, of the extraordinary privileges which the Jesuits enjoyed, they were but a small part of the force which Dr. Allen had persuaded the Pope to send into England at this time. The army of missionaries was led by Dr. Goldwell, the Bishop of St. Asaph ; with him were Dr. Mor-

ton the Penitentiary of St. Peter's, and four old priests of the English hospital, Dr. Brumberg, William Gibley, Thomas Crane, and William Kemp; Lawrence Vaux, the old prior of Manchester, was drawn from his cell at Louvain, and several young priests from Rheims joined in the company. The Catholic association had already been organised in England by William Gilbert, a young man of property, who had been converted by Father Parsons in Rome early in 1579, and had been sent back to England to prepare for the enterprise which was already on the anvil; three young priests from the English College, and two laymen, who thought to take a leading part in the association, accompanied the fathers from Rome. Finally, there were the two fathers, with Ralph Emerson, a lay brother; and thus all ranks in the Church—priests, both secular and regular, and laymen—had their share in this great spiritual enterprise.

It would have been well for English Catholicism if there had not been another enterprise in hand, of a very different character, but aiming at the same object,—the reduction of the British islands to the obedience of the Pope. Unfortunately there is a perfectly overwhelming mass of evidence to show that the proviso "*rebus sic stantibus*" in the mitigation of the Bull was introduced with an intention too plain to be misconstrued. I have already quoted a letter from Dr. Sanders to Dr. Allen, in which he tells of the Pope being ready to give 2000 men for an expedition into Ireland. While Allen was at Rome, the Roman government organised this force, and the expedition must have sailed soon after the missionaries started from Rome, since it reached Ireland about the same time that Parsons and Campion were entering England. The expedition, and the part that the Roman government took in it, was no secret to the diplomatic body of Europe; Corrado, the Venetian ambassador at Rome, related to his government on his return in 1581* how the Pope spent 230,000 scudi upon it, and an account of an Irish agent of the Vatican, announcing the safe arrival of the "five great ships full of soldiers and munitions of war, sent by the Holy See," has been published by Theiner.† Further, a brief of Gregory XIII., dated May 13, 1580, and doubtless intended to be distributed in Ireland by Dr. Sanders and the leaders of the expedition, gives plenary indulgence, such as was given to Crusaders, to all who join John Geraldine or his brother James, or help them "with counsel, favour, supplies, arms, or in any other way," as may be seen in O'Sullivan's History, chap. 17. The English government

* Relazioni, vol. x. p. 282.

† Annales Ecclesiastici, vol. iii. p. 217.

was as well informed as any other, as is evident from the French ambassador's despatches from London, giving an account of the whole expedition, and of its disgraceful failure. It was commanded by an Italian, San Giuseppe, and Dr. Sanders was attached to it; and afterwards, whenever a priest was captured in England, he was asked what he thought of the conduct of the Pope and Sanders, and generally condemned to die if he refused to qualify it; and at the time of Campion's trial the attorney-general cynically observed that the Jesuits had arrived here "as it seemeth of purpose to answer the doings of those rebels there" in Ireland.

The policy of combining these two expeditions is hard either to be justified or to be understood. But I will venture a few remarks on the subject. First, the distinction between the temporal sovereignty of the Pope over his own states, his temporal supremacy over other princes, and his spiritual power over the whole Church, was not in those days accurately drawn; law had not yet altogether superseded force, and divines like Stapleton still held that it was part of the Pope's duty to put down heretical princes by the same violent methods that one prince might employ against another. Next, the distinction that was made between the Papal treatment of Ireland and that of England corresponded to the difference of the Papal rights to the two islands respectively. The Pope had been the acknowledged donor of Ireland to the English crown; his suzerain rights had always been more or less acknowledged, whereas his feudal superiority over England, though admitted by King John, had been always indignantly denied by the people and the other kings. He, therefore, had a right to interfere in Ireland with higher hand than he could use in England. It must be remembered that the Pope had long since committed himself in Ireland by the aid and encouragement he had given to James Geraldine, the father of the present leaders of the Irish insurgents, who had lost his life in the Papal cause. Such forcible attempts had been made in England, and had failed, and there was no present prospect of renewing them. England then could only be assailed by spiritual weapons. And it was hoped that the Pope would for the present be considered as only a spiritual person in his relations with England, though he was behaving as a temporal belligerent in Ireland,—much as the Emperor of China was lately at peace with us at Peking, and at war in Canton. Perhaps also the Italians thought they could conceal the intricacies of their policy from the blear eyes of the Northern barbarians.

It is strange to see how often the acute and subtle

countrymen of Machiavelli fail through not giving credit to others for equal acuteness, and through believing that others will be caught in a web of sophistry that Italians can disentangle with ease. It is not difficult to understand into what a false position the Jesuits and the other missionaries were thrown by the Irish expedition, and how entirely they were compromised; imposed upon themselves, it was their mission to impose upon others likewise, and to make believe that the Bull was so modified as to make the relations between Pope and Queen compatible with the continual allegiance of Catholics. Yet, after all, the famous mitigation amounted in reality to no more than an ill-conceived attempt to pretend to be at peace with the queen in England, while open war was being made upon her in Ireland. And yet there can be no doubt that this double dealing was a strictly logical result of the attempt to guarantee the Pope's spiritual power through his temporal power, or that the persevering attempt to preserve the temporal rights over Ireland which the Popes held in trust most materially interfered with the independence of their spiritual power in England, and disappointed the well-founded hopes of reducing our country to the faith. It is scarcely possible to say this in stronger words than it is said by Parsons himself in his *Ms. life of Campion*. He thus describes the dismay with which he first heard of it from Dr. Allen at Rheims, just before he and Campion crossed over into England:

"Dr. Allen also told us that he had heard from Spain that Dr. Sanders was just gone into Ireland, by the Nuncio Mgr. Segá's orders, to comfort and assist the Earl of Desmond, Viscount Balinglas, and others that had taken arms in defence of their religion, and had asked the Pope's help, counsel, and comfort in that cause. Though it belonged not to us to mislike this journey of Dr. Sanders, because it was made by order of his superiors, yet were we heartily sorry, partly because we feared that which really happened, the destruction of so rare and worthy a man, and partly because we plainly foresaw that this would be laid against us and other priests, if we should be taken in England, as though we had been privy or partakers thereof, as in very truth we were not, nor ever heard or suspected the same until this day. But as we could not remedy the matter, and as our consciences were clear, we resolved through evil report or good report to go on with the purely spiritual action we had in hand; and if God destined any of us to suffer under a wrong title, it was only what He had done, and would be no loss to us, but rather gain, in His eyes who knew the truth, and for whose sake alone we had undertaken this enterprise."

The papers that relate to the mission of 1580 reveal ano-

ther difficulty that was occasioned by the intimate union between the temporal and spiritual grandeur of the Church, and by the feudal state with which it was considered necessary to surround her prelates. I have already related how Bishop Goldwell was at the head of the mission; he failed to penetrate into England, and no other Bishop was sent in his place. After nearly thirty years the ordinary jurisdiction over England was conferred on an archpriest, and in the lamentable disorders that followed, the Jesuits, and especially Father Parsons, were accused of having by their intrigues prevented the appointment of Bishops, in order to keep the management of affairs in their own hands. This accusation is scarcely fair; we have seen that one of the objections to sending the Jesuits at all was the absence of episcopal authority in England, and that they were not sent till a Bishop was sent with them. It was not their fault that Goldwell was taken ill at Rheims, and that "before he recovered, the persecution in England had grown to be so rigorous that it seemed not good to the Pope to adventure a man of that age and dignity to so turbulent a time, and so called him back to Rome, where he lived in the love of all men and in universal opinion of sanctity till his death in 1584."* It was not the Jesuits' fault that Watson, the Bishop of Lincoln, was kept so close in Wisbeach Castle, till his death in 1584, that he could perform no episcopal duties. The Jesuits had no sooner arrived in England than they began to beg for Bishops. In September 1580, Parsons wrote, "There is immense want of a Bishop to consecrate the holy oils, for want of which we are brought to the greatest straits, and unless his Holiness makes haste to help us in this matter we shall be at our wit's end." Again, in 1591 he renewed his request, and got Sarmientos, the Bishop of Jaen, to promise him a competent support for two or three Bishops.† In 1597 he again presented a memorial to the Pope and Cardinals, praying for the appointment of two Bishops *in partibus*;‡ but soon afterwards, finding the objections at Rome insurmountable, he changed his plan, and asked for the appointment of an archpriest.

The real reason why no substitute was provided for Goldwell was, as Parsons says, because the Pope did not like to adventure the episcopal dignity in such turbulent times. That this was the received theory at Rome is proved by the pamphlet of "Franciscus Romulus" (supposed to be Bellarmine) on the Papal duty of dethroning evil princes, published at Rome in 1588. The writer feels it necessary to apologise

* F. Parsons. † Brief Apology, 101. ‡ Tierney's Dod. vol. iii. p. 47.

for the primitive Bishops not dethroning princes; "for those were times," he says, "when it behoved Bishops rather to be ready for martyrdom than for coercing kings." This announcement drew down a storm of reproaches; "what then, are these times when Bishops must be men of war and not martyrs? Is it not the strength of the Reformation that our Bishops are more ready to kill than to be killed, that they think heresy can be better exterminated with the bodies of heretics than wiped out of their minds by argument and good example? Is not the rebellion more against the wealth, the secular power, the pride of the clergy, than against the doctrines of the Church?" Bellarmine knew all this, and did not intend to deny it, but his opponents took occasion by his words to argue against an idea that was supposed to be powerful at the Vatican.

And that this supposition was not unfounded is clear from the following letter, written from Rheims to the Pope by Goldwell, July 13, 1580, who had been "a month cured of his fever, and yet not well either in mind or body, but waiting for the decision of his Holiness."

"BEATISSIMO PADRE,— If I could have crossed over into England before my coming was known there, as I hoped to do, I think that my going thither would have been a comfort to the Catholics, and a satisfaction to your Holiness; whereas now I fear the contrary, for there are so many spies in this kingdom, and my long tarrying here has made my going to England so bruited there, that now I doubt it will be difficult for me to enter that kingdom without some danger. Nevertheless, if your Holiness thinks differently, I will make the trial, though it should cost me my life. Still it would be impossible for me alone to supply the wants of the Catholics, who are more by many thousands than I thought, and scattered over the whole kingdom. The most that I can hope to do is to supply for the city of London and some miles round. And therefore, in my ignorance, I cannot but marvel how it is that, after God has given your Holiness grace, as it were, to plant anew and support the Catholic faith in that kingdom, you make so many difficulties about creating three or four titular Bishops to preserve and propagate it,—a thing that might be done with as little expense as your Holiness pleases; for God has so inclined the minds of the priests to spend their lives in promoting the reduction of that kingdom to the Catholic faith, that, after being made Bishops, they would be contented to live as poorly as they do now, like the Bishops of the primitive Church. God inspire your Holiness to do that which shall be most to His honour, and prosper you many years. I humbly kiss your feet.—Your Holiness's most devoted servant, THE BISHOP OF ST. ASAPH.*"

After this it will be impossible to doubt from what quar-

* Theiner, *Annales*, vol. iii. p. 700.

ters the difficulties about sending Bishops to England originally proceeded. It may be that the Jesuits, after enjoying for twenty years the consequence that accrued to them through the absence of Bishops, preferred another arrangement; but they had always asked for Bishops, and their request had been refused, because feudal power and ecclesiastical authority had become so mixed up together in men's minds, that they feared the scandal of a poor Bishop, hiding from his pursuers, disguised like a soldier, mariner, or serving-man, living in garrets, inns, woods, caves, or barns, wandering over the land, and at last dying ignominiously on the gallows. It would have been easy enough to find men contented to live in apostolic poverty, but it was impossible to get them consecrated under such conditions. Etiquette and routine prevailed, and the Church in England was left without Bishops till the factions had grown so furious among the clergy that the measure which might have been a successful preventive was not strong enough to be an adequate cure.

Father Parsons, Campion's superior in the mission, was his junior in age and in religion; but he had talents better suited for administration and management. Inferior in eloquence, and in enthusiastic simplicity of purpose, he had a deeper knowledge of men and things, greater versatility, a finer and subtler policy, and as strong a will. He was also *notus Pontifici*; and the regulations of the society say, "those who are sent on missions should be exceedingly well-known to the superior." Parsons had always lived in the metropolis, Campion had been buried in a distant province. It is, perhaps, one of the inconveniences of any centralised system, that it tends to give the advantage to showy talent known at headquarters over deeper merit obscured by distance. Both Parsons and Campion were doubtless "well proved, especially in obedience," and "ready to go any where without excusing themselves," though Campion had practised the more complete abnegation of will. They were furnished with the instructions from which I have already quoted, which descended to particulars about things and persons in a way that must have given a very diplomatic air to those who implicitly followed such orders. The rule prescribed that the missionaries should be at least two, and that for a very fervent and courageous man a cooler and more circumspect companion should be chosen; in this expedition the prudence was Parsons', the zeal was Campion's. Simple as a child, he knew he was marching to his death; still he affected no more courage than he felt, but owned and made a joke of his fears. The flesh was weak, but the will was strong, and though the body trembled and the

teeth chattered, in the depths of his soul he loved the danger that he contemplated so clearly, and deliberately courted the self-sacrifice. To apply his own words about St. Wenceslaus to himself, “*Quid faciat? Eat? Matrem, qualem illam cunque, matrem tamen oppugnabit. Non eat? amabit tyrannidem, prodet innocentes, Christum deseret. Vicerunt piorum lacrymæ, bonitas causæ, periculi magnitudo;*” every thing he thought, should be risked rather than the salvation of a single soul. Parsons was a man of more animal courage, but he did not obtain the grace of martyrdom. *Finis coronat opus*, and martyrdom is generally the seal of merit.

Campion, as I said, reached Rome April 5, 1580. There “the youth of the English College wished to have him with them for one or two days, and to hear him preach;” and five of them accompanied him to England. He remained till April 18th; on that day Robert Owen, a Welsh exile for the faith, wrote to Dr. Humphrey Ely at Rheims a letter which fell into the hands of Walsingham’s agents, and conveyed the first intelligence of the mission to the English government. “My Lord of St. Asaph and Mr. Dr. Morton are gone hence, some say to Venice, some to Flanders, and so further, which if it be true you shall know sooner than we here. God send them well to do whithersoever they go, and specially if they be gone to the harvest. The sale that Mr. Dr. Morton made of all his things maketh many think *quod non habet animum revertendi*. This day depart hence many of our countrymen thitherward, and withal good Father Campion.” Another agent furnished Walsingham with a list of the English scholars in Rome; the English gentlemen at Rome, Rheims, Paris, and Douai; and of those that departed from Rome, April 18, with Edmund Campion and John (Robert) Parsons. These were Ralph Sherwin, who had been leader of the movement of the English scholars against Maurice Clenock and the Welshmen, Luke Kirby and Edward Rishton, priests, and Thomas Bruscoe and John Pascal, lay students, the firstfruits of the recently erected English college, the four Marian priests of the hospital whom I have named above, Ralph Emerson, a Jesuit lay brother, and another not named. They were accompanied by Sir Richard Shelly, the English Prior of Malta, and almost all the Englishmen then in Rome, and by Father Oliverius Manareus and other Jesuits sent by the General, as far as the Ponte Molle, where there was a solemn and affectionate farewell, which, as described by the biographers, was not very consistent with the mystery and secrecy sought to be thrown round the mission.

Goldwell and Morton had ridden on before; our pilgrims

followed on foot. Parsons managed every thing. "It was thought convenient," he writes, "that each priest should change his long apparel, both for better travelling afoot, as also not so easily to be discerned in Germany and some other places of Protestants, where priests are little favoured. And when some new apparel was offered to Campion, he would in no wise take it, but only covered himself with certain old buckram under an old cloak, and passed with that attire throughout his whole journey;" "for he said, that to him that went to be hanged in England any apparel was sufficient." "And to prove the blessed man the more, God sent continual rain for the first eight or ten days after our leaving Rome, so as from morning to night he travelled in the wet with that evil apparel, and oftentimes stuck so fast in the mire in those deep and foul ways that he was scarce able to get out again." There were a few horses among them for the use of the old and sick; but Campion never rode but once, when he was suffering from ague and diarrhœa. It was ordered also that every man should take a new name, to escape the chance spies by the way, who would discover each man in particular to the Council. They wanted to call Campion Petre; but he, remembering how well he had escaped from Ireland under St. Patrick's patronage, would take no other name but his old one of Patrick. "Albeit," says Parsons, "when we came to St. Omer's, and were to enter into England, we persuaded him to take some other English name, lest the other, being Irish, might bring him in question; for Ireland at that time was noised to be in trouble by the arrival of Dr. Sanders with some soldiers from the Pope for the assistance of certain Catholic noblemen in arms for their religion, as they said."

It was Campion's custom on this journey to say Mass very early every morning, and then, after reciting the *Itinerarium* with the rest, to push on about a mile ahead of the company, to meditate for a few hours, read his breviary, and recite the litanies of the saints, when he would lag to allow the party to catch him up, and would joke and chatter with them till it was time to push forward again for his evening meditation and prayer. At Bologna they were obliged to stay some days, by an accident to Parsons' leg. They had brought a letter from Agazzari, the Rector of the English College, to Cardinal Paleotto, the Archbishop, who received them hospitably. This prelate enforced a monastic discipline in his palace. At dinner, after the usual reading, questions were proposed, and discussion often passed into discourse. Campion and Sherwin were both encouraged to speak.

“Campion’s discourse,” says Parsons, “was very pithy, and fit for the place and time. He began with Cicero’s quotation from Pythagoras, who, perceiving by the light of nature man’s difficulty to good, and proneness to vice, said, that the way of virtue was hard and laborious, but yet not void of delectation, and much more to be embraced than the other, which was easy. Which Father Campion applying to a Christian life, showed very aptly both the labours and delights thereof, and that the saying of Pythagoras was much more verifiable in the same than in the life of any heathen philosopher, for that the labours were greater, the helps more potent, the end more high, and the reward more excellent. Whereby also in fine he came to declare the nature and quality of the journey and enterprise which his fellows had in hand, and greatly to encourage them in the same.” The rest at Bologna gave Campion time to write to one of his friends at Prague. Here is a translation of his letter :

“This is an answer to your two letters, one of which I received as I was leaving Munich, the other when I had reached Rome. What you tell me for my salvation, I accept as the command of God. Only do not think that your care of me is ended while I live. You must not wonder that when I wrote from Munich I did not say a word about your letter, for it was delivered to me after I had folded mine, and had left it with the Rector of the College. I see you had not read it even when you wrote your second letter to me; you must therefore speak to Father Ferdinand, and give him my dutiful salutation. With respect to the *Ambrosian* (his tragedy) which you ask me about in your other letter, you must know, my Father, that it was not given back to me after your return from Vienna; but that I saw it in your chamber, where I doubt not but it still lies in some corner, unless it is in somebody’s hands, who borrowed it of you when you were engaged, so that you have forgotten about it. If it is acted again, I pray you let it be made more comprehensible. I submit it to the censure of a practised man, such as Father Nicholas; I remembered him in the Holy House at Loreto, and I read the poem which he hung up. I accept with joy Father Urban’s bargain; I expected nothing so little as a letter from him, whom in my journey I had often recommended to God as dead; now at last I learn there was a mistake in the person, on account of his having the same name as the one who lately died at Fulda. So I am excessively glad that such a pious agreement exists between Father Ziphelin and me. I have a similar agreement with Fathers Aquensis, Gabriel, Stephen of Dalmatia, and Troger, jointly and severally. Now they can be of great service to me in the midst of my infinite perils. I am now at Bologna, on my return from Rome, and on the way to my warfare in England. Whatever becomes of me, our posterity

survives. You would hardly believe me if I told you what comfort I feel when I think of them. If they were not Englishmen I would say more about them. In this expedition there are two Fathers of the Society, Robert Parsons and myself, seven other priests, and three laymen, one of whom is also of us. I see them all so prodigal of blood and life, that I am ashamed of my backwardness. I hope to be with Allen, at Rheims, in the beginning of June. We all travel at the Pope's cost. Though we should fall at the first onset, yet our army is full of fresh recruits, by whose victory our ghosts will be pacified. But let us come ὅσπερον πρότερον to the journey to Rome. I drove in the carriage of Prince Ferdinand as far as Innsbruch, thence I walked to Padua. There, as I was about to bestow what money I had left, according to your directions, I was suddenly told to make haste to Rome. We mounted our horses, for I had stumbled on another Father by the way. Though I had so much money left at first, yet in a few days I should have had nothing to pay my bills, except my companion had had plenty. I made use of God's providence, and your liberality, as you told me. Indeed I was liberal enough to spend more than the whole. At Padua I was shown about by young Matthias Melchiorius, who scarcely left my side ; he has the best dispositions towards the Society, and is of excellent report. Here I am reminded of my pupils, and of our companions, whom I often think of. There are so many to whom I wished to write severally, and I was so overwhelmed with their number and with my other business, that I have hitherto written to none of them. I am tired when I reach our colleges ; in the inns I can scarcely breathe. I was at Rome about eight days, cramped for time, more than during all the rest of my journey. I must ask them therefore, and especially my fathers and brothers of Prague, to pardon what I cannot help. The rest I reserve for a fourth letter. I shall be very glad if I find one from you before I pass over into England. You may send to Rheims, Paris, or Douai, for I suppose that I shall visit these places. But, anyhow, if they are sent to Allen, they will be delivered to me. In uncertainty whether we shall ever see one another again, I write my will, and I leave to you and all of them the kiss of charity and the bond of peace. Farewell. Bologna, the last of April, 1580.

Reverend Father, again and again, and for ever, farewell."

Before leaving Rome, our pilgrims had doubtless originated the custom of the English missionaries going to St. Philip Neri, ere they set out for the scene of their passion, that the full zeal and love pent up in that burning breast might find a vent and flow over from him who was kept at home upon those who were to face the foe. "Therefore," says Dr. Newman, "one by one, each in his turn, those youthful soldiers came to the old man, and one by one they persevered and gained the crown and the palm—all but one, who had not gone and would not go for the salutary blessing." I don't

know whether John Pascal was in this case; he, I think, was the only one of this company that fell. He was a layman, a great favourite of the Pope, an agreeable companion, and a pupil of Sherwin; after his fall it was remembered of him that he had shown great defect of character in his behaviour to the Pope, whose generosity and kindness he received with too great familiarity. Bombinus says this was pride,—“for the same arrogance which covets distinctions above one’s sphere, makes light of them when gained.” Johnson, perhaps, would have called it servility, one of the basest features of which is to suffer one’s liberty in the presence of great men to aggrandise him in his own esteem: a favourite may be saucy; but he is saucy only because he is servile.

They had left one Saint at Rome, they were to find another at Milan. St. Charles Borromeo received our pilgrims into his house, and kept them there for eight days. He made Sherwin preach before him, and he made Campion discourse every day after dinner. “He had,” says Parsons, “sundry learned and most godly speeches with us, tending to the contempt of this world, and perfect zeal of Christ’s service, whereof we saw so rare an example in himself and his austere and laborious life; being nothing in effect but skin and bone, through continual pains, fasting, and penance; so that without saying a word, he preached to us sufficiently, and we departed from him greatly edified and exceedingly animated.” St. Charles always showed a partiality for the English exiles. Owen Lewis, the Bishop of Cassano, had been his vicar-general, and William Giffard, afterwards Archbishop of Rheims, his chaplain. After our pilgrims’ visit he wrote to Agazzari, the president: “I saw and willingly received those English who departed hence the other day, as their goodness deserved, and the cause for which they had undertaken that voyage. If, in future, your Reverence shall send any others to me, be assured that I will take care to receive them with all charity, and that it will be most pleasing to me to have occasion to perform the duties of hospitality, so proper for a Bishop, towards the Catholics of that nation. Milan, the last of June, 1580.”

From Milan our party went to Turin, and entered the Alps at Mount Cenis, “all in health, and apt for travel,” and after sundry long marches, arrived at St. Jean de Maurienne, in Savoy, where they encountered many troops of Spanish soldiers, who were marching from Flanders to Milan, on occasion of the truce between Don John of Austria and the States-General of Holland. Our priests were thereby somewhat distressed for necessary lodging and provision for man and horse. At Aiguebelle they met with another “rout” of the

army, and learned besides that the road by Lyons was blocked up and imperilled by the insurrection of the peasants of Dauphiné; and so, after deliberation, they resolved to pass by Geneva in spite of the difficulties that might arise from the difference in religion; for it was a free city, and the laws of the Swiss cantons permitted travellers, whether Catholics or not, to pass that way, and stay for three days, which was a longer delay than they meant to make. Most of the company also desired to see Theodore Beza, of whom they had heard so much in England, where his fame was greater than in any other Calvinist country, much greater than it was then in Geneva itself. Some of them jested merrily at the suggestion that perhaps the magistrates of the city, who were in confederacy with Elizabeth, might detain them, or send them prisoners to England, by way of the Rhine, at the instance of Beza or the English residents. But they concluded, that if God would have them taken, He would find means; and to them it was all one whether they were captured in Geneva or in England.

There remained yet another little consultation, whether they should confess to the magistrates what religion they professed, and whither they were bound, or only tell them as much as they were obliged; but it was quickly resolved unanimously to declare clearly that they were Catholics, and to begin their confession in the city where the sect of Calvin was first hatched. Nevertheless, before they arrived near that "sink of heresy" every man disguised himself, and Campion "dissembled his personage in form of a poor Irishman, and waited on Mr. Pascal," the mere remembrance of how naturally he played his part being a continual source of merriment to Sherwin. Thus disfigured they came to the gates of Geneva; Campion and Sherwin were two of the first to enter; the soldiers, who were keeping great watch and ward for fear of the Spanish bands passing through the country, asked whence they were, and whither they went; after answer was made, the captain told one of his men to conduct them to be examined by the magistrates, who were in session with certain ministers in the open market-place. They were again asked whence they came, and whither they travelled, and why they passed not the ordinary way. They replied: "To avoid the Spaniards, and the 'Dolphinates' who were up in arms." Then they were asked what countrymen they were,— "Some English, some brought up in Ireland," was the reply; and Campion was introduced as Mr. Patrick. "Are you of our religion?" "No," said Pascal. "From the first to the last of us we are all Catholics," said Bruscoe boldly. "So are we

too," said the magistrates. "Yea, but," said Sherwin, who only now came up, "we are all Roman Catholics." "Of that we marvel," said the magistrates, "for your Queen and all her realm are of our religion." "As for our Queen," answered one,—Parsons does not remember whether it was Campion,— "we cannot tell whether she is of your religion or no, considering the variety of opinions that this age has brought forth; but sure we are she is not of ours. Though for the realm, you must understand that all are not of her religion, nor of yours; but many be good Christian Catholics, and do suffer both losses at home and banishment abroad for the same, of which number are we, who have lived divers years in Italy, and are going now towards the English Seminary in Rheims, but are obliged to pass by Geneva to avoid the Spanish soldiers and Dauphinese insurgents." Then the magistrates promised them free and courteous entertainment according to the laws of the country; and seeing them all so resolute, they questioned them no more about religion, but only about the Spaniards, of whom they could give but very small advices. So a soldier was ordered to guide them to their inn, a very fair one, bearing the sign of the city, and willed that they should be very well used for their money—as they were. This was about 11 o'clock in the forenoon. As they were being examined, they saw the long-bearded ministers of Geneva looking at them from the windows and laughing. "But if we might have had our wills," says Sherwin, "we would have made them to have wept Irish." As they were passing through the streets of the city, some one said, "They are all priests;" others, "They are all monks;" and one, seeing Campion dressed like a servant, thought either to discover him or to chaff him, by asking in Latin, "*Cujas es?*" ("Whose man are you?") Campion had his wits about him, and answered sharply, "*Signor, no!*" The fellow was taken aback, and asked, "*Potesne loqui latine?*" no doubt mistaking the Italian for Latin; and Campion answered with "a shrink with his shoulder, and so staked off the knave."

After dinner, forthwith, Father Parsons, Pascal, with his man Patrick dressed in an old suit of black buckram, Sherwin, Rishton, and Kirby, sallied forth to visit Beza, and, if possible, to have some speech with him, either about the Catholic religion, or about the controversy between the Protestants and Puritans, as he was reckoned one of the chief writers in it. When they knocked at the door, his wife Candida,* of whom

* In his edition of his poems, Geneva, 1569, he denies that the Candida whom he celebrates was meant for Claudine, the tailor's wife of the Rue de la

they had read so much, and who had been the tailor's wife at Paris, came and opened the door, and let them into a little court, where she told them to stay, as Monsieur Beza was busy in his study, and would come forth to them, which it seems he did with the worse will, as he had been informed about them by the magistrates. However, when he came forth in his long black gown and round cap, with ruffs about his neck, and his fair long beard, he saluted them courteously, but did not invite them into his house, or to sit down, but remained on foot, and asked them what they would have. They told him, that being scholars, and passing by Geneva, they could do no less than come to see him, for the fame that they had heard in England of his name: he answered, that he understood it was far greater than he deserved; that he loved all Englishmen heartily, but was sorry to hear his visitors were not of the religion of their country. They answered that their country was large, and held more sorts than one; that they kept to the religion to which it was first converted from paganism, but if he could show more weighty reasons to the contrary than they had yet heard or read, they would be content to hear him. Father Parsons then asked how his Church was governed, and he replied, "By equality in the ministry: there are nine of us, and every one rules his week." Then it was said that the English had Bishops, and that the Queen was the head without any interruption; he answered "shamefully" that he did not know it to be so, and after some shuffling declared that he did not approve of it; however, he said, the difference is one of discipline only, not of doctrine; but he could not proceed with the dispute, which would take more time than he could spare, for he was busy, having just received some packets of letters from France about the Duke of Guise and his practices against the professors of the Gospel, of which he told tales that they afterwards found quite untrue; and thus drew aside the talk from religion to other subjects, and with this would have broken off. But Campion (who in his serving-man's attire had all the while stood waiting with hat in hand "facing out the old dotting heretical fool," says Sherwin) was unwilling to let him escape thus, and broke forth: "Sir, though I perceive you are much occupied and would be gone, I pray you let me ask but this question: How do you say that the Queen of England and you be of one religion, seeing that you defend the religion of the Puritans, which she so much abhorreth and persecuteth?" Beza replied, with a slight shrug, "I know not what 'Puri-

Calandre, at Paris, who eloped with him to Geneva when he fled from the Parliament of Paris, and whom he afterwards married.

tan' means. The difference you speak of is none at all in fact." On this Campion offered to prove that the differences were very important, and many, and essential, even on such points as the Sacraments. Beza, fearing from this exordium a long controversy, made a sign to his wife, who interposed with another packet of letters; on which he said that he could stay no longer, and courteously took leave of them, promising to send to their inn to visit them an English scholar of his, the son and heir of Sir George Hastings, and next of kin to the Earl of Huntingdon, the Puritan president of the north. The youth, however, never came, but instead there came his governor, Mr. Brown, very fervent in the religion of Geneva, and with him Mr. Powell, a Protestant, but a very civil gentleman, a young man of good parts, son of one of the six clerks in Chancery, and M.A. of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he had been acquainted with Campion, and familiar with Parsons and Sherwin; there came also three or four Englishmen more. Campion was absent when they came, and as he was in such strange attire, it was thought advisable not to let them see him. So Parsons and the rest walked about the town with them, and had much familiar speech, which ended in an invitation to supper; however, Powell and the rest would not sup with them, but promised to come afterwards. When they came, Parsons took Powell in hand, and Sherwin, Kirby, and Rishton attacked Brown, with whom they hotly disputed in the streets of Geneva almost till midnight, sending to Beza through him a challenge to a public controversy on any disputed point, with this condition, that he that was justly convicted in the opinion of indifferent judges should be burnt alive in the market-place. Brown promised to convey the message; "but God knoweth," says Sherwin, "that he durst not perform it, nor show himself to us any more." Powell, on hearing what had happened, told Parsons that he knew the place well, and was sure that if Brown told Beza or the magistrates of the challenge it might bring them into trouble; they were within the municipal jurisdiction, and a reason might easily be found for detaining them beyond the three days allowed them by law, in which case it would be hard to get any remedy. Parsons profited by this sage and friendly advice, and made peace for that night, resolving to leave the town early the next morning. Powell offered to accompany them, but he was asked not to bring the Puritan schoolmaster.

Early the next morning Powell came again and breakfasted with them, using them lovingly, and brought them out of the town on their way. All this while Campion

had played the serving-man, and not wishing to be recognised by Powell, he and Bruscoe were sent forward by themselves. On the top of a hill, about a mile out of Geneva, on the road towards France, they met one of the great ministers of Geneva, who seemed to be conning a sermon without book. Campion straightway buckled with him, and asked, "How his Church was governed?" The minister, who supposed Campion, as an Englishman, to be Protestant, explained that it was governed by nine ministers in their turns. "Then who is the chief head of it?" asked Campion. "Christ," said the other. "But has it no one certain supreme head or governor upon earth under Christ?" "It needeth none." "Why, then," said Campion, "how can you hold the religion of the Queen of England to be true, when she calls herself head and supreme governor of the Church?" "She doth not call herself so," said the minister. "Yes, but she doth," said Campion; "and he that shall deny her supremacy in causes ecclesiastical in England must suffer death for it, for it is treason by statute." The minister, in a great chafe,— "almost mad"—was going to deny again, when Campion, seeing Powell and the rest approach, left him suddenly; Parsons and Sherwin came up to the man, who seemed in desperation, and told them that there was a fellow beyond who held a strange opinion, and had mocked him about his Church; upon which the whole company "fell upon him, and shook up the poor shakerell before the soldiers in the gate." Campion looked back and saw that the dispute was renewed; so, fearing misrepresentation, he went back to tell what had been controverted, on which Parsons and Powell, who was acquainted with the minister, said that it was undeniable that the Queen was taken for head of the Church, and that the first-fruits of all benefices were paid to her, and that Parliament had transferred all the Pope's jurisdiction in England to her. The preacher then suggested: "It may be she calleth herself supreme head of the Church *quia Regina est Christiana*." "Ergo," said Campion, "much more is the King of France head of the Church, because he is called *Rex Christianissimus*." "Nay," said the minister, "I mean *Catholica Christiana*." "Ergo," quoth Campion, "much more the King of Spain, whose title is *Rex Catholicus*." The minister was furious, and declared that Campion was no Englishman but a very Papist. But Powell, who had recognised Campion, and saluted him with much affection, quieted the preacher and sent him off, and walked on a mile or more with them, promising to study Catholic books and to visit Rome, and then returned; but they looked back from the top of a hill

upon the miserable city, and said a *Te Deum* for their escape from it; and for penance for their curiosity the whole company made a pilgrimage to St. Clodoveus, in France, about eight or nine miles off, over difficult paths, and afterwards went stoutly on their journey till Whit Monday, when eight of them fell sick in one night; so they had to travel to Rheims by short stages, and all but Kemp reached that city the last day of May, having spent nearly six weeks on the journey.

Correspondence.

THE PUGIN TESTIMONIAL.

SIR,—The recent appearance of Mr. Ferrey's *Recollections of A. N. Welby Pugin* suggests an opportunity for reminding Catholics of what, in the press of graver interests, they may possibly have forgotten,—the testimonial which is in course of being raised to do honour to the memory of that great and good man.

Opinions may vary indefinitely as to the relative merits and conveniences of different kinds of ecclesiastical architecture, or, again, as to Pugin's success in that style which he had made peculiarly his own. I am no bigoted and exclusive devotee of Gothic, and am quite ready to believe that there was something of narrowness and servile copyism in Pugin's treatment of it as compared with the developments it has subsequently received at the hands of Mr. Scott and other living masters of the art. But it must never be forgotten that a man who came forward single-handed to indicate the true principles of Christian art at a time when the fashionable ideals of church-building oscillated between a kind of stunted theatre and what looked like an overgrown summer-house, has established a lasting claim on the gratitude and respect of all lovers of correct taste, and all who regard the external accessories of reverence as a help and not a hindrance of true devotion. His famous *Contrasts* may have lost their interest now, but it is because their work is done. Others may have excelled him in originality of conception, and in power of elasticity in adapting the principles of mediæval art to the exigencies of modern ritual and modern society; but they have been able to profit by the errors no less than by the experience of the last thirty years. It is seldom given to the genius which creates—and Pugin was truly a genius—to bring its own creations to perfection. And it is also fair to remember that he had seldom the opportunity of even doing justice to himself. The excessive and disproportionate ornamentation of Cheadle Church is partly to be explained by a change in the scale of expenditure announced by its founder when the work was already in progress;

and if St. George's Cathedral—his second *chef-d'œuvre*—is in some respects a conspicuous failure, our criticism is disarmed, though our regret is not diminished, by considering that the architect was hampered by the supervision of a vexatious committee, and the still more serious drawback of inadequate funds. After all deductions, it remains certain that he did a work by which his name will live, and which leaves a lasting impress on the architecture of his country.

But it is not only as an architect that Pugin claims our honour. He was one of the noble few who are nature's heroes, marked out as such by the generous courage, the outspoken candour, and the uncompromising self-devotion to whatever appeared to him bound up with the interests of truth, which were his characteristics through life. In word and deed he was essentially the reverse of being a sham; there was nothing little, or mean, or narrow about him. Such men do not turn up every day, and deserve to be recognised and honoured when they do.

On us, as Catholics, his memory has a further claim. We cannot forget that, almost before the first whispers were heard of that movement which has convulsed the Anglican Communion, and sent so many converts to the Church, at a period when Popery and Paganism were almost synonymous terms in the minds of Englishmen, Pugin came forward, reckless of consequences, and at the cost of associations to him peculiarly dear, to offer an unpopular homage to conscientious convictions in the acceptance of Catholic truth. The idea of the present testimonial did not indeed, I believe, originate among ourselves. It is not a religious but a national tribute to the memory of one of whose genius and character the nation may well be proud. But that is no reason why we should not join our fellow-countrymen in the graceful expression of a sentiment which we have indeed every reason for sharing with them, but which also comes home to us with a force peculiar to ourselves. Let me add, that in asking a place in the *Rambler* for these few lines in memory of Pugin, I feel that I am making a request not inconsistent with the character of a Journal so honourably distinguished among us by its hearty and discriminating recognition of moral and intellectual eminence.

Your obedient servant,

JUSTITIA.

RECOLLECTIONS OF PUGIN.

SIR,—I should think that you would be unwilling to renew the controversy between your Review and Mr. Pugin, which seemed altogether stilled by the death of that great architect. There seems to be no such unwillingness on the side of Mr. Purcell, who has contributed the Catholic part to Mr. Ferrey's recent volume of *Recollections of Pugin*. He tells how Pugin was the chief object of the

attacks of a clique of writers, whose chief organ was the *Rambler*, whom he taxed with harbouring Genevan tendencies, and indulging in methodistical cant. Pugin denounces, says Mr. Purcell, the dangerous innovations and discontented spirit which he discovers lurking in the pages of the *Rambler*, and foretells, with an almost prophetic keenness of vision, that sooner or later its writers (probably quite different people from the present staff) will gravely offend against Catholic judgment, and wound in its dearest interests Catholic instinct. After this, Mr. Purcell has to defend his friend against the charges of looking upon the Anglican Establishment as a branch of the true Church, and of recognising her orders as valid, and to praise him for "rising superior to the weakness, too common among Catholics of the present day, of seeking to hide from the contemptuous or hostile gaze of the world the blotches and sores that from time to time burst forth and deface the divine beauty of the Church of God." But I do not think Mr. Purcell's insinuations to be worth a retort, so I will crave your permission to offer a few recollections of Pugin which may serve to fill up some gaps, and to explain the reasons of his differences with the *Rambler* of his day more fully than Mr. Ferrey or Mr. Purcell have thought necessary to do.

I met Pugin for the first time at Rome, in 1847. Though he found scarcely any thing to interest him in the Eternal City, his activity was as energetic there as any where else. Under the guidance of various friends, he visited church after church, disgusted with all, but solacing himself occasionally with fragments of mediæval work, especially with the incised grave-stones which exhibited the same outlines of ecclesiastical vestments as he had adopted. "Ah," said he, "they must have had fine things at one time."

There were, however, a few exceptions to his general disgust. I took him to the Basilica of St. Mark, where there is a double chancel, one rather lower than the nave, the other built over it on arches, and reached by a flight of steps on each side. Pugin admired it much, declared it was well worth coming all the way from England to Rome to see, and took out his sketch-book, pencil, and rule, and at once proceeded to transfer, not St. Mark's, but a variation of it, to his tablets. Under his rapid pencil all the arches became pointed, the classic shafts became clustered piers, the painted apse became a Gothic semi-octagon with tall lights, and St. Mark's came out in Gothic raiment.

I went with him to St. Peter's. He was violent in his condemnation of the whole thing. Nothing satisfied him. It was the upas-tree of Christendom; it was the pagan model to which Bishops and princes came from the countries of pointed architecture, and from which they carried memorials and drawings of the hideous altars, to be substituted at a vast expense for the magnificent remains of real Christian art, which would still have been left if it had not been for the foolish Romanising of travelling prelates. Thus St. Peter's had spoiled half the fine old buildings of Christendom. I was contented that he should quarrel with the nave, with its plaster pilasters,

its stable windows, and Daniel-Lambert piers ; but when he pronounced the dome to be a humbug, a failure, an abortion, a mass of imposition, and a sham, constructed even more vilely than it was designed, I must confess that I was somewhat taken aback. I suspected that his violence covered a void that he was desirous to conceal, and that his prejudices arose, not from any exuberance of study and knowledge, but from sheer ignorance and want of depth. I suspected that he was accustomed to elevate accidental and partial developments into fundamental and universal principles ; that he had drawn his own canons of taste only from that which *he* had always seen and known, and which had become familiar to him ; and that he had sworn a great oath to impose these canons of taste upon every body else, without any regard for what *they* had always seen and known, and had become familiar with,—as if an Eastern despot, having found pleasure in eating sugar and oysters for breakfast, were to issue his *hât* that all his subjects, without any gastronomical distinctions, should also eat sugar and oysters for breakfast, and should like the mixture, under pain of the bow-string. Of the same kind was his decision in favour of English Gothic, in comparison with the French, German, or Italian varieties. Such, too, as I discovered, was his dislike of domes.

As we were leaving St. Peter's, half-way down the nave I turned and called Pugin's attention to the extraordinary effect of the sunbeams traversing the dome, and half-concealing the presbytery beyond in a mist of glory. For the moment Pugin was quite overcome, and he became nearly as enthusiastic as he had been at St. Mark's. I improved the occasion to show him how glorious a Gothic dome would be, and reminded him how noble an example we had in the lantern of Ely Cathedral, which only wanted a slight development to become a genuine dome. I urged also that the outline of the dome was the Gothic arch, and therefore ought to be more easily absorbed in a Gothic than in a classical outline. When Pugin next called upon me, I showed him some sketches in which I had attempted to adapt English Gothic details to the forms of Florence Cathedral, and of the beautiful little cupola of Santa Maria di Loreto, near Trajan's column. Pugin seemed at first taken with the idea, was kind enough to praise one or two of my details, and took up my pencil to make a kind of cloudy outline of a central dome, flanked by four towers, with nave, choir, and transepts, which he said would be very fine. But in a moment or two he seemed to change his mind. He said that my adaptation was a baptistry, and not a cathedral. I then described the Duomo of Florence to him. He had not then seen it, for he came to Rome by Marseilles and Civita Vecchia, having on his way visited Avignon, with which he was specially delighted ; the Papal Palace, he said, was more like a production of nature than of art, it seemed to grow out of the rock, and was pretty nearly as massive as if it had been a spur of the Alps ; his sketch-book was full of beautiful drawings ; perhaps the contrast of Avignon and Rome was an element in the disap-

pointment he felt ;—but to resume. He still objected to the massive piers which would be necessary to support such a dome, and which were quite contrary to the intercolumnary principle of Gothic architecture. I asked why he thought the usual division into nave and aisles, separated by moderate columns, to be fundamentally necessary in a Gothic church. He replied, that the chief reason was, that the congregation might be concentrated in the nave, while the aisles were kept clear for processions. I suggested that processions might walk just as well in an undivided hall, for room might be kept for them on the floor. He made out in reply, that a procession was of no good unless it played bo-peep among the pillars, appearing and reappearing in the intercolumniations, like an army marching through a wood. I had heard that he had once asked Father Ignatius, who, after giving benediction in some chapel in a French cope, had met Pugin in the sacristy, and had begged him to join in the crusade of prayers for the conversion of England, “Why, what’s the use of praying for England in such a cope as that ?” so I was not surprised at his selection of the feature of a procession in which he supposed its virtue to reside, and I accordingly held my peace. I afterwards found that Pugin’s taste on this point went on the principle that the great charm of Gothic ornamentation is to conceal its charms, to hide one rich feature behind another of equal richness, even to the extent of blending all in one glare of gold and pomp. I remember on one occasion suggesting to him that a stone canopy for the exposition of the Blessed Sacrament at Benediction ought to be painted with some colours which might contrast with the gold of the remonstrance, so as to enable persons at the other end of the church to see whether it was under the canopy or not. Pugin entirely dissented from my view, and asserted that the object of decoration was not to show distinctly, but to blend every thing in a blaze of splendour and mystery. Mr. Purcell tells us how Pugin detested the “all-seeing” principle of the *Rambler*, which would convert our churches into show-rooms, barren and bare as barns, and hideous to look upon as shambles ; which only looks upon ceremonies as spectacles, and which therefore ought to build churches upon the model of theatres. Pugin seems to have held that ceremonies should only be half seen. He objected to the solid Greek screens and to the massive piers of the nave of St. Peter’s, because they would entirely hide all processions and ceremonies ; he considered Gothic piers and open screens to be the just mean, because they only half hid what went on behind them. The “all-seeing” principle was to govern secular theatres ; the “half-seeing” principle was that of the spiritual theatres, or churches. But to revert to our domes.

He was hardly satisfied with the result of our talk ; for when I met him a year afterwards in England, he told me that he had held a long argument on the subject with Sir Charles Barry, and that at last they had both come to the conclusion that the dome was at variance with the fundamental principles of Gothic architecture, and that the

central dome between the two Houses of Parliament was an abominable failure. At the same time he praised the Victoria Tower as the finest existing building in the style ; chiefly, I think, because it was the biggest.

At Rome, also, I took Pugin to Overbeck's studio ; and as he expressed a desire to have some conversation with the great artist, I invited them to meet at my rooms in the evening. Pugin spoke French like a Frenchman. Overbeck spoke German and Italian fluently, but it was only with difficulty that he could speak, or even understand, French. But Pugin allowed no difficulties to spoil so glorious an opportunity of inculcating his principles on one who might give such great help in spreading them. From the moment Overbeck came into the room he appropriated him, and rattled into his ears a voluble torrent, which had no break, and scarcely allowed Overbeck to get in a word. The artist was much amused, and sat listening with his calm smile ; he afterwards professed to have learned much from the interview, and thanked me for giving him the occasion. Pugin, I remember, was trying to impress upon the painter some of the general principles that he had drawn out in his books. In particular, he was illustrating his axiom, that the great test of architectural and decorative beauty consists in the fitness of the design to the purpose for which it is intended. He was applying this test to the angels painted by Steinle as decorations in the spandrels of the arches of the choir at Cologne Cathedral. Pugin confessed that as angels they were beautiful enough ; as decorations they were failures. All Gothic decoration, he said, should be exuberant ; it should be full measure, pressed down, and running over ; the saint should fill his niche, and more than fill it—he should be too big to be altogether put into it. Some parts of the figure should be concealed behind the tabernacle work, some parts should project beyond. Pugin's active pencil kept forming a running commentary on his precepts, and he sketched for Overbeck how a Gothic niche should be, and how it should not be, filled. Then he returned to Steinle's angels. Their fault was that they did not fill up the spandril. This is how they ought to be, he said, making a sketch, in which he exhibited the angel stretching out one wing to fill up the angle at the point of the arch, and gathering up the other wing so as to adapt it exactly to the right angle formed by the ascending vault-shaft, and the horizontal string-course under the triforium ; while the toes of the angel were awkwardly pointed down, to fill up the acute angle at the spring of the arch. That's how they ought to be, said Pugin, showing with some triumph his angular and conventional deformity, which he had somehow brought himself to regard as ideally beautiful. Overbeck took the sketch, looked at it with a quiet, quizzical smile, then folded it up and pocketed it, while Pugin was plunging into the next point of his discourse. The interview lasted till late at night, when the two artists departed, with strong expressions of delight at having made each other's acquaintance.

Mr. Ferrey is right in saying that Pugin thought it the greatest day of his life when he received a medal from the Pope. As was natural, he interpreted it as meaning more than it did mean; for it was a clear exaggeration to look upon it as an approbation of his exclusive views, and as a condemnation of those ecclesiastics who still preferred Italian "abominations" to Gothic furniture. Still Pius IX. has shown a toleration of Gothic which has been unknown at Rome since the fifteenth century. Till lately there was a municipal regulation which prevented any one putting a Gothic window or door even into his own house, if it looked upon the public street. It was too great an eyesore, too *tedesco*, too *trito*, for tastes formed by Bernini's graven images, fluttering and frowning in their histrionic brass. But Pius IX. has not only permitted a Gothic chapel to be fitted up in the Vatican, he has also caused the only Gothic church in Rome, the Minerva, to be restored in its original style. Pugin mistook the wide toleration of that large heart for all mere matters of taste, and the earnest approval and benediction which it had for all well-intentioned efforts directed towards the good of religion for a distinct approbation of the side he took in the Gothic controversy, and a distinct condemnation of his opponents. It is quite needless to say that this was merely his fancy. Pugin's gratification was all the more intense as it was unexpected. He was so annoyed with Rome, that he contemplated leaving it without seeing the Pope. I think it was Mgr. Talbot who prevented this unseemly step, by procuring an audience for the celebrated architect, the reviver of Gothic churches, and almost of ecclesiastical ceremonial, in England. This honour plunged Pugin into new and somewhat comical difficulties. Mr. Ferrey describes with some vexation Pugin's slovenliness in dress. His eccentricity in this respect was more marked on his travels than at home. He had arrived in Rome with the very minimum of luggage, and his artistic implements filled so much of his hand-bag that there was no room for a change even of his linen. His manner on his journey had been to wear whatever he had on as perseveringly as a Capuchin wears his habit, till he judged it to be unfit for further use, when, without troubling the washerwoman, he would buy a new garment, and leave the old one as a legacy to the chambermaid. The etiquette of Rome is not very stringent, but the forms of the Court would hardly admit of Pugin paying his respects to the Pope in the rough sailor's garb that he wore on his travels: he had, therefore, to rig himself out in borrowed garments; and I have never ceased to wonder how he thrust his brawny arms through the sleeves of my coat, or drew it round his broad shoulders without bursting the seams. On his return from the Quirinal he spoke in most affectionate terms of the Holy Father, in whom he had found all the dignity, all the saintliness, and all the paternal familiarity that his imagination required; but he never ceased lamenting the meanness of the chamber where he sat, and of the scanty furniture which garnished it. He wished that he could have the furnishing of the audience-room. For his fancy had at once supplied him with a design full of scenic

effects :—the Pope in the distance, seated under a Gothic canopy, shining in gold and purple, and surrounded with holy images, and all the sacred emblems of religion ; the steps of the throne guarded by a balustrade of kneeling monks with flowing draperies, while prelates in Gothic copes stood round the Chair of Peter ; an avenue of Swiss and halberdiers, in mediæval costume, guarding the way up the throne, along which the persons to be presented were to make their three solemn prostrations ; while the Pope above them, amid swinging censers and clouds of incense, was to cast his benediction upon them, and to receive them with outstretched arms to the kissing of his foot. For Pugin's mind could never emancipate itself from its slavery to theatrical effect ; and amongst the shams and impositions which he denounced with such precipitate simplicity, he never once suspected that the made-up solemnities of histrionic functions could deserve to be classed.

I think that Pugin was never very consistent in the application of his principles. He never seemed to know whether to derive styles of architecture from the symbols of religion, or from the constructive necessity of the materials first used. The latter idea, which was really important and prolific, was often overlaid and distorted by the former. He did not see that symbolism is conventional, and that any signs might in time come to have any meaning. Architecture first existed, and then assumed a meaning. His rage at Michael Angelo's "Last Judgment" was quite comical. Seriously he thought that any representation of a naked figure (he had never seen the catacombs) was quite irreconcilable with Christian symbolism. The garments signified the grace of God, sanctity, and so forth ; and to represent a saint without them was a simple profanation. I said, not without the intention of provoking him, that there might be another way of looking at it ; as Adam and Eve were naked before they fell, nudity might be a good symbol of the state of paradisaic innocence regained by the saints. "Why, my dear sir, you are a preadamite heretic," he shouted ; and then turning to some one standing near—"Here is a preadamite heretic," he said ; and followed up his denunciation with a whimsical perversion of the argument I had used to him. I do not know that he was more serious when he called the *Rambler* heretical or methodistical. He felt strongly, but not so strongly as he expressed himself ; and his disciples should not take all his exaggerations as gospel.

I will conclude by offering a few remarks on Pugin's place as an architect. Neither his works nor his ideas should I estimate so highly as Mr. Ferrey. His merit was to be the pioneer of a revival, to recommend new principles, and to expose the utter hollowness and want of principle in the architecture generally prevailing. He was just the man for this work. But when he turned from precept to practice, his incompleteness at once became manifest. In the first place, he could no more design a figure than Mr. Bell can design a pedestal. The way in which he reduced the human form, the perfection of natural beauty, to a mere angular filling-up of the vacant

spaces of his panelling, was simply grotesque. In his architecture, also, he carried out his vertical principle, which in his eyes was the emblem of the resurrection, to an absurd length ; and his buildings and drawings always want that repose and grandeur which the due development of horizontal lines can alone give. Then he wanted the taste to appreciate any architecture but the English Gothic, or rather his principles drove him to say that he wanted the taste ; for twice I have caught him, in moments of enthusiasm, charmed with Italian buildings ; but during those very days he could write, " Italian architecture is a mere system of veneering marble slabs." I wonder what he would have said to the Italianisms and marble veneers of the exquisite little chapel of the Blessed Sacrament at Chelsea.

To his geniality no compliment would be exaggerated ; he was a prince of good companionship. And for the solid character of his charity, I cannot help quoting in conclusion a page out of Mr. Ferrey's " Recollections."

" In his generosity he spared neither money nor personal exertion, and relieved all, without distinction of country or religion. For this end he had in his hall a chest filled with entire suits of clothes ; and one of his greatest pleasures in life was to send away clothed and fed those who came to him ragged and hungry. His active benevolence originated the Sailor's Infirmary at Ramsgate, the embryo of which was to be found in two small houses he hired in King Street, where he engaged nurses to attend the fever-stricken sailors who were left destitute in port.

. . . . " Visiting one Sunday afternoon the captain of his lugger, who had sprained his leg, and finding him destitute of what he considered necessary for his comfort, he at once returned home, and finding no man about the place, he sallied forth, to the astonishment of all who met him, with a mattress, blankets, &c. upon his shoulder, and a bag of provisions in his hand, for the use and comfort of the damaged sailor.

" On another occasion, when two hundred German emigrants were detained in port by stress of weather, this thoughtful and kind-hearted friend of the friendless not only attended to their corporeal wants, but at his own expense invited the priest from the German chapel in London to come down and look after their spiritual necessities.

" While living at Ramsgate, his love for cruising was easily gratified ; yet he did not sail for pleasure only, but was always ready in the roughest weather to put out to sea and aid in the rescue of crews whose vessels were cast upon the Goodwin Sands."

For a character like his, even those who do not consider him to have been a complete artist may perhaps be allowed to profess their love and veneration, without too much offence to enthusiastic admirers like Mr. Purcell, who confuses his artistic excellencies with his personal qualities, and judges of the beauty of his buildings by the secret motives and intentions of his heart. Pugin's life must be considered in many aspects, and his geniality and his religion must

be marked off from his artistic genius before the latter can be rightly valued.

Your obedient servant,

S.

Literary Notices.

La Beata. By T. A. Trollope. An Italian story of seduction and desertion rather prettily told, but which would scarcely deserve popularity out of Exeter-Hall circles (in which hatred to Rome may be said to cover a multitude of sins), but for some vivid descriptions of Florentine customs and scenery, and an evident familiarity with such forms of its society as might be expected to gather round an English resident with strong anti-Catholic prejudices. The author of *La Beata* should be an excellent judge of the measure of success attainable by a dextrous use of the prejudices and foibles of the respectable, religious, and moneyed class of the community in England, and therefore peculiarly well adapted to detect and expose such devices as trading on the opinions of powerful majorities usually involve. There can be little doubt that the bitter Protestantism of Mr. Trollope must *pay* far better in rich England than right-minded adherence to the Church and State of Tuscany, in the days when such things existed, could have prospered the artist-hero of Mr. Trollope's story. Under such circumstances there is something not a little ludicrous in his zeal to convince his readers that it is only Catholics and Italians who make literary, artistic, or business capital out of their religious and political opinions, or, which is a branch of the same art of combining the service of God and Mammon, who offer up their discarded mistresses on the altar of respectability when anxious to make advantageous marriages. Some of the instances which afford Mr. Trollope occasion for specimens of his fiercest power of sarcasm or invective are almost absurdly appropriate to places nearer home,—as, for example, where he is shocked by the indulgent Florentine use of the word “disgrazia.” He has forgotten the precisely similar popular use of the words “misfortune” and “unfortunate” in England.

The excesses to which French novelists have been led by this very road are glaring examples of the evil that results from the dramatic arrangement of questions of casuistry, in which the author can range from sarcasm to argument, from innuendo to appeal, from reason to sympathy, and from sympathy back to reason, with the art of an advocate and the zeal of an amateur, to the perfect contentment of those whose convictions, nationality, prejudices, and circumstances entirely agree with his own. How modern Italians can be content to excite English sympathies at the cost of so much personal contempt is a curious question; and how Englishmen, who

look on almsgiving as degrading, can venture to offer what is really a moral alms of so insulting a nature as contemptuous sympathy is still more astonishing.

History of the First Crusade (Histoire de la Première Croisade). By J. F. A. Peyré. 2 vols. This is the fullest account of the first Crusade that has appeared in recent times, and if a laborious compilation could supply the place of critical history, it would be one of the best. Unfortunately it is an example of those defects which make the French, who are the best writers of history in the world, the worst possible historians. It is written without passion, and with a very extensive knowledge of the mediæval writers, but absolutely without the least idea of criticism or scientific investigation. The French historians of the last century were addicted to unscrupulous calumny, and those who have succeeded are for the most part afflicted with a contemptuous indifference to the distinction between fact and invention. To the former, the Church and the middle ages were objects of hatred, whilst the historians of the present day generally exhibit admiration and sympathy; yet on the whole there is more to be learnt from those who lied only where passion or interest swayed them than from men who never feel a strong inducement to prefer truth to falsehood. When Deguignes tells us that the Crusaders travelled to Asia in order to obtain wealth and impunity for their crimes, we know what allowance we must make for his opinions, without refusing the credit due to his learning. But when Michaud, who is full of enthusiasm for his subject, tells us that Peter of Amiens appeared at the Council of Clermont, and described the sufferings of the Christians with dejection and consternation in his face, with a voice that was choked by sobs, and an emotion that penetrated every heart, we need only remember that there is no proof that Peter was present at Clermont, in order to be sensible that we are reading a romance, and that neither the author's learning nor his impartiality is a substitute for veracity. The Crusades were extremely unfavourable to historical literature, which degenerated from the close of the eleventh century, and came to be disfigured by an extravagant credulity and imaginativeness, and by all the license which travellers immemorably assume. Modern writers are confounded by the mixture of practical designs with enthusiasm, and very few can distinguish and appreciate the two. From the beginning a poetic and legendary tradition sprang up, which totally distorted the facts and proportions of history, and which soon supplanted the authority of more exact and sober narratives of contemporaries. The most popular myth is that which represents Peter the Hermit as the real author of the movement. This story arose among the lower orders, who formed the army which he led to Anatolia, and invests him with all the merit, to the exclusion of the Pope, and especially of the nobles; and this view took root in Constantinople, for in the narrative of Anna Comnena the Pope disappears altogether. It found its way into later works, and men still write that Peter had a vision in the

Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and came to Europe to rouse the Pope and the nations for its deliverance. The original authorities know nothing of all this. The writers of his own country do not raise him above the level of many other popular preachers, and the contemporary writers of England, Germany, and Italy scarcely mention his name.

The extravagance of such writers partly justifies the contempt with which the Crusades have so commonly been regarded, as a product of unthinking fanaticism, and has long concealed their real character and the profound design which inspired them. Before Jerusalem was taken by the Turks, and before the Greeks had applied for aid, the first outline of the prodigious scheme was traced by Gregory VII., almost immediately after his elevation. It was the Eastern counterpart of the policy by which he was seeking to raise the hierarchy above the states of the West. That policy would be strengthened by the rise in the lost regions of Asia of states where the Church would enjoy political sovereignty, and where the position of the feudal princes would resemble that which it was his object to establish in Europe. It was for this reason that Gregory wished to go himself, that Urban appointed a legate, that the clergy opposed the election of a king of Jerusalem, and that the patriarch was speedily involved in serious quarrels with him. The schism of the East was the second reason which suggested to the Pope the idea of a great expedition. "The Church of Constantinople," he says, "abandoned by the Holy Spirit, has turned away from us, and requires to be reunited with the Apostolic See, whilst great part of the Armenians have abandoned the Catholic faith, and most of the Christians of the East await for St. Peter to decide their disputes." The Grecian emperors had cut off the nations of the West from all intercourse with Asia, and had thus made Constantinople the emporium of all the commerce of the East. The schism made this exclusion a calamity for the Church as well as for the people, and the war with the infidel would necessarily break it down, and the hostility of the Greeks would be silenced by an enterprise which they could but approve. Hence there was as much fear of the sovereignty of the Holy See as mere political ambition in the eagerness with which Alexius exacted homage from the Latin chiefs. It was in accordance with the profoundly practical and statesman-like genius of Gregory VII. that he regarded the conquest of Jerusalem as the reward, not the object, of the expedition. When the Latin arms had established their power on the Bosphorus and in Armenia, Palestine would be securely theirs. Without such a basis, the kingdom of Jerusalem could not stand. Accordingly the wisest princes of the first Crusade abandoned the army on its march, and set up states for themselves at Antioch and Edessa; and later on, St. Lewis reverted to the idea of St. Gregory, and sought to found Frankish states in Africa as bulwarks of the Holy Land. But so lofty a design as that which is sketched in the letters of the great pontiff could not be intelligible to the narrow minds of the people, and his summons produced no effect. Urban II.

had recourse to a more powerful instrument of popular influence. He invoked the religious fervour, the chivalrous enthusiasm of mankind, and with this he succeeded. But the substance of the scheme of Gregory was sacrificed to obtain this support ; for no idea can be popular without some alloy of error to recommend it to the vulgar mind, and this sacrifice was fatal. The Church could not either guide or restrain the enthusiasm she had awakened. St. Bernard discouraged at first the project of the second Crusade. It is better, he told the king of France, to combat our own vices than to fight the Turks ; and it was only when Lewis was resolute that the saint roused the empire to assist him, and achieved in the Cathedral of Speyer that marvellous success which surpasses all that the imaginations of men had attributed to the eloquence of Peter the Hermit. But as there was at first more enthusiasm than policy in the Crusaders, so afterwards there was more selfishness than religion ; and the Popes, who had been unable to control the first impulse, were helpless before the reaction. When the Crusades began, the feudal nobility had attained the summit of their power, and it was chiefly through them that the papacy wrought out its ends. They were its auxiliaries against the tyranny of the kings, and its instrument for the deliverance of the East. The Crusades are the spontaneous external action of the Church during the period when her influence was exercised over a military aristocracy. They ended when the political authority of the Church, and the chivalrous society on which it stood, declined before the rise of absolute monarchy and of commercial republicanism. The decay of the great families by impoverishment, the prolonged absence, and the loss of life which the Crusades involved, developed the power of the kings ; and the destruction of the Templars marks at once the victory of the crown over the nobles, and the extinction of the crusading spirit. The rise of the Levantine commerce hastened the growth of the towns ; and Venice and Philip the Fair instance the two tendencies to which it is due that the Holy See lost so much of its power, and Christendom the places which had been made holy by its Founder.

There is abundant evidence of the close connection between the Crusades and the predominance of the Church in its contest with the state, and of the identity of the spirit which animated the Crusader and the Guelf. The most comprehensive of the mediæval chronicles was finished in a first edition by Abbot Ekkehard in the year 1099. The war between the priesthood and the empire was at its height, and the abbot is an imperialist. Seven years later he rewrote his work. In the interval he had been to the Holy Land, he had seen the handiwork of the Popes, and he had become an ardent advocate of their cause. The testimony of the legend is not less significant. Godfrey, like Ekkehard, was originally a partisan of the emperor before he became the champion of the Church ; and the poets, who chose the first king of Jerusalem as their hero, have heightened the contrast between the two portions of his career. They represent him as the foremost of the soldiers of the empire ;

in the battle between Henry and Rodolph, he carries the imperial banner, and slays with his own hand the emperor who had the support of the clergy. Then he followed his master to the siege of Rome, and was the first to enter the place. But the sacrilege was punished by an attack of that Roman fever so well known to the soldiers of the empire, which never left him till he made a vow to take the cross; and then, when he had performed his penance, and his work was over, God sent the fever once more, which carried him away in the first year of his reign. These fables, recorded by William of Malmesbury, show that the general belief agreed with the idea of St. Bernard,—“*ita qui corruerat contra pontificiam militans, major excitatus est.*” The same change is repeated on a much greater scale in the life of Frederic the First. Whilst the beginning of the movement exactly coincides with that exalted position of the Church which was created for her by Hildebrand, they declined together, and the Pope stood alone for many generations, appealing in vain to the princes for a new Crusade. It was precisely at the close of that period of ecclesiastical supremacy that the news of the fall of Ptolemais and the total loss of the Holy Land reached Europe. The Pope wrote to France; but the prelates and nobles replied that to preach the cross was useless so long as the Greeks, the Sicilians, and the Aragonese disturbed the peace of Europe. This allusion to the interests of France in Naples proves how completely, in the generation which had seen St. Lewis, attachment to the state prevailed over attachment to the Church, and the dynasty over the old noblesse. The Crusades had checked the ardour of the contest with the monarchy by enlisting all men in an enterprise with which every Catholic sympathised, but which necessarily placed him in a position of subordination to the Holy See, which Ghibelline feelings could not survive. Yet it is a singular fact that the idea of rescuing the holy sepulchre, which had derived all its vitality and power from the influence of the Holy See, should have outlived that influence, and have sought to recommend itself at the expense of the papal interests. A Frenchman of the reign of Boniface VIII., a disciple of St. Thomas, submitted to the king of France a plan for the restoration of the Frankish dominion in the East, the first condition of which was the establishment of peace in Christendom. This, he says, would be obtained if Philip would convey the states of the Church into the hands of one of his sons, with the title of Senator of Rome, giving the Pope, by way of compensation, a yearly pension. His power, having the authority of the Holy See at its disposal, would then be supreme, and the kings of the earth would be ready to follow him to Palestine.

Current Events.

HOME AFFAIRS.

Parliament and the Ministry.

June 19th. The Bill for the abolition of Church-rates was thrown out on the third reading, by the casting-vote of the Speaker, after a division of 274 to 274. The only notable circumstance in this debate was the proposal of the Home Secretary to ticket Churchmen. Referring to the compromise proposed by Mr. Cross, he said: "The objection I have to the plan of the honourable member is, that it starts with the assumption that every occupier in a parish is a member of the Established Church, and puts upon those who are not members of the Established Church the obligation of keeping their names off the list of ratepayers. I would proceed in a reverse direction. I would begin by laying the charge on those who are members of the Church, and who testify their membership by attendance at a place of worship. It seems to me that a list should be made of persons attending the church and forming the congregation in each parish, and that there should be a power of imposing a compulsory rate upon them." Mr. Stansfeld, the most advanced Radical theorist in the House of Commons, a friend of Mazzini, touched on the question of conscience: "It has been said that the question of Church-rates, which in its inception was probably a question of conscience, has become a question of supremacy. I accept the antithesis with this qualification, that the question of supremacy has been superadded to the question of conscience which remains." But the conscientious element has been made so completely subordinate to the political question by Mr. Bright, as to induce many to oppose the bill out of fear of democratic encroachment. "With the Nonconformists," he said, "it is a question of supremacy on the part of a great establishment which is at least as much political as religious—against which their forefathers have

fought, and against which they are obliged inevitably still to contend. . . . They come down from the Puritans of an earlier period, who, I believe, have gained for England all that there is of freedom in the English constitution."

In contradiction with this view of our constitutional history, it has been often asserted that the liberties of England are an inheritance from Catholic times, developed under the influence and through the independence of the Church. Unquestionably the substance of our constitution is derived from the middle ages, and the fundamental rights of parliament, the right of voting supplies, making laws, and controlling the administration both of finance and of law, were secured in the fifteenth century. Moreover, our old Teutonic system of jurisprudence which had been interwoven during nine hundred years with Catholic ideas and moulded to Catholic habits, was never interrupted or interpolated by the introduction of the Roman law, which, all over the Continent, subverted the mediæval state. Nevertheless, the old constitution was practically abrogated by the royal supremacy and the Reformation. For a hundred years the ancient forms lost their power, the monarchy was absolute, and the work of suppressing Catholicism secured to it the support of all classes. Absolutism never prevailed in England, but on the basis of ecclesiastical tyranny. The Puritans were therefore its natural opponents under the Stuarts, as the Catholic clergy had been under the Normans; and the opposition to Strafford had a strong political resemblance with the struggle of St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and Langton against kings who strove to degrade the Catholic Church to the position which the Protestant Church occupied in England in the days of Parker and of Laud.

In reply to Mr. Bright, Mr. Disraeli used an argument against the

abolition of Church-rates which brings forward the Established Church as a third candidate for the credit of having been the safeguard of our political freedom. "The Church of England is not a mere depository of doctrine. The Church of England is a part of England; it is a part of our strength, and a part of our liberties; a part of our national character. It is a chief security for that local government which a Radical reformer has thought fit to-day to designate as an archæological curiosity. It is a principal barrier against that centralising supremacy which has been in all other countries so fatal to liberty."

It is probable that Mr. Disraeli would find it difficult to explain how the English Established Church affords a greater security against centralisation than the Catholic Church in countries like France and Austria, which have been the nurseries of centralisation. At the same time the allusion to the parish as the seat of local self-government leads to the consideration of a very important question. Originally the parish was the only sphere of local administration in which the principle of election was carried out; and it is moreover the only natural division of the country; the only one, at least, which was adopted, and not introduced, by the government. The people were distributed by the State as they grouped themselves naturally round the altars and the graves. The Church-rate first bestowed on the ecclesiastical congregation an administrative office; and out of the meeting of the parishioners in the sacristy for the purpose of raising it, the political function of the vestry was developed. Its importance increased with the decline of the ecclesiastical authority. The secularisation of Church property created pauperism by altering the mode of cultivation, and at the same time removed the protection which the poor had found from religious houses. That provision, therefore, which had belonged exclusively to the department of the Church, was transferred, as a secular office, to the parochial administration. The Reformation having given to the parish its political importance, the immense increase of local charges has secularised it altogether, and the Church-rate—out of which this altered relation of

the parish to the administration originally arose—has long ceased to be a principal or essential part of its concerns. The parishes have afforded the framework for the development of a vast system of local taxation, which has so completely overgrown their original character, that the coincidence of the secular with the ecclesiastical community is not only unnecessary but unreasonable. The separation of Church and State is not involved in a distinction of their duties and their powers, the want of which is a result of that confusion of ideas which the royal supremacy brings with it.

The untenable position of the parish as the pivot of local self-government has become manifest in the poor-law system, in which a long inquiry has established a strong case against the efficiency of the local boards, and in which an altered system of rating can hardly fail before long to be introduced. The Committee on the English Poor-Law concluded the examination of the Catholic case, but postponed its report to next year. The published evidence will prepare men's minds for the necessity of a further great step in the course which was commenced by the Act of Emancipation. That measure has borne less abundant fruit because it was carried by intimidation, and was conceded by a hostile government to force, not to reason. To some extent, therefore, it has had the character of a compromise, not of the establishment of a new principle in our government, from which would necessarily flow a series of consequences altering in every department the position of Catholics. The law still imposes disabilities upon us; and in the administration of the law we still find that our social power is not equal to our political rights, and that there is a wide difference between the position of Catholics in the army, where they are under the authority of a constitutional statesman, and in other departments in which the influence of the State is not supreme. A minority has no security for its rights in concessions obtained by threats from the weakness of parties, or by trading on the perils of the State. There is a reaction against compliance to which the will did not

consent; and the majority may take advantage of moments of strength to revoke what was wrung from its weakness. Emancipation was not inconsistent with the Ecclesiastical Titles Act. The scandal was, that that act should have been introduced and supported by men in whose party emancipation was regarded as a necessity, not of policy, but of principle. On this ground, however, there are many public men ready and anxious to support in Parliament the recommendations which will be made by the Committee for the freedom of religious worship and education among the Catholic paupers.

The death of Lord Campbell was followed by the elevation of Sir Richard Bethell to the woolsack, and Mr. Roundell Palmer became Solicitor-General. At his election he declared himself a supporter of the foreign policy of the government, as not exceeding the legitimate interference in favour of the liberties of nations. His political programme nearly resembled the ideas of Mr. Gladstone, and his acceptance of office adds to the influence of that statesman, and is not unlikely to exert a salutary influence upon him. In the trial of the Emperor of Austria against Kossuth for the printing of Hungarian paper-money, Mr. Roundell Palmer was selected by the Austrian government as the least likely among our first-rate lawyers to be biased by revolutionary sympathies. In addressing the Richmond electors, he spoke of the disappearance of strongly marked differences between opposite parties. The consequence was, he said, that the struggle for power was more arduous and violent. It was for the advantage of the country that a government should be reasonably strong; but the approximation of opinions militated against it. There were two kinds of Conservatism,—one was destructive, the other was common to all good Liberals. The destructive stood still, was selfish, advocated class privileges, thought every thing was as good as it should be, and disliked all change. Such Conservatism would revolutionise society. True Conservatism was progress,—that which was stationary in the world went to decay and died; that which was progressive lived and

grew. The progress of reform should be constant and steady, and on this the security and prosperity of the nation depended. The policy of the present administration was safe and progressive, and he felt it no slight honour to be connected with it.

An event which was universally felt to be a public calamity, but which none have so much reason to deplore as the Catholics, soon after gave rise to more important changes. Early in July it became known that the best of the English statesmen was sinking rapidly under a mortal disease. Lord Herbert remained in office for some weeks after all hopes of his recovery were abandoned, as the government had some difficulty in arranging the new distribution of offices that was to ensue; for Lord John Russell was to be raised at the end of the session to the House of Lords. At the time of Sidney Herbert's elevation at the end of last year, the same thing was already spoken of; but it was deemed necessary that Lord John Russell should defend his foreign policy in the House of Commons during the session, and the removal simultaneously of two secretaries of state to another place was not advisable. But when the session was drawing to a close, and a new Secretary for War was to be chosen among the Commoners, these reasons no longer availed; and on July 19th, in a debate on the annexation of Sardinia, Lord John Russell delivered his last speech in the House of Commons. He said: "With regard to the question of Sardinia, I entirely admit the importance of that island; and I have in despatches repeatedly expressed my opinion that the annexation of the island of Sardinia to France would be a great disturbance of the territorial distribution of power in Europe, and would affect the distribution of power in the Mediterranean. It may be an object of desire and ambition to an ambitious Power; but I must put in the balance the consequences, the very grave consequences, which would follow from any attempt on the part of France to annex the island of Sardinia. It is not a transaction which could take place merely between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia. It must put an end at once to any intimate alliance

between this country and France. At the same time I must say it is not my opinion that the government of the Emperor of the French will attempt to annex the island of Sardinia, seeing the grave consequences that would ensue. . . . Sir, I admit—one must admit—that in the present state of Europe, and seeing what has passed during the last three or four years, it would be very unwise in the Government of this country, very unwise also in the Parliament of this country, to rest in a blind confidence that there would be no aggressions, no annexations, no ambitious projects entertained. The Emperor of the French is very powerful. Every body sees the great power that he has. But, at the same time, if it was his intention, as I believe it is his intention, to preserve the peace of Europe and remain upon the most friendly terms with England, I am not at all sure, I cannot rest in any perfect confidence, that the state of public opinion in France, that the state of opinion in the French Chambers or in the French army, might not in a most sudden manner alter the whole policy of the Government. . . . It is a great misfortune for England, and it is a great misfortune for Europe, that such costly armaments should be kept up in time of peace; but we should not remedy that if we were to disarm, and to leave other nations to increase their preparations. I trust that no shortsighted view of our interests, no narrow spirit of saving with regard to any particular tax, will induce this country, in the present state of Europe and the world, to maintain a navy and army which are not adequate in all respects to the position we ought to occupy. Not merely the greatness, but the very safety of this country is concerned in her state of preparation."

Sir George C. Lewis became Secretary for War; Sir George Grey Home Secretary; Mr. Cardwell Chancellor of the Duchy; Sir Robert Peel, whose Liberalism contains less of true liberality than that of almost any other public man, became Irish Secretary; Mr. Layard became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for which he is at least qualified by a knowledge of foreign countries. These changes seriously damaged the Government;

but the greatest loss was the death of Lord Herbert, August 2d. He had sought relief for his failing health in the repose of the House of Lords, where he did not attempt to sustain his reputation as an orator, and had ceased during nearly the whole session to be personally before the public. As a statesman, he had no other serious fault but his popularity. The long ostracism of the followers of Peel, the obloquy which was incurred by the opponents of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and the outcry against the management of the Crimean War, his lofty spirit could easily bear. But the ease with which men were won by the charm of his manner accustomed him to aim at conciliation, and to seek the utmost gratification from his natural advantages. This was the source of that want of decision and of energy which was the gravest fault imputed to him, and which appeared still graver because the consciousness of his great faculties did not conceal from him the limits of his knowledge. He redeemed these defects by extraordinary merits. He reluctantly consented, under the influence of Mr. Gladstone, to resign his office on the Crimean inquiry; but the political union of the two men came to an end after what occurred on that occasion, and Mr. Herbert held aloof when the Tories so nearly succeeded in obtaining the services of Mr. Gladstone. Whilst Mr. Gladstone supported Lord Derby's Government with his vote, both in the division on their Reform Bill and in the division which expelled them from office, Mr. Herbert was one of the most vehement of their opponents. In consequence of this difference he made that remarkable declaration, in a speech which was soon after quoted in these pages for the truest exposition of Catholic policy, that the political ostracism of the Peelite party had not been unjust, but that the Peelites existed as a party no longer. In the administration which followed, he was the soul of that policy of armed defence and distrust of France by which he created the Volunteers, and carried, in spite of the obstinate resistance and public opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the measure for the fortification of the coasts. On foreign questions he differed widely

from his more popular colleague, and shared as little his enthusiasm for the Italian Revolution as for the despotism of Napoleon. In exact harmony with the liberality of his speeches on Catholic affairs, and with his care of Catholic interests in the administration of the army, he understood that it was the duty and the interest of England to defend the independence of the Holy See. For all these reasons he was better qualified for the first than for the second rank; and he would have been, not perhaps more successful, but more fully understood, and still more deeply esteemed, if he had become Prime Minister. It may be that no minister would have the power to do for the Church all that policy and justice require to be done on the Continent and at home; but if there was one of our statesmen who knew that duty, and would have tried to discharge it, it was the man who so distinctly foresaw, and so vigorously prepared for, impending war with France, and who knew that it would be the signal for an altered policy, and for the revival of public principles which have been too long forgotten.

Parliament was prorogued by commission August 6th. The only important paragraphs of the Queen's speech were the following:

"Her Majesty commands us to inform you that her relations with foreign powers are friendly and satisfactory, and her Majesty trusts there is no danger of any disturbance of the peace of Europe.

"The progress of events in Italy has led to the union of the greater part of the peninsula in one monarchy under King Victor Emmanuel. Her Majesty has throughout abstained from any act of interference in the transactions which have led to this result, and her earnest wish as to these affairs is, that they may be settled in the manner best suited to the welfare and happiness of the Italian people.

"The dissensions which arose, some months ago, in the United States of North America have, unfortunately, assumed the character of open war. Her Majesty, deeply lamenting this calamitous result, has determined, in common with the other powers of Europe, to preserve a strict neutrality between the contending parties.

"Her Majesty commands us to inform you that the measures adopted for the restoration of order and tranquillity in Syria, in virtue of conventions between her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, and the Sultan, having accomplished their purpose, the European troops which, in pursuance of those conventions, were for a time stationed in Syria to coöperate with the troops and authorities of the Sultan, have been withdrawn; and her Majesty trusts that the arrangements which have been made for the administration of the districts which had been disturbed will henceforward secure their internal tranquillity."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Austria and Hungary.

The problem which has occupied the efforts of the Austrian Government since February is the most complicated, the most extensive, and the most difficult that could fall to the lot of a civilised community. It is the reconstruction of a legitimate order where a long period of absolutism has crushed the institutions and broken off the traditions of history; the application of a system in harmony with the irresistible exigencies of modern opinion to a society

preserving many of the forms and much of the spirit of a remote age; and the establishment of a fair equipoise between the concentration of authority and the claims of autonomy, and between necessities of a highly developed state and the rights of dissimilar nationalities. No modern power has ever attempted so much, or has ever accomplished any one of these objects. The difficulty is increased by the coincidence that the same public calamities which have compelled the Emperor to commence the enterprise have so far lowered the prestige

of his authority as to give courage and confidence to the opponents of his design; but the real difficulty, which would make success problematical even without the Hungarian opposition, is the diversity of opinions and interests among the public men of the empire.

Since the misfortunes of 1859 and the retirement of Bach, who was identified in the public mind with the Concordat and the bureaucratic system of administration, the advanced Liberal party have risen in importance, and have regarded each successive change as a concession to their views. They represent what is emphatically understood by modern ideas. They are not democrats, and would deny that they are revolutionists. According to their theory, the government ought to be founded on the will of the people, expressed by a representative assembly elected with the lowest franchise consistent with the security of property; the nobility should sit in an Upper House, without real influence; the parliamentary majority should be supreme in the land, by means of a responsible ministry, and a highly developed system of administration. Individual liberty should be carefully protected against every authority and every limitation but that of the state; while freedom of settlement would disengage men from all local restraint, freedom of conscience would abrogate religious disabilities and ecclesiastical authority, freedom of trade would open out unrestricted competition, and remove all the antiquated and unpopular remnants of an imperfect civilisation. Centralisation would thus remain unimpaired, but controlled by Parliament. The State would lose none of its authority, but it would be exercised by the people's representatives. Local and provincial self-government, the visible action of religion, and every kind of intolerance but that which is directed against bodies accused of intolerance, are the special objects of their antipathy. These views, not very remote from those entertained in England by a party of which we may take Lord Russell as the type, prevail in the middle class in Vienna, and are defended by the majority of the newspapers. These were, until last year, the ex-

clusive organs and guides of public opinion; and since the commencement of constitutional life, the editors have become conspicuous parliamentary leaders. One of the most influential of these is Kuranda, editor of the *Ost Deutsche Post*, and a Jew; for the papers are almost entirely bought, or conducted, or written by Jews; and the influence both of their capitalists and writers is very great. Hence a particular feature of Vienna liberalism is hostility to the Church, even in her own sphere, which takes the shape of attacks on the Concordat. For the hatred which the common people feel for the Jews is as strong as in the reign of King John, and their emancipation has been retarded almost as much by the fear of an outbreak against them as by the fear of the influence they would obtain. In the course of this year their unpopularity has shown itself ominously on several occasions in Hungary, in Galicia, and at Prague. Consequently, while they are stronger in Austria than in any other country, they live nowhere in so much danger or so much alarm. The terror is constantly before them that in a revolution they would be the victims of the popular fury. Against this peril they endeavour to provide in two ways—by attacking the clergy and by attacking religion. From a demoralised and irreligious people they have nothing to fear; on the other hand, they hope to save themselves by directing popular feeling against the priesthood. For this purpose every species of calumny and ridicule is brought to bear on the priests; and the Jews reckon upon it that in a moment of revolution they will be able to lead the mob against them. For these reasons they are stronger and less unpopular in the capital than in the provinces, for the inhabitants of Vienna are the most demoralised of the Austrians, and they are moreover in league with the Jews in favour of centralisation. Of these two elements, the Viennese Liberals and the Jews, the Centralist party is composed. "I have seen," says Sainte-Foi, "some who leaned towards the future like men who wish to grasp an object; and the world applauded them, for it said: These are men of progress and of action. But they

had nothing behind them; the past humiliated them, the future flattered them, and none were more selfish than they."

A party less powerful than this, but gradually gaining ground under the influence of Hungary, is the Centrifugal party in Bohemia and the Slavonic provinces. Their head is Palacky, one of the first of living historians, and the greatest scholar of the Slavonic world. Their Parliamentary leader is Rieger. Three elements combine to make up their peculiar view. The first is a reaction against the centralisation and constant interference of the Austrian Government, which was oppressive under Joseph and Francis, but which became intolerable after the revolution of 1848 had enabled Bach to organise a new and more vigorous bureaucratic system. From this point of view the parliamentary centralisation is as hateful as the absolutist, and the predominance of a German majority as the authority of a German minister; for a special jealousy of the Germans is another element of this opinion. Bohemia maintained for centuries a contest for independence against the empire, and its princes were long the rivals of the Habsburgs. In the fifteenth century their patriotism was strengthened by the rise of a national heresy; and the memory of the Hussite days, and of the wars of extermination carried on with the Germans, is still living and powerful among them, and is the great topic of Palacky's works. Again, in the seventeenth, they renewed—with the assistance of Protestantism—the old rebellion, and gave the signal of the Thirty Years' War. The tremendous execution which followed the victory of Tilly extinguished Protestantism for a time, but made the old animosity more bitter, and there is consequently a strong Protestant feeling mixed up with the national tendencies of the Czechs. Thirdly, the Pan Slavist intrigues have been at work, and Russia gains all the sympathies that Austria loses among them. This party forms a small minority in the Reichsrath, but sympathises with Hungary.

The absolute Conservatives or anti-constitutional party, have lost the day and are no longer powerful; but they were responsible for the delay

which has proved so nearly fatal to the state. They are represented in the Reichsrath by some of the great nobles, such as Clam-Gallas, who was formerly an intense admirer of Bonapartism, and who bears much of the reproach of the disaster of Magenta. Many of them, despairing of their country, have refused to take part in the new order of things. The most distinguished of these was Prince Frederic Schwarzenberg, who published, 14th April, his farewell to public life. These men look with horror at all that modern liberalism destroys to make way for its own short-lived creations, and they discern democracy and irreligion in the wake of liberalism. A representative government, the irresistible instrument of popular opinion, the prerogative of the crown taken away, and the privileges of the various orders sequestered; the Church despoiled, insulted, and oppressed, the rights of the provinces crushed by centralisation and a new distribution of property following with distant but inevitable certainty the new distribution of power,—this is the picture of the future which drives many honourable and high-minded men to bury themselves in the ruins of the past. Among them, too, there are many to whom the words apply: "I have seen men whose mind and whose heart were turned towards the past; and the world admired them, and said, See how constant and how faithful they are. But their past had been propitious, the present was hostile to them, and the future threatening; and they threw themselves on the past as on a couch, because they were indolent, and cared only for themselves."

Equally remote from each of these fractions, a small and unpopular party stands, to whom, if the state survives, its future government will probably be committed. These are the advocates of self-government on the basis of historical tradition, the party of organism and of autonomy. They wish each province to preserve its individuality and its rights, and desire to revive every where, as far as possible, the remains of the old representative institutions, modifying them according to the altered condition of the time. They demand full municipal

liberties, and accept only so much of centralisation and unity as political necessity requires. They are not, therefore, zealous for an imperial parliament, but hold to the authority of the crown, limiting and fencing it by an improved system of provincial estates. Parliamentary government is a necessary evil, wrong in theory, founded on popular sovereignty, and closely allied to revolutionary principles. But this they deem only a reason to adapt themselves to the new circumstances, and to use the institutions they do not heartily approve for the good of the state. They are the Conservatives of the Reichsrath, small in number, and powerful only by means of a perilous coalition with the Centrifugal party, and by the rising ability and influence of Count Clam-Martinitz their leader. This distinguished man, the son of Field-marshal Clam, who, but for his early death, was designated as Metternich's successor, and of an English mother, is only thirty-five, and has come prominently forward only within the last two years. He began public life as the confidential adviser of Count Stadion, in the ministry that gave the constitution of March 1849, and many of the documents which the government issued in connection with that ill-planned and ill-fated scheme proceeded from his pen. He rose rapidly in the public service, and became civil governor of Cracow in 1856. When Bach's administration was shattered by the defeat in Italy, the Emperor sent for Clam-Martinitz, and offered him the ministry of the interior. But he refused,—in consequence, it is said, of his disagreement with Bruck,—and, determined to watch his opportunity, resigned his office in Poland. In conjunction with several of the great nobles, he set about organising a party, of which the *Vaterland* became the organ in the press, and in which he obtained the support of the houses of Lichtenstein, Schwarzenberg, and Wolkstein. His great achievement has been to convert the aristocracy from a party of resistance into partisans of a definite scheme of progress, and to commit the Austrian Conservatives to a policy of reform. Yet it is hardly conceivable that with such materials his design should succeed. He will be called upon to do battle with the

revolution, and consequently with the perpetual temptation to seek safety from democratic encroachment in stagnation, to identify change with innovation, and Conservatism with immobility. Judging from his conduct in the enlarged Reichsrath of last year, he is personally free from this tendency. By demanding the restoration of the political rights of each historic unit in the empire, he obtained the coöperation of the Hungarians, led by Count Szecheny, with the enemies of centralisation, and thus secured the majority. A minority insisted on a central parliament without provincial assemblies, and unfortunately no combination of the two views was possible. A national representation was the proper and necessary complement of that system of provincial autonomy advocated by Clam-Martinitz. But the Hungarians would not accept a scheme which gave unity to the empire, and the Liberals were opposed to the local self-government of the provinces. The result was, that constitution of October which restored local rights without saving the unity of the state, and therefore placed Hungary in an exceptional and privileged position, from which she has refused to recede. At the beginning of the restoration, the first political writer of the day undertook to show that the constitution was no security for freedom without those institutions which belong to the programme of the Austrian Conservatives. "Municipal power," says Fiévée, "and provincial power are the basis of the liberties of the monarchy. They cannot embarrass the action of the government; that is, they cannot prevent it from making peace, or from making war, or from managing and commanding the army, or from appointing to the great offices, or from balancing and conciliating the interests of the various classes of society. But they annoy the government as universal administrator . . . The municipal and the provincial power once established, and similar interests united under the name of orders, or of corporations, whether you add two Houses or recognise three estates, you will have as much liberty as the times will bear. . . . Two Houses, or what is now called the representative system, is the complement of the other institutions favourable to liberty. For my part I see no ad-

vantage in it, excepting that whenever politics speak in public they are obliged to be moral, and nothing contributes more to form the morals of a nation. . . . All public and free discussion on politics is essentially moral." Then, taking his example from Austria, he says, "If it should some day please the House of Austria to unite members of each provincial assembly in a general assembly; or if the peculiar conditions of its policy, or of its dominions, make this union appear useless or dangerous, there will be neither more nor less liberty in each province, provided each has its own assembly to defend its customs, its local laws founded on its customs, and to make itself heard by the Emperor. . . . Liberty must be secured by the provincial assemblies, which will protect their local interests, customs, and laws against the projects of a general assembly. . . . It is certain that only the establishment of provincial administrations is an insurmountable barrier against the errors of liberty, which terminate always in despotism, and sometimes in dissolution. . . . They are the only intermediate bodies that can exist in a state without the distinction of orders. The parliament is a legislative power; the tribunals a judiciary power. They are independent, and cannot therefore be intermediate. When there is nothing between the general administration and the people, there can never be either freedom or stability."

Another fraction, of no note if we consider the grouping of ideas, but of some consequence in the Reichsrath, consists of loyal cavaliers, who support the Emperor for his own sake, in the spirit of men whose ancestors have fought for the dynasty faithfully and unconditionally in every war, and who stand by it with the same fidelity in the great crisis of its existence. The chief of this party, Prince Auersperg, is President of the Upper Chamber.

With this arrangement of parties, Schmerling, who belongs properly to none of them, has to work out his scheme of February, and to carry on the great constitutional struggle with Hungary. He has to rely, out of the Reichsrath, on the bureaucracy trained by Bach, men wholly regardless of ancient traditions, familiar only

with the state as it has been reconstructed since 1848, averse to provincial rights, to self-government, and to the Concordat, but entirely devoted to the minister; secondly, on the small group of Hungarians who wish to save the constitution of the empire and to prevent a breach; thirdly, on the army, whose feelings for discipline and authority were expressed by Benedek, when he spoke with contempt of the ignorant civilians and cowardly magnates, who play into the hands of the revolution, and of the enemy against whom the army knows that it is arrayed. In the Reichsrath itself he is sure of large majorities, so long as the conflict endures between Vienna and Pesth.

The statesman on whose firmness and ability the fate of Austria depends earned his parliamentary reputation and experience at Frankfurt. When the Parliament met, he was Austrian envoy at the Diet, and speedily became the chief of the first national ministry in Germany. "He appeared," says an opponent, "at first sight, a man of a plain exterior and great calmness. To a close observer, his sharp and not distinguished features gave the impression of extraordinary cunning. The passion that flashed but rarely from his gray eye seemed to have become congealed in a coldness of manner that betrayed to his friends the consciousness of an exulting confidence, and could drive an adversary to distraction. What he said was simple in tone and gesture, but it touched the opposite party to the quick, for it seemed ever to cover a contemptuous irony; and the listener was persuaded that the speaker was filled with a profound disdain, not only for his opponents, but also for those whom he was sure of convincing. The easy, negligent tone, the nasal voice, the smooth indifference, proclaimed the far-seeing calculator." His first appearance in debate, 26th May 1848, gives a more definite notion of his parliamentary character. A conflict had occurred at Mentz, between the people and the Prussian soldiers, and the revolutionary party made use of the occurrence to vindicate the mob against the army, to vilify the Prussians, and to create a breach between them and the Austrians, by dwelling on the very differ-

ent conduct of the Austrian portion of the garrison. Schmerling turned these materials to account in a masterly way. "As an Austrian," he exclaimed, "I repudiate that praise. It has been uttered not so innocently as it pretends to be, but in order to destroy the good feeling that subsists between the Austrian and the Prussian regiments of the garrison. The object is to divide the two portions of one and the same German army. The Austrian soldier is only a German soldier, the comrade in arms of the Prussian and of every German with whom he is led, either against a foreign enemy, or for the suppression of anarchy at home. I am convinced that the Austrian troops, if they had heard their Emperor and their state insulted as Prussia is proved to have been, would have exhibited the same indignation."

The men who have led the Hungarian Diet, and are up to this moment at the head of the nation, Deak and Eötvös, are second in character or ability to no statesmen of the present day. Deak was the leader of the Opposition at Pesth in 1840, and enjoyed the highest reputation both as an orator and a lawyer. One of his opponents, Mailath, says of that period of his career that no man stood higher, that he loved his own party and respected his adversaries; and he describes him as the most consummate speaker, deficient only in passion and imagination. He goes on to say that in the reforms which Deak demanded, he went no further than the most intelligent Conservatives. His conduct in 1843 gives an idea of the strict and almost dogged attachment to legality and formal right which distinguishes his character, and explains the successes and the failures in his career. The elections of 1843 were made on the question of the taxation of the nobles. Deak declared to the electors of his county that he would not accept their mandate unless on condition of voting against the exemption of the nobles. Disturbances ensued, and the election was irregular. Afterwards a new election was made; Deak was chosen, and an instruction was carried in favour of taxation. But Deak deemed the proceedings unconstitutional, and declined the election. The conse-

quence of this moderation was, that he was outstripped by Kossuth, and lost his popularity. He was minister of justice in the first Hungarian ministry, and here again he soon retired before the extreme party. His time came when the Opposition could take its stand on Conservative and legitimate ground, and in this position he has shown himself an expert tactician.

Eötvös, like Deak, an earnest Catholic, stands high among the political writers of the day. His work on the "influence of the prevailing ideas on the state" is the best existing confutation of the theories of democratic Liberalism, and an excellent defence of the principle of the limitation of authority. Denying the sovereignty of the majority, and the omnipotence of the state, he establishes authority and liberty on the autonomy of moral individualities. The foremost of these, he argues, is the nation. As liberty is due to every corporation, as well as to every individual, and as the power of the state is limited by private rights, the same respect is due to the rights, liberties, and independence of each nationality. In a later work on "the guarantees of the power and unity of Austria," published in 1859, he demands, that the empire should be divided into three parts, a German, a Magyar, and a Slavonic state, that centralisation should be abolished, self-government revived, and the independence of nationality made the foundation of a new system. Now that he has an opportunity of acting on his theories, he is the ablest supporter of Deak's policy, and with great consistency proclaims the unity as well as the independence of nationalities, and allies his cause with that of German and of Italian unity. Both of these eminent men are sincere Conservatives and zealous enemies of revolution. They rest their case on tradition, on the continuity of right, on the history rather than the wishes of their country. Whether, in appealing to the laws of 1848, in denying the validity of every act of the government since the Hungarian War, and in making common cause with Garibaldi, Napoleon, and the *National verein*, they occupy a position which they can defend against the revolutionists, or whether

they have conceded so much that the victory must ultimately be with the most consistent arguer,—whether, in short, their principle will bear being pushed to its extreme consequences without an actual revolution, cannot long remain a problem.

The elections for the provincial assemblies were completed in the first week of April. In Hungary a large majority belonged to the extreme Opposition, who looked up to Teleky as their leader. In the German dominions a very large proportion of electors voted with the feeling that the decisive moment for the empire had arrived, and that all the resources of the state were needed to resist separation. During the elections a ministerial crisis occurred at Vienna. The statute for the organisation of Transylvania was drawn up most favourably to the Magyars, and adopted by the Emperor without the knowledge of the German ministers. They at once resigned, but a pacification was effected. The Hungarian ministers were able to hold their own against Schmerling, for the opening of the Diet made it most important at that moment not to offend Hungary. It was also the policy of Schmerling to give no provocation, and to allow the Hungarian movement to take its own course. The country was well garrisoned, but nothing was done to check the Opposition, no impediment was put in their way, and nobody appeared at the Diet to speak for Austria. In pursuance of this policy, the *Judex Curie* announced, April 3d, that the judiciary system proposed by the Hungarian Conference was adopted, and would be submitted to the Diet. The Diet was summoned to meet at Buda, which is the royal residence, and a fortress. Even the Hungarians in the ministry feared the influence which the mob would acquire if it met at Pesth. But the Hungarians insisted on Pesth. Deak declared it a matter of no consequence.

April 6th. The provincial assemblies were opened through nearly the whole of the empire. The Diet of Hungary met at Buda and adjourned to Pesth. The *Judex Curie*, Count Apponyi, in his opening speech, said that the Emperor's purpose was "to restore, secure, modify, and improve

the constitution of the land, and to bestow equal rights on all the states." The diploma of October, he said, "restored her constitution to Hungary, and conferred similar rights on the other territories." The diploma of the resignation of Ferdinand and of the Emperor's father, and the diploma of the constitution of February, were to be submitted to the Diet before they sent the representatives of the kingdom to Vienna. In the first discussion that ensued, one of the magnates demanded a Hungarian ministry. The language of Apponyi was intended to signify that the constitution had never been legally suspended, and that Hungary simply recovered her rights. But in fact the other territories had also their representative institutions, which had been for the most part dormant longer than those of Hungary, but which were in no greater need of modification, and which had never been forfeited by rebellion; which were, therefore, both formally and essentially not less valid. At Salzburg one of the ministers, Lasser, was a member of the assembly. He declared that the work in hand was the fundamental reconstruction of the state on a new model, without reference to the past, and thus justified the statement of Apponyi, and admitted the difference of principle on which the constitution of Hungary and those of the rest of the empire stood. But the Carinthian assembly, in voting an address of thanks to the Emperor, added a prayer that, in introducing the new system, no favour or exception should be allowed to any portion of the monarchy. Several of the German assemblies dwelt, in their addresses, on the unity of the empire. Some passed an address of confidence in the ministers, and in that of Upper Austria it was proposed to thank them for having induced the Emperor to grant the constitution.

The most important of the assemblies was that of Prague, where the opposition of the Czechs broke out at once, altogether independent of that in Hungary. There was even a small democratic section, which condemned the constitution as not sufficiently liberal; but this was the only instance of the kind in the whole empire. Clam-

Martinitz, who sympathised with the Bohemian movement, so far as it was hostile to absolutism and centralisation, urged the assembly to support the Emperor. Their first care, he said, ought to be to save the empire; the province would then save herself; and the only danger came from the blindness of the Hungarians. By another singular combination, Cardinal Schwarzenberg moved that the Emperor should be asked to come to Prague to be crowned King of Bohemia, which, as a victory of the Centrifugal party, was adopted unanimously, and was even acceded to by the Emperor.

A very different interest belongs to the assembly of Tyrol, where the Italian part of the population was not represented. In accordance with the principle of self-government, which was being carried out in every department, and had already been conceded to the Catholic Church, and to the Protestants of Hungary, a law was issued, April 8th, regulating the position of the Protestants out of Hungary, by which they obtained perfect equality, the right of governing their own ecclesiastical interests, access to all public appointments, and freedom from all payments to the Catholic priesthood. This was in strict conformity with the spirit of the new institutions. Religious toleration and religious liberty are essentially distinct from each other. One is a negative permission, the other a positive right. One is wrong as a principle, the other is a necessary consequence of the principles of a free government. It is quite consistent with civil liberty to refuse toleration, but it is not consistent with it to refuse self-government to a tolerated religion. For it is a part of the theory of freedom that each body in the state controls its own internal affairs. The government of a religion by the state implies the government of a part by the whole, the control of a minority by the majority, which is the contradiction of the principle of self-government. On the other hand, it is quite as true, relatively, that religious unity should be preserved where it is possible, as that liberty should be granted where it is claimed. To enforce unity where it does not exist is always disastrous to the state that attempts it.

France, Spain, and England are sufficiently impressive examples. To introduce toleration where unity is preserved is equally erroneous; for abstract toleration makes the state indifferent,—that is, atheistical,—and connects it, not with the religion of a part of the inhabitants, but with a system which is professed by none. The theory of self-government, therefore, requires, not that all religions should be tolerated, but that all tolerated religions should be free. It condemns alike exclusive protection and persecution. Against the principle of the new law the Austrian Catholics had nothing to urge; but a dispute arose which involved the question, not of religious liberty, but of provincial self-government, and the maintenance of local laws. Tyrol was always so peculiarly a Catholic country, that it was exempted from the operation of the Edict of Toleration of 1781; and when in 1859 Francis Joseph issued his patent for the regulation of the Protestant churches, he engaged to make no alteration in Tyrol without consulting the estates of the province. The law of last April was of general application, and disregarded the habits of the various countries. It was to be foreseen that difficulties would follow.

In 1848, the Parliament of Frankfurt proclaimed the liberty of religion as a fundamental law of the Confederation, adopting a formula which was drawn up by Catholic divines and canonists, and which was afterwards incorporated in the Prussian constitution, and in the Austrian constitution of 1849. Dr. Gasser, of Brixen, one of the representatives of Tyrol, spoke against the application of this law to his own province. Separated by their mountains from the rest of Germany, their pride and their strength lay, he said, in the memory of their own achievements, and in their reverence for the olden time; and the unity of religion belonged to the notion of the olden time. "I well know that the principle of the liberty of conscience is a political necessity for Germany, and I know its value; but I must demand that in extending this law to Tyrol, the peculiar circumstances of that country be taken into consideration. A single confession reigns throughout the land;

and the unity of faith is more dear to the inhabitants than the beauty of their mountains." He concluded by demanding that time should be given in order that the people might be gradually prepared for their new position, and that the change might be introduced with care and with forbearance. A deputy from Italian Tyrol contradicted this speech, and repudiated the notion that caution was needed; but the representative of Innsbruck supported Dr. Gasser.

The orator who protested at Frankfort against the disturbance of the ancient unity of faith in Tyrol is now Prince-Bishop of Brixen, and with the great authority and influence of his new position he has resisted the legislation of Vienna as he did the legislation of Frankfort. He brought forward in the Assembly at Innsbruck two motions: one for a separate Assembly for the Italian part of the principality, which had refused to join the German; the other that Protestants should not enjoy the liberty of public worship, or of holding land in Tyrol. This was voted by the Assembly, but afterwards rejected by the Emperor; and a general agitation has ensued among the people of Tyrol, which has alienated them from the dynasty and from the new institutions of the empire. In theory, the Tyrolese are undoubtedly right to oppose the introduction of new religions; but the question is, whether that principle can be admitted in a province of a free and united empire. The dispute is between autonomy and sovereignty: whether religious liberty is a constitutional, and therefore universal, principle in the state, or whether it is a subject for particular laws and local policy. In an absolute state there would be no difficulty, because the various territories, being united, not under a common law, but under a single will, may be as dissimilar as possible. Whilst the Emperor Nicholas was persecuting Latin Catholicism in Lithuania, he was protecting it in Poland; and the Polish censorship excluded or expurgated books that attacked the Church, while the Russian censorship condemned those which defended her. But in Austria the concession to the Protestants was in great measure made for the purpose of influencing the province,—namely,

for the conciliation of Hungary. The patent for the German and Slavonic provinces was a consequence of that for Hungary. It was, therefore, an imperial measure. If it could have been left to provincial arrangement, if Tyrol could be allowed to settle the question for itself, the same privilege might have been given to Hungary, where there is less ill-will between Catholics and Protestants than in almost any country, and where the problem would have been easily solved. By making the patent of toleration an act of sovereignty, the Emperor made it a principle of state, and removed it from the jurisdiction of the provincial authorities.

The immediate office of the several assemblies was to elect the representatives of the several provinces to the Lower House of the imperial Parliament, which was summoned for the 29th of April. When this was done they were prorogued. But the Hungarian Diet made no election, and spent the month of April in demonstrations of hostility to the new system; but proceeded to no important action until the Austrian Reichsrath met. The agitation was more active in the counties, where the constitution of February was declared illegal, and where the payment of taxes was refused. Deak's party did not at that time encourage the refusal of taxes, and they had not yet acquired the lead which they afterwards obtained. Meantime attempts were made by the Hungarians in the government to obtain a security that, if the laws of 1848 were conceded, they would be revised. But the government in general held aloof, and waited till the Diet should take a decisive step.

May 1st. The Reichsrath, which had met on the 29th of April, was opened by the Emperor. As the representatives of a large portion of the empire did not appear, the assembly was not addressed by the Emperor as the council of the empire; and he had not appointed to the House of Peers the contingent of those states which had refused to elect deputies. At Vienna the imperial speech made a favourable impression, and the debates were followed with the warmest interest. The great question of the day was started at once: on the 2d of May a Centralist deputy asked the

minister to explain his position and his intention towards Hungary. Schmerling proposed to reply, if required, on a future day. The Hungarian Chancellor, Vay, offered his resignation, and the result was that no answer was ever given. On the 3d, the other great topic—of the relation of unity to autonomy—was brought forward by the Centrifugal party. They demanded that in each committee members should be selected from each part of the empire, and that the provinces should continue to be individually represented in the Assembly. This made the deputies representatives, not of the nation, but of their constituents; and made the Reichsrath the council, not of the State, but of the several provinces. It cut off the constitutional element in the government, and reduced it to a modification of the old system of estates. Burke has laid down on this subject the natural law of all constitutional governments. "Government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments? . . . Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest,—that of the whole; where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." "If we do not permit our members to act upon a very enlarged view of things, we shall at length infallibly degrade our national representation into a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency. When the popular member is narrowed in his ideas, and rendered timid in his proceedings, the service of the crown will be the sole nursery of statesmen." Clam-Martinitz urged that the demand should be granted, not on principle, but as a provisional regulation, in order to avoid the discussion of the question involved in it.

Meanwhile the Hungarian Diet was considering the mode in which it should announce the rejection of the constitution of February, and of the constitutional unity of the empire. The majority of the deputies, led by the pardoned traitor Teleky, were anxious for a breach with Austria, in hopes of forming an independent state which, with the annexed territories, would be nearly equal in population to Spain or Prussia. The moderate party, led by Deak, wished for the personal union with Austria, and sought by concessions to obtain the coöperation of the other. Teleky's antecedents were an obstacle in the way of a coalition with men who were the defenders of historic rights. His position towards the Emperor, to whom he had personally sworn fidelity; to the emigration, whose designs he had undertaken to execute; to the moderates, whose policy secured to Hungary the sympathy of Europe, and with whom he could not join,—was untenable and desperate. On the 8th of May he committed suicide. Such was the feeling in Hungary that the clergy joined in patriotic demonstrations over the grave of the rebel who was a suicide and a Protestant.

On the 13th Deak proposed his address to the Emperor. He demanded a Hungarian ministry and the whole legislation of 1848, the right of voting soldiers and money, the restoration of the dependent territories, the withdrawal of all decrees subsequent to the revolution. "We will share with none but our own king the right of making laws for Hungary. Our government and administration can be dependent on nobody but the King of Hungary, and cannot be joined to that of other countries. We will therefore take no part in the Reichsrath, or in any imperial representation. . . . We are only ready to enter from time to time into communication with the constitutional nations of the hereditary lands, as one independent free people with another." These demands amounted to independence. Deak could not stop short of the laws of 1848, for he required a constitutional security against the arbitrary system of bureaucratic administration, and against the democratic centralisation of the Austrian liberals. If he had appealed to the constitution before 1848, he

would not have had the nation with him, and he would have demanded an impossibility; for the revolution destroyed the whole social fabric on which the old Magyar system rested, and there were no materials to reconstruct it. The constitution of 1848 was revolutionary and impracticable; but it afforded a basis on which modifications might be introduced.

May 16th. The opposite party moved a resolution as an amendment to the address. In substance, Deak's plan contained all they wanted; but they wished it to be in such a form as should make it an act of hostility to the crown. Eötvös spoke on the following day. The February constitution, he said, was impracticable, and no general constitution was to be desired. The connection of one part of the empire with the Germanic confederation rendered the political union of Austria impossible, while the union of Austria would render the national unity of Germany impossible. The claim of Hungary is founded on the right of national, not of political unity, and is therefore a common cause with the unity of Italy and of Germany. This was in reality more than Deak had offered; or at least it was more clear and more definite. On these principles it is obvious that the independent Hungarian government would refuse troops and taxes for the defence of Venetia, and the German provinces were made over to the future state which is to be the result of the unity of Germany. So great a concession to their views ought to have disarmed the extreme party; for Eötvös practically surrendered the historic-conservative basis of his policy. Admitting the right of each nationality to govern itself as a political unit, he preferred the natural physiological definition of the nation to the historical and political definition. His nation is the product of the family, not of the state. This is the fullest negation of history and tradition, and a thoroughly democratic idea. The result of the long discussion was, that a portion of the party of the resolution did not vote, and the address was determined on by a majority of 155 to 152, on the 5th of June. On the discussion in detail, however, Deak was defeated. It was resolved that the act of abdication should not be consi-

dered until the laws of 1848 were restored. Francis Joseph was therefore not regarded as King of Hungary, and his title was not given to him. In this form the address was adopted, June 16th, in the Lower Chamber, and on the 20th by the magnates.

June 30th. The Emperor replied that he would not receive the address as it stood, and demanded that it should be again presented to him with the alteration of the form. The rescript was moderate in tone, and so conclusively right that it proved a blow to the advanced party in Hungary, who had carried the change against Deak. On the 2d July, Rechberg communicated the rescript to the Upper House, where it was received with acclamation; and Count Hartig at once carried an address of thanks to the Emperor for his fidelity to the constitutional unity of the state. Schmerling read the rescript in the second Chamber, where it was well received by all but the Poles and Bohemians; and when the resolution of the other House was known, a similar address was voted.

These addresses of the Reichsrath, in support of the constitution against the Magyars, were equivalent to declarations of confidence in the minister who is the author of the statute of February. Schmerling obtained the zealous and indignant support of the Austrians by the patience with which he allowed the schemes of the Hungarians to ripen and to display themselves. All who cared for constitutional government in Austria put themselves on his side; and he is able to reckon on the national spirit of the dominant race, on the idea of the empire, and on the representative principle to maintain the struggle. The policy of governing one part of the monarchy by the other is dangerous and unsound; but it has become, by the October constitution, the only resource by which the unity of the state can be preserved.

On the same day Schmerling said, that, although the ministers were virtually responsible, no law on the subject could be presented in the Reichsrath until it had obtained its full competency, and embraced the whole empire. This speech, which made the definitive establishment of the constitutional system dependent on the defeat of the Hungarian move-

ment, gave a further power to the ministry; for it enlisted on their side, not only the cause of unity, but the cause of liberty. At the same time, the great military commands in Hungary were given to the most resolute and devoted officers that could be found.

July 4th. The Poles and Bohemians, who had refused to support the address, explained that it was not from disloyalty, but because no opportunity had been allowed them of making their reservations and conditions in favour of the claims of nationality.

At Pesth, the party of Deak, whose ascendancy was confirmed by the rejection of the address, on the ground of a change which had been made in their despite, carried the required modification. On the 5th of July, even the loudest advocates of the resolution consented silently to the motion. From this moment, however, the councils of the Hungarians ceased to be divided, and all combined in support of a common policy. But the feeling in the country was not so unanimous as that of the Diet. The new national system for the administration of justice, and the retirement of the German bureaucracy, had deprived the people of the unpopular but salutary order and regularity which was the merit of Bach. There was much disturbance and disorder, and large interests were injured by the agitation. The organ of the moderate party complained that there was so much disaffection towards the movement, that the Emperor would have no difficulty in finding instruments to carry out a different policy. In the Croatian assembly, when the news arrived that the address had been refused by the Emperor, a member proposed to suspend the discussion relative to annexation with Hungary, and it was replied that the Magyars would doubtless retire from their false position, and make the necessary alteration.

On the 13th July, the Assembly decided in favour of separation from Hungary.

July 8th. The address was presented to the Emperor at a private audience by the Presidents of the two Houses of the Diet, Count Apponyi and Coloman Ghiczy. Francis Jo-

seph promised a speedy reply; but in the course of conversation he informed the deputation that the demand of a Hungarian ministry could not be conceded. "I cannot govern one empire," he said, "with two ministries."

The German and the Hungarian ministers separately drew up a reply to the address. Whilst the deliberation was going on, the Hungarian Chancellor, who had countersigned the rescript by which the address had been originally returned, was in negotiation with the leaders at Pesth to find a common basis of agreement. At the same time he ordered that the military should be called in to enforce the payment of taxes where it was refused. He proposed a draft reply substantially in harmony with the ideas of Deak, by which the conduct of the army and the administration of finance were alone reserved to the Emperor; and the Hungarians were requested to overlook the acts of the last twelve years, in consideration of the Emperor's willingness to grant oblivion of the events of 1848 and 1849. The passage concerning the disposal of the army was probably directed against an obvious consequence of the theories of Eötvös, that the Diet might make conditions as to the purpose for which the Hungarian troops should be employed.

Vay's plan was withdrawn, and one drawn up by Szechen substituted for it by the Hungarians. Count Szechen is, of all the magnates, least a Hungarian patriot, and most an imperial statesman. The seat of his ambition is at Vienna; the aim of his career to rule the destinies, not of his country, but of Austria; and some believe that he will be Foreign Minister, if an administration should be formed by Clam-Martinitz. He it was who compelled Count Rechberg to draw up the statute of October, and both he and Vay assisted to draw up that of February; but he alone signed it. His colleague managed to be out of the way at the time. Szechen's draft was naturally more conservative and more statesman-like than Vay's, which was a complete capitulation. It insisted upon the real union of Austria and Hungary as distinguished from the personal union; but it conceded the laws of 1848, and made no

mention of the statutes of October and February. This scheme was rejected on the 13th July by the German ministers. For a moment an attempt appears to have been made by Schmerling and Szechen to come to an agreement on a plan by which a ministerial capacity should be given to the great offices of the Hungarian crown, the Chancellor, the *Judex Curiae*, and the *Tavernicus*. But no arrangement was possible on the conditions which Deak had made the rule of all the Hungarian patriots. The issue was on both sides a ministerial question. Vay wished to stand by his first scheme, but he consented to adopt that of Szechen; and when it was rejected, they both resigned.

July 17th. The Emperor adopted the reply that was drawn up by Schmerling, and accepted the resignation of the Hungarian ministers. The other great dignitaries, Apponyi and Mailath, were induced to remain in office. Count Forgach, the Governor of Bohemia, became Chancellor of Hungary, Count Maurice Esterhazy succeeded Szechen. Both these changes were injurious to the government. Forgach, though a Hungarian, served in 1849 against the revolution, whilst his predecessor Vay had been sentenced to imprisonment for sedition. Szechen was identified with the statute of October, which conferred on Hungary its new independence. His successor was only known in the Austrian diplomacy.

July 22d. The imperial rescript was communicated to the Diet at Pesth. The position of Schmerling is, that the states of the empire are united together, and that one part cannot alter the fundamental laws without general consent. The laws of 1848, putting Hungary in an exceptional position, were invalid, because they were inconsistent with the character of a constitutional state. This was felt at that time; and on the 1st of May 1848, the estates of Lower Austria (Vienna) protested against the union of Transylvania with Hungary, as involving the dissolution of the empire. If Austria is a constitutional empire, the sovereign cannot deal with one part of it, except with the consent and for the advantage of the whole. If the Hungarian claims are granted, the constitution must

fall to the ground. Whilst the Hungarian statesmen are forced into a coalition with the revolution, the Austrian Government is obliged to rely on the party of parliamentary centralisation. The theory of nationality puts Eötvös in the wrong, and the theory of centralisation is the error of Schmerling. The Hungarians are wholly justified in their resistance to the Centralists, but that is equally the position of the party of self-government, who are free from the taint of revolution. The Austrians are right in insisting upon unity, but this is likewise the view of Clam-Martinitz, who does not push unity to uniformity, or rest concentration in administrative centralisation. In this conflict of two extreme principles, the right is practically with those whose victory is necessary for the preservation of the state, and the failure of Schmerling would be a far greater calamity than the loss of Lombardy. But the victory would be too dearly bought by the supremacy of that form of Liberalism which is the common enemy of the Austrian and of the English state. Schmerling has exhibited only his great abilities in political management and tactics, and is assuredly the right man for the crisis. But the state will be ruined by the principle of its constitution, if the party which combines progress with tradition and unity with self-government fails to obtain the lead.

August 8th. Deak's address in reply to the imperial rescript was unanimously adopted, and the adoption of the Austrian constitution imperatively refused. The Primate had spoken in favour of conciliation, but the address was adopted by the magnates on the 10th. It repeats with great fullness the old arguments, seeks by an appeal to Bohemia to create a diversion against the Emperor, denies the legality of the acts of the government in Hungary, and defies its power. On the 14th, the address was presented to the Emperor. So far the conflict has proceeded between self-government and centralisation, and between constitutionalism and the theory of nationalities.

August 21st. When it became known at Pesth that the Diet would be dis-

solved, a protest was proposed by Deak, and adopted by both Houses. Its purport was, that the Diet could not be legally dissolved, according to the law of 1848, until it had discussed the accounts of the past, and the budget of the current, year. This had not been done, and could not be done so long as the Diet had not recovered all its rights, or so long as there was no Hungarian ministry. Further, the law requires that a new Diet shall meet within three months of the dissolution of the last. Against the breach of all these laws and privileges the Diet solemnly protested, declaring that it stood by the old laws, but could not resist force: "Our only weapons," said Deak, "are the law and the justice of our cause; and leaning upon them we confront the weapons of force. It is an old saying, and one which, as history shows, hardly ever deceives, that in the end victory is always with the just cause. On this we must build our hopes. In order safely to occupy that ground, we must not and cannot ever, under any pretext, abandon the footing of perfect legality, for that is the only field which, without armed power, and against armed power, we shall be able to maintain. . . . I trust that the local authorities and the individual citizens will faithfully follow the example of the Diet. While holding fast by the basis of the law, abiding by it, and never departing from it, they will neither grant nor obey any thing which is against the law, or which deviates from it in any way whatever." Thus the eloquent leader of the Hungarian nation takes his stand against the improvements introduced by the imperial government on the very ground that was taken by the absolute Legitimists, or in England by the Tories, against every reform. This would be utterly inconsistent with his former career, if we did not learn from his more speculative and less diplomatic colleague Eötvös that the appeal to law is only an artifice for the realisation of the revolutionary idea of the unity of nationalities.

August 22d The imperial commissary brought the rescript dissolving the Diet, and announcing that a new Diet would probably be summoned in six months. In the debate on the protest, the Tavernicus, Count Mai-

lath, said that he believed means of reconciliation might yet be found; and he acknowledged that the laws of October and of February were inconsistent.

The imperial message to the Reichsrath on the dissolution was well received, and addresses were carried in both Houses in acknowledgment and support of the policy. The message points out the complete disorder and anarchy which, in great part of Hungary, has been the result of the measures of the Diet. Whereas Hungary alone had forfeited its privileges by the revolution of 1848, which was a thorough breach of law and of tradition, Hungary received by the new measures more than any other part of the monarchy. But the incorporation of the institutions of that country in the new constitutional system given to the whole empire is necessary for the unity, the credit, and the parliamentary government of Austria.

The War in America.

For six weeks after Mr. Lincoln's installation at Washington, it was doubtful whether the secession of the South would be accomplished without war. The Border States, especially Virginia, were actively employed in preserving peace, and the Government of the United States were not prepared with a policy to meet a contingency of which there was no example in their history. But the Seceding States never for a moment wavered in their determination; they refused to consider any terms of compromise, and sought not the redress of injuries or the alteration of laws, but separation from the North. When provisions were running short at Fort Sumter, it was resolved that an attempt should be made to furnish the garrison with supplies, in order that the Union should not submit to outrage or appear to surrender its rights. On the appearance of the Federal fleet, the Confederates commenced the bombardment of the fort; the Government at Washington had not decided on war, the fleet took no part in the defence, and Anderson surrendered, April 13th.

April 15th. Mr. Lincoln issued a

proclamation calling for a militia force of 75,000 men in order to retake the fortresses and property of the United States, and "to suppress combinations" in the South. At the same time he summoned an extraordinary Session of Congress to meet on the 4th of July. Though this was in fact a declaration of war, the force demanded was manifestly inadequate to the task of subduing the Southern States, and the President was altogether ignorant of the magnitude of the enterprise on which he was engaging. It soon became apparent that he had not foreseen the effect which the fall of Fort Sumter would have upon the States. The demand for men was addressed to all, and each State had to come to a decision. The avowal of a policy of coercion turned against the Union the central Slave States, that were not inclined to join the Plantation States. Missouri refused to supply troops. Kentucky refused likewise, and declared herself neutral. Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, successively joined the Southern Confederation. Above all, the State which had seemed for a time to hold the balance between North and South, and had been the head-quarters of negotiation, and which must inevitably become the seat of war, declared against the Union, blocked up the Naval Dockyard at Norfolk, and seized the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry. But Virginia was herself divided. The western portion of the State is not interested in the slave trade, and is so nearly surrounded by the States of the Union, that it had strong inducements to go with the North. This policy became by degrees more certain and more definite, and when the decisive moment came, many western counties declared that they did not follow the remainder of the State. Thus by a strange complication the revolution which has been made on behalf of the sovereign unity of the several States has in one conspicuous instance led to the destruction even of that authority and territorial unity which every party concedes to each State. And this division of opinion in Virginia likewise explains why she was so eager to intervene between the opposite parties, and to

prevent a breach. The position of Maryland was even more peculiar. For Maryland, which is famous in history as a Catholic colony, and as the first place where religious liberty was established in the modern times, is the most northerly Slave State, and neither a great producer nor a great consumer of slave labour. Her interests, therefore, are in no degree bound up with those of the South; but the instincts of all slave-owners are against a government of Abolitionists, and politically the sympathies of Maryland are against democratic absolutism. Hence Baltimore, which of all the great American cities is nearest to the capital, has been distracted by the meeting of the hostile views. The State voted indeed by a majority in favour of the Union, but the vote was accompanied by an earnest appeal to the President to desist from coercive measures. The feeling in Baltimore itself was strong against the Government. The Federal troops as they marched through the city were attacked, and blood was shed; the bridges were broken by the people, and the railway cut up. For some time the troops had to go from Philadelphia to Washington without touching Baltimore. At length the disturbance was so great that severe measures were taken against the Secessionists, and a military government was established. As large masses of troops were concentrated about Washington, the country parts of Maryland were quiet, but their loyalty to the Union has become more and more doubtful.

But the North-Eastern States vigorously responded to the President's call. Massachusetts, the home of theoretical, *doctrinaire* abolitionism, and on former memorable occasions the foremost upholder of the centralist principles, through her great representative, Daniel Webster, was the most prompt of all in sending regiments to protect the capital. Pennsylvania and Ohio followed, with thirty regiments. New York hesitated for a moment, and doubts were entertained whether the exporting interest would not submit to the power of cotton; but this did not last long. The resources of the Empire State, with its population of near four millions, and its enor-

mous wealth, were tendered with enthusiasm to the Federal Government, until at last, when the stake was forgotten in the excitement of the contest, and interest was silenced by passion, New York became the centre of the movement on behalf of the Union. It is a curious, though perhaps at this time an idle, speculation whether at some future day the great city, which is rich and strong enough to rule the Union, may not become the seat of government. Washington was an artificial and sentimental creation; it has never thriven, and it is likely to become a frontier town on an insecure frontier, and within sight of a threatening neighbour. In a long war it will be a very bad basis of operations, and if the Union is ultimately divided, it will become insupportable to Federalists to govern the Northern half from the former capital of a greater confederacy. Whatever the military issue of the war may be, there can be no doubt as to its constitutional results. Those who come after Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, and General Scott, will exercise a less extensive, but certainly a far greater authority than their predecessors in office. The power of a government that has waged a great war, commanded an army of 500,000 men, introduced a heavy system of direct taxation, and created a national debt of European proportions, belongs to a totally different category than that which was jealously conceded to Washington, and which his successors down to Buchanan have only increased by corruption and by servility. This augmentation of the central power will be the result of the principle of pure democracy and of the absolute supremacy of the people, for that is the question at issue between the North and the South. Consequently the increased power will require an increased control. It would be inconsistent with the democratic principle, which is the mainspring of the war, that the state should be allowed to separate itself from the nation, and that the government should have a will distinct from that of the people. Hitherto the people have exercised their power over the executive by the right of election. But the security that the man of their

choice would continue the organ of their policy consisted only in the mediocrity of his powers, and in the hope of reelection. Even this last security has been given up by common consent, as is seen from Mr. Buchanan's self-denying declaration, and from the provision in the Constitution of Montgomery. During his occupancy of the White House, the President is actually inviolable and beyond control. In the desolate scene of his authority there is not even the constitutional restraint of a mob. In this remoteness from the public view there is something autocratical and suspicious. It has been one of the characteristics of European absolutism that it could not govern from a capital, unless it was a military despotism. The Escurial, Versailles, Potsdam, are common signs of this general truth, and the people became conscious of it when they brought Lewis XVI. to Paris. Such power as the United States Government will in future possess cannot, in a democracy, be trusted out of sight, or out of reach, of the real sovereign. There is much to make it likely that the future capital will be one of the great cities, and it is hardly conceivable that any city would dispute the prize with New York, which is large enough to silence jealousy, and to represent no particular interests. The vigour with which it supports the Union is peculiarly valuable, because it possesses in its large Irish population the best materials for a regular army.

The refusal of the Slave States to furnish their contingent compelled the Government to demand more than their fair proportion of men from the States that continued faithful. Here there was no difficulty in obtaining them, and numerous regiments of volunteers were immediately formed, who engaged to serve for three months. This happened in the middle of April; consequently their term of service expired in July, at the very moment when they were required to act. As a large regular army is contrary to the nature of a democracy, both on political grounds and from the inconsistency of submission to stern discipline by men who possess individual sovereignty,

the only resource is an army of volunteers serving for a very limited period. But the impatience of discipline diminishes the efficiency of the volunteers, and the officers in command at Washington placed very little reliance upon them. When hostilities commenced, and the Confederate forces occupied the line of the Potomac, the capital was for a moment exposed to a great danger. This was averted by the speedy arrival of the newly-raised regiments; but they were not fit to carry on the war, and on the 3d of May President Lincoln called for an addition of 23,000 men to the regular army. General Scott did not wish to invade the South until a powerful regular force was organised, and that would be long after the volunteers, whom the first moment of excitement had called to arms, had returned to their homes.

Meantime the Southern Congress met at Montgomery on the 29th of April. It had been elected for the purpose of accomplishing the independence of the South, and proved, therefore, most serviceable in assisting the Government to prepare means of defence. Mr. Davis in his message demanded a loan of 50,000,000 dollars, and repeated the old arguments of Calhoun to prove that secession is a constitutional right. At that time he could only announce the accession of Virginia, but shortly after the wisdom of his policy in precipitating a crisis was proved by the detachment of all the six central Slave States from the North. When Fort Sumter was attacked, Mr. Davis was the ruler of seven States, with an area of 560,000 square miles, and a population of five millions. The result of the declaration of war was to separate from the Union six more States, with an area of 315,000 square miles, and a population of six millions and a half. In consequence of this altered state of affairs, it was announced that the seat of Government would be removed to Richmond. Commissioners had already started for Europe to recommend the interests of the new Confederation to the Great Powers, and especially to England and France.

Great importance was justly attached to the opinion of this country. Regarding secession as rebellion, the

people of the North expected the support of English sympathy in their struggle, and imagined that the policy of non-interference would not prevent the exercise of our moral influence in their behalf. There was much doubt and hesitation, and considerable ignorance in England as to the nature of the dispute. Our antipathy against absolute monarchy does not extend to absolute democracy, and the vulgar and superficial Liberalism of the country was on the side of the North. The Government succeeded in preventing a discussion which was more than once pressed upon them by the partisans of the South. They recognised the rights of the South as belligerents, and proclaimed, 13th May, an entire neutrality. Undoubtedly this was the only prudent course, and it furnished no justification of the violent ill-will displayed by the Federalists against England. A war with England would have aroused a far stronger feeling than has been displayed for the preservation of the Union; and a great proportion of the Secessionists would have been rallied to its banner in the presence of a foreign foe. There were two conclusive reasons, therefore, against interference in favour of the South,—the certainty of war, and the danger of checking secession. For there is no doubt that both our interests and our political principles are on the side of the South. This was understood by Ministers; and they believed that the Secessionists were right in their interpretation of the Constitution—a point on which they may be mistaken, but which is of no importance whatever. The great difficulty of the slave question was a further reason for extreme caution in the expression of opinion; but it is only fair to say, that the Government was not carried away by a cry which would have been popular, and that their American views were in happy contradiction with the principles which Lord John Russell has laid down in his Italian despatches.

In the first week of May Washington was secure against any attack which the Confederates were then in a condition to make; but the presence of a Southern corps at Harper's Ferry, and on the heights immediately opposite the capital, was a constant menace. It was necessary for the honour of

the North, and for the permanent safety of the seat of Government, to drive the enemy from the line of the Potomac. On the 23d of May the Federalists occupied the right bank, and the Secessionists retired, still holding Harper's Ferry. Whilst the Federal troops were gradually surrounding them at this point, and whilst continual skirmishing was going on along the line of outposts, the first serious encounter took place at Great Bethel, near Richmond, on the 9th of June, and ended in the repulse of the Federalists. On the 16th Harper's Ferry was evacuated.

July 4th. Congress met at Washington, and received the President's message. In this moderate but most awkwardly written document Mr. Lincoln reviewed the events of his administration, and justified his policy. He had intended at first to use no coercive measures against secession, but to leave it to time to demolish. He "sought only to hold the public places and property not already wrested from the Government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, and the ballot-box." Fort Sumter could not be relieved before the provisions were exhausted; to remove the garrison would have been fatal to the position and claims of the Union; it was resolved, therefore, to provision it. When this determination was announced, and before it could be executed, the fort was attacked and captured. This forced the Union to try the issue of the sword; "and this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes It forces us to ask: 'Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness?' Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" Here we have the measure of the political insight of the man who, in the great crisis of America, was the ruler of the state. It is remarkable that the problem as he puts it is precisely that which was created by Protestantism.

Mr. Lincoln proceeds to give his theory of the Constitution, which certainly admits of a better defence. The Union, according to its last President, was anterior to the States composing it. The colonies formed the Union, and the Union converted them into States, giving each of them whatever of independence and liberty it has. This is the extreme logical result of the democratic theory, according to which the whole is author of the parts, and absolute master of them. In the face of such a doctrine it is obvious that state rights are the only security for freedom, and the Southern States need only admit Mr. Lincoln's as the true interpretation of the original Constitution in order to justify their secession. The conclusion of the message was a demand for 400,000 men, and 400,000,000 dollars. Congress immediately voted 500,000 men (40,000 for the regular army), and 500,000,000 dollars. Whilst the Government endeavoured by the activity of its preparations to keep pace with the demands of the party of action, and to crush the opposition of ten or eleven Western Senators, headed by Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky, whose attitude betrayed the real character of the neutrality of his State; and whilst in the valley of the Missouri scattered corps fought with little bloodshed and varied success, to determine the wavering loyalty of the Unionists,—the United States army commenced a general advance against the Secessionists.

The Appalachian range traverses Virginia in two parallel lines of hills, the Alleghanies and the Blue Ridge. The Alleghanies form on their north-western slope, which falls gradually towards the valley of the Ohio, the rich agricultural district of Western Virginia, which has followed in the present conflict the natural instinct of its geographical position. Beverly is on this side. The Blue Ridge runs parallel with the Alleghanies, and leaves Virginia at Harper's Ferry, where the Potomac cuts through it at its confluence with the Shenandoah. The country between the two lines of mountain is the great valley district of Virginia; and here, on the road from Beverly to Harper's Ferry, is the town of Winchester. On the east of the Blue Ridge, on the line

from Harper's Ferry to Richmond, is the junction of the Winchester railway, near Manassas gap, within thirty miles of Washington. The Federalists, masters of both banks of the Potomac, operated in three bodies, separated by the two ranges of hills. The key of the southern position was strategically at Manassas Junction, where troops could be easily poured in from the South; and here they had fortified themselves among thick woods, and with a deep river in their front. General Johnston was at Winchester with the corps which had evacuated Harper's Ferry, and there were several regiments beyond the Alleghanies. The task of the Federalists was to clear Western Virginia of these troops, to drive back Johnston, and then to fall on the enemy at Manassas. On the 12th and 13th of July General McClellan attacked the Secessionists near Beverly, repulsed them after very little resistance, and made himself master of North-Western Virginia. The military importance of this decided success was diminished by the fact that the Southern force was already in full retreat on Winchester. On the 17th General Patterson, who commanded a force of 20,000 Federalists at Harper's Ferry, advanced into the valley of Virginia, threatening to cut off Gen. Johnston from Manassas. At the same time the main army, under General M'Dowell, advanced from its position on the heights opposite Washington, pillaging and destroying as they went: "to the horror of every right-minded person," says the General with apparent irony, "several houses were broken open, and others were in flames, by the act of some of those who, it has been the boast of the loyal, came here to protect the oppressed and free the country from the domination of a hated party." On the 18th he had his first encounter with the enemy at Bull's Run, the stream that covered their position, and his troops were repulsed. A flag of truce was sent for the dead and wounded, but was not admitted by the Southern officers into their lines. Meantime the President compelled General Scott to give M'Dowell orders to attack, and on the 20th the enemy's position was reconnoitred. All day long the trains

were heard running into Manassas Junction, and the Federal commander knew that the encounter of the 18th had given the alarm, and that Johnston had escaped Patterson without firing a shot, and effected a junction with Beauregard and Lee. General Patterson had been unable to attack him, for at that very moment fifteen of his regiments declared that their time of service had expired, and refused to go into battle. For the same reason M'Dowell's attack was unsuccessful. He advanced early on the 21st July with the intention of turning the left of the enemy, who came out of their lines to meet him. Two hours after the firing began regiments of volunteers began to march away, as their time was up, but M'Dowell kept up the fight until late in the day, when his army became disorganised and fled. The loss was under 1500 men. Some corps of European troops covered the rear, and there was no pursuit. The officers made two vain attempts to rally the army, and at 11 o'clock at night Washington was filled with fugitives from the field of battle thirty miles off. The victory was not followed by an advance, and the Southern generals seem to have been ignorant of the extent of their success. Congress immediately voted 80,000 more men, and there was a threat that they would proclaim the emancipation of the slaves. The defeat occurring at the moment when many thousands of three months' men were leaving, seriously damaged the position of the North. In the Southern army, on the contrary, all the troops are engaged to serve as long as the war lasts. There was a contrast in the manner in which the news was received which shows the difference of character of the two parties. At the North there were recrimination, extraordinary excitement, and the utmost exaggeration. The responsibility for the advance was repudiated by the commander-in-chief, and his own plan of operations has been published. He designed to spend the summer in making the army efficient, and then to invade the South on the line of the Mississippi, whilst the fleet maintained a strict blockade. But he was not allowed to carry out his intention. "There are gentlemen in the

Cabinet," he says, "who know much more about war than I do, and who have far greater influence than I have in determining the plan of the campaign. . . . I shall do, or attempt, whatever I am ordered to do; but they must not hold me responsible. . . . I have lived long enough to know that human resentment is a very bad foundation for a public policy." McDowell was succeeded in the command by McClellan, and Patterson by Banks. In Western Virginia Resencranz pursued the success of McClellan, whilst in Pennsylvania a disturbance arose among the disbanded militia, which was calmed with difficulty.

The President of the Southern Confederation had arrived from Richmond on the day of the battle in time to take the command of the centre. The despatch in which he announced his victory on a hard-fought field was remarkable for the absence of triumph and exultation, and it was received by the Richmond Legislature in the spirit in which it was written. Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, after reading the announcement of the victory that had been gained, went on to say: "But it has been at a cost that will bring sorrow into many families, wet with burning tears the cheeks of many widows and orphans, and into many happy homes bring grief and desolation; and I presume, sir, Congress will be little disposed on such an occasion to go on with their usual business." He then moved three resolutions. The first, "That we recognise the hand of the Most High God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing Sabbaths, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance." Secondly, "That we deeply deplore the necessity which has washed the soil of our country with the blood of so many of our noble sons, and that we offer to their respective families and friends our warmest and most cordial sympathies." The third resolution provided for the wounded; and then Congress adjourned. All our information concerning the Southern

States comes through the North, and is very scanty. It may be doubted whether this is a disadvantage to them.

The natural history of confederations is so little known, that it may throw some light on the events in America to recall the characteristic points in the similar movement which took place not many years since in the Swiss cantons. The Swiss Radicals, like the Republicans in the United States, maintain the principle of the absolute right of majorities over each separate canton, and over every corporation. But, in fact, the theory that a minority has no rights which the majority may not violate or abolish, is equivalent to the right of might. They were therefore perfectly justified, on their own principles, in repudiating the will of the legal majority when it was against them: what they could carry by a vote they invested with the authority of law; when the vote was against them they made a tumult, upset the government, and carried their measures. The organised insurrection of the free corps accordingly became a regular institution in the constitutional existence of Switzerland, and revolutions were an instrument of government. That the Catholic Church would be hated by a party of this kind is not merely to be gathered from their having summoned Strauss and Zeller, the ablest of the German Atheists, to professorships, in their universities. The Church has rights which are inviolable, and teaches the moral duty of respecting the rights of others. For political as well as religious reasons, therefore, her existence was intolerable to the Radicals. In Aargau the Catholics were oppressed; a strong force came from Berne to put down their resistance, and in the presence of a large Radical army the abolition of the monasteries was decreed. The Diet declared the act illegal, but the victors were too strong to submit. In opposition to these proceedings, the zealous Catholics of Lucerne determined to call in the Jesuits. The opposition of the moderate party was overruled, and the decree carried, 24th October, 1844, in spite of the warnings of the Secretary of State, whom the events which followed and fulfilled his prophecy drove into exile;

and who has since exercised, under Baron Bach, a powerful Catholic influence in the ministry of the interior at Vienna. "You are kindling," he said, "a fire among the people that will not die out, and will become the occasion of political intrigues and agitation that will keep our people in constant disturbance. Bring in the Jesuits, and you throw open to our enemies a vantage ground they would otherwise never obtain, where we shall be compelled to be always in arms against them, and where we cannot reckon on the support of our political friends." Up to this moment the European powers had sustained the Catholic cantons, and England had threatened the Swiss with the revocation of their neutrality, if they broke through the treaties to which the Catholics appealed. Metternich held the same language, but he did all he could to prevent the admission of the Jesuits. "The agitation against them," he said, "would be a pretext for other purposes, and would end in civil war." But the leader of the extreme party at Lucerne, Joseph Leu, was resolute. "The Radicals," he said, "love evil and hate good; they hate nothing more than the Jesuits; we cannot, therefore, do better than send for them."

Before long Leu was murdered in his bed, and a free corps marched against Lucerne. A distinguished Swiss officer who was then residing in the town has described, in an account of these transactions, his feelings on that occasion. "Without sharing the prejudices which pursue the Society, I thought the decree of the Great Council, which admitted them into the canton of Lucerne, untimely and unwise The Jesuits were not a cause, but a welcome occasion, for attacking central Switzerland. But for their admission it would have been impossible for Radicalism ever to have awakened such a fanatical spirit amongst the Protestant population against their peaceable fellow-citizens. It was most imprudent to give the enemy a standard round which they could rally I was not a Lucerner; I was bound by no positive obligation; my life, my military reputation, the existence of my family, were at stake, and it was very doubtful whether

these sacrifices would not be made in vain. But on which side was the right? Of that there could be no doubt, for those theories by which the minority must subject itself to the majority when that is radical, whilst in the opposite case the radical minority may take up arms,—these theories are too bald for me."

And so this honourable soldier accepted a command, and saved Lucerne. We shall not be misunderstood when we say that the Jesuits play the same part in the history of the dispute between Catholic and Radical Switzerland that belongs to slavery in the North-American contest. They were already tolerated in Friburg, and those who responded to the call of Lucerne were only a carriageful. But the self-government of the Southern States and of the Catholic cantons was as well worth fighting for as the twenty shillings of Mr. Hampden.

"Where the law is ruled over, and without authority, in that state," says Plato (*Laws*, iv. 7), "I see ruin at hand; but where it is master of the government, and the government the servants of the law, there I see safety, and all the good things the gods bestow on states."

As the Diet ended by approving of the suppression of the monasteries, and as new invasions of free corps were announced, the seven Catholic cantons threatened to secede from the Confederation, and formed a league among themselves to protect each other from the violation of their territory or of their Federal rights. The answer to this was, as in America, that the Diet might have been wrong, but that it could not be said not to have been competent. As this did not convince the Catholics, an army of 100,000 men was set on foot against them, encouraged by Lord Palmerston and the English *chargé d'affaires*, Sir Robert Peel, and the command was given to General Dufour, an old imperial officer and a friend of Lewis Napoleon. The *Journal de Genève* says, "Our respected fellow-citizen, Colonel Dufour, is placed in a very painful position by his appointment as general of the Federal troops. He disapproves, as much as we do, of the war he is to conduct. He has said so to every body, before and since his appointment; but he deems it his

duty as a soldier and servant of the Confederation to obey the call, and to make this grievous sacrifice."

After a short campaign the Catholics were defeated, and their league dissolved. While the analogy in principle is perfect, it must be observed that there is this difference between the policy of the Sonderbund and that of the Secessionists, that the former were ready to give way, provided their rights were secured, whilst the latter have sought independence unconditionally, not as the alternative of redress. Soon after these events a politician, who has never swerved in his love of freedom, though not always equally successful in defining it, Count de Montalembert, delivered, in the discussion of the Swiss question in the Chamber of Peers, the most eloquent of his speeches.

"The fight in Switzerland has not been for or against the Jesuits, for or against the national sovereignty; but for you and against you. It has been a fight for savage, intolerant,

irregular liberty, against a tolerant, regular, legal liberty, of which you are the defenders and the representatives in the world I speak before the representatives of social, regular, and liberal order that has been defeated in Switzerland, and is menaced throughout Europe by a new invasion of barbarians Last year there was a crime committed by absolute monarchies: it is committed this year by pretended Liberals, who are but tyrants of a worse kind. Then, as now, what have we seen?—the abuse of force, the suppression of freedom, of right, by a brutal and impious violence, the violation of sworn faith, the superiority of numbers raised into a dogma, and falsehood serving as a weapon and an ornament to violence The crime of last year (the incorporation of Cracow), a crime of force, was committed in the name of force. This year it is a crime of despotism, with the addition of hypocrisy, committed in the name of freedom."



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